classical theory criminology essay

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Classical criminology.

Classical criminology usually refers to the work of 18th-century philosophers of legal reform, such as Beccaria and Bentham, but its influence extends into contemporary works on crime and economics and on deterrence, as well as into the rational choice perspective. The entire range of social phenomena can be understood more or less accurately using models of economic transactions and the assumption that people make rational choices between opportunities to maximize their own utility. This was a foundational assumption of classical criminology.

I. Introduction

Ii. rational choice theory and get-tough policies, iii. classical and rational choice theorists and their heirs, iv. recent studies, v. further perspectives on deterrence, vi. costs and benefits: the economic mod, vii. crime, self-control, and patterns of influence, viii. conclusion.

IX. Bibliography

Classical criminology usually refers to the work of 18th-century philosophers of legal reform, such as Beccaria and Bentham, but its influence extends into contemporary works on crime and economics and on deterrence, as well as into the rational choice perspective. The entire range of social phenomena can be understood more or less accurately using models of economic transactions and the assumption that people make rational choices between opportunities to maximize their own utility. This was a foundational assumption of classical criminology. Sociological theory viewed crime through economic models, and this assumption is called rational choice theory. For criminologists, rational choice theory has origins in sociological theoretical thought and in various perspectives on economics and markets, but, more prominently, its influences are found in the classical school of criminology.

Drawing on the classical contention that man is a calculating creature, rational choice criminology begins with the assumption that behaviors of groups and individuals will reflect attempts to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Theorists in this tradition hypothesize how varying conditions shaping the payoff of an endeavor in combination with varying utilities and desires will contribute to aggregate and individual levels of crime. Most adherents agree that the utilities, or desirability, of activities are varying and subjective, so that crime may have attraction for some people that is not seen by others. There also is widespread agreement that the strength and quality of individual or group preferences can be taken into account in studying the occurrence of criminal behavior. Therefore, in criminology rational choice theory usually is a variant of expected utility theories and portrays the process of considering (or ignoring) criminal opportunities as part of a rational calculation based in part on subjective assessments wherein the expected costs and benefits of actions are considered.

The fundamental assumptions and methods associated with rational choice theory and its classical predecessor undergird a great deal of modern criminology, but its theoretical proponents and defenders have been in and out of fashion throughout criminology’s history. The perspective fell from favor in the eyes of many criminologists in the last several decades in part because of its resonance with audiences prepared to “get tough” on crime through mass imprisonment and in part because it was seen as an attack on sociological, psychological, cultural, and structural explanations. It was often portrayed as a reductionist and simplistic theory due to the fact that proponents often emphasized the most obvious costs and benefits of crime commission, such as monetary payoff versus terms of imprisonment. Moreover, its foundational assumptions sometimes are critiqued for being so broad as to be meaningless. In very recent years, however, the theory has attracted investigators drawn by its potential for making clear sense of why people commit crime and its ability to communicate the theoretical reasons behind research results to any audience. In contemporary forms, it also can conveniently integrate structural and perceptual models of offending, and the perspective easily makes sense of the use of a wide array of variables from multiple levels of analysis. The rational choice framework has great capacity for incorporating knowledge and techniques garnered from across the social sciences, because its central premises are extremely broad and conflict directly with few extant statements from other perspectives. In broad form, the rational choice perspective has as much potential for integrating knowledge from various spheres of criminology as does any other grand theory. For all its shortcomings, which derive mainly from economic assumptions about human and aggregate decision making and the tendency to focus on the most tangible variables, it makes efficient sense of complex questions.

Accompanying a more even-keeled political approach and more rigorous empiricism in criminology than was prevalent in more ideologically combative times has been a realization that there is nothing necessarily punitive in classical or rational choice theory and that therefore the perspectives should not be faulted when it is misapplied or misunderstood. Articles framed by the perspectives usually examine the possibility that punishment reduces crime, and often that is found to be the case in at least some examined conditions. However, for people who would use the perspectives as ideology to support getting tough on crime, the approach has as many inherent inconsistencies as convergences. Contemporary versions of rational choice specify countless complications of simple postulated relationships between increased punishment and decreased crime, for example. There clearly the rational choice tradition acknowledges that there are limited conditions under which one should expect punishment increases to lead to reductions in rates of crime or to impede individual decisions to commit crime.

Indeed, people who would turn to rational choice and classical theory for endorsement of punitive perspectives should know that they have opened themselves to attack from their desired theoretical bedfellows. This is because rational choice theorists and their classical forebears generally demand consistent and logical economic arguments and real evidence for the practicality and efficacy of state practices. Those who follow the tradition would evaluate the net payoff of punitive programs skeptically before determining them legitimate. Moreover, the tradition is closely coupled historically with utilitarian views of law wherein good laws are only those that can be enforced (which usually requires considerable popular legitimacy) and that lead to the general betterment. The latter, of course, is a difficult philosophical and empirical obstacle to surmount for people who argue that more punishment is needed.

The earliest classical theorists postulated that many punishments were necessarily irrational and excessive simply because they would inevitably be ineffective in deterring crime. This fact still exerts significant influence in both rational choice and classical theorizing. Laws that are groundless, inefficacious, unprofitable, or needless are not good laws. If any convenient liaison between the classical, rational choice perspective and get-tough policies existed, it seems to have been temporary and probably not all that important for, properly modified, almost any broad ideology can inspire or be used to defend vengeful approaches to criminal justice.

Because the intellectual seeds for classical and rational choice criminology were sown in the 18th-century Enlightenment Age, many of the central questions and biases in the approaches were formed then. When the theories are recapped in textbooks, one is as likely to see reference to Beccaria and Bentham as to lesser sociological thinkers on choice and economics of crime of the last half century. Although the mathematics in contemporary applications sometimes are overwhelming to people who are unaccustomed to reading formulas, the thinking in older and newer versions of classical criminology at least is familiar. Much in the U.S. system of justice rests on the same foundations, and we live with the cultural and intellectual legacy spawned by the scholars who inspired classical criminology. The most important historical fact to keep in mind is that classical theorists were concerned primarily with reforming a primitive, irrational justice system that often was based on privilege and vengeful ritualistic traditions with a justice system that drew legitimacy from reason.

Early classical theorists knew that crime required rational management; they intended to calibrate the law and justice system for the task and generally agreed that the state should do no more than required to protect citizens and their property. The law should be pragmatic and effective. Precise visions of the philosophical underpinnings of rights, the law, and justice varied widely, but there was near-universal agreement among classical and enlightened thinkers of the 18th century that the deterrent value of the law should expend the least possible harm to society and to the individual; that is, the law should operate without undue or unneeded cruelty to offenders. According to this perspective, the costs of committing a given crime usually would slightly outweigh potential benefits, in order to tip the decisional scales toward compliance with the law; however, any punishment beyond that needed to accomplish this task is likely cruel and unnecessary. Classical visions eventually came to reflect the utilitarian ideas that balancing private and individual interests against public interest required optimizing liberty; minimizing harm; and, wherever possible, close correspondence between the two objectives. From inception, theorists contended that implementing rational law and legal measures required dispassionate judgment of what would be most effective and scientific evaluation of attempted improvements. Crime control should be measured and its effectiveness evaluated objectively to ensure the proper balance of controllable costs and benefits of crime. Therefore, most evaluation research of legal changes and large-scale policy changes in the criminal justice system can be comfortably placed under the classical/rational choice tent.

The battles between those who rigidly adhered to purist sociological theories of crime (which generally focused on what is wrong with societies or other external social forces producing aberrant-thinking criminals) and those who took the side of a purist economics and rigid classical criminology are fading to intellectual history. As the latest generation of seasoned combatant in the fight leaves the field, one finds that their legacy is empirical support for multiple approaches to the problem of crime. It educates about the pitfalls of stringent and egotistical adherence to a single perspective and rigid defense of boundaries as much as it provides support for competing visions. With resulting invigorated faith in integration and cross-disciplinary approaches in criminology, rational choice and classical perspectives are on the cusp of revitalization and the perspective that may lead the way in sophisticated and integrated crime theorizing that is to come. The form of rational choice perspectives of the future will starkly contrast with the depictions of the school of thought that were presented in academic critiques and textbook accounts over the last several decades; these often pointed out that the theory was elementary and that it offered an unrealistic or artificial depiction of criminal choice as a rational/ economic outcome.

This possibility of reinvigoration of classically inspired thinking via rational choice in the form of a sophisticated, integrated, and formal theory of criminal behavior is signified by a study of high-risk youth in Denver (Matsueda, Kreager, & Huizinga, 2006). Matsueda et al. (2006) drew on longitudinal data to assess how perceived certainty of arrest is affected by individual characteristics (control variables, including age, race, residential stability, poverty) as well as theoretically inspired rational choice variables of experienced certainty (the ratio of experienced arrest or police questioning to crimes committed), unsanctioned offenses (the number of crimes committed by persons not questioned or arrested), and delinquent peers. Lagged perceived risk of arrest and self-reported risk preference (enjoyment of daring things) also were included. Perceived risk of arrest for theft and violence was regressed onto these variables.

Matsueda et al.’s (2006) results revealed that individuals who have not offended or been arrested overestimate the certainty of arrest. Experience of arrest certainty also leads to increased certainty estimates, revealing that offenders learn a desired lesson from being arrested for the crimes they commit; those who are arrested most regularly resemble the naive in their high assessments of risk. Those who offend but go unsanctioned perceive that the certainty of arrest is low and tend to move farther and farther away from naïve offenders with more criminal successes. Delinquent peers lead to decreased estimates of the certainty of arrest. On the whole, these findings show that assessments of the rewards of crime are acquired by Bayesian learning; individuals begin with a prior subjective probability estimate of an event based on accumulated information and update probability estimates as new information is gained directly or vicariously. Perceptions are formed by experiences and approximate rational outcomes.

In the next part of their article, Matsueda et al. (2006) showed the effects of certainty estimates on offending. They predicted violence and theft commission in one wave of data with previous wave reporting of rational choice/ perceptual variables including the positive experiences found in excitement from crime, seeing crime as cool, and committing crime and getting away with it. The downside of the criminal calculation is conceptualized as perceived risk of arrest (measured as perceived certainty by perceived utility) and lost investment in employment and grades. The authors assessed these effects, controlling for the effects of five measures of (1) neighborhood disadvantage, (2) basic individual control variables, (3) police contact, (4) risk preference, and (5) impulsivity. They also controlled prior delinquency to ensure that the temporal specification is clear and that current crime is a function of theoretically important variables instead of stable criminal behavior across waves.

Considerable support was found for a rational choice perspective on offending. This support is seen in significant effects for perceived risk of arrest as a cost and being seen as cool as significant benefits for both theft and violence; excitement from crime predicted theft but not violence. Perceived opportunities to commit theft and violence and get away with it also were significant predictors of both theft and violence in the expected direction.

This litany of findings is presented here only because it instructs on contemporary rational choice criminology and the attractions of the perspective today. The abstract lessons are that rational choice theory can guide the formation of intuitively valid, creative, and testable hypotheses that add to understanding of crime. The prospects for the perspective include understanding how experience and conditions shape thinking that makes some people more likely to offend than others, and this is the most promising line of inquiry for understanding why people commit, persist, or desist from committing crimes. More important for its future is that rational choice theory is completely compatible with dynamic and developmental perspectives that measure movement into, out of, and within criminal careers. Therefore, rational choice theory is commensurate with the core of contemporary criminological research: life course and developmental research. Any reader intrigued by studying crime over the life course or the prospects for interfering in the sequences of thinking that contribute to higher chances of crime commission can find guidance in rational choice theory as well as in the more commonly used control theories.

As with many theories, however, the features that distinguish rational choice and classical perspectives from other camps can be difficult to see when they are used in integrated pictures of crime. It is safe to say that the degree to which adherents view crime as an outcome of a choice that is subject to general economic principles and that results from maximizing behavior on the part of decision makers distinguishes the camps from other areas of criminology. From this perspective, offending rates result from optimizing individuals’ reactions to their estimates of incentives (referred to as perceptual deterrence, i.e., the role of an individual’s perceptions of costs because these deter crime) and are aggregate results of individuals’ assessments of costs and benefits. The offender traditionally is portrayed as a normal person (with no peculiar motives or individual defects that are thought to predispose crime) who responds predictably such that if probable costs exceed the probable benefits, he or she will not commit crime. Reflecting a tradition of methodological individualism, individuals’ combined decisions to commit or abstain from crime on the basis of judgments of its net payoff are thought to explain variation in crime rates across space and time.

Gary Becker’s work best represents the purist economic camp and thus may best represent a contemporary application of traditional classical thinking; it is grounded on the assumption that offenders are by and large normal and for the most part are responding to measurable incentive structures. Becker has been awarded a Nobel Prize and a Medal of Science, as well as a Presidential Medal of Freedom, and he is Distinguished Professor of Economics, Business and Sociology at the University of Chicago. Becker proposed what is now known as the subjective expected utility model of crime, which has proven to be surprisingly controversial. According to this theory, crime will be more likely if the individual’s perceived expected utility (expressed in monetary terms) for criminal behavior is greater than the expected utility of some legal alternative. This model is often represented mathematically with the following formula: EU = pU (Y – f) + [1 – P_ U (Y)], where EU represents the expected utility from the behavior, p is the probability of punishment, and U represents the utility (the severity) of costs or benefits. Becker contends also that people who might consider crime calculate the following: (a) practical opportunities of earning legitimate income, (b) amounts of income offered by these opportunities, (c) amounts of income offered by various illegal methods, (d) probabilities of being arrested for illegal acts, and (e) probabilities of punishment if caught. The act or occupation with the highest discounted return is likely to be chosen (Sullivan, 1973). As an economic purist, Becker asserts provocatively that there is little reason for theorizing that treats offenders as if they have a special character that leads them to crime. Becker extends his logic to conclude that the most prominent theories of motivation in criminology are not needed; basic economics addresses their problem sufficiently. Criminal offenders are normal, reasoning economic actors responding to market forces. This dogma understandably leaves him out of favor with many sociologists of crime who specialize in other criminological theories and, as one might imagine, he is not a favorite of criminal psychologists either. If classical criminology theory as used by Becker is accurate, then one should expect that rates of crime will be stable if the costs and benefits of it remain so; however, in modified versions that are endorsed most often among scholars who claim rational choice as their perspective, allowance is made for the fact that the population of likely criminals and prevalence of criminal thinking might also vary.

