history of un preventive diplomacy essay

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH AND POLICY JOURNAL

A ‘HIGH-EFFICIENCY FACTOR JOURNAL’

An Open Access Article

Article History at IRPJ

United Nations Preventive Diplomacy: Evolution and Practice

Deryck FRITZ

Author’s Affiliation: (1) School of  Diplomacy and International Affairs, Pôle Universitaire Euclide (Euclid University), Bangui (Central African Republic) and Greater Banjul (Republic of the Gambia) / EUCLID Global Institute, Washington DC (United States)

Email: [email protected]

Corresponding Author:

Pr Devender BHALL, HDR 

Email: [email protected]

Violent conflict can have a devastating impact on individuals, communities and societies. This is evidenced by the destruction wrought by the two world wars, which claimed millions of lives, required billions of dollars for reconstruction of conflict-affected countries, and continues to have a profound physical and psychological impact on the international state system today. The United Nations is the principal international institution that emerged from the second World War, with the enormous responsibility to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” in accordance with the UN Charter. It has made concerted efforts in this regard, in terms of conflict prevention, conflict management and resolution, promoting human rights and fostering development. This paper examines the preventive diplomacy efforts of the UN, in cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations, in view of the increasing and diverse challenges faced by the Organization in today’s complex and interdependent world.

1. Introduction

There is an old saying that prevention is better than cure. Nowhere perhaps is this more pertinent than in the case of international peace and security. Violent conflict can have a devastating impact on individuals, communities and societies. This is evidenced by the destruction wrought by the two world wars, which claimed millions of lives, required billions of dollars for reconstruction of conflict-affected countries, and continues to have a profound physical and psychological impact on the international state system today.

The United Nations is the principal international institution that emerged from the second World War, with the enormous responsibility to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” in accordance with the UN Charter. It has made concerted efforts in this regard, in terms of conflict prevention, conflict management and resolution, promoting human rights and fostering development. This paper will examine the preventive diplomacy efforts of the UN in the view of the increasing and diverse challenges faced by the Organization in today’s complex and interdependent world.

2.      Background

2.1.  early prevention efforts.

The end of World War II heralded the introduction of a new international architecture for conflict prevention, based on the foundation set out in the UN Charter, and aimed at “reducing the risks of interstate conflict” [1]. Chapter I, Article 1 of the Charter states that the main conflict prevention objectives of the UN are “to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and . . . to bring about by peaceful means . . . adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace” [2].

Initially, peacekeeping missions were deployed to monitor interstate ceasefires (Israel and Lebanon, 1948; India and Pakistan 1949). However, towards the end of the cold war in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the emphasis shifted towards resolving intrastate conflicts and ending civil wars. The associated approaches included mediation of political settlements, and greater investment in peacekeeping operations to implement the agreements, as in the case of Cambodia and Mozambique. A preventive approach placed a greater emphasis on prevention of further escalation of conflict rather than preventing the outbreak of the conflict in the first place, or addressing its root causes. It was therefore not surprising that in several cases, there was a recurrence of conflict, often with devastating consequences in terms of loss of life, property and livelihoods.

2.2.  The Agenda for Peace

In 1992, there was a renewed focus on the prevention efforts of the UN. The Secretary-General’s report, An Agenda for Peace , presented the following definition of the preventive diplomacy: “action to prevent disputes arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” [3]. The report introduced the term “post-conflict peacebuilding,” which was defined as “comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people” [4].

However, the inability of the UN to adequately respond to the conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia highlighted the ineffectiveness in the prevention capacity of the UN, and in particular of the Security Council. The first comprehensive report by a Secretary-General focused solely on conflict prevention was produced in 2001. This report made the distinction between operational prevention (actions taken in an immediate conflict), and structural prevention (longer-term actions aimed at addressing root causes of conflict) [5]. Later that year, the unfortunate attacks of 9/11 would take place, resulting is a shift of focus of the Security Council from conflict prevention to counter-terrorism.

At the World Summit in 2005, world leaders made a commitment “to promote a culture of prevention of armed conflict as a means of addressing the interconnected security and development challenges faced by peoples throughout the world, as well as to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations for the prevention of armed conflict” [6]. The 2005 World Summit established the Peacebuilding Commission as an “intergovernmental advisory body” [7], supported the Secretary-General’s efforts to strengthen his mediation capacities, and endorsed the concept of the “Responsibility to Protect” [8].

2.3.  Towards Sustaining Peace

Globalization and the increasing interdependence of the world has brought with it a change in the nature and causes of conflict. Today’s conflicts are no longer interstate, but are also intrastate, and do not only involve conventional military forces. The combatants also include non-state actors, who have “transnational goals” [9]. Many of these conflicts also risk spilling over into neighboring countries, and so the internationalization of domestic conflicts is of primary concern.

The international conflict prevention architecture is currently confronted by other “new and complex challenges [that] have arisen since the end of the Cold War that range from terrorism and violent extremism to cybersecurity, from climate change to massive forced displacement, and from global illicit activities to outbreaks of disease” [10]. In August 2007, a presidential statement of the Security Council noted that conflict prevention strategies should incorporate systemic prevention (measures taken to address transnational threats, and “to prevent existing conflicts from spilling over into other States” [11]). The need to address these challenges adequately prompted three reviews of the UN’s peace and security architecture in 2015: the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO); the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) review of the peacebuilding architecture; and the Global Study on Women, Peace and Security.

Activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict . . . and should flow through all three pillars of the United Nation’s engagement [peace and security, human rights and sustainable development] at all stages of conflict.

The Global Study on Women, Peace and Security, which looked at both operational and structural causes of conflict, reaffirmed the link between peace and development, and called on the UN to “support women’s engagement . . . in preventive diplomacy efforts” [15]. In 2015, the UN General Assembly also adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which consists of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Included among these is Goal 16, which again emphasized sustainable development as a prerequisite for peace and vice versa: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

3.      Examples of UN Preventive Diplomacy

3.1.  un in the lead.

UN preventive diplomacy is an aspect of conflict prevention that is a “means to engage with individual actors” and to “influence their strategies in situations at risk of conflict” [16]. UN preventive diplomacy interventions include 1) undertaking good offices; 2) supporting domestic and regional prevention; and 3) international coordination. The good offices activities include engaging with the parties to find peaceful solutions, facilitation of dialogue, and mediation [17].