Underlying much writing in the classical tradition is the objective of determining what a reasonable system of justice would look like, and this leads to the assessment of the effects of varying policy on criminal behavior. This includes evaluation of what the optimum level of enforcement and sanctions should be and whether deterrent measures have worthwhile prospects. Following the belief that criminal law must minimize the social cost of crime, and that social costs are calculated by adding the harm crime causes and the cost of punishment, researchers who focus on deterrence, which is an offshoot of classical criminology, analyze penalties and their effects.

Research that does not allow for varying perceptions of costs and benefits across types of would-be offenders, places, or time periods are referred to as objective deterrence studies. The study of the relationship between imprisonment rates and crime rates, for instance, usually falls within this category. In contrast, perceptual deterrence theorists focus on varied perceptions of costs and benefits across types of would-be offenders, places, or time periods. In practice, the distinction between the objective deterrence and perceptual deterrence/rational choice perspectives also rests on the former’s focus on aggregate variation and tendency to use macrolevel variables that reflect variation in opportunity for crime and spatial and temporal differences in payoff and punishment. Objective deterrence theorists are likely to use the most general economic variables and predictions that emphasize variation in state policies and economic conditions, whereas perceptual deterrence/rational choice theorists are more likely to focus on individual variation in crime and varying individual criminal propensity. They also are more likely to incorporate a wider array of variables into explanations, often drawing insight from traditional domains of psychology and sociology.

A small but increasing share of the voluminous literature on deterrence reflects emerging interest in modeling formally and testing game theoretic and other exchanges occurring between individuals who would deter crime and those who would commit it (Fender, 1999). One notion is that aggregate offender (and state) choices reflect the ongoing mouse-and-mousetrap relationship as crime fighters and the people who might consider illegal acts learn and react to changing environments of exchange. There also is increasing theoretical attention to the possibility that lawmakers can use deterrent penalties to shift moral and cultural qualms about crime and change the public’s cost–benefit analyses as a result (Dau-Schmidt, 1990). The integration of game theory and other dynamic views on feedback between penalties and assessments of crime into classical criminology is in its infancy, however. Investigating how changes in policies affect the subsequent behavior of population aggregates, such as by examining the effect on drunk driving of stringent enforcement of laws prohibiting drunk driving and accompanying public information campaigns (they worked), or the number of crimes prevented by executions (a highly contested series of findings), remains the thrust of deterrence research.

If there are contingencies in efforts to deter crime by raising its costs, the most apparent is that the point of diminishing return for investing in deterrent efforts varies by crime, probably according to the size and characteristics of the population that remains undeterred when a new policy is imposed. Crimes committed by many people, by nondesperate or lightly motivated people, or by legally informed people and crimes with currently lenient penalties must be easier to reduce with new measures than are crimes committed by a few desperate persons who are capable of ignoring penalties that already are stiff. In the former case, the easy work is yet to be done. Partially because natural consequences and shame are powerful deterrents (Pratt, Cullen, Blevins, Daigle, & Madensen, 2006), relatively rare crimes that have tremendously devastating natural or informal consequences are difficult to deter further by formal means. For some of these reasons, the great classical criminologist Beccaria famously observed that 18th-century laws forbidding suicide necessarily are ineffective. Crimes with already stiff penalties also are unlikely to effect significant additional deterrence by adjusting formal penalties upward; some people do not scare easily. Even those who might be scared should they consider a consequence may not be deterred if, at the moment of decision, that consequence is not recalled, or if they are so intent on committing an act that little else matters.

Only a few criminology scholars use experimental methods to assess whether rewards and punishment affect cheating or risk-taking on assigned tasks (Ward, Stafford, & Gray 2006). There are numerous studies in which participants of varying background have put pen to paper to explain how they would evaluate costs and benefits presented in vignettes and have answered background questions about their own decisions and experiences to see whether they are able to predict costs and benefits. When presented vignettes that contain calculable and finite costs and benefits, respondents usually answer accordingly, leading to the conclusion that the decision to commit crime generally is predicted by cost–benefit assessments. On the whole, and with many caveats, there can be no doubt, on the basis of the results of this research, that deterrence works when other relevant factors can be controlled and that there is considerable rationality undergirding criminal choice.

Similar survey techniques for examining criminal decisions include exercises in which known offenders, responding to vignettes, describe in detail what they consider when deciding to commit or selecting real crimes. There also have been interviews about rationality in the target selection process and on how offenders sequentially proceed through decisions leading to crime. Here, it has been confirmed what researchers who study target selection and routine activities approaches have already shown by survey and geographic methods: Where crime is easy to commit and the odds of getting away with something are made high by environmental arrangements and circumstance, offending is likely.

A case can be made that a general and accurate picture of crime can be presented with grand economic theories containing only the most apparent variables representing the market for crime. This form of theorizing holds most true to the classical tradition. Analyses of aggregate variation tend to smooth out some of the complexities and detail found in decisions; however, such analyses generally attempt to model the effects of only a few variables that might influence the rate of occurrence of crime generally. The trade-off of such a general approach is that it necessarily obscures important details and peculiar thinking that affect decisions in many offenses. This empirical– theoretical divide in rational choice/classical literature is not unique to criminology. Economists might examine how purchasers respond to price changes by graphing the number of purchases by increasing prices, and that approach obviously can provide general knowledge on the subject. However, the microconsiderations of real buyers and their idiosyncrasies are more likely to be found in interviews, captured in surveys, or seen in laboratories by observing would-be consumers. Marketers might be more intrigued by the information gained in the last approach. The analogy reveals that aggregate and bottom-up studies of decision making approach the same phenomena from different angles and levels of analysis.

These divides are revealed in debates among researchers who study crimes as economic decisions. Despite debates, diverse approaches are commensurable, and in some cases each type of analysis might incorporate variables discovered in models done in the other. As is often the case with large numbers, many idiosyncratic influences on decisions cease to exist, but both normal and exceptional psychological patterns can be discovered and modeled in aggregate data. In fact, almost all contemporary economists recognize that there is a complex psychology of markets that incorporates external variables and logics but that affects the aggregate outcome significantly. It is widely accepted that learning, ignorance, convenience, and the tendency to satisfy (as opposed to maximize) all affect choice.

Some scholars who attempt to model relevant and recurring behavioral components into macrolevel models are at the forefront of the discipline of economics. There are subfields devoted to decision making under uncertainty and prospect theory, which models heuristic shortcuts that depart systematically from principles of probability shaping choice. There have also been advances in theorizing behavioral/economic approaches to law, which attempt to improve models of rational choice by relaxing assumptions that people are only rational optimizers of self-interest and by incorporating complexities of learned strategies for decision making under uncertainty. Criminology has far to go in understanding how even the simplest intersections of psychology, decision-making considerations, and changing markets influence crime and further still before it can incorporate cultural shifts and changing preferences into traditional aggregate economic or classically inspired models.

There is an emerging consensus within the classical camp, especially among legal scholars with an interest in moral shifts, that crime rates probably reflect fluctuation in the size and tastes of a likely customer base as well as in changing estimates of incentives and sanctions by the general population (Cooter, 2000a, 2000b). Crimes with payoff that objectively is stable over time, for example, might ebb and flow in their perceptual attractiveness in part because of the public’s multifaceted response to law. This view acknowledges that, if there is a market for crime, there may be limited numbers of participants under normal historical conditions. However, many citizens will ignore completely variation in the factors intended to raise or lower net criminal benefits, for one reason or another. There is almost no reason to think that the size of the likely offender population is stable or contingent only on economic variables, and models of crime that want to increase explained variation probably should take that into account. There is less reason for assuming that individual offenders’ thinking is intractable rather than developed over time and contingent on varying ways of thinking, events, and previous outcomes.

Many of the complications of applying the rational choice perspective are due to preferences, commitments, and mental impediments that can influence choice and make crime more or less likely. Preferences, commitments, and mental impediments may be disproportionately characteristic of identifiable groups of persons that are prone to offending. Individuals or categories of people may desire things that are not apparently objective costs or rewards of a given decision for all observers. Advertisers, for example, know that they can play on consumers’ irrational preferences by cleverly and expensively packaging goods even when that packaging is thrown away immediately on purchase; marketers know that some consumers are more enticed than others and how to play to the tastes of particular groups. Preferences affect what is chosen when one is confronting criminal opportunity as much as they determine what persons choose when deciding whether to purchase or walk away from a product in a store. For example, problem gamblers have not only an increased desire for arousal that comes from the activity but also increased expectations that gambling will result in positive and arousing experiences, as has been shown in a sample of criminal offenders (Walters & Contri, 1998). Therefore, rational choice applications that fail to account for varying tastes and sensations related to crime may be neglecting important variables and limiting explanatory power. Despite the admonition that explanations of crime that focus on abnormality are superfluous by advocates of pure economics, it is likely that offenders are drawn to elements of criminal activity in a way that others are not.

Individuals or groups also may have ways of thinking that skew their analysis of costs and benefits, apart from utilities. It is now widely accepted that there are thinking mistakes associated with addiction, for example. These mistakes include a willingness to act without full information, mistaken retention of practiced behaviors in simple tasks, and the discounting of future consequences. If one looks to gamblers, and experiments that emulate gambling, one can see that a great many people are overoptimistic about their ability to calculate outcomes, consider sunk costs errantly, are too loss averse to play rationally, see only the most available options, and misinterpret near-misses as near-wins instead of as losses. Indeed, the earliest statements of classical criminology recognized that the severity of punishment generally is discounted according to the amount of time (celerity) until it will be imposed, implying that the discount might be greater for some than others. There is a long and continuing history of examining whether offenders discount future costs more than nonoffenders and of extrapolating the implications for law (Listokin, 2002, 2007). Discounting potential negative consequences at greater rates than others may be one manifestation of impulsivity, a construct increasingly integrated into individual-level analyses of crime. Many of these analyses are inspired by and designed to improve on earlier versions of rational choice and classical criminology.

A currently prominent general theory of crime that claims descent from classical criminology and takes significant inspiration from rational choice perspectives asserts that offenders are likely to have low levels of self-control. They are hyperphysical, self-centered, impulsive, hot-tempered risk-takers who enjoy simple, unchallenging tasks (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990).The opposite of these characteristics is termed self-control. For persons with low self-control, crime is a particularly attractive prospect. There is considerable evidence in psychology and criminology that some persons are predisposed by such tastes for offending. The source of the thinking problems may lie in inattentive parenting. In the language of rational choice perspectives, individuals without self-control, which is conceptualized as a stable characteristic, prefer crime and similarly present-oriented activities more so than other individuals. Given equivalent costs and benefits, we should expect people who have exhibited limited self-control to be more likely to choose crime than those who have not. Such impediments, in combination with the fact that many active criminals are intoxicated much of the time and the significant percentage of criminals who are on the lower end of intellectual abilities, might indicate that offenders occupy the high tail of the curve for impediments to reason. In fact, in a recent restatement on the measurement of self-control, Hirschi (2004) suggested that self-control is best measured as the number of costs considered during an offending decision, coupled with the perceived importance of these costs. Clearly, Hirschi is suggesting a correspondence between self-control and rational choice as explanation of crime.

Preferences that lead to crime need not be the ones that lead to stupid decisions, and they need not be especially peculiar. Some are widely shared and can lead to other healthy outcomes. For example, base desires for money and material trappings underlie a great deal of offending but also can lead to hard work. McCarthy and Hagan (2001) showed that a disposition for risk taking and competence interact to raise the rewards of crime, much as the characteristics lead to successful entrepreneurship. This suggests that some people are suited to crime and gaining its returns, just as some are suited to becoming entrepreneurs. It is a small inference to assume that the latter might find crime more attractive than criminals who are destined to achieve low returns. In a study of predictors of white-collar crime, N. L. Piquero, Exum, and Simpson (2005) showed that a desire for control is correlated with such crimes. It is also known that some rewards of crime are interpreted differently by known offenders and others; for example, subcultural dictates lead some offenders to interpret interpersonal confrontations using a particular set of costs and benefits that likely will elude people outside their cultures. People who stand up for themselves might also be rewarded by deference from those who would harass them otherwise.

It might be said that some people have a strong preference for law abidance and some do not. Where one falls on the spectrum of preference for and against illegality can determine attentiveness to rational choice considerations. Likewise, there is considerable reason to think that criminally prone individuals are influenced differently by sanctions (Wright, Caspi, Moffitt, & Paternoster, 2004). Greg Pogarsky’s (2002) survey of 412 university students about drinking and driving is illustrative of this point. After reading a vignette about deciding to drive from a bar or find another means home after drinking too much, students estimated the chances of being caught and the severity of the punishment if they were. They were then provided with the same vignette and asked whether they would drive if they knew there were no chance of being caught. Students were classified into those who would not consider drinking and driving at all (acute conformists), those whose chances of drinking and driving increased when they had knowledge that they would get away with it (deterrables), and those who reported that they were more than likely to offend in both the first instance and with no risk of being caught (incorrigibles). Acute conformists were influenced heavily by self- and social disapproval. Predictors were analyzed further by comparing incorrigible and deterrable offender categories. It is important to note that incorrigibles’ offending likelihood was not subject to certainty or severity estimates of the varied consequences. The effects of severity operated strongly on deterrable students. Certainty of being caught and self-disapproval had significant effects in the expected directions. This serves as one of the many sources of evidence for the interaction of rational choice variables with other variables and what should by now be an obvious point: There are patterns of influence for rational choice variables in subcomponents of the population that affect the general population differently.

Commitments are externally created considerations that are imported into a discrete decision; they would have little bearing on its outcome and would not shape immediate costs and benefits except for the fact that the people who harbor them assign them importance. These people’s behavior often seems irrational to people who are not aware of the outside obligations affecting their decisions. Imagine a rational choice theorist attempting to understand when a loan shark shoots the indebted by looking only at a particular transaction with a deadbeat. An investigator might assume that the loan shark will do what maximizes the chances of financial return. However, it is necessary to understand that the usurer has an image to uphold that allows the work to be done. Apart from the job and best strategy for sustaining a career, if the loan shark has promised that delinquent borrowers will be hurt, the general value of credibility for interpersonal exchange might lead to an unfortunate result. A promise is a promise.

Of course, commitments also can work to impede crime. Travis Hirschi asserts that his control theories of crime are extensions of classical theory and highly compatible with rational choice theories. In calculating the costs of crime, individuals consider their investments in conformity and institutions. Sally Simpson has conducted multiple studies that bear on rational choice and prospects for deterrence among people with differing opinions. In one such study (2002), she administered surveys to business students and corporate executives containing vignettes of white-collar decision-making contexts and possible criminal responses. Estimates of personal benefit predicted intentions to offend, as did risk perceptions. Respondents who saw opportunity for career advancement and thrills also were more likely to choose crime than others. Scores on an ethical reasoning scale; shame; and the possibility of informal sanctions from family, friends, and business associates affected criminal intention. The threat of being fired or corrected by superiors decreased intent, and being ordered to commit crime increased intent. Most relevant for understanding the place of commitment is that for highly moral “good citizens,” neither threat of sanctions nor other variables made much difference. Respondents who scored low on personal morality (low commitment to a moral code) were another matter; they were deterred by threat. Evidence for similar interaction between morality (self-disapproval, capacity for shame) and perceived opportunity has been reported by many other researchers.

Perspectives that imagine crime to be the outcome of a deliberative calculation have limitations. They sometimes contain an uncomplicated view of the rational man as homo economicus. It is clear that the strengths of classical criminology and rational choice are not found in their sophisticated depiction of the intricacies and diverse workings of human cognition and psychology. The mind and meaning are not where the core of tradition suggests that investigators look for answers about the occurrence and distribution of crime. Moreover, the fact that crime is often a stupid mistake leads many scholars to incorrectly and intuitively believe that rational choice perspectives miss the mark on the basis of the colloquial use of the word rational as a synonym for prudent, careful, or cautious. No reasonable rational choice or classical camp scholar has ever contended, however, that deliberating criminals choose their courses of action carefully. All scholars recognize that decisions and options can be constrained and that most daily and significant decisions are not made with ledgers in hand. In fact, recent research in neuropsychology and the decision-making sciences suggests that human decision making is aided, for instance, by the individual being in an optimal state of emotional arousal—that the arousal state is not too “hot” so as to make rash decisions but not so “cold” as to be unmoved by potential consequences (see Damasio, 1994). Similarly, emotional processing of information has been demonstrated to aid decision making by allowing heuristic “shortcuts” in the decision process. However, no perfect knowledge, lightning-fast calculation, or any of the other caricatures of economic theory are required to make efficient sense of crime with economic logic and methods (Becker, 1968).

Even rational choice theories, which typically add complexity not found in traditional classical models, sometimes are criticized for being too general. However, rational choice theory is best seen as a “framework, a rubric or a family of theories” that serves to “organize findings, link theoretical statements and logically guide theory constriction” (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997, p. 194). In criminology, attempts to dismantle or criticize the general perspective rather than specific hypotheses derived from it might be particularly futile, because rational-choice theorists acknowledge that they support the perspective for its sensitizing principles and because it suggests variables that one ought to examine. Scholars who adhere to even purist, or thin, versions of rational choice and classical depictions of crime are not blinded to the way things really are, or to the complexities of crime and cognition, inasmuch as they have clear notions about where to begin: with a focus on the content and process of individuals’ decisions to engage in criminal behavior as well as the belief that cost–benefit analyses occur on the part of the offender.

Bibliography:

• Beccaria, C. (1986). On crimes and punishments. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. (Original work published 1764)
• Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169–217.
• Bouffard, J. A. (2007). Predicting differences in the perceived relevance of crime’s costs and benefits in a test of rational choice theory. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 51, 461–485.
• Cooter, R. D. (2000a.) Do good laws make good citizens? An economic analysis of internalized norms. Virginia Law Review, 86, 1577–1601.
• Cooter, R. D. (2000b.) Three effects of social norms on law: Expression, deterrence, and internalization. Oregon Law Review, 79, 1–22.
• Cornish, D. B. (Ed.). (1986). The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. New York: Springer-Verlag.
• Dau-Schmidt, K. G. (1990). An economic analysis of the criminal law as a preference shaping policy. Duke Law Journal, 1, 1–38.
• Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
• Ehrlich, I. (1996). Crime, punishment and the market for offenses. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 43–67.
• Fender, J. (1999). A general equilibrium model of crime and punishment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 39, 437–453.
• Gottfredson, M., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
• Grasmick, H. G., & Bursik, R. J. (1990). Conscience, significant others, and rational choice: Extending the deterrence model. Law & Society Review, 24, 837–861.
• Hechter, M., & Kanazawa, S. (1997). Sociological rational choice theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 23, 191–214.
• Hirschi, T. (2004). Self-control and crime. In R. F. Baumeister & K. D.Vohls (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulation: Research, theory and applications (pp. 537–552). New York: Guilford Press.
• Listokin, Y. (2002). Efficient time bars: A new rationale for the existence of statutes of limitations in criminal law. Journal of Legal Studies, 31, 99–118.
• Listokin, Y. (2007). Crime and (with a lag) punishment: Equitable sentencing and implications of discounting. American Criminal Law Review, 44, 115–145.
• Matsueda, R. L., Kreager, D. A., & Huizinga, D. (2006). Deterring delinquents: A rational model of theft and violence. American Sociological Review, 71, 95–122.
• McCarthy, B. (2002). The new economics of sociological criminology. Annual Review of Sociology, 28, 417–442.
• McCarthy, B., & Hagan, J. (2001). When crime pays: Capital, competence, and criminal success. Social Forces, 79, 1035–1060.
• Nagin, D. S., & Pogarsky, G. (2003). An experimental investigation of deterrence: Cheating, self-serving bias, and impulsivity. Criminology, 41, 501–527.
• Pezzin, L. E. (1995). Earnings prospects, matching effects, and the decision to terminate a criminal career. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 11, 29–50.
• Piquero, A. R., & Tibbetts, S. G. (Eds.). (2002). Rational choice and criminal behavior: Recent research and future challenges. New York: Routledge.
• Piquero, N. L., Exum, M. L., & Simpson, S. S. (2005). Integrating the desire-for-control and rational choice in a corporate crime context. Justice Quarterly, 22, 252–280.
• Pogarsky, G. (2002). Identifying deterrable offenders: Implications for deterrence research. Justice Quarterly, 19, 431–452.
• Pogarsky, G., Kim, K., & Paternoster, R. (2005). Perceptual change in the National Youth Survey: Lessons for deterrence theory and offender decision making. Justice Quarterly, 22, 1–29.
• Posner, R. (1998). Rational choice, behavioral economics, and the law. Stanford Law Review, 50, 1551–1575.
• Pratt, T. C., Cullen, F. T., Blevins, K. R., Daigle, L. E., & Madensen, T. D. (2006.) The empirical status of deterrence theory: A meta-analysis. In F. T. Cullen, J. P. Wright, & K. R. Blevins (Eds.), Advances in criminological theory (Vol. 15, pp. 367–396). Edison, NJ: Transaction.
• Simpson, S. S. (2002). Corporate crime, law and social control. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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• Wright, B. R. E., Caspi, A., Moffitt, T. E., & Paternoster, R. (2004). Does the perceived risk of punishment deter criminally prone individuals? Rational choice, self-control, and crime. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 41, 180–213.

2.5 The Classical School of Criminological Theory

Brandon Hamann

Figure 2.1: Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)

During the Middle Ages, people began to question the justification for how they were being ruled by their governments (Fedorek, 2019). In the mid-17th century Thomas Hobbes [1] (1588-1679), a British philosopher, wrote in his seminal piece Leviathan (1651) that people were rational and were entitled to such things as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as well as the right to self-government. In the case of punishment, according to Hobbes (1651), judges were not bound by another’s sentencing prescription simply because there was precedence to do so (Hobbes, 1965). This social contract thinking would later be a building block for the modern American Criminal Justice System.

Figure 2.2: Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794)

One of the first “Criminologists” wasn’t even one. Cesare Beccaria [2] (1738-1794), an Italian philosopher, economist, and politician, is considered to be the “Father of Criminology.” He authored a book titled An Essay on Crimes and Punishment in 1764 which laid the foundation for what came to be called the Classical School of Criminological Theory . In the book, Beccaria theorized that crime occurs when the benefits outweigh the costs—when people pursue self-interest in the absence of effective punishments, and that crime is a free-willed, rational choice. Beccaria also developed the concept of proportionality , which states that in order for a punishment to be effective, it must fit the crime that it is intended to deter from repeating (di Beccaria & Voltaire, 1872).

• Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) – British philosopher who wrote that people were entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and the right to self-government. ↵
• Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) – Italian economist, philosopher, and politician. The Father of Criminology. ↵

crime is a rational choice made when the benefits outweigh the costs.

punishment should fit the crime it is intended to deter from repeating.

2.5 The Classical School of Criminological Theory Copyright © 2024 by Brandon Hamann is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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Classical and Rational Choice Theories

Module 5 introduces classical and rational choice theory as two distinct yet related perspectives that lend to foundations of early criminological thought. Classical theory in criminology refers to a school of thought that emerged during the Enlightenment period in the 18th century. It represents a significant departure from the prevailing views on crime and punishment at the time, which were often characterized by harsh and arbitrary methods of dealing with criminal behavior. Classical criminology is associated with the works of prominent thinkers such as Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. Their writings sought to establish a rational and systematic approach to understanding crime, punishment, and the functioning of the criminal justice system. Rational choice theory is a social science perspective that seeks to explain human behavior, including criminal behavior, based on the idea that individuals have agency. That is, humans are rational decision-makers who weigh the costs and benefits of their actions to maximize their self-interests. It is widely used in various fields, including economics, sociology, political science, and criminology.

Learning Objectives

After completing this module, you should be able to:

• identify the major principles of the Classical School of criminology?
• name some forerunners of classical thought in criminology?
• list some important thinkers of the Classical School of criminology, and what was their legacy?
• describe neoclassical criminology, and how does it differ from the classical perspective? How does it build on it?
• explain the role of punishment in neoclassical criminology?
• describe the policy implications of the Classical School and of neoclassical thought?
• recognize the social context of neoclassical theories and their rise to prominence in America during the 1970s.
• describe the central concepts in deterrence theory, including specific, general, marginal, and focused deterrence.
• recall what the various empirical tests indicate about the empirical status of deterrence theory.
• explain the central concepts in the routine activities and lifestyle approaches to criminal behavior.
• describe rational choice theory and its relationship to deterrence. Pg. 65
• understand policy implications of rational choice theory, including criminal justice policies and situational crime prevention.

Classical and rational choice theories are two influential perspectives in criminology that attempt to explain criminal behavior based on rational decision-making processes. While they share some similarities, they also have distinct features and historical contexts.

Classical criminology emerged during the Enlightenment period in the 18th century and was popularized by thinkers like Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. It marked a significant shift away from the prevailing views of crime and punishment at the time, which were often characterized by harsh and arbitrary penalties.

Classical theory assumes that individuals are rational beings who make decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis. Criminal behavior is seen as a calculated choice made by individuals who weigh the potential benefits of the crime against the perceived risks of getting caught and punished.

A central concept in classical theory is deterrence. The theory posits that punishment can deter individuals from engaging in criminal acts. This idea is based on the belief that if the punishment is swift, certain, and severe, potential offenders will be dissuaded from committing crimes.

Classical criminologists emphasized the need for a fair and just legal system. They advocated for the rule of law and argued that all individuals, regardless of their social status or wealth, should be treated equally before the law.

Classical theorists proposed that individuals enter into a social contract with the state or society, surrendering certain freedoms in exchange for protection of their rights and property. Criminal acts were viewed as a breach of this social contract.

Rational choice theory builds upon the foundation of classical theory but takes a more individualistic and micro-level approach. It gained popularity in the late 20th century and is based on the principles of rational decision-making and utility maximization.

Rational choice theory focuses on the decision-making processes of individuals. It examines how individuals assess the costs and benefits of engaging in criminal behavior and how they seek to maximize their self-interest.

The theory emphasizes the importance of opportunity structures. It suggests that criminal acts are more likely to occur when there are suitable opportunities available for offenders to exploit. These opportunities might be influenced by factors such as the presence of capable guardianship, the attractiveness of potential targets, and the absence of effective deterrents.

Rational choice theory has practical applications in the field of crime prevention. By understanding the decision-making processes of potential offenders, situational crime prevention strategies aim to manipulate the factors that influence criminal opportunities, making crime less attractive or more difficult to commit.

Rational choice theory is closely related to routine activities theory, which was introduced by Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson. Routine activities theory suggests that crime occurs when three elements converge: motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence of capable guardianship.

Neoclassical theory in criminology is an extension and refinement of classical theory that emerged as a response to some of the limitations and criticisms of the classical perspective. While neoclassical theory shares many fundamental principles with classical theory, it introduces certain modifications and acknowledges additional factors that influence criminal behavior.

Neoclassical theory represents a more nuanced and flexible approach to understanding criminal behavior than classical theory. It seeks to strike a balance between acknowledging the role of rational choice and recognizing that human behavior can be influenced by various psychological, social, and situational factors. This perspective has contributed to ongoing discussions and reforms within the criminal justice system regarding the appropriate treatment of offenders based on individual circumstances and levels of responsibility.

While both classical and rational choice theories emphasize rational decision-making, rational choice theory takes a more nuanced approach by focusing on individual-level factors and situational contexts that influence criminal behavior. These theories have been influential in shaping modern criminological thought and have contributed to the development of crime prevention strategies and policies that aim to deter criminal activity by manipulating the cost-benefit calculations of potential offenders.

Key Takeaways

• Classical criminology is based on the idea that crime is a rational choice influenced by the costs and benefits of offending.
• Deterrence theory is a branch of rational choice theory that examines how the threat of formal and informal sanctions can prevent or reduce crime.
• Empirical research has provided mixed evidence for the effectiveness of deterrence theory, especially for the severity of formal sanctions, such as the death penalty.
• Deterrence and rational choice theories assume that people are rational and self-interested and that they weigh the costs and benefits of their actions before deciding whether to commit crime or not.
• Policy implications of deterrence and rational choice theories include increasing the cost of crime, increasing the benefits of non-crime, reducing the benefits of crime, and reducing the costs of non-crime.
• Rational choice theory is more general and broader than deterrence theory, as it considers not only the costs and benefits of crime, but also the costs and benefits of alternative, noncriminal courses of action.
• Self-control theory is another descendant of classical criminology that argues that low self-control, a stable personality trait, predisposes individuals to crime and other present-oriented activities.

Key Terms/Concepts

Age of Reason (also known as the age of Enlightenment) Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) Ronald Clarke and Derek Cornish Classical Criminology Daniel Nagin Deterrence Gary Beker (1968) Homo Economicus Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) Just Deserts Natural Law Neoclassical Criminology Objective Deterrence Perceptual Deterrence Rational Choice Theory (RTC) Routine Activities Theory Self Control Theory Situational Crime Control Subjective Utility Model

Modern Application

Integrated Deterrence In Cyberspace

Integrated deterrence is a framework that combines all domains of warfare, all instruments of national power, and the coordinated capabilities of allies and partners to deter adversaries and defend national interests.