In Burkina Faso in 2014, following an attempted coup by former members of the presidential against the transitional authorities, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the UN Regional Office for West Africa (UNOWA) together with ECOWAS engaged with the coup leaders to convince them that “they did not enjoy political support.” They also worked with national political actors and civil society organizations to engage in dialogue. These efforts by a UN Special envoy, along with unified messages from the regional political actors and the international community, supported by staff from UN HQ, ensured timely preventive diplomacy intervention. This led to a revised constitution and restored transitional arrangements leading to successful elections in 2015 [18].

In Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy (UNRCCA), and in coordination with the EU, OSCE and the UN Country Team supported the efforts of a UN Special Envoy, who had been sent to address a political and humanitarian crisis there. The conditions of instability were caused by “nationalist, extremist and criminal groups” in the south of the country, as well as by clashes between the most populous ethnic groups, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks [19]. The joint efforts involved “capacity-building . . . facilitating regional dialogues, especially around terrorism, water and energy; and providing aid to displaced Uzbeks” [20]. This allowed for the de-escalation of tensions and the creation of an environment for a reform process and eventual elections.

Within weeks of the protests that claimed several lives in Malawi in 2011, the Secretary General dispatched an Envoy to the Southern African nation. The work of the Envoy, which was supported by analysis provided by the UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative on the ground, involved engaging with the Government and civil society to desist from activities that would escalate the conflict. Moreover, both parties were persuaded “to accept a UN-facilitated dialogue,” and the subsequent discussion of the procedural aspects of which were facilitated by the UN Resident Coordinator, until such time as an external facilitator could be identified [21].

3.2.  UN in Support

The UN also plays an important role in support of preventive diplomacy efforts of regional and sub-regional organizations. In the wake of the post-electoral violence and loss of life in Kenya in 2007, the African Union appointed a mediation team to help the parties to find a way out of the conflict. As a member of the technical support team for these talks, I personally witnessed the UN System, both in Nairobi and in New York, heavily supporting the mediation efforts of the AU team through the provision of political and humanitarian analysis, electoral technical advice, as well as financial and material resources. The UN team also coordinated with the technical support teams from the AU and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in the provision of secretariat services to the mediation team.

In Yemen in 2011, a youth uprising demanding the resignation of the country’s president turned violent after lethal force was used by the government. This led to an agreement in principle by the President to step down, and a subsequent initiative by the Gulf Cooperation Council to assist the Yemenis in drafting an agreement on the terms of the president’s departure. However, there was no implementation plan for the agreement. The Secretary-General sent a Special Advisor to Yemen, who assessed that “the UN’s added value lay in helping develop an [inclusive] implementation plan” [22]. The Special Advisor coordinated with GCC, keeping the Security Council informed, resulting in the passing of a SC resolution on October 2011 that “urged the parties to comply with the terms of the GCC initiative,” and the implementation plan. Three months later, after the holding of elections, the President finally stepped down, transferring power to his deputy.

4.      UN Preventive Diplomacy Tools

While the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the International Court of Justice all have important roles in the prevention of conflict, it is the Security Council and Secretariat that bear the brunt of the burden in the UN’s preventive diplomacy. The UN Security Council has several tools at its disposal for taking preventive action, one of which is the visiting Security Council mission. In this regard, all or part of the membership of the Security Council may undertake visits to countries at risk of conflict, for the purposes of “information gathering, support for peace operations and peace processes, conflict mediation and preventive diplomacy” [23].

Article 34 of the UN Charter gives the Security Council the mandate to “investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute” [24]. Actions under this mandate include “commissions of inquiry, Council fact-finding missions and the establishment of investigatory subcommittees of the Council” [25]. Another set of tools available to the Council under Article 41 of the Charter are sanctions, which can be applied to influence the behavior of parties in order to prevent armed conflict. The Council also created the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and through the twin resolutions on sustaining peace have created a framework for greater engagement between the Council and the PBC.

The UN Secretariat, for its part, employs a diverse range of mechanisms in its conflict prevention toolkit, including special envoys (senior diplomats deployed by the Secretary-General to resolve a diverse array of disputes); special political missions (ensuring sustained preventive efforts in a country, across a range of disciplines); and peacekeeping operations (integrated civilian, police and military operations aimed at providing security, political and peacebuilding support) [26].

Regional offices (platforms for preventive diplomacy, supporting national actors, UN Country Teams, and regional organizations); standby mediation experts (senior mediation practitioners able to deploy at 72 hours’ notice); UN country teams (the UN in-country presence of agencies, funds and programmes); and Resident Coordinators (senior UN officials who coordinate the efforts of the UN Country Team) provide the requisite country-specific and technical expertise that is required to support preventive diplomacy initiatives [27].

Other tools at the disposal of the UN Secretariat include electoral assistance (electoral experts deployed to support the conduct of credible elections); gender and inclusion expertise (experts deployed to ensure gender mainstreaming and inclusion in the national social and political processes); and political and human rights analysts (providing analytical capacity where there are risks of serious human rights violations). Sanctions monitoring groups (Panels of Groups of Experts deployed to monitor implementation of sanctions regimes) are also employed in particular circumstances [28].

5.      Obstacles to Effective Preventive Diplomacy

While the importance of conflict prevention is undeniable, the effectiveness of the UN’s preventive diplomacy efforts has come under question following outbreaks of violent conflict around the world. According to the UN/World Bank report, “Data suggest that, while diplomatic engagement is the most common form of international recourse in violent conflict, evidence of its ability to halt the outbreak of conflict is mixed” [29].

There exist several challenges to the UN’s efforts at preventive diplomacy. Within the Security Council, for example, divisions exist over the extent to which there can be “external involvement to prevent or mitigate conflict,” given that the UN Charter places a great deal of importance on the issue of state sovereignty [30]. Some Security Council members who agree with this view, believe that such interventions “can have the effect of exacerbating instability and conflict,” and are suspicious of the motives of the proponents of intervention [31]. Critics of this viewpoint suggest that this is simply a way to “protect . . . allies from international scrutiny.”  The political interests of Security Council members, especially when “one or more . . . is party to a conflict or provides support to one of the parties,” have therefore also inhibited timely prevention efforts in several conflict situations [32].

The report of the Advisory Group of Experts highlighted several challenges to effective peacebuilding by the UN, several of which also apply specifically to preventive diplomacy activities. The fragmentation of the UN System, with responsibilities distributed among the various Departments, Agencies, Funds and Programmes, as well as those between the Headquarters and field levels, is seen as one of the contributors to the ineffectiveness of effective peacebuilding. The UN has fallen short in its efforts to “Deliver as One,” and has continued to work in silos [33].