Because cyberspace is a contested and complex domain, it poses unique challenges and opportunities for integrated deterrence, such as the difficulty of attribution, the asymmetry of capabilities, the speed and scale of cyber operations, and the interdependence of public and private actors.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is implementing integrated deterrence in cyberspace by generating insights about the adversary’s cyber operations and capabilities, enabling better cyber defenses for the U.S. government, industry, and international partners, and acting to deter or disrupt adversary cyber actors and halt malicious activities.

Understanding concepts of deterrence within the context of cyberspace is increasing important as it will inform the authorities, identify domestic and international obligations, and aid in the assessment of risks of cyber operations.

• Jacquelyn Schneider, Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Does cyber deterrence work? National security expert on cybersecurity and National Defense Strategy (Government Matters, Jan. 2022) [also embedded below]

Read, Review, Watch and Listen

1. Read Chapter 23: Classical Perspective by Andy Hochstetler, Iowa State University (Hochstetler, 2009)

• Print a copy or have access to this reading via a digital device for in class review and discussion.

2. Read Chapter 27: Deterrence and Rational Choice by Raymond Paternoster, University of Maryland (Paternoster, 2009)

3. Review Twenty-Five Techniques of Situational Prevention (ASU Center for Problem Oriented Policing, 2023)

a. Situational crime prevention is a key component of rational choice theory within the field of criminology. Rational choice theory is a theoretical framework that suggests that individuals make decisions to engage in criminal behavior based on a rational assessment of the potential costs and benefits of their actions. Situational crime prevention focuses on altering the immediate environment and situational factors to reduce the opportunities for crime and make criminal behavior less attractive to potential offenders.

4. Review the National Institute of Justice’s FIVE THINGS ABOUT DETERRENCE , (DOJ/OJP, May 2016)

5. Watch Self-Control Theory (Danielle MacCartney) [last accessed, Sep. 2023]

a. The self-control theory of crime, also known as the General Theory of Crime or the self-control theory, is a criminological theory developed by Travis Hirschi and Michael Gottfredson in 1990. This theory focuses on understanding why individuals engage in criminal behavior and what factors contribute to their decision to commit crimes. The central premise of this theory is that low self-control is the primary factor underlying criminal behavior.

6. Watch The Trouble with Long Prison Terms (Justice Policy Institute, September 2020)

a, The effectiveness of long prison terms in deterring crime is a complex and debated issue within the field of criminology. While some proponents argue that longer sentences act as a deterrent by incapacitating potential offenders and sending a message that crime will be met with severe punishment, others contend that the relationship between long prison terms and crime deterrence is not straightforward.

b. The relationship between long prison terms and crime deterrence is not straightforward, and its effectiveness can vary depending on the type of crime, individual factors, and societal conditions. While long prison sentences may deter some individuals from committing crimes, they are not a panacea for reducing crime rates. Many experts argue for a more balanced approach to criminal justice that considers factors such as rehabilitation, reintegration, and addressing the root causes of criminal behavior in addition to punitive measures like long prison terms.

7. Watch Reason TV’s 3 Reasons to Get Rid of the Death Penalty (Sep. 9, 2014) – last accessed September 2023. Also embedded below.

a. The death penalty, also known as capital punishment, is a controversial and heavily debated topic when considered as a form of deterrence in criminal justice systems. The central argument in favor of the death penalty as a deterrent is that the prospect of facing the ultimate punishment, death, can deter individuals from committing serious crimes, particularly murder. However, this argument is fraught with complexities, and its effectiveness as a deterrent is a subject of extensive research and debate.

b. The idea behind using the death penalty as a deterrent is rooted in deterrence theory, which suggests that potential offenders weigh the potential costs and benefits of their actions before committing a crime. Proponents argue that the death penalty, being the harshest punishment possible, can act as a strong deterrent because individuals may be less likely to commit a murder if they fear execution.

c. Criminologists argue that potential offenders are influenced by various complex factors, such as socioeconomic conditions, family background, drug addiction, mental health issues, and the perceived likelihood of getting caught, in addition to the severity of punishment. Therefore, the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent is challenging to isolate from these other influences.

To access the PPT file, click HERE . Note that files are updated regularly and as such might change in content and appearance.

Read, Review, Watch and Listen to all listed materials by the due date listed within the course LMS (i.e., Blackboard) site.

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Discussion Questions

• How rational and deterrence theories account for the influence of emotions, impulses, or peer pressure on criminal behavior?
• What are some of the unintended consequences or side effects of relying on sanctions to prevent crime?
• How can deterrence and rational choice theories inform crime prevention policies and programs?
• How do classical criminology and rational choice perspectives differ in their assumptions, methods, and applications?
• How do the concepts of deterrence and self-control relate to the classical and rational choice perspectives on crime?
• How do individuals and groups make or structure decisions that lead them to engage in or abstain from criminal behavior?

Supplemental Resources

• Executions in Oklahoma: Cruel and Unusual? (VICE News, Feb. 2023) [last accessed, Feb. 2024].
• Cornish and Clarke (2003). 25 Techniques of Situational Crime Prevention (as cited by ASU, Center for Problem Oriented Policing, 2024) [last accessed, Feb. 2024].
• The Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) is a national non-profit organization whose mission is to serve the media, policymakers, and the general public with data and analysis on issues concerning capital punishment and the people it affects. DPIC does not take a position on the death penalty itself but is critical of problems in its application.
• The Center for Law and Social Policy ( CLASP ) is a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization advancing policy solutions for people with low incomes.
• Associated Press (AP), California moves to dismantle nation’s largest death row (January 21, 2022) [last accessed, Feb. 2024].
• CBS News Kenneth Eugene Smith executed by nitrogen hypoxia in Alabama, marking a first for the death penalty (Jan. 26, 2024) [last accessed, Feb. 2024].

Students should review the course syllabus to determine the assignment of this activity.

This is a copy of the module’s activity that students find within Blackboard. For that reason, refer to the Activities page to submit your work for review.

Note to students – Refer to the course learning management system; that is, Blackboard for assigned activity information. In addition, refer to the course syllabus for a detailed week-to-week activity schedule.

Note to faculty – Contact the Dr. Ramirez-Thompson ([email protected]) for a shared folder containing course activities.

• Hochstetler, A. (2009). Classical Perspectives. In J. M. Miller (Ed.),  21st Century Reference Series .  21st Century Criminology :  A Reference Handbook  (Vol. 1, pp. 201-209). SAGE Reference.  https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CX3201600034/GVRL?u=cod_lrc&sid=bookmark-GVRL&xid=fe41aea7
• Paternoster, R. (2009). Deterrence and Rational Choice Theories. In J. M. Miller (Ed.),  21st Century Reference Series .  21st Century Criminology :  A Reference Handbook  (Vol. 1, pp. 236-244). SAGE Reference.  https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CX3201600038/GVRL?u=cod_lrc&sid=bookmark-GVRL&xid=79736864
• Arizona State University (2023), Twenty-Five Techniques of Situational Prevention (Center for Problem Oriented Policing, 2023). https://drive.google.com/file/d/1g4meX_GHR2tu3zlFPFp5srGSc6aWOrVq/view. Accessed 19, Feb. 2024.
• National Institute of Justice’s (NIJ). FIVE THINGS ABOUT DETERRENCE, (DOJ/OJP, May 2016). https://drive.google.com/file/d/16p1KSzLr-NV-4MD2X5EM8I_Ln2leL_bS/view. Accessed 19 Feb. 2024.
• Danielle MacCartney (Oct. 2021), Self-Control Theory . https://youtu.be/AiIIDC3fHGY?si=t_tIzykM4MTgJ6-P. Accessed 19 Feb. 2024.
• Justice Policy Institute (Sep. 2020), TheTrouble with Long Prison Terms (Justice Policy Institute, September 2020). https://justicepolicy.org/long-prison-terms/. Accessed 19 Feb. 2024.
• Reason TV, 3 Reasons to Get Rid of the Death Penalty (Sep. 9, 2014). https://youtu.be/qI1-rneRkDE?si=gNFPamsx2h_r5Ilh. Accessed 19 Feb. 2024.

An important social movement in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Key thinkers whose ideas were the foundation for the Enlightenment were Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778).

Cesare Bonesana, Marchese di Beccaria, was an Italian philosopher, criminologist, and jurist. Beccaria is best known for his influential work in the field of criminology, particularly for his groundbreaking treatise titled "On Crimes and Punishments" ("Dei delitti e delle pene" in Italian), which was first published in 1764. In "On Crimes and Punishments," Beccaria argued against the prevalent and harsh penal practices of his time and advocated for a more humane and rational approach to criminal justice. He criticized the use of torture, the death penalty, and other cruel forms of punishment that were common in Europe during the 18th century. Beccaria believed that punishment should be based on the principle of utility, aiming to deter crime and protect society while avoiding unnecessary cruelty.

Beccaria proposed that punishment should be severe enough to deter individuals from committing crimes, but it should not be excessively cruel. He argued that the certainty of punishment is more effective in deterring crime than its severity.

Beccaria emphasized the importance of equality before the law, advocating for a legal system that treats all individuals equally regardless of their social status or wealth.

Beccaria urged for quick and transparent trials, ensuring that justice is delivered promptly and that the public can trust the legal system.

Beccaria strongly opposed the use of the death penalty, arguing that it was neither effective in deterring crime nor in achieving justice.

Leading scholars of RCT who have proposed a framework for modeling offenders’ decisions and have applied RCT to various types of crimes and crime prevention strategies.

A school of thought in criminology that emerged during the 18th century as a response to the harsh and arbitrary legal systems of that time. It is considered one of the foundational theories in the field of criminology and marks a significant departure from earlier approaches to crime and punishment.

A prominent criminologist who has conducted extensive research on the empirical status of deterrence theory and the role of choice in criminological theory.

A concept in the fields of international relations and criminology that refers to the use of threats or the imposition of costs to prevent others from taking certain actions or engaging in undesirable behavior. The idea behind deterrence is to discourage potential adversaries or individuals from pursuing a course of action by making them believe that the costs or consequences of their actions will outweigh any potential benefits.

An influential American economist known for his pioneering work in the field of economics. Becker made significant contributions to various areas of economics, particularly in the areas of human capital theory, labor economics, and the economics of discrimination. Some of his most notable contributions and ideas include human capital theory, economics of discrimination, economic approaches to family and household, and rational choice theory. Gary Becker received numerous awards and honors during his lifetime, including the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1992. His work continues to be a foundation for research in economics and has had a lasting impact on the field.

Often referred to as "economic man," is a theoretical concept in economics that represents an idealized and simplified model of human behavior within economic contexts. It is not a description of how real people always behave, but rather a simplifying assumption that helps economists analyze and understand economic decision-making.

Was an influential British philosopher, jurist, and social reformer. He is best known for his contributions to the fields of ethics, political philosophy, and legal theory. Bentham was a leading figure of the utilitarian movement and is often considered the father of utilitarianism.

A concept in criminal justice that refers to the idea that individuals who commit crimes should receive punishments that are commensurate with the severity of their offenses. In other words, it means that the punishment should be proportional and fair, reflecting the moral responsibility of the offender for their actions.

The philosophical perspective that certain immutable laws are fundamental to human nature and can be readily ascertained through reason. In contrast, human-made laws are said to derive from human experience and history, both of which are subject to continual change.

A kind of middle ground between the total free will of the classical perspective and the hard determinism of positivism. It differs from the classical perspective in that it focuses focused on the importance of character and the dynamics of character development, but also incorporates classical concepts by considering the rational choices people make when faced with opportunities for crime. Essentially, it is a modern-day application of classical principles to current problems of crime and crime control in contemporary society.

Refers to a concept in criminology and criminal justice that focuses on reducing or preventing criminal behavior by creating an environment where potential offenders perceive a high likelihood of getting caught and facing severe consequences for their actions. It is a theory that relies on the objective elements of deterrence rather than the subjective motivations of individual offenders.

Also known as subjective deterrence, is a concept in criminology and criminal justice that focuses on how individuals' perceptions and beliefs about the likelihood of getting caught and the severity of punishments influence their decision-making regarding criminal behavior. Unlike objective deterrence, which emphasizes the actual, observable aspects of law enforcement and punishment, perceptual deterrence centers on the subjective factors that affect an individual's choice to engage in or abstain from criminal acts.

Developed out of the neoclassical school of criminology and is based on the belief that criminals make a conscious, rational, and at least partially informed choice to commit crime after weighing the costs and benefits of available alternatives. The two main varieties of choice theory are routine activities theory and situational choice theory.

Examines the interaction of motivated offenders, capable guardians, and suitable targets as an explanation or crime and suggests that an individual’s everyday activities contribute significantly to the likelihood of his or her victimization.

Another descendant of classical criminology that argues that low self-control, a stable personality trait, predisposes individuals to crime and other present-oriented activities.

Shifts the focus of crime prevention away from the offender and onto the context in which crime occurs. Instead of focusing on why people commit crime, it looks primarily at why crime occurs in specific settings. It emphasizes the concept of opportunity – reduce opportunities for crime in specific situations to prevent crime. Situational crime control works by removing or reducing criminal opportunity.

A concept in economics and decision theory that focuses on how individuals make choices based on their subjective evaluations of the utility, or satisfaction, they expect to derive from different options or outcomes. This model is a fundamental component of microeconomics and helps explain how individuals make rational decisions by weighing the benefits and costs of various alternatives.

Criminology: Foundations and Modern Applications Copyright © 2023 by Eric Ramirez-Thompson, PhD is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien

Classical Criminology

27. May 2019 | zuletzt aktualisiert am 18. April 2022 von Christian Wickert

Classical Criminology sees criminal action as the result of free and rational decisions of the acting individuals.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Main proponents

Cesare Beccaria , John Howard , Jeremy Bentham , Samuel Romilly, John Anselm von Feuerbach, Sir Robert Peel, Samuel Pufendorf u.a.

Classical crime theory, especially according to Beccaria, is based on the assumption that people are free of will and thus completely responsible for their own actions, and that they also have the ability to rationally weigh up their abilities. Crime is therefore the result of free and rational decisions of the acting individuals.

Although social conditions are also mentioned as causes of crime in the classical period, Beccaria and others are more interested in the crime than in the perpetrator. This is due to the idea of equality of all human beings, as well as to the fact that any social (or at the beginning of the classical period also supernatural) circumstances can be met equally, which means that only the deed itself distinguishes the criminals from the non-criminals.

Implications for Criminal Policy

The central demand of the classical school of criminolgy is the proportionality of the sanctions to its preceding crimes. According to Beccaria, the level of punishment must be based on the damage caused. The arbitrary use of justice and overly harsh and inappropriate punishments should be rejected. It is necessary to introduce clear, legal and equal rules for everyone with regard to punishment and the severity of penalties, which should not be based on the person committing the crime but only on the act itself. Therefore, for the same crimes, there must be consistently the same penalties, which in turn must be strictly bound to the written, precise definitions of the various crimes and their corresponding criminal regulations.

The call for punishment and less cruelty came not only from Beccaria. Romilly opposed the arbitrary imposition of harsh and disproportionate punishments, Peel called for the necessary secularization and rationalization of criminal law, Feuerbach advocated the abolition of torture, Pufendorf introduced the concept of human dignity into criminal law, and Howard achieved prison reforms that took into account the health and hygiene of prisoners.

Almost all criminologists from his time period also called for the more or less extensive abolition of the death penalty. However, Beccaria and other authors referred above all to the often disproportionate nature of this sanction to their crime. Many people were then executed for less serious crimes or even killed unjustly. Beccaria wanted to fight this grievance.

However, a stance which in principle is opposed to the death penalty – as it now prevails in many countries, particularly in Europe – cannot be associated with the classical school of criminology, even though they have often been interpreted in this way in the past. After all, Romilly, Feuerbach and Beccaria referred to offences that would still be eligible for the death penalty.

This phenomenon can be explained by the demand for the preventive effect of criminal law, which emerged at the time. According to Beccaria, punishment may only be used if and when it serves to prevent crime. Since man is seen as a free and responsible being, deterrence is the only imaginable form of crime prevention.

The first consequence of this is that secret trials must be abolished and court proceedings accelerated in order to discourage the apparently high level of crime investigation and effective suspension of justice. It also follows, however, that certain particularly serious crimes must continue to be punishable by the death penalty in order to comply with the requirements of proportionality and prevention.

However, Beccaria stresses that the vast majority of criminal offences should be punishable by imprisonment, since too frequent use of the death penalty leads to brutalisation of society and therefore no longer has a deterrent effect.

The deterrence hypothesis on the one hand and the underlying assumption of human rationality and responsibility on the other are also reflected in Bentham’s idea of the Panoptikum, a prison in which the inmates, due to the construction of the building, are at all times under the visual surveillance of the guards or must assume that this is the case. According to the tradition of classical criminology, Bentham assumes that this form of constant surveillance must lead to a conformist way of life for the prisoners within the walls, since it would be extremely irrational to behave criminally in the conscious presence of a guard. Even more than Beccaria, Bentham can be seen here as the implicit precursor of the ‘Rational Choice’.

Critical Appraisal & Relevance

It is certainly problematic that the question of the phenomenon of “crime” in the classical period was probably still a by-product of the political and literary handling of punishment and justice. There was no such thing as a specially developed classical theory of crime. The classical theory of crime is rather a summary of the mostly political ideas of Beccaria and his contemporaries, presented and interpreted in retrospect by recipients. Thus there are quite a few who date not classical but positivist criminology as the actual beginning of today’s criminology, since there the subject of “crime” is clearly outlined.

However, the significance of Beccaria and classical criminology (in addition to their influences on crime policy) can be justified above all by their diverse current perceptions (rational choice, deterrence, routine activity approach). Thus, the classical school is not only the oldest school, but probably also the most constant, whose relevance is repeatedly confirmed in neoclassical studies.

In terms of content, classical theory weakens the incompatibility of the assumptions that although people are free and responsible for their actions, they are at the same time subject to (supernatural, later social) causes that lead to their deviant behaviour. However, this contradiction is again due to the fact that Beccaria and Co. did not pursue a coherent crime theory, but tried to justify their political and criminal demands theoretically. On the one hand, it was necessary to mention society as the focus of criminal activities in order to achieve a certain understanding of the perpetrator and thus a renunciation of excessively harsh punishments (this was also associated with criticism of the judges and the judicial proceedings). On the other hand, the emphasis on the equality and freedom of all human beings was also important in order to underline the utilitarian and enlightenment thought prevailing at that time and to establish it in criminal law.

A theory-related critique can therefore be better carried out on the basis of deterrent and rational electoral theories .

• Cesare Beccaria (1764): Dei delitti e delle pene
• Cesare Beccaria (1819): On Crime and Punishment
• Jeremy Bentham (1787): Panopticon or the Inspection-house . In: The Panopticon Writings. Hrsg. von Miran Bozovic. London/New York, 1995.
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SozTheo is a collection of information and resources aimed at all readers interested in sociology and criminology. SozTheo was created as a private page by Prof. Dr. Christian Wickert , lecturer in sociology and criminology at the University of Applied Sciences for Police and Public Administration in North Rhine-Westphalia (HSPV NRW). The contributions and linked articles available here do not necessarily reflect the official opinion, attitude or curricula of the HSPV NRW.

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The Classical School of Thought and Strain Theory in Criminology Essay

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• As a source of information (ensure proper referencing)
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Introduction

Classical school of thought, strain theory.

Criminology theories assume that crime occurs as a result of social causes. These theories go a long way in making us understand the occurrence of crime. Comprehensively, criminology theories make us understand how laws are made, broken and the overall reaction after breaking the laws. These events always occur in a given sequence which is encompassed by criminology theories but to a great extent, existing theories investigate the etiology, nature and the extent to which criminals exhibit such sort of criminology behaviors (Ruder, 1994, p. 71).

Considering all these insights to criminology, it is obvious to note that this discipline encompasses all arrangements in the society, the roles of different criminology groups, the social structure of the society that necessitates crime and other factors that affect group actions. These elements will be further analyzed in this study.

The classical school of thought was developed as far back as the 18 th century with notable pioneers such as Cesare Beccaria taking a leading role in coming up with the principles of the theory. The classical theory advances three main ideas as its basic pinnacles of thought. They are: people always have the freedom to choose what their actions will be, people have the ability to control the choices they make, and there will always be a sense of certainty and swiftness of punishment when laws are broken (Siegel, 2004).

The first pinnacle of thought advances the fact that humans have the option of choosing their actions; meaning that people choose to be either greedy jealous, murderers, thieves, lustful of such like personality attributes. The second pinnacle to the classical theory also advances the fact that people have the will to control the variables that characterize their personality. In literal terms, people are usually prompted to control their actions because of the existence of the law.

Human beings can therefore potentially analyze both probabilities (positive and negatives) of their actions and choose one outcome. For example, if a person perceives the risks involved in committing a given crime as less than the benefits, the person may very well commit the said crime. This pinnacle advances the fact that there is usually a certain and swift sense of punishment when people commit crimes. The Classical theory, therefore, purports that when these elements of punishment exist in society, individuals are likely to be deterred from committing a crime. If the kind of punishment to be given is fair, then the aspect of certainty of punishment is therefore enforced (Cook, 2005).

It can therefore be said that the presence of punishment attributed to crime makes people obey the law. In addition, if such punishments are usually carried out in a just and fair manner, people are definitely going to be deterred from doing crimes.

The applicability of the three pinnacles to the classical theory has however been diverse when analyzed with existing cases because the theory has given diverse outcomes to certain cases. It is therefore important that when the theory is analyzed with regard to a given case, the context in which a crime is committed should be factored into consideration. Because of these variables, it is important to incorporate the element of choice theories in analyzing criminology. For instance, some criminologists would prefer to incorporate the principles of the rational theory in analyzing crime while others would rather incorporate the situational crime theory as an element of the understanding crime (although still under the classical thought of crime analysis).

In the classical theory, criminals are always noted to be motivated by the presence of an opportunity to commit a crime. This will also help us analyze how victimization occurs because some variables such as human demographics and lifestyle patterns are important when analyzing how victimization occurs. For instance, some analysts have argued that being a single male and leading an active lifestyle has a potential effect on victimization. However, it should not be assumed that the classical school of thought entirely derives its principles from variables in human demographics because this element is only useful in analyzing how crime occurs. However, some of the variables associated with human demographics may still qualify as complete theories of criminology.

The strain theory advances the fact that social structures in society contribute a great deal to the occurrence of crime. Emile Durkheim is a pioneer in the advancement of this theory. The structural elements in the society, therefore, have a trickle-down effect on the people that make up the society in the first place. More frankly, the needs of the people are usually determined by the structural factors that exist in society. The analysis of the occurrence of a crime (for a criminal) is therefore analyzed through the structural opportunities or deterrents that exist in society.

The strain theory also advances the fact that people in society have to undergo various difficulties in trying to meet the expectations of society. Most of the time, when these expectations are of importance to an individual, then persons may go to an undefined length to get what they want, regardless of whether the means they take is legitimate or not. This fact has also been largely used to explain the occurrence of suicide because pioneers of the strain theory have advanced the fact that people are often pushed to the extent of committing a crime, either because the society has neglected them or when the individuals lack a sense of purpose; although of course, suicide is also complemented by a lack of personal values on the part of the individual.

Other studies identified that the likelihood of committing suicide is also complemented by the strains of the Environment. For instance, when criminology studies were undertaken during the 19 th century to determine the level of crime among African Americans, it was observed that the crime level among the group increased because of the heightened levels of political reforms that increased the expectation of the group in the society, therefore, making most of them engage in crime to meet these expectations (Schmalleger, 2005).

In this respect, the strain theory can be analyzed through functional or structural elements existing in society. Regarding the structural aspect of this analysis, individuals get to comprehend how things work in the society. For example, before individuals commit crime, they analyze the level of interdependence of their actions and this either provides the motivation or the deterrent to committing crime. On the functional part of the theory, it is evidently clear that this aspect assumes that the structural opportunities or barriers in the society are part of the overall system of committing crime. Social systems in the society that cause crime are therefore best analyzed with regards to the elements that constitute the structures in the first place and if one aspect of this structure malfunctions, a strain is likely to be developed.

This strain to a far extent determines the occurrence of crime (also as advanced through the strain theory). Two avenues have therefore been advanced to analyze the avenues through which strain motivates crime. The first avenue is defined through cultural structures that either provide an opportunity or barrier to the occurrence of crime. This fact was advanced when people from many cultures were moving to the United States in pursuance of the American dream but as established, there was a significant difference between the cultural expectations of these individuals and the societal expectations of the same.

The strain theory therefore comes in to explain the gap between the strain created between the available opportunities in the society and the aspirations individuals have. This explains the reason why crime has been noted to be quite prevalent among people in lower social classes because the opportunities available to them (for success) are surprisingly minimal. In this manner, they resort to do crime so that they can create an opportunity to flourish in the society, just like other people (Pearce, 2003).

Most of these people usually lose their motivation and purpose in life and get strained by the society. Unfortunately, the society bears a lot of emphasis on those who have succeeded as opposed to those who had the will to compete with the best of the best. Also unfortunate is the fact that there is no clear structure to define success in the society and therefore anomie is created and cultural chaos also spring up as a result.

The strain theory advances the fact that social structures in the society contribute a great deal to the occurrence of crime. To a great extent, this theory acknowledges the effects of societal structures and environmental pressures in contributing to crime because it advances the fact that people can go to unprecedented levels of crime in order to meet society’s expectations. On the other hand, the classical school of thought advances the fact that: people always have the freedom to choose what their actions will be; people have the ability to control the choices they make, and there will always be a sense of certainty and swiftness of punishment when laws are broken.

This theory therefore acknowledges the sequential process of crime and the influence of demographical factors to the occurrence of crime. However, both these theories are applicable in criminal case studies but at the same time, one theory may stand out to explain the occurrence of crime better than the other. It is therefore important to analyze the context in which a crime occurs to know which theory best explains the crime.

Cook, D. (2005). Social Process Theories Vs Social Structural Theories . London: Routledge.

Pearce, F. (2003). Crimes of the Powerful . New York: Peter Lang Publishing Company.

Ruder, L. (1994). Enhancing Capacities and Confronting Controversies in Criminal Justice: Proceedings of the 1993 National Conference . New York: DIANE Publishing.

Schmalleger, F. (2005). Criminology Today- An Integrative Approach . London: McGraw hill publishers.

Siegel, L. (2004). Criminological Theories, Patterns and Typologies . Los Angeles, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.

• Definition and Aspects of Criminology
• Classical Criminology and Present Day Crime
• Environmental Criminology and Its Aspects
• Prison Facilities and Certified Mental Facilities
• Crime Analysis Data Sources
• Deciphering the Wounds of the Victim
• Forensic Information and Evidence
• The Concepts of Identity Theft via the Internet
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2022, March 19). The Classical School of Thought and Strain Theory in Criminology. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-classical-school-of-thought-and-strain-theory-in-criminology/

"The Classical School of Thought and Strain Theory in Criminology." IvyPanda , 19 Mar. 2022, ivypanda.com/essays/the-classical-school-of-thought-and-strain-theory-in-criminology/.

IvyPanda . (2022) 'The Classical School of Thought and Strain Theory in Criminology'. 19 March.

IvyPanda . 2022. "The Classical School of Thought and Strain Theory in Criminology." March 19, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-classical-school-of-thought-and-strain-theory-in-criminology/.

1. IvyPanda . "The Classical School of Thought and Strain Theory in Criminology." March 19, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-classical-school-of-thought-and-strain-theory-in-criminology/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "The Classical School of Thought and Strain Theory in Criminology." March 19, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-classical-school-of-thought-and-strain-theory-in-criminology/.

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4 Classical Theories of Criminology: Deterrence

Lucy Forrester and Carley Ruiz

Learning Objectives

• Introduce the reader to theories that underpin the deterrence framework.
• Provide an understanding of the key principles of deterrence theory.
• Explore the deterrence theory framework in the criminal justice system context.

Before You Begin

• How do you act when no one is looking?
• Have you ever thought about doing something you’re not supposed to? Does the risk of getting caught change your decision about engaging in that behaviour?
• Who are you most worried about knowing you’ve done something wrong? Do you worry about the government or your friends/family/loved ones?

INTRODUCTION

Have you ever wondered why sentencing scenes in courtroom dramas are so intense? They highlight the legal system’s focus on deterrence, where judges weigh the crime’s impact on society and the message it sends. Phrases like “Let this be a lesson” emphasise the importance of deterring future offending. But why is there also an emphasis on the public nature of sentencing and tailoring punishment to send broader societal messages? Why does the severity of the punishment often seem tailored not just to the crime, but to the broader social message about how to act? This chapter explores classical deterrence theory, shedding light on these questions.

While much of criminology focuses on the psychological or sociological underpinnings of criminal behaviour, classical deterrence theory offers a different perspective by looking at how the legal and penal systems can influence potential offenders’ decision-making processes. Through understanding the principles of deterrence, we uncover fundamental strategies for preventing crime through punishment.