The AGE report also cited the insufficient institutional focus on conflict prevention, as well as a lack of women’s political participation. It also highlighted the positioning of the UN with regard to national leaders, noting that it is counter-productive for the UN to align itself to leaders “whose strategies and interests proved not to be aligned with peacebuilding,” at the expense of engaging with “broader domestic constituencies” [34].

Another factor that can inhibit the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy is the number of parties involved, each having its own diverse agenda. According to the UN/World Bank report, “the breadth and complexity of the conflict [in Yemen, for example] and the multiplicity of actors involved have defied long-standing efforts to secure lasting peace” [35].

6.      Effective UN Preventive Diplomacy

6.1.  understanding escalation.

Nathan et al point out that, in order to succeed, “preventive diplomacy actors must have a very good understanding of the conflict parties’ perspectives on violent and non-violent courses of action” [36]. They add that the context in which these actors operate (power structures, economic relations, social norms and ideology) impacts their behavior, and that violence is a chosen response to the prevailing social, economic and political conditions.

The authors describe the elements of an escalatory dynamic: 1) action-reaction; 2) growing polarization; 3) intense mistrust; 4) inflammatory threats; and 5) mutual demonization, which also influence the choice of the actors to take a path towards violence. Preventive diplomacy aims to assist parties to exit the escalatory dynamic and to “re-calibrate their cost-benefit analysis in favor of a non-violent course of action” [37].

6.2.  Prerequisites for Prevention

In their paper on conflict prevention, Day and Fong [38] identify five variables as being necessary for effective preventive diplomacy: 1) consent of the conflict actors; 2) timing of the diplomatic intervention; 3) the situational knowledge and associated relationships; 4) leverage available to be applied on the conflict actors; and 5) sustainability.

UN preventive diplomacy requires the “willingness of the parties to a dispute to permit the UN to play a part in resolving it,” otherwise known as their consent. Where this consent is not readily achieved, as a result of sovereignty concerns or other factors, the UN can continue to gradually work towards generating it, slowly “building the trust  and the space to engage” [39].

Regarding timing of the diplomatic intervention, the authors make use of a model developed by Gowan on the stages of escalation from pre-conflict to conflict. These comprise: “1) ‘latent tension,’ in which potential causes of conflict have been identified; 2) ‘rising tension,’ in which conflict is emerging and violence is spreading; 3) ‘decision points,’ when actors are on the verge of deciding for or against violence; and 4) ‘post-decision points,’ when actors have entered into either all-out violent conflict or fragile settlements” [40]. They suggest that preventive diplomacy has a unique potential for greater impact in stages two and three.

Day and Fong also point to the importance of an on-the-ground presence, mediator credibility, frank communication and engagement with all the parties, as critical to enhancing local knowledge and building the necessary relationships required for successful preventive diplomacy. The UN regional offices, Resident Coordinators and the UN Country Teams have been important platforms for ensuring the on-the-ground presence. Given the personal nature of diplomacy, mediators with situational knowledge and existing relationships with the actors prior to the crisis will have greater credibility [41]. The mediators should also possess very good communication, coordination and persuasion skills, and should adopt a “non-threatening, discreet posture, avoiding public criticism of the conflict parties” [42]. However, their pre-existing relationships with the parties can be used to facilitate candid exchanges with the actors on the options available as a result of their actions. Also, as the authors also point out, “Diplomacy can no longer afford to be state- or elite-centric, it must also account for a broader range of actors who can influence the trajectory of a conflict” [43].

With regard to leverage, the authors suggest that this is less of a requirement when parties are “looking for a [peaceful] way out” [44], in which case “discreet good offices” may suffice. However, if “their motivations . . . are pulling them towards violent conflict rather than away from it,” then forms of leverage – including “incentives and inducements” all the way to coercive measures, such as “sanctions, threats of prosecution by the International Criminal Court, or military intervention – may be applied. However, caution is advised in the application of coercive measures, as there is an accompanying risk of unexpected negative consequences, including escalation of the conflict. Instead, others suggest that “the deployment of UN resources and technical expertise can constitute soft leverage in support of UN diplomacy” [45]. In this regard, examples of possible entry points could be through support to elections, or UN development projects [46].

The last variable, sustainability, is critical in avoiding the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict. The authors stress that “preventive diplomacy . . . should remain largely focused on agency and the core tasks of persuasion and political deal-making. At the same time these efforts should be linked to longer-term arrangements that can engage society more broadly in addressing underlying drivers such as inequality, relative poverty and exclusion” [47]. They suggest that 1) maintaining a supportive political constellation of regional and international actors; 2) achieving the buy-in of all conflict-affected parties; and 3) linking the political process with development, and thus “including development actors in crafting a diplomatic engagement and vice-versa, involving the political pillar more systematically in longer-term development planning” [48].

7.      Conclusion

Today’s conflicts are complex, with a multiplicity of actors, each with competing interests and claims to legitimacy. Nor is it a straightforward affair of one traditional state army against another, fighting across borders. Today’s conflicts are largely intrastate, and in some cases, involve proxies, funded and equipped by governments with their own agendas. However, regardless of its nature and form, the common thread is the adverse and debilitating consequences of violent conflict on the societies directly affected. And it is here that the UN, as well as other regional and sub-regional organizations have a responsibility to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict.

We have seen that there are several factors that work against the UN’s preventive diplomacy effectiveness. These include Security Council disunity and political interests, UN system fragmentation, lack of inclusivity in the interventions, particularly of women and affected constituencies. At the same time, there have been successes in places where these obstacles have been overcome like Burkina Faso, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi and Yemen. However, these achievements have not prevented the recurrence of violence in Kenya in the 2017 elections or in the civil war that continues in Yemen. Conflicts are also ongoing in Libya, South Sudan and Syria, which indicate that there is still a lot or work to be done by the UN and other preventive diplomacy actors.

The good news is that the UN continues to evaluate its performance in this area, and lessons continue to be learned. The adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the recent restructuring of the UN Secretariat Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and Peace Operations, are signs that the Organization is slowly moving away from the fragmentation that has plagued its existence and towards a unified approach across its peace and security, human rights and development pillars. Action must now speak louder than words, because it is what those most affected by conflict are demanding.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Acknowledgment

I wish to acknowledge the support and direction provided by EUCLID University towards the completion of this paper.