In this chapter, we explore the evolution of classical deterrence theory during the Enlightenment era, focusing on the contributions of thinkers Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. The objective of this chapter is to provide you with an overview of classical deterrence theory. We will explore the key concepts underpinning the theory, including the rational choice perspective, general and specific deterrence, and principles of punishment and proportionality. Additionally, we will examine the role these principles play in influencing penology and in shaping criminal justice policies. Finally, we will critique the theory’s notable shortcomings and consider developments and directions of the theory.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CLASSICAL DETERRENCE THEORY

The origins of classical deterrence theory can be traced back to the 18th century, a period marked by an intellectual and cultural revolution known as the Age of Enlightenment . This era, characterised by a critique of then-dominant forms of authority and religious systems, set the stage for transformative shifts in criminological and philosophical thought. It advocated the ideals of individual free will and rational decision-making, challenging earlier beliefs that viewed human behaviour as predestined.

At the forefront of this revolution were influential figures like Cesare Beccaria [1] and Jeremy Bentham [2] , whose contributions laid the groundwork for classical deterrence theory. Beccaria’s essay, On Crimes and Punishments (1764), pioneered a shift in the way of thinking about human behaviour and justice. It advocated for punishment to be rational, systematic and grounded in the principles of deterrence, proportionality and the protection of individual rights. This was different from prevailing notions of criminal justice responses that were characterised by arbitrary forms of punishment. Jeremy Bentham’s (1789) writings on utilitarianism and penal reform further advanced these ideas by emphasising the role of legislation in creating a rational social order where individuals, acting in rational self-interest, would be dissuaded from engaging in criminal behaviour due to the threat of punishment.

The intellectual legacy of figures like Beccaria and Bentham, alongside their contemporaries from the Enlightenment era, significantly shaped the development of modern criminal justice systems worldwide Their advocacy for legal and penal reforms emphasised crime prevention through the deterrent effect, rather than relying solely on punitive penalties, thereby reshaping approaches to crime and punishment in the centuries that followed.

Deterrence continued to dominate criminal justice philosophy in the late 18th and early 19th centuries and remains a cornerstone of modern approaches to law enforcement and punishment today.

DESCRIPTION OF THEORY

The following section will explore the key principles of classical deterrence theory, clarifying its key concepts and the pivotal role these ideas play within the framework of criminal justice.

Rational Choice Theory

Grounded in Bentham’s (1789) rational choice perspective, classical deterrence theory claims that people are rational beings who seek to maximise pleasure and minimise pain. This perspective offers insight into human behaviour within the context of classical deterrence. It suggests that potential offenders will calculate the benefits and consequences of an offence before deciding to engage in it (Bentham, 1789). Consider, for instance, an individual who is thinking about committing fraud online. They might consider the immediate financial gain and the anonymity the internet provides as benefits of offending. However, they must also consider the risks involved, such as the likelihood of being traced by cybercrime enforcement units, facing legal penalties and damage to their professional or personal reputation.

A rational choice perspective maintains that crime occurs when the perceived benefits of an offence outweigh its perceived consequences (Bentham, 1789). Building on this, classical deterrence theory suggests that crime prevention can be achieved by increasing the threat of punishment , effectively influencing the decision-making process of potential offenders.

Do Online Illicit Drug Markets Exchanges Afford Rationality?

Andrew Childs, Ross Coomber, and Melissa Bull

Published in Contemporary Drug Problems (2020), Volume 47, Issue 4, pages 302-319.

Rational choice theory is a popular theoretical framework used to explain the nature of exchanges in illicit drug markets, however gaps have been identified in the theory, particularly within online drug markets. The article critiques the use of rational choice perspectives to explain online drug exchanges as there are differences in the nature of offending to offline street-level drug markets. The article provides an in-depth critical analysis of rational choice theoretical perspectives, from exploring the origins of 17th and 18th century theorists to how it is relevant in today’s society, especially how it applies to the online illicit drug market.

Due to the varying nature of the online supply and access to illicit drugs, the article aims to reassess theoretical assumptions that are prevalent in research about offline illicit drug exchanges. The article describes how online illicit drug markets operate in various forms, including through social media and encrypted messaging applications. These methods differ greatly to offline illicit drug market exchanges. The article emphasises the need to address the lack of theoretical attention in research on the emerging trend of online illicit drug markets. The authors make comparisons to the different structures of online and offline illicit drug market exchanges to highlight the importance of the need to utilise theoretical frameworks to better understand the variation between the markets.

The conclusion the article comes to is that online platforms may afford greater elements of rationality than offline forms of drug exchange. The article suggests that as illicit drug markets continue to diversify through the use of online technology, it is important to monitor and analyse the changing nature of drug exchanges.

A summary by Melissa Osborn

Certainty, Celerity, and Severity of Punishment

Classical deterrence theory outlines three critical factors that influence the decision-making processes of potential offenders: certainty, celerity, and severity of punishment (Beccaria, 1764; Bentham, 1789).

Certainty of Punishment

Certainty of punishment refers to the likelihood of being caught and punished for a crime. When individuals believe there is a high chance of being caught, they are less inclined to partake in criminal activities. Certainty of punishment aims to deter individuals from offending by increasing the perceived likelihood of apprehension and prosecution (Bentham 1789).

To demonstrate this concept, imagine a scenario of a small town where graffiti has become a widespread issue, tarnishing public buildings and private properties. In response to community concerns, police boost patrols in hot spots and install visible surveillance cameras. This strategy aims to deter potential vandals by raising the likelihood of punishment. As the community becomes more vigilant and the police more present, the perception that graffiti will lead to immediate consequences grows stronger among would-be offenders.

Celerity (Swiftness) of Punishment

Celerity of punishment refers to the speed at which offenders are apprehended and penalised following an offence (Beccaria, 1764). The principle emphasises the importance of swift legal responses to crime. Delays in apprehension and punishment can significantly weaken the deterrent effect of punishment, making swiftly punishment crucial in preventing further offending (Blumstein et al.,1978; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001).

To illustrate this concept, think about the handling of traffic infractions in Australia. Once a speeding is detected offenders are promptly notified of their fines, usually within weeks of the violation. This rapid response, from detection to penalty, enhances the deterrent effect of punishment, aiming to decrease instances of speeding and thereby enhance overall road safety.

Severity of Punishment

Severity of punishment refers to the degree of consequence for offending. It serves as a deterrent by heightening the perceived risks associated with criminal behaviour (Gibbs, 1975). This strategy seeks to increase the severity of punishment to a level where the costs of committing a crime outweigh any potential benefits (Andenaes, 1974). In theory, the more severe the punishment for a crime, the stronger its deterrent effect on prospective offenders (Beccaria, 1764; Bentham, 1789).

Influencing Driver Offending Behaviour: Using an Integrated Deterrence-Based Model

Eslam Hassan, Lyndel Bates, and Justin Ready

Published in Crime and Delinquency (2022). Online First.

Most road incidences involve human error and a key strategy to road policing has been targeted at changing driving behaviour. Deterrence theory has been the basis of many road policing strategies such as random breath tests (RBT) and speed and red-light cameras. Deterrence is to discourage a behaviour by threatening a sanction. In the context of road policing, deterrence is utilised as a strategy by increasing the perceived risk of punishment and consequences to reduce offending driving behaviour. This study aims to build upon existing literature and proposes an integrated deterrence-based model that consists of the classical deterrence theory, reconceptualised deterrence model and informal deterrence mechanisms. To investigate the relationship between these factors and offending driving behaviour, the researchers conducted an online survey and relied on self-reported data from the participants.

The results suggest that social sanctions such as feelings of shame, guilt and embarrassment and the threat of material loss were predictive of reduced offending behaviour. Furthermore, individuals who committed an offence and did not receive punishment, had lower levels of perceived certainty of punishment which in turn increases offending driving behaviour. Regarding the sociodemographic data, this study found that younger drivers reported more driving offending behaviour compared to middle-aged and older drivers. Moreover, individuals who drove more frequently were also associated with driving offending behaviour.

When applying these results to inform road policing, they suggest that random highly visible enforcement operations may increase levels of perceived certainty of detection and punishment which may reduce offending driving behaviour. However, while this deterrent method is effective, it is costly to maintain. Therefore, a cost-effective alternative would be non-legal countermeasures that utilise social sanctions to influence driving behaviours to reduce potential offending. Another form of deterrent threat was through the use of well-run media campaigns as they increase individuals’ perceived certainty of punishment, as well as raise awareness regarding the types of possible consequences that could be administered when drivers are caught breaking road rules.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that some of the results of this study were contradictory to the current literature. This may be due to the limitations of the study; however, it also indicates that more research surrounding this topic is required to gain a more concrete understanding of deterrence theory and how it can inform policing strategies to reduce offending driving behaviour.

A summary by Natasha Smith

Specific Deterrence versus General Deterrence

Classical deterrence theory distinguishes two main mechanisms through which punishment can deter crime: specific deterrence and general deterrence.

Specific deterrence is the concept of deterrence through first-hand punishment. It is achieved when the punishment of an individual for a crime dissuades them from offending in the future (Andenaes, 1968, 1974). General deterrence is the concept that witnessing the punishment of an individual or group second-hand can discourage a community or society from engaging in similar criminal acts (Andenaes, 1968; Nagin, 1978). General deterrence is achieved through publicly visible and consistent punishment, which serves to deter the broader community from offending by warning them of the consequences of unlawful behaviour (Nagin, 1978; Paternoster & Piquero, 1995). Principles of general and specific deterrence have long been the underlying foundation of criminal justice policies and practices.

To demonstrate this concept, consider a scenario where a community has been confronted with an increase in alcohol-fuelled violence in nightlife/entertainment precincts, sparking widespread concern among residents. To address this, new legislation was introduced that mandates more severe consequences for violent offences. These mandates include restrictions on the sale of alcohol and the introduction of ID scanners. Using linked data, scanners can detect problematic patrons on court, police, or venue-imposed banning orders and prevent them from entering a venue or an entertainment precinct. In this context, the severity of punishment not only lies in the denial of entry to a venue but also in the legal consequences for breaching a court order (e.g., fines or imprisonment) (Miller et al., 2023).

Principle of proportionality

Embedded within classical deterrence is the principle of proportionality [3] , which asserts that the punishment must correspond to the gravity of the offence (Beccaria, 1764). It aims to ensure that penalties are neither excessively harsh nor too lenient (Zimring & Hawkins, 1973), ensuring fairness and efficacy in criminal justice policies (von Hirsch, 1993). This not only preserves public trust in the legal system but also safeguards the fundamental morals and values of society (Andenaes, 1974; Tonry, 2011).

Classical deterrence theory suggests that the more certain, immediate, and severe the punishment, the stronger the deterrent effect (Beccaria, 1764). This emphasises the importance of striking a delicate balance in the criminal justice system, ensuring deterrence while upholding principles of fairness and proportionality.

Classical deterrence theory understands offending behaviour through a rational framework of offending, where the decisions to offend involve a calculation of risks and rewards. Punishment serves to deter the general community and repeat offenders. In principle, deterrence is best achieved when responses to crime are certain, swift, and severe yet proportionate responses to crime.

THEORY APPLICATION

Classical deterrence theory lays the foundation for our law, regulations, and approaches within the criminal justice system. It serves not only as a penological principle but also as a strategic guide for policy development, interventions, and preventive measures aimed at influencing individuals’ decision-making processes before they commit an act.

In Australia, deterrence is explicitly recognised as a guiding sentencing guideline. At the federal level, Section 16A(1) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth ) requires the Australian courts to consider factors like the nature and seriousness of the offence when determining a sentence. Similarly, in Victoria, Section 5(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) states that courts must consider the maximum penalty and the standard sentence for offences, ensuring alignment with the seriousness of the crime’s gravity. These sentencing guidelines exemplify the principle of proportionality by mandating that courts weigh the gravity of the offence against the severity of the punishment, ensuring that the sentence accurately reflects the seriousness of the crime committed.

Judges apply legislative guidelines to ensure that sentences fulfil both punitive and deterrent objectives, aligning with societal values and expectations of justice and fairness (Brown & Pratt, 2000). In their rulings, judges often articulate the deterrent function of a sentence, highlighting the importance of deterring not only the individual offender but also sending a clear message to the community about the consequences of criminal behaviour (Roberts & Stalans, 1997). This judicial emphasis reflects the dual objectives of specific deterrence, aimed at preventing reoffending by the individual, and general deterrence, intended to discourage others in society from committing similar criminal acts (Brown & Pratt, 2000).

Principles of Punishment in Australian Criminal Justice Policies and Strategies

The principles of certainty, severity, and celerity have been foundational to crafting criminal justice policies. These principles inform the design of legislative measures, shape judicial sentencing practices, and direct law enforcement strategies (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011).

Applications of Certainty of Punishment

The principle of certainty of punishment is operationalised through robust law enforcement and legal processes designed to ensure that offences are detected and prosecuted. Examples of initiatives that increase the certainty of punishment include increasing police presence (Sherman & Weisburd, 1995), the use of technology in law enforcement like CCTV and automatic license plate recognition systems (Ratcliffe et al., 2009), hot spot policing (Braga, 2005), randomised drug testing (Watling et al., 2010), direct communication by police with known potential offenders (Kennedy, 1997), and community policing (Skogan, 2006). These initiatives ensure that offences are detected and prosecuted and thereby increase the perceived risk of detection and punishment among potential criminals.

Applications of Severity of Punishment

The principle of severity of punishment is operationalised through stringent sentencing guidelines and judicial practices, ensuring that penalties are proportionate and significant enough to act as a deterrent. Legislative measures, such as minimum sentencing and mandatory sentencing laws, are examples of legislative measures that aim to increase the severity of punishment by limiting judicial discretion in sentencing for certain crimes. Public opinion and safety are driving factors in the implementation of severe mandatory sentencing policies, which they support in concept, but not in practice when it comes to cases sentenced under mandatory regimes (Roberts et al., 2003). Contrary to the principle of severity, deterrence research does not generally find support for the threat of mandatory sentencing practices (see Day et al., 2021) and the threat of longer sentences for assault rates (Menéndez & Weatherburn, 2016).

Applications of Celerity of Punishment

Celerity, or the swiftness with which punishment is applied, is another critical component of deterrence. The Australian criminal justice system strives to minimise delays in the adjudication and sentencing processes, recognising that the prompt application of punishment can reinforce its deterrent effect.

Criminal justice strategies for increasing celerity of punishment focus on improving the time it takes to detect, apprehend, and punish an offender. Initiatives to reduce the time in which offenders are processed through the criminal justice system include expediting cases for high-risk offenders (Turner & Petersilia, 1992), specialised courts (e.g., drug, mental health and family violence courts; Redlich & Summers, 2012), and the use of technology to improve case processing (Redlich & Summers, 2012). By reducing the time between the commission of a crime and the imposition of a penalty, these measures aim to strengthen the impact of deterrence on both the individual offender and the broader community.