• Day, Adam, and Alexandra Pichler Fong. “Diplomacy and Good Offices in the Prevention of Conflict – United Nations University Centre for Policy Research.” Last modified 2017. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://cpr.unu.edu/diplomacy-and-good-offices-in-the-prevention-of-conflict.html.
• Nathan, Laurie, Adam Day, Joao Honwana, and Rebecca Brubaker. “Capturing UN Preventive Diplomacy Success: How and Why Does It Work? – United Nations University Centre for Policy Research.” Last modified 2018. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://cpr.unu.edu/capturing-un-preventive-diplomacy-success-how-and-why-does-it-work.html.
• Security Council Report. “Can the Security Council Prevent Conflict? : Research Report : Security Council Report.” Last modified 2017. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/can-the-security-council-prevent-conflict.php.
• United Nations. “2005 World Summit Outcome Document (16 September 2005) | United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination.” Last modified 2005. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://www.unsystem.org/content/2005-world-summit-outcome-document-16-september-2005.
• United Nations. “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Report of the Secretary-General – United Nations and the Rule of Law.” Last modified 1992. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/an-agenda-for-peace-preventive-diplomacy-peacemaking-and-peace-keeping-report-of-the-secretary-general/.
• United Nations. “Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 | UN Women.” Last modified 2015. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://wps.unwomen.org/.
• United Nations. “Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General (A/55/985-S/2001/574) – World.” ReliefWeb. Last modified 2001. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/prevention-armed-conflict-report-secretary-general-a55985-s2001574.
• United Nations. “Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture.” PeaceWomen. Last modified 2016. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://www.peacewomen.org/resource/report-advisory-group-experts-review-peacebuilding-architecture.
• United Nations. “Report of the Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations.” United Nations Peacekeeping. Last modified 2015. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-high-level-panel-peace-operations.
• United Nations. “S/RES/2282 : UN Documents : Security Council Report.” Last modified 2016. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/sres2282.php.
• United Nations. “Statements Made by the President of the Security Council in 2007 | United Nations Security Council.” Last modified 2007. Accessed October 26, 2019. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/statements-made-president-security-council-2007.
• United Nations. “UN Charter (Full Text).” Last modified April 15, 2016. Accessed March 16, 2019. http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/.
• United Nations. “United Nations Conflict Prevention and Preventive Diplomacy in Action | Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.” Last modified 2018. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://dppa.un.org/en/united-nations-conflict-prevention-and-preventive-diplomacy-action.
• United Nations, and World Bank. “Pathways for Peace : Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict.” Last modified 2018. Accessed October 20, 2019. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337.
• United Nations and World Bank, “Pathways for Peace : Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” 231, last modified 2018, accessed October 20, 2019 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28337.
• United Nations, “UN Charter (Full Text),” 1, last modified April 15, 2016, accessed March 16, 2019, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/.
• United Nations, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Report of the Secretary-General – United Nations and the Rule of Law,” 5, last modified 1992, accessed October 20, 2019, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/an-agenda-for-peace-preventive-diplomacy-peacemaking-and-peace-keeping-report-of-the-secretary-general/.
• United Nations, “Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General (A/55/985-S/2001/574) – World,” ReliefWeb, 7, last modified 2001, accessed October 20, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/prevention-armed-conflict-report-secretary-general-a55985-s2001574.
• United Nations, “2005 World Summit Outcome Document (16 September 2005) | United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination,” 21, last modified 2005, accessed October 20, 2019, https://www.unsystem.org/content/2005-world-summit-outcome-document-16-september-2005.
• United Nations and World Bank, “Pathways for Peace : Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” 237.
• United Nations, “Statements Made by the President of the Security Council in 2007 | United Nations Security Council,” 2, last modified 2007, accessed October 26, 2019, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/statements-made-president-security-council-2007.
• United Nations, “Report of the Independent High-Level Panel on Peace Operations,” United Nations Peacekeeping, 16, last modified 2015, accessed October 20, 2019, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/report-of-independent-high-level-panel-peace-operations.
• Security Council Report, “Can the Security Council Prevent Conflict? : Research Report : Security Council Report,” 10, last modified 2017, accessed October 20, 2019, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/can-the-security-council-prevent-conflict.php.
• United Nations, “S/RES/2282 : UN Documents : Security Council Report,” 2, last modified 2016, accessed October 20, 2019, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/sres2282.php.
• United Nations, “Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 | UN Women,” 399, last modified 2015, accessed October 20, 2019, https://wps.unwomen.org/.
• Adam Day and Alexandra Pichler Fong, “Diplomacy and Good Offices in the Prevention of Conflict – United Nations University Centre for Policy Research,” 2, last modified 2017, accessed October 20, 2019, https://cpr.unu.edu/diplomacy-and-good-offices-in-the-prevention-of-conflict.html.
• Laurie Nathan et al., “Capturing UN Preventive Diplomacy Success: How and Why Does It Work? – United Nations University Centre for Policy Research,” 2, last modified 2018, accessed October 20, 2019, https://cpr.unu.edu/capturing-un-preventive-diplomacy-success-how-and-why-does-it-work.html.
• United Nations, “United Nations Conflict Prevention and Preventive Diplomacy in Action | Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs,” 6–7, last modified 2018, accessed October 20, 2019, https://dppa.un.org/en/united-nations-conflict-prevention-and-preventive-diplomacy-action.
• United Nations and World Bank, “Pathways for Peace : Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” 242.
• Nathan et al., “Capturing UN Preventive Diplomacy Success: How and Why Does It Work? – United Nations University Centre for Policy Research,” 25–26.
• Security Council Report, “Can the Security Council Prevent Conflict? : Research Report : Security Council Report,” 14.
• United Nations, “United Nations Conflict Prevention and Preventive Diplomacy in Action | Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs,” 4–5.
• United Nations and World Bank, “Pathways for Peace : Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict,” 244.
• Security Council Report, “Can the Security Council Prevent Conflict? : Research Report : Security Council Report,” 4.
• United Nations, “Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture,” PeaceWomen, 25–26, last modified 2016, accessed October 20, 2019, https://www.peacewomen.org/resource/report-advisory-group-experts-review-peacebuilding-architecture.
• Nathan et al., “Capturing UN Preventive Diplomacy Success: How and Why Does It Work? – United Nations University Centre for Policy Research,” 8.
• Day and Fong, “Diplomacy and Good Offices in the Prevention of Conflict – United Nations University Centre for Policy Research,” 2.
• Nathan et al., “Capturing UN Preventive Diplomacy Success: How and Why Does It Work? – United Nations University Centre for Policy Research,” 12.
• Day and Fong, “Diplomacy and Good Offices in the Prevention of Conflict – United Nations University Centre for Policy Research,” 6.
• Nathan et al., “Capturing UN Preventive Diplomacy Success: How and Why Does It Work? – United Nations University Centre for Policy Research,” 11.
• Day and Fong, “Diplomacy and Good Offices in the Prevention of Conflict – United Nations University Centre for Policy Research,” 9.

Table of Contents

RECENT ARTICLES:

The Case for Privacy in Diplomatic Negotiations: Lessons from the 1787 Constitutional Convention, the 1993 Oslo Accords, and the 1998 Good Friday Accords

ABSTRACT Transparency has come to be the hallmark of liberal democratic government. Inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” Speech, “open contracts, openly arrived at” is

Challenges and Strategies for Improving Hemophilia Care in Refugee Settings: A Comprehensive Examination from Health Systems, Humanitarian, Legal, and Healthcare Innovation Perspectives

ABSTRACT This paper addresses the critical healthcare challenges faced by refugees, particularly the management of chronic conditions like hemophilia, in the context of displacement due

Strengthening Public Sector Health Systems For Global Progress. Are There Lessons To Be Learned From Rwanda?

ABSTRACT One challenge experienced by health systems globally is the management of complex and changing health needs in areas of constrained resources. Building and strengthening

COP 28 – The First Global Stocktake – A Ray of Hope

ABSTRACT One of the key aspects of The Paris Agreement is to establish a method to evaluate the progress of collective efforts to meet the

Law and Regulations for Deep-Sea Mining: Following the Guidance of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

ABSTRACT The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets the guidelines for the care of the world’s oceans. This article will

Implications of Neurocognitive Impairment-Associated Neglected Tropical Diseases in Migrant Children Upon Settlement in a New Host Country

ABSTRACT This paper focuses on the critical yet often overlooked issue of Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs), particularly those that lead to Neurocognitive Impairment (NCI-NTDs), in

Publisher information: The Intergovernmental Research and Policy Journal (IRPJ) is a unique interdisciplinary peer-reviewed and open access Journal. It operates under the authority of the only global and treaty-based intergovernmental university in the world (EUCLID), with other intergovernmental organizations in mind. Currently, there are more than 17,000 universities globally, but less than 15 are multilateral institutions, EUCLID, as IRPJ’s sponsor, is the only global and multi-disciplinary UN-registered treaty-based institution.

IRPJ authors can be assured that their research will be widely visible on account of the trusted Internet visibility of its “.int” domain which virtually guarantees first page results on matching keywords ( .int domains are only assigned by IANA  to vetted treaty-based organizations and are recognized as trusted authorities by search engines). In addition to its “.int” domain, IRPJ is published under an approved  ISSN for intergovernmental organizations  (“international publisher”) status (also used by United Nations, World Bank, European Space Agency, etc.).

IRPJ offers:

• United Nations Treaty reference on your published article (PDF).
• “Efficiency” driven and “author-focused” workflow
• Operates the very novel author-centric metric of “Journal Efficiency Factor”
• Minimal processing fee with the possibility of waiver
• Dedicated editors to work with graduate and doctoral students
• Continuous publication i.e., publication of articles immediately upon acceptance
• The expected time frame from submission to publication is up to 40 calendar days
• Broad thematic categories
• Every published article will receive a DOI from Crossref and is archived by CLOCKSS.

Copyright © 2020 IRPP et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

The appropriate office and officer will reply within 2 business days. If calling a EUCLID office, make sure to call the correct location based on your profile.

The application review process takes 4-6 business days after receipt of form and file.

EUCLID (Pôle Universitaire Euclide |Euclid University) A treaty-based organization with international liaison and representative offices in: New York, Washington DC, Montpellier (France)

Headquarters: Bangui, Central African Republic Commonwealth / ECOWAS Headquarters: Banjul, The Gambia

Studying with EUCLID

• Ph.D. / Doctorate
• Master's degrees
• Bachelor's degrees
• Habilitation and Post-Doc
• Specialized Certificates

Quick Access

• Tuition and Fees
• Scholarship Programs
• News and Events
• Faculty Profiles

Legal Protection Switzerland

About EUCLID

• Legal Status
• Accreditation
• Offices and HQs
• Annual Reports

The EUCLID Charter in UNTS

IRPJ: A PEER-REVIEWED ACADEMIC JOURNAL SPONSORED BY AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION UNDER UN-PUBLISHED TREATY MANDATE

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.

• Preventive Diplomacy at the UN

In this Book

• Bertrand G. Ramcharan. Foreword by Leon Gordenker
• Published by: Indiana University Press
• Series: United Nations Intellectual History Project Series

Table of Contents

• Series Editors’ Foreword
• pp. xvii-xviii
• Preface and Acknowledgments
• pp. xix-xxi
• List of Abbreviations
• pp. xxiii-xxiv
• Secretaries-General on Preventive Diplomacy
• pp. xxv-xxvii
• Introduction
• 1 Preventive Diplomacy in the Concert of Europe, the Hague Peace Conferences, the League of Nations, and the UN Charter
• 2 UN Policies and Doctrines of Preventive Diplomacy
• 3 The Practice of Preventive Diplomacy by the Security Council
• 4 The Practice of Preventive Diplomacy by the Secretaries-General
• 5 Preventive Diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis
• pp. 105-116
• 6 The Practice of Preventive Diplomacy by Representatives of the Secretary-General and UN Subregional Offices
• pp. 117-137
• 7 The Preventive Role of UN Peacekeepers and Observers
• pp. 138-148
• 8 Preventive Diplomacy in the Economic, Social, Human Rights,and Humanitarian Fields
• pp. 149-174
• 9 Preventive Diplomacy in an Age of Genocide, Terrorism, and Nontraditional Threats to Security
• pp. 175-193
• 10 Cooperative Preventive Diplomacy with Regional and Subregional Organizations
• pp. 194-208
• Conclusion: Some Thoughts for the Future
• pp. 209-216
• pp. 217-244
• pp. 245-262
• About the Author
• pp. 263-264
• About the United Nations Intellectual History Project
• pp. 265-266

Additional Information

THE UNITED NATIONS: From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy

Related Papers

Dawit berihun

JOURNAL OF “HISTORY OF SCIENCE”