The effectiveness of severe penalties in deterring crime has been increasingly questioned, with studies indicating that the certainty of punishment, rather than its severity, is more influential in preventing crime (Durlauf & Nagin, 2010; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). This highlights the need for a re-evaluation of criminal justice policies to prioritise evidence-based strategies that address the root causes of crime without resorting to excessive punishment.

The effects of banning orders and ID Scanners on Violent Crime and Disorder: An analysis of Micro-locations in Surfers Paradise

An Honours Thesis by Adam Turner

Prior to this research examining a recent change in the legislation in Queensland there was little research looking at the use of the ID scanning technology and the effects it had specifically in Safe Night Precincts (SNP) across the state. Banning orders were another intervention introduced with the changes in legislation giving venue owners, police, and courts the power to ban problematic patrons from a venue or prescribed area for three or more months.

Surfers Paradise was identified as the research site due to the suburb containing a SNP as well as being a well-known tourist destination that attracts people of all ages and nationalities. SNPs are known to be hot spots of violence in public places due to the higher concentration of individuals under the influence of alcohol and illicit substances which increases the likelihood of associated harms. The introduction of the ID scanners in all licensed venues open after 10pm has the aim of restricting problematic patrons from entering a specific venue or all venues within a given SNP.

The project utilised a geospatial analytic method to observe where crimes were taking place and how offending patterns changed over time. To more accurately identify where crimes were occurring street segments were used. A street segment is a section of road between two intersections such as traffic lights, roundabouts, or street intersections. Each crime recorded by the Queensland Police was attached to the nearest street segment and then an aggregated by month over the 36-month study period. In total there are 626 street segments in Surfers Paradise of which approximately 70% (n=433) were included in the analysis after removing segments that were too short for meaningful analyses to be conducted. Of the street segments roughly 20% (n=84) contained at least one alcohol selling venue. We then observed the changes of crime patterns across street segments with and without alcohol selling venues to see if there were any crime reduction effects.

Interestingly only street segments that had a licensed venue saw a reduction of interpersonal violence in the first 12 months after banning orders were introduced. It wasn’t until after this 12-month period that a more widespread reduction of interpersonal violence was observed due to the introduction of ID scanning technology which allowed venue staff to better identify problematic patrons and be able to provide a safer environment for others in the area.

Unlike interpersonal violence there was no change in offending patterns for public disorder in the 12 months across all street segments. A small reduction in public order offending was seen across all street segments after the introduction of ID scanners. This is likely due to banning orders focusing largely on creating safer environments within a venue and not targeting public places.

The findings of this research provided theoretical and practical implications that can help further reduce crime in SNPs. Firstly, the research demonstrated that without the presence of an enforcement mechanism such as ID scanners it is hard to detect people who have been problematic in the past and are unable to make informed decisions about whether they should be granted entry into a licensed venue. This can be done with the ID scanners as they are all connected to a central database of all problematic patrons across the state and is not limited to staff’s personal knowledge of frequent troublemakers. Theoretically, the research has helped to demonstrate the diffusion of crime control benefits as the more time passes after the introduction of the intervention the benefits are seen in a wider area. This also has a flow on effect to deterrence literature to show that while there are penalties in place for certain crimes, individuals will not be suitably deterred until there is a mechanism in place to enforce the punishment.

These changes in legislation came after a lot of public attention was brought to interpersonal violence in and around night clubs after more ‘coward punches’ were resulting in deaths. The findings of this research can continue creating safer environments for people to enjoy a night out without a high risk of violence in the area. It also highlights the need for processes to be in place to enforce penalties in the surrounding area and not rely solely on the individual to follow any restrictions placed on them.

A Deterrence-Based Strategy to Reduce Driving Offences

This section will highlight deterrence research relating to each principle and policing strategies and enforcement for driving under the influence (‘DUI’) with a focus on drink driving. Australia’s approach to road safety enforcement is heavily influenced by key principles of deterrence theory, such as severe fines and a disqualified licence, to reduce benefits of engaging in the act.

The deterrence framework has been utilised by road policing scholars to determine if there is an impact on reducing illegal offending behaviour or perceptions of behaviour. Findings have been mixed but examined in the following contexts: drink driving (Freeman & Watson, 2006); drink and/or drug driving (Armstrong et al., 2018; Truelove et al., 2023); speeding (Truelove et al., 2017). Growing interest in deterrence and mobile phone use research includes phone use (Ehsani et al., 2014; McCartt et al., 2010, including social media application Snapchat while driving [Truelove et al., 2019a; Truelove, Oviedo-Trespalacios et al., 2021]), drivers’ uncertainty and perceptions on phone use (Kaviani et al., 2021; Truelove, Freeman et al., 2021), and use of mobile phones and the perception of risk information (Kaviani et al., 2022).

Research has also examined the effectiveness of policing enforcement tools and practices underpinned by deterrence theory to deter driving offences. These Australian studies assess the effectiveness of various road safety strategies that aim to detect and deter offending, including random breath tests (Homel, 1988), random drug testing (Watling et al., 2010), speed and red light cameras (Bates et al., 2020; Watson et al., 2015), legal and non-legal measures (Hassan et al., 2022), and mobile phone use cameras (Kaviani, et al., 2020a), and police patrol (Ogden et al., 2022). However, classical deterrence has not always been supported with scholars finding support for informal deterrence measures, such as internal loss (shame and guilt) or material loss to decrease offending (Hassan et al., 2022; see also Allen et al., 2017).

The objectives of certainty are to deter drink driving through the apprehension of the individual using police strategies, intervention, and campaigns. A random breath test (‘RBT’ or blood test; Queensland Police Service, 2024) is a key policing tool that increases certainty of punishment tool for drink driving by increasing the public’s perceptions of getting caught through various testing measures (Homel, 1988). RBTs are carried out during police duties (i.e., being stopped roadside), through coordinated roadside RBT) operations/blitz (i.e., visible mass testing roadblocks), and have expanded with mobile testing units (‘booze buses’; increase visibility and testing abilities) with coordinated intelligence efforts based on crash and offender hot spots (Queensland Police Service, cited in Davey & Freeman, 2011). All these measures provide police with the ability to test for drugs (random drug test; RDT; Queensland Government, 2021). Research is mixed on certainty of punishment and perceptions in predicting offending or future offending (see e.g., mixed: Owens & Boorman, 2011; high perceptual certainty: Freeman et al, 2016; Freeman et al., 2020), including young drivers (see e.g., lower perceptual certainty: Mills & Freeman, 2023). However, certainty of apprehension can be effective in reducing recidivism (Freeman & Watson, 2006) and reducing fatal crashes Homel (1994) speculates, particularly on holidays and Saturdays, after examining crash data following the introduction of RBTs.

Celerity of Punishment

In line with the principle of celerity, the impacts of punishment for drink driving are most effective when administered soon after the act (Homel, 1988). Drivers are charged and will receive an immediate licence suspension, which can vary in length of time depending on their range of drink driving offence (i.e., BAC range, failing to produce blood/breath sample, or dangerous DUI; Queensland Government, 2023a). Punishment is dependent on magistrates’ decision in court and therefore may be a lengthy process. This may have an impact on the deterrence on drink driving in the interim period subject to the charges. Swiftness is the least examined principle with findings suggesting that time is pivotal to deterrence in driving offenders (Freeman et al., 2016 Freeman et al., 2020; Yu & Wilford, 1995). Re-offending was more-likely if penalties were not administered within 6-months (Yu & Wilford, 1995), while drug driving offenders do not perceive sanctions to be swift but severe and certain (similar punishment procedure for drug driving; Davey et al., 2008).

The legal consequences for DUI are based on the level of substance present. In Queensland, penalties include fines, license suspension and/or disqualification, impounding car (in certain circumstances or BAC), or imprisonment (Queensland Government, 2023a). The severity of penalties imposed for DUI offences depends on the severity of intoxication of an offender (i.e., BAC range), prior driving history, and whether a first or repeat offender. Deterrence measures to reduce recidivism include education courses following disqualification and alcohol ignition interlock devices, with mid-range offenders now eligible under Queensland’s reforms (Bailey, 2021). Australia’s punishments align with the principle of proportionality as they escalate in severity relative to the level of intoxication, with incarceration being a measure of last resort. In contrast, internationally the most severe punishment of imprisonment, 2-day mandatory jail for first-time drunk drivers, had no significant effect on reoffending (Martin et al., 1993).

Overall, the effects of severe punishment for DUI offences have varied. Research into penalty increases to reduce reoffending has yielded mixed findings (see Weatherburn & Moffatt, 2011; Watson et al., 2015). Repeat offenders who perceive sanctions to be severe can be deterred from continuing behaviour (Freeman et al., 2006). Interlock devices are also effective while active in reducing drink driving (Rahman, (2022). Underpinned by severity and certainty for high-risk drink driving offences, an interlock breath test device will not allow a driver to start the car if alcohol is detected and may increase their probationary period (Queensland Government, 2023b).

Non-legal measures of deterrence reinforce the law through advertisements and campaigns highlighting the harms, risks, and consequences aimed at the severity, certainty of punishment and informal sanctions. Road safety messaging can be educational, emotive, fear-based, and coping appraisal (Cismaru et al., 2009; Homel, 1988; Lewis et al., 2007; Phillips et al., 2011). Similarly, campaigns often draw on severity and informal sanctions, such as shame, physical pain, and material loss. Campaigns targeting driver’s self-efficacy can be more effective than threat messages (severity and vulnerability; see review by Cismaru et al., 2009).

To reap the expected outcomes of classical deterrence, ensuring awareness of the likelihood of being caught is high, punishment is swift and severe is pivotal. However, perceptions of punishment may not align with the principles, reducing the deterrent effect.

THEORY CRITICISMS

Despite its foundational status in criminology, classical deterrence theory has faced much criticism. This next section will discuss several key criticisms of classical deterrence theory.

Classical deterrence theory has faced criticism for its overly simplistic approach to understanding criminal behaviour. Its view of offenders as rational actors who make calculated decisions to offend fails to consider a broad range of influences on human behaviour. Human behaviour is complex and is influenced by a myriad of factors, including social, psychological, biological, and environmental factors (Felson & Messner, 1996; Wikström and Treiber, 2007). By overlooking these complexities, classical deterrence theory provides a limited understanding of why individuals engage in criminal activities.

Another critique arises due to inconsistent empirical support for the effectiveness of deterrence-based strategies across the deterrence literature. Overall, the perceived certainty of being caught and punished has been found to play a more important role in deterrence, the impact of severity and celerity is less clear and varies across different contexts (Chaflin & McCrary, 2017; Donohue, 2009; Nagin, 2013; Pratt et al., 2006; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). These findings highlight the need for criminal justice policies to prioritise increasing the likelihood of punishment over imposing harsher penalties.

Critics argue that classical deterrence framework is overly dependent on formal sanctions, neglecting other potential mechanisms of social control. Similarly, deterrence studies have been criticised for their reliance on legal sanctions to evaluate deterrent effects (Simpson et al., 2014). This narrow focus overlooks the broader spectrum of non-legal sanctions that may influence deterrence outcomes, indicating a need for more comprehensive investigations into diverse forms of social control within deterrence frameworks.

Finally, there are concerns about how deterrence theory is applied in criminal justice systems, especially regarding policies that increase the severity of punishment. This focus has prompted some countries to adopt “tough on crime” strategies, which entail imposing excessively harsh penalties for certain offences. This trend is evident in the “three-strikes” laws in Western Australia and mandatory minimum sentencing in the Northern Territory, which remove judicial discretion by requiring the enforcement of severe penalties for certain repeat offences [4] . These policies raise significant ethical concerns regarding their impact on marginalised communities and the principles of fairness and justice within society (von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005). Not only have these policies failed to deter crime effectively (Nagin, 2013), but they have also contributed to the issue of mass incarceration (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2018; Tonry, 2014).

The criticisms against deterrence theory outlined in this section raise questions about its credibility as a key sentencing goal and framework underpinning criminal justice system policies (Frase, 1997).

FUTURE OF THE THEORY

Adapting and refining principles through integrated multidisciplinary perspectives.

In recent decades there has been increased scholarly effort to further reconceptualise the traditional deterrence doctrine to include new and relevant concepts. These adaptations integrate insights from various criminological perspectives, such as social learning theory, self-control theory, and economic theories (Stafford & Warr, 1993).

Social Learning Theory and Vicarious Deterrence

By drawing upon principles found in social learning theory, Stafford and Warr (1993) adapted the deterrence model to include vicarious deterrence alongside specific and general deterrence. Vicarious deterrence suggests that individuals can be deterred from committing crimes not only by their own experiences with punishment but also by observing the consequences faced by others for similar actions (Stafford & Warr, 1993). This challenges traditional views by highlighting the significance of learning from others’ outcomes in deciding whether to commit a crime. For more about social learning theory, check out Chapter 10.

Social Control Theory and Informal Sanctions

Another notable development of deterrence theory draws upon insights from social control theory to include informal sanctions as an additional cost considered in the decision-making process of potential offenders (Hirchi, 1969; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Informal sanctions involve the social and psychological consequences of not adhering to societal norms, such as shame, community disapproval (Sampson et al., 1997), or reputational damage (Coleman, 1988). This adaption expands the deterrence framework to encompass a broader range of deterrent factors beyond formal legal consequences. Scholars, such as Braithwaite (1985), have also explored the concept of reintegrative shaming (see Chapter 13) as a form of deterrence, emphasising the role of social disapproval and restoration of social bonds (see Chapter 10) in preventing recidivism and promoting compliance with legal norms.

To demonstrate real-world applications, reflect on how road safety campaigns utilise informal sanctions to discourage dangerous driving practices like driving under the influence and speeding. These campaigns effectively employ the social and emotional consequences of traffic violations on personal and community connections to foster compliance with road safety regulations (Allan et al., 2017; Homel, 1988). Education and awareness campaigns targeted at reducing traffic-related offences are examples of proactive informal sanctions designed to deter the community from engaging in unsafe and unlawful behaviours. To influence behaviour, campaigns target awareness of practices, punishment, and avoidance tactics used by drivers, and often communicate the potential consequences of offending. These campaigns focus not only on communicating the tangible risks associated with dangerous driving like injury or death but also depict informal costs like social shame associated with dangerous driving (see Owens & Boorman, 2011 pp. 10-11).