Ramile Dadaşova

The veto right of the permanent members of UN is one of the worst gaps of the SC and this power made the organization non-democratic. Permanent members use the veto power as a political weapon against each other. Permanent members, based on geopolitical interests, impede the process of resolving conflicts. As a result, double standards arise in the activities of states using the veto right to ensure their interests, and the principle of the sovereign equality of states is violated. Countries with veto power use all legal and illegal means to realize their claims, while the principles arising from the norms of international law are sometimes of secondary importance. The second, permanent and temporary members of the SC are selected according to the Cold War period’s regions. Two permanent members of the SC are the Western European states. They are Great Britain and France. Africa, Latin America and Caribbean region don’t have permanent representatives, although the second one is the second most dense continent. No any Muslim country has permanent membership right in the Security Council. The third, increase of armament, interest of selling weapons to the conflicting countries prevents the SC to fulfill its role on adjustment of conflicts. The permanent members of the Security Council have more weapons and they have interests in selling their weapons to conflicting states. Therefore, it is not helpful for them to resolve conflicts quickly. The fourth, there is inequality between numbers of members of the SC and GA. The UN has 193 members. The Security Council is represented by 15 states. Five permanent members have the veto right. Veto right restricts rights of other states. Decisions are made in the interests of permanent members.

International Journal

David Malone

Z. Kembayev, ‘The UN Security Council Reform: An Analysis and A New Proposal for Twenty-First Century’ 35 International Law News 13-16

Zhenis Kembayev

Valeriu Mija

The research presents an empirical analysis of the United Nations Security Council weakness and deficiencies. The study was focused on the UN Security Council performance in the period of an international crisis or of a necessity to functionally solve an international conflict or humanitarian catastrophe. The analysis demonstrates that the UN is perceived as the primary global collective security organization to safeguard security and preserve stability in the world. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council has demonstrated deficiencies during latest important international crises to be solved by joint international effort, which almost approached current international order to a revision. The analysis demonstrated that the UN formation overcame deficiencies and weaknesses of the previous international collective security organizations – the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations. Meanwhile, the principal decision-making mechanism of the UN – Security Council with the veto right of five permanent members – periodically undermines collective security principles. Several important factors amplify this weakness: lack of common identity among the UN Security Council members, domination of the neo-realism paradigm provisions in their foreign policies, and different views on international law provisions: internal sovereignty versus necessity of humanitarian intervention. Therefore, powerful actors of international order should consider these deficiencies and launch a comprehensive reform of the UN decision making process to better react at least in international humanitarian crises. Otherwise, the UN may experience the fate of the League of Nations.

UNITAR Multilateral Diplomacy Summer School–Student Papers

Adérito Vicente

This policy paper explores both the concept and the reform of the veto power, as well as the attempts that have been made to allow more countries the power to veto, along with a conceptual analysis of the arguments for and against extending this power to other UN members. This paper proceeds through three main sections. The first section analyses the concept of the veto power, and demonstrates how the use of veto is now distinct from that initial reason and how this power has turned into a device for protecting national interests of P5 or their strategic allies. The second sec-tion looks through the history of the efforts to reform the undemocratic structure of the UNSC and examines the main impediments towards the reform of the Security Council. The third section indicates a detailed recommendation for specific steps on how to implement the recommended policy option (and criteria).

Opeyemi A Ewumi

The establishment of the United Nations at the end of the Second World War in 1945 was a welcome development after the failure of the League of Nations to ensure the protection of international peace and security. After the war, the victorious allies founded the UN under the principles of the UN Charter of 1945; under the charter, the United Nations Security Council was given the responsibility of ensuring the UN’s prompt and effective actions in carrying out its duties for the maintenance of international peace and security, which is a primary objective of the United Nations. The Security Council is indeed one of the most important of the 6 organs of the United Nations, as all decisions of the organization must be deliberated upon by members of the Council, and the resolutions or decisions from the Council play an important role in the actions of the United Nations towards ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security. The Iraqi invasion, the Syrian issue and the increase in international terrorism and the failure of the United Nations to provide an effective and sustainable solution that will bring about the end of the crises has caused many to doubt the effectiveness of the Security Council in carrying out its mandate of ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security. This paper thus takes a critical look at the roles of the Security Council, with a view to understanding how its composition and functions affect the way the United Nations acts in response to crisis and matters where international aid is needed. This paper also discusses the effectiveness of the Security Council in carrying out its duties, and the many criticisms of the Council on its composition and its mode of operation.

Filip Kokotović

The United Nations are one of the key elements of the modern system of collective security. This paper analyses political inhibitors that prevent efficient operation of the United Nations as a system of collective security. It points out the issue of the lack of consensus among the Permanent member states of the Security Council. It also states that certain elements of the United Nations system work only if the system functions within the framework of the Charter, which has not been significantly modified since 1945. It is also relevant to reflect on R2P and its effect on the system of collective security of the United Nations and attempt to find a way of its inclusion in the existing legal framework. The paper analyses conflicts with the most fatalities in the past 20 years. In each conflict there were either no effective Security Council resolutions or they proved to be completely ineffective when taking into account the scope of the conflict. The overall conclusion is that the United Nations lacks a legal framework to efficiently approach intra-state conflicts.

Berdal ARAL

International Journal Of Research and Analytical Reviews

Najeeb Mujadidi

The United Nations (UN) was formed as the flag bearer of the new international system in which the achievement of important ideals such as international peace and security, respect for freedom and human dignity, equality, respect for human rights and cooperation for economic and social growth of all nations must be guaranteed. In order to realize the aforementioned goals, an essential balance between the powers of the main organs of the UN, including the General Assembly and the Security Council is required. But, the world super powers, following the preference of their own interests over the interests of the world, first reserved exceptional privileges (permanent membership in the Security Council and the right of veto) during the preparation and approval of the text of the United Nations Charter then during the activities of the organization, to some extend they are preventing the operationalization of the relative balance between the powers of mentioned organs and hinders realization of the goals with expanded interpretations of the articles of the charter. The Court's advisory opinion on " how to admit new members to the United Nations without the recommendation of the Security Council" issued on March 3, 1950 was a good opportunity that the court could use the principle of justice to limit the veto power of permanent members of the Security Council at least in respect to the admittance of new members. But with a dogmatic interpretation of Article 4, Paragraph 2, of the UN Charter, the Court put its seal of approval on it forever. The result is that the current ruling system in the UN, with so many inequalities and unbalanced powers of its main organs, has not been able to realize the lofty goals of humanity and demands fundamental reforms.