Economic Theories and Decision-Making Processes

Gary Becker’s (1968) economic approach to crime frames the decision-making process of engaging in criminal activities within the broader context of rational choice theory and economic analysis. This approach acknowledges a broader range of factors influencing criminal choices, beyond just the fear of punishment. It advocates for a strategic mix of legal penalties and socio-economic policy interventions aimed at reducing the attractiveness of criminal behaviour.

The advancements mentioned above broaden the scope of deterrence theory, deepening our understanding of the decision-making processes for criminal behaviour. These adaptations address multiple critiques of classical deterrence theory, leading to a resurgence of scholarly discussions and inquiry into its effectiveness as a framework for understanding and preventing crime.

Applications Beyond “Traditional Offences”

In recent years, deterrence theory has expanded its application beyond traditional crime, finding relevance in various domains and offences. The deterrence literature has expanded to include a broader range of non-traditional offences, such as environmental crime (Simpson et al., 2013), cybercrime (Bossler, 2019), terrorism (Kroenig & Pavel, 2012), and human rights violations (Kim & Sikkink, 2010). One notable area of advancement is the application of deterrence principles to corporate crime, where the focus shifts from individual offenders to organisations and their decision-making processes (Simpson et al., 2014).

These developments highlight the evolving nature of deterrence theory and its applicability across different contexts and enforcement actions, which may be underpinned by shame, vicarious punishment or injury, and therefore social learning. Harnessing a crime problem from a multi-disciplinary approach expands the boundaries of deterrence theory to better understand its effectiveness and abilities to leverage risk and benefits in altering the decision-making process.

In conclusion, classical deterrence theory has served as a cornerstone in understanding and shaping criminal justice systems globally. It offers a framework that emphasises the rational choice of potential offenders, highlighting the significance of punishment in influencing decision-making processes to prevent crime.

Throughout this chapter, we explored the evolution and application of classical deterrence theory, delving into its key concepts such as rational choice, general and specific deterrence, and the principles of punishment severity, swiftness, and certainty. We examined how these principles inform criminal justice policies, sentencing practices, and law enforcement strategies, emphasising the balance between deterrence and fairness within legal systems.

Despite facing criticism for oversimplification, mixed empirical support for its effectiveness, and an overreliance on formal sanctions, recent interdisciplinary insights have helped refine the deterrence doctrine to make it relevant in addressing contemporary challenges and diverse forms of criminal behaviour.

Check Your Knowledge

Discussion questions.

• How does rational choice theory explain human behaviour within the framework of classical deterrence theory?
• What are the concepts of specific deterrence and general deterrence within classical deterrence theory?
• What are some examples of how the principles of certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment are applied in Australian criminal justice policies?

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Queensland Police Service. (2024, 7 February). Drink driving .

Rahman, S. (2022). The effectiveness of alcohol interlocks in reducing repeat drink driving and improving road safety .

Ratcliffe, J. H., Taniguchi, T., Groff, E. R., & Wood, J. D. (2009). The Philadelphia foot patrol experiment: A randomized controlled trial of police patrol effectiveness in violent crime hotspots. Criminology, 47 (3), 795-831. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2009.00157.x

Redlich, A. D., & Summers, A. (2012). The effect of court appointed representation on criminal case outcomes: Evidence from Cook County, Illinois. Journal of Empirical Legal  Studies, 9 (4), 792-817. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2012.01257.x

Roberts, J. V. (2003). Public opinion and mandatory sentencing: A review of international findings. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 30 (4), 483-508.  https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854803253133

Roberts, J. V., & Stalans, L. J. (1997). Consistency and disparities in punishment. Social  Forces, 75 (4), 1207-1230. https://doi.org/10.2307/2580561

Sampson, R. J., Raudenbush, S. W., & Earls, F. (1997). Neighborhoods and violent crime: A multilevel study of collective efficacy. Science, 277 (5328), 918-924.  https://doi.org/10.1126/science.277.5328.918

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Simpson, S. S., & Koper, C. S. (1992). Deterring corporate crime. Criminology, 30 (3), 347-376. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1992.tb01108.x

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• Want to know more about Cesare Beccaria? Check out this video about him. ↵
• Jeremy Bentham is another interesting historical figure. Learn more about him here . ↵
• For a more in-depth discussion about proportionality, check out this video . ↵
• For more information about how the Serious Violent Offences Scheme worked in Queensland, check out this video . ↵

Introduction to Criminology and Criminal Justice Copyright © 2024 by Lucy Forrester and Carley Ruiz is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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6.3 Neoclassical Perspective

6.3.1 early origins of the neoclassical perspective.

If you recall from reading Chapter 3 , the classical school of criminology refers to the Enlightenment era philosophical writings of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers and social reformers such as Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. They argued that humans are rational and self-serving and that punishment should have a utilitarian (as opposed to symbolic) purpose, such as deterrence or incapacitation. Because the ideas outlined in the classical school emerged prior to the rise of positivism (the dawn of scientific empirical research), these ideas were never considered scientific theories and not actually tested.

Also, once positivism emerged, the theories that were fashionable tended to focus on biological explanations of criminal behavior, which contradicted ideas about free will. For this reason, the scientific tools of early positive school criminologists like Cesare Lombroso were focused on measuring and comparing observable physical characteristics among criminals and noncriminals. As you learned in Chapter 3 , there were many ethical and methodological issues with the studies of Lombroso and his contemporaries, and his ideas have been widely criticized in textbooks on criminology.

Unfortunately, the ideas of the classical school (such as deterrence and rational choice) were overlooked by social scientists until nearly two hundred years after they emerged. Starting in the 1960s, researchers such as Gibbs (1968) and others finally began to empirically test deterrence and rational choice theories. Neoclassical theories (a new look at the original classical theories) share elements of both the classical and positive schools because they highlight the role of free will, human agency, choice, and decision-making, while also emphasizing a scientific approach to evaluating their validity.

6.3.2 Deterrence Theory

According to the basic ideas of deterrence theory, if punishments are certain, swift, and proportionate to crime, then individuals will be scared away from criminal offending. Deterrence comes in two forms: general and specific. General deterrence  refers to circumstances in which individuals are discouraged from committing crime due to their perceptions of the certainty, swiftness, and severity of legal consequences. Specific deterrence  refers to circumstances in which individuals who were caught and punished are dissuaded from committing future offenses because of their personal experiences of those legal consequences.

Initially, researchers testing deterrence theory conducted studies relying on objective measures of apprehension and punishment. In other words, they looked at anonymous data of arrests and sentencing. These objective measures relied on administrative data from police or correctional agencies across numerous jurisdictions (e.g., states, cities) to measure the actual certainty and severity of punishment for different crimes. For example, Gibbs (1968) examined state-level data on the ratio of prison admissions to cases of reported homicide to measure the certainty of punishment, and the average length of prison sentences served for homicide to measure the severity of punishment. He then calculated the relationship between these measures of the certainty and severity of punishment compared to crime rates across the states.

This research revealed that, as predicted by deterrence theory, the severity and certainty of punishment were inversely related to crime rates; that is, states with higher certainty and severity of punishment had lower crime rates and states with lower certainty and severity of punishment had higher crime rates. This means it seemed to be working as theorized. Later research using similar methods confirmed a consistent deterrent effect of the certainty (or risk) of punishment on crime. However, many studies found that the severity of punishment was directly or positively correlated with crime rates—that is, states with higher severity of punishment had higher crime whereas states with lower severity of punishment had lower crime (Paternoster, 1987). This did not  support deterrence theory and what the classical school claimed would work to deter crime. Even though this is the opposite of what deterrence theory would predict, it is important to remember that in Beccaria’s original work, he said that increasing the certainty of legal consequences was far more important in the administration of justice than making sure the punishment was proportionate to the crime.

Later research relied on perceptual measures of punishment , or what people thought would happen to them if they were caught for committing a crime. These studies surveyed individuals and asked them about their perceptions of the certainty (and sometimes the severity) of punishment for hypothetical crimes. For example, to measure the certainty of punishment, Saltzman and colleagues (1982) asked participants, “Out of the next 100 people in (city name) who commit ‘crime x,’ how many do you think will be arrested?” Researchers using such perceptual measures would then analyze their relationships to self-reported crime (or intentions to offend). Like the earlier research that relied on objective measures, this body of research has also generated support for the certainty effect predicted by deterrence theory (Nagin, 1998). And as predicted by Beccaria and consistent with the earlier studies, perceived severity of punishment has generally had a weak relationship to crime (Paternoster, 1987; Apel & Nagin, 2011).

Over the past few decades, numerous scholars have tested propositions of deterrence theory and even made revisions to the theory. Stafford and Warr (1993), for example, reconceptualized general and specific deterrence theory using concepts such as direct (experienced) and indirect (observed) punishment and punishment avoidance. In doing so, they highlighted that deterrence is a learning process based on direct and vicarious experiences of not only being punished but also getting away with crime. Similarly, Paternoster (1987) and others (like Saltzman et al., 1982), have shown that perceptions of the risk and severity of punishment may be due to personal experiences of punishment and punishment avoidance.

Deterrence theory has obvious relevance to the administration of justice and criminal justice policy. Deterrence theory was especially popular among politicians and others during the “tough on crime” era of the 1980s and 1990s and is still used in political campaigns today. During the 1980s and 1990s, voters, legislators, and policymakers across the United States rejected the idea of rehabilitating individuals who had committed crimes. Instead, they began advocating for tougher sentences, longer terms of imprisonment, and other harsh penalties (like mandatory minimum sentences) with deterrence as their justification. Programs such as “Scared Straight” were designed and implemented to scare delinquent youth by confronting them with the harsh extremes of imprisonment, whereas other correctional programs (like boot camps) were designed to be as mentally and physically unpleasant as possible.

Unfortunately, the record on such “deterrence”-oriented programs is quite clear: increasing the harshness of punishment is an ineffective and inefficient approach to deter crime (Apel and Nagin, 2011). In other words, it does not work. Specifically, the evidence shows that, on average, incarceration has either no effect or actually increases crime, casting doubt on specific deterrence (Nagin, Cullen, & Jonson, 2009). Also, boot camps, Scared Straight, and other juvenile “awareness” programs have been shown to be ineffective at best and criminogenic (crime-generating) at worst (Mackenzie, 2006; Petrosino, et al., 2003). They make kids more  likely to commit crimes and to increase the frequency and violence of their criminal behavior.

Although it has often been deployed ineffectively in the past, there is some evidence that deterrence can work if designed appropriately. Think of cameras, patrol cars, or other tools that increase the perception of risk of receiving a citation for traffic violations such as speeding. As you have probably experienced, the presence of a camera or patrol car makes people slow down (at least until they are out-of-sight of the police car). This supports what Beccaria originally claimed – that the certainty of punishment is a far more effective deterrent than the severity of punishment. Other research has also shown that the certainty of apprehension has a stronger, larger, and more consistent impact on decreasing crime than the severity of punishment (Beccaria, 1764; Paternoster, 1987).

In addition to this, research shows that police crackdowns and other strategies that increase the certainty of apprehension are related to reduced crime. Probation programs that rely on frequent drug testing and swift, certain, and fair (SCF) sanctions for individuals who violate the conditions of their probation by using illicit drugs or alcohol (such as Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement) have been shown to reduce criminal reoffending (Kleiman, 2009).

In general, research has shown that increasing the actual or perceived risk of apprehension or punishment has at least a short-term deterrent effect on crime. Research is less clear about the longer-term effect of deterrence on crime, which we will discuss later in this chapter.

6.3.3 Rational Choice Perspective

Another prominent theory in the neoclassical school is the rational choice perspective rooted in the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. Like deterrence, rational choice has its origins in the classical school of criminology but was largely overlooked until the 1960s when it was revitalized by the economist Gary Becker (1968) and others. The main argument of the rational choice perspective is that offenders consider the potential costs and benefits of various courses of action before making decisions about whether to commit crimes. Costs include, but are not limited to, formal (legal) and informal (social disapproval) sanctions; and benefits include the variety of potential rewards from criminal behavior (like money, status, power).

In resurrecting the rational choice approach, Gary Becker (1968) argued that criminal behavior was like any other economic behavior, guided by the rational consideration of costs and benefits. The rational choice perspective was also elaborated in greater detail by Cornish and Clarke (1986) in their text The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending . In it, they argued for a distinction between criminal involvement (factors leading to an individual’s “readiness” to commit crime) and criminal events (factors influencing the commission of specific offenses), a greater emphasis on situational factors surrounding the criminal incident (such as lower surveillance), and more crime-specific analyses.

A related concept to rational choice is the notion of thoughtfully reflective decision-making  (TRDM) defined by Paternoster and Pogarsky (2009, p. 104–105). They said this TRDM is “the tendency of persons to collect information relevant to a problem or decision they must make, to think deliberately, carefully, and thoughtfully about possible solutions to the problem, apply reason to the examination of alternative solutions, and reflect back upon both the process and the outcome of the choice in order to assess what went right and what went wrong” (Paternoster & Pogarsky (2009, p. 104–105). In other words (and a much shorter description), TRDM “describes the process of good decision-making” (2009, p. 105).

This concept has been developed to understand the processes of how adults desist   from crime (stop committing more crimes), which we will discuss more in the section on developmental, life-course criminology below. What this perspective shares with the rational choice perspective is a unique portrait of human nature, one which depicts individuals as conscious, thinking, reasoning agents—who act deliberately, making decisions and choices in their lives. This portrait of human nature contrasts with many sociological and psychological theories, which place greater emphasis on the influence of structural factors (like poverty) on individuals’ lives and decision-making process.

The rational choice perspective became more popular and influential because of the frequent finding in studies testing deterrence theory. Scholars found that informal sanctions were more influential at influencing self-reported intentions to commit crime than formal, legal consequences (Pratt et al., 2008). In other words, people place greater value on job loss, a tarnished reputation, and harm to their relationships with significant others, than the actual legal consequences of committing crime.

Although it shares the same assumptions about human nature as deterrence theory, the rational choice perspective offers a broader framework for understanding criminal decision-making because it considers a broader array of influences than just criminal justice apprehension and punishment. It has been successfully revised to explain crime from a situational (as well as individual) perspective. This has been particularly useful for the development of practical solutions to address crime. Specifically, situational crime prevention techniques have been used widely in the public and private sectors to increase the risk of apprehension. Studies examining the use of lighting and security cameras show that both factors are associated with modest reductions in crime, consistent with arguments made by the rational choice perspective.

6.3.4 Licenses and Attributions for Neoclassical Perspective

“Neoclassical Perspective” by Mauri Matsuda is licensed under CC BY 4.0 .

 Introduction to Criminology Copyright © by Taryn VanderPyl. All Rights Reserved.

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