RELATED PAPERS

مجلة نقد وتنوير – العدد الثالث عشر – السنة الرابعة

Emad Abdul Latif د. عماد عبد اللطيف

A. Yasnitsky, R. van der Veer, & M. Ferrari (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cultural-Historical Psychology (pp. 217-244). New York/London: Cambridge University Press

Anna Stetsenko , Igor Arievitch

James Trolinger

Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications

Rodrigo Cardeccia

Subhadip Chakrabarti

ISTANA YATIM

Istana Yatim

Lev Ryzhkov

YOLANDA AOKI

Samer Ibrahim

Joan Brumberg

TAJDID : Jurnal Ilmu Keislaman dan Ushuluddin

Putri Purwari

Coluna/Columna

David Meneses

Robert Yantosca

VASUDEV SANKHLA

The European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences

Reni Nuraeni

Andrzej Kotyrba

Pediatric Radiology

Paolo Simoni

Wireless Personal Communications

Hwang-Cheng Wang

Antonio Carlos Duarte Nascimento Carlos

Puteri Jannatul Ma'wa

puteri jannatul

Revista Eletrônica de Estratégia & Negócios

Maicon da Silva

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

Introduction: Preventive Diplomacy in Theory and Practice

• First Online: 11 June 2020

Cite this chapter

• Okon Akiba 2  

305 Accesses

The main concepts, norms, traditions, and theoretical constructs considered relevant for studying conflict including its impacts, management, and resolution are brought forward and explained in this chapter. Those roots of violence already identified by astute and judicious scholars are further interrogated to demonstrate how they apply to West Africa. The scope and limits of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) guiding the main lines of argumentations are also mapped, and the utility of alternative approaches to explaining conflict and preventive diplomacy is elaborated. Contributors are asked to consider the set of interrelated questions as follows: As a framework of analysis, what are the defining qualities of the ECPF? To what extent does this theoretical construction inform the overall activities of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in regional conflict management and peacemaking? What are the main practical challenges and opportunities in the path of preventive diplomacy? In what ways can ECOWAS further strengthen or improve its conflict management instruments? Are conflict-prone countries yielding or resistant to preventive measures?

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Compact, lightweight edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info
• Durable hardcover edition

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

International and Comparative Politics Professor, York University, Toronto, Canada

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and affiliations, rights and permissions.

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Akiba, O. (2020). Introduction: Preventive Diplomacy in Theory and Practice. In: Akiba, O. (eds) Preventive Diplomacy, Security, and Human Rights in West Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25354-7_1

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25354-7_1

Published : 11 June 2020

Publisher Name : Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

Print ISBN : 978-3-030-25353-0

Online ISBN : 978-3-030-25354-7

eBook Packages : Political Science and International Studies Political Science and International Studies (R0)

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research

Search form

United nations conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy in action.

An overview of the role, approach and tools of the United Nations and its partners in preventing violent conflict

Find us on Twitter Find us on YouTube RSS feed

UN diplomacy in modern conflict prevention

Alexandra pichler-fong.

Senior Policy Adviser, UNU Centre for Policy Research

UN Political Adviser, Eritrea

Join the Conversation

• Share on mail
• comments added

Welcome to the United Nations

• About the General Assembly
• Schedule of Meetings
• Election of the 77th President of the General Assembly
• PGA Biography
• Vision Statement
• Transparency and Ethics
• Team OPGA 76
• Past Presidents
• Newsletters
• Meetings with Security Council President
• Press Conferences and Statements
• Spokesperson’s Briefings
• Press Releases
• GA Calendar of Events
• PGA’s Appointments
• High-level Thematic Debate of the General Assembly: Moment for Nature
• Special High-Level Dialogue on the Sustainable Development of Africa
• High-Level Special Event on Food Security
• High-Level Thematic Debate on Tourism
• Galvanizing Momentum for Universal Vaccination
• Delivering Climate Action
• Townhall with Civil Society Organizations
• High Level Forum on the Culture of Peace
• High-Level Meeting on Peacebuilding Financing
• Preparatory meeting for “Stockholm+50″
• Informal Interactive Dialogue on Commodity Markets
• High-Level Meeting on the Implementation of the New Urban Agenda
• High-Level Meeting on Trafficking in Persons
• High-Level Meeting on Global Road Safety
• International Migration Review Forum
• Meeting mandates for UNGA77 and beyond
• Deliver for Equality
• Hope Fellowship

Select Page

UNSC Open Debate on “Peace and Security through preventative diplomacy: A Common objective to all UN principal organs”

16 Nov 2021

Remarks by H.E. Mr. Abdulla Shahid, President of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly

16 November 2021

Mr. President,

Excellencies,

It is indeed a great honour to speak today at the Security Council Open Debate on “peace and security through preventive diplomacy”. My first, as the President of the 76 th session of the General Assembly.

I thank you Mr. President for the initiative and the invitation, as the President of the Security Council, for organizing this meeting.

For 76 years the United Nations has represented the pinnacle of what concerted diplomacy can achieve in preventing global conflict.

In that time, we have learned much about what is required to preserve international peace.

We understand better how socio-economic factors exacerbate conflict and more keenly appreciate diplomacy’s role in preventing it.

We understand that peace requires a holistic effort that goes beyond traditional paradigms.

One that considers the security, human rights, and development priorities of the entire membership.

One that empowers all voices in the global security discourse, including women and youth.

It is in acknowledgement of this that the membership has been increasingly calling for a more representative Security Council.

One that is better equipped to deal with the novel and complex challenges of the 21 st century.

One that works in tandem with other UN organs to deliver comprehensive solutions to current and emerging security issues. 

The Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated socio-economic challenges. It has starkly highlighted the interconnectedness of today’s challenges. Our health, our economic prosperity, our planet’s wellbeing, and our safety and security – are all interlinked.

Indeed, the 2030 Agenda has long recognized that peace and sustainable development complement each other.

Communities that struggle to meet their most basic needs, or that lack economic and social mobility, are prone to unrest and strife.

Climate crises and disasters threaten displacement and force communities into competition over scarce resources.

Ineffective institutions rob people of hope and undermine their faith in governments and justice systems.

And the absence of democratic participation, political freedoms, and equality deprives entire populations of their human rights. This limits their ability to turn to peaceful recourse in redressing their grievances.  

We see these truths borne out in many conflict-ridden places across the world.

The global community simply must do more.

In addition to humanitarian relief, we must support preventive measures to build resilience, and strengthen sustainable development to give people the opportunity to live in dignity and in prosperity.

Truly, human rights, justice and sustainable development are our greatest tools in both building and maintaining peace and security.

Preventive diplomacy today is being conducted by a broader array of actors, using a wider range of tools, than ever before.

These include the development of early warning systems and targeted funding mechanisms for rapid response, the establishment of dedicated prevention structures, and the ongoing use of special envoys.

The critical importance of peacekeeping operations in the Organization’s overall peace and security toolkit has been recognized for decades.

However, today, sustaining peace and peacebuilding is no longer limited to traditional military peacekeeping but also includes strengthening capacities, institutions, and democratic integrity.

This dramatically reduces the likelihood of conflict and is one of the most effective strategies to secure durable peace.

The Peacebuilding Commission, which is an intergovernmental advisory body of the Security Council and the General Assembly, ensures sustained international attention to countries emerging from conflict, including to the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovering from conflict.

I welcome the call in “Our Common Agenda” to invest in prevention and strengthening peacebuilding efforts through adequate and predictable financing.

And I call upon all UN bodies to coordinate to embed peacebuilding, and peacekeeping operations more deeply in the global security architecture.      

Global security will always be within the proper remit of the Security Council. However, work done by the General Assembly and ECOSOC to build resilient and prosperous communities facilitates the work of the Security Council.

In fact, in November 1999, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement recognising “the importance of building a culture of prevention… and the need for all UN organs to pursue preventive strategies”.

In fact, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his 2011 report, “Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results” underscored the importance of preventive diplomacy throughout the conflict spectrum.

The report noted that “through its norm-setting capacity and deliberative functions, the General Assembly has a central role in contributing to a conducive environment for conflict prevention”.

The Secretary-General’s  “Our Common Agenda ” report, also stresses the importance of system-wide cooperation and the need for greater focus on prevention.

The agenda’s commitment to boosting partnerships envisions stronger engagement within the UN system and calls for reforms of the UN’s three principal organs: making the Security Council more representative, revitalizing the work of the General Assembly, and strengthening ECOSOC.   

Revitalizing the General Assembly is one the key elements of my ‘Presidency of Hope’. To that end, I not only want to make it more inclusive of the views and priorities of the membership, but also want to strengthen cooperation between the main UN organs, to streamline our responses to global challenges – including security challenges.

I call upon the membership to work together to implement General Assembly resolution 75/325 on ‘Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly’, which ‘encourages regular interaction and continued coordination between the Presidents of the General Assembly, the Security Council and ECOSOC’.

Regular coordination meetings between the General Assembly, the Security Council and ECOSOC, as mandated in the resolution, help bridge differences and improve the efficiency of our work.

On my part, as President of the General Assembly, I am keen to engage with my peers to synergize our efforts to recover better, improve global governance, and strengthen the international security regime.

Under my Presidency of Hope, I will continue to engage with Member States, as well as with the principal organs of the UN, to ensure progress in our common endeavors.

I hope that same spirit of cooperation will guide our discussions today.

I look forward to a wide-ranging and productive debate. I expect that their outcomes will put us in a better position to deliver to our global constituents.

Throughout our disarmament efforts, it is my conviction that women and youth can make a meaningful contribution. Let us take special pains to ensure that women and youth, as well as civil society, are more actively engaged in this work going forward.

President of the UN General Assembly

United Nations

A-Z Site Index | Contact | Copyright | Fraud Alert | Privacy Notice | Terms of Use

Stories from the UN Archive: UN’s first peacekeeping force

Facebook Twitter Print Email

As the world celebrates the  International Day of Living Together in Peace , marked annually on 16 May, we are taking you back to the 1950s, when the UN deployed its first ever peacekeeping force to the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula to help bring an end to the Suez Canal crisis.

The crisis began when Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal Company in July 1956, and France and the United Kingdom protested. By October of that year, Israeli forces launched an attack on Egypt and occupied Sinai, with British and French troops landing soon after in the Suez Canal Zone.

The UN was unable to resolve the matter in the Security Council , which met for discussions on 31 October and failed to adopt a decision after France and the UK used their veto power, a privilege of the organ’s permanent members.

Those vetoes triggered provisions in the  “Uniting for Peace” resolution, adopted by the General Assembly in 1950, which states that if the Council, “because of a lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of peace or action of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Member for collective measures”.

Two firsts in UN history

The Uniting for Peace resolution’s terms also stated that an emergency special session could be convened within 24 hours, so that’s what the General Assembly did a day after the Council vetoes.

From 1 to 10 November in its  first ever  emergency special session , the Assembly called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces, with then-UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld providing the latest updates.

“We are now less than two hours from the time set for an agreed ceasefire, without commitments from the three Governments, which so far have not indicated their acceptance,” the UN chief told the world body.

The Assembly then requested that, within 48 hours, the Secretary-General should present a plan for the establishment of a United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, so he did.

His  plan was a blueprint for establishing the first UN peacekeeping force – the UN Emergency Force (UNEF). The mandate was to supervise the withdrawal of the three occupying forces and, after the withdrawal was completed, to act as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire. The UN Emergency Force was armed, but the units were to use their weapons only in self-defence and even then, with utmost restraint.

Though more than 100 peacekeepers were killed, the operation successfully oversaw the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli armed forces from Egypt.

Following the swift dispatch of UNEF to the area, the French and British forces left the Suez Canal Zone by 22 December 1956, and the withdrawal of the Israeli forces was completed by 8 March 1957.

UN clears the blocked Suez Canal

UNEF’s creation represented a significant innovation within the UN. It was not a peace enforcement operation, as envisaged in Article 42 of the UN Charter , but a peacekeeping operation to be carried out with the consent and the cooperation of the parties to the conflict.

Stationed entirely on Egyptian territory with the consent of the government, UNEF patrolled the Egypt-Israel armistice demarcation line and the international frontier to the south of the Gaza Strip and brought relative quiet to a long-troubled area.

The Suez Canal, blocked because of the conflict, was cleared by the United Nations.

The UN Emergency Force comprised 6,073 military personnel at its peak, from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and then Yugoslavia.

There were fatalities: 109 military personnel and one local staff.

At the request of the Egyptian Government, which informed the Secretary-General that it would no longer consent to the stationing of the Force on Egyptian territory and in Gaza, UNEF withdrew its personnel in May and June 1967.

Watch UN Video’s Stories from the UN Archive  latest episode on UNEF  here .

UN News ’s #ThrowbackThursday series showcases epic moments across UN history, cultivated from the  UN Audiovisual Library ’s 49,400 hours of video and 18,000 hours of audio recordings.

Catch up on UN Video’s Stories from the UN Archive playlist  here and our accompanying series  here .

Join us next Thursday for another dive into history.

• stories from the un archive