definition of social justice essay

Roosevelt Review (Archives, 2014-2018)

Archives of roosevelt review: the roosevelt university alumni magazine, faculty essay: what is social justice.

May 14, 2015 by Susan Torres-Harding, associate professor of psychology 2 Comments

Susan Torres-Harding is an associate professor in the Department of Psychology. Her research interests include understanding the impact of sociocultural factors on physical and psychological health and assessing the development of social justice attitudes and social activism. She earned her PhD in Clinical Child Psychology from DePaul University in 2001.

Social justice has always been an important value to me and a foundation for my career aspirations. Therefore, in 2006, I was pleased to join the faculty at Roosevelt University, a university founded on inclusivity and one with a strong focus on social justice and social action. I quickly realized that this was a friendly “home” where I could continue to discuss the impact of societal inequalities and discrimination in health care, my own area of research.

At the same time, I was intrigued by the reactions of friends and colleagues when I told them that I was now at Roosevelt. Invariably, I would meet people who had been at Roosevelt in those early years, and they would tell me stories about what a special place Roosevelt is. They described Roosevelt as a school where people of all races came together—a college unlike others. The pictures hanging on the walls of the Auditorium Building from those early years are visual reminders of this truly unique integration of people from diverse racial groups at a time when racial segregation was the norm. Today Roosevelt continues to be ethnically and racially diverse, but the world has changed since Roosevelt came into being in 1945. In addition to racial injustice, which regrettably remains prevalent in our society, we now truly confront other forms of discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation, social class and disability status.

As a Roosevelt psychology professor, I often talked in my classes about social justice as a key value for the Roosevelt community, but I found students grappled with the meaning of social justice. What is social justice? Whom is it for? Many students talked about social justice as if it were a high-minded ideal, unrealistic or impractical to do in real life. While we often discussed the need to use our knowledge and skills to work for a more fair and just society, I wondered if students had become overwhelmed with the amount of injustice in society and whether they believed they could actually make a difference in the world.

This led me to ask myself, what do students think social justice is all about? More importantly, I wanted to know what I could do to empower them to take action and strive to make a difference while at Roosevelt and after.

In response to these questions, I started a series of studies to investigate how students understood social justice and how, if at all, they were learning about our social justice message and integrating it into their own lives. What did all of this talk of social justice mean to the students? And, how could we, as educators, facilitate the goals of students who had the sincere desire to promote social justice, but who also had the notion that it was too hard, impractical, unrealistic or idealistic? As an educator, I had a personal stake in these questions. I wanted to know if integrating social justice concerns into my classes was actually making a difference in how students viewed themselves, their communities, and their own personal and professional actions. In other words, were we living up to the Roosevelt University mission of educating “socially conscious citizens”? Does talking about social justice make a difference, or is it all a lot of feel-good talk that is disconnected from reality?

Students Define Social Justice

To begin answering some of these questions, my research team and I embarked on a study to first understand how students defined social justice. In textbooks, researchers and educators define social justice as “involving the recognition of the existence of social injustices based upon being a member of a non-dominant or marginalized social group.” These marginalized social groups can include people who live in poverty, women, people who are LGBTQ, people who are disabled, people from racial and cultural minority groups, and people who have severe mental illness or have a substance abuse disorder. Researchers also defined social justice as “a value or desire to increase access of power, privileges and socioeconomic resources to people from socially marginalized groups.”

But is this how students thought about social justice? I believed it unlikely that most students would think about social justice in such abstract terms. So we conducted a study with Roosevelt students simply asking how they defined social justice. We found that students were relatively consistent in their definitions. They tended to describe social justice as addressing injustices in equality and promoting opportunity, rights, fairness and acceptance of everyone, including people from diverse backgrounds. Interestingly, a significant proportion (44 percent) of the students said they engaged in some activity that promoted social justice.

Additionally, we asked students to describe what they were actually doing to promote social justice. In most academic papers, social activism is defined as political activism: marching in protests, attending rallies, writing legislators or voting in order to promote policy or legal changes.

They tended to describe social justice as addressing injustices in equality and promoting opportunity, rights, fairness and acceptance of everyone, including people from diverse backgrounds.

Interestingly, there was a tremendous range of responses to our question. In addition to political activism, we identified many different categories of social justice activities, including conducting social-justice-related research, being a member of or volunteering for an organization that focused on social activism, seeking out educational opportunities to learn more about social justice, engaging in advocacy on behalf of people from disadvantaged or marginalized groups, and talking to family and friends about social justice.

What was most impressive to me was the creativity displayed by students as they sought to promote social justice, as well as the diversity of issues addressed by their actions. Many students reported participating in marches, protests and other direct social actions for economic or racial change. One participant was working to promote social justice by acting in a short film that aimed to foster acceptance of LGBTQ youth during the coming out process. Some students were using a social justice approach when providing clinical services to children with developmental disabilities. A few reported that they were engaged in youth mentoring or were working on behalf of youth within the juvenile justice system. Others were working to promote racial justice, women’s empowerment and awareness around diversity-related justice. Still others described being LGBTQ allies or serving as advocates for women who have endured domestic and sexual violence. We also had students who volunteered at community or religious organizations to help individuals around issues of poverty and food security.

A significant number of students indicated that they spoke with family or friends about these issues. I think that these kinds of actions are more quiet forms of activism. Discussing issues of social justice with significant others might have the impact of changing attitudes or gaining support from them. In turn, this might ultimately increase awareness of social issues and might influence others to take action in some way in their own lives.

Many of the students’ efforts involved using resources available at Roosevelt University. These included engaging in social-justice related research, attending lectures, being part of student groups and organizations that promoted social justice such as RU PROUD (a lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, questioning and ally organization) and Students for a Sensible Drug Policy , engaging in social justice as part of their professional clinical training and volunteering as part of service learning. Although less than half of the students we surveyed reported engaging in activism, those who were active appeared to take advantage of the resources and opportunities available at Roosevelt, and many sought to integrate these experiences with their academic studies.

Connecting With The Mission

The second study that my research team and I conducted focused on the role of the University mission in promoting positive attitudes toward social justice. I wanted to understand whether students who felt more involved at the University and agreed with its mission were in fact more likely to engage in social activism. Interestingly, I found that students who reported having a high sense of community—that is, feeling as if they belonged to the “Roosevelt family”—said they valued the social justice mission more.

Students who respected the social justice mission were much more likely to state that they intended to work for social justice in the future and felt that they possessed the skills to effect positive change. These students were also more likely to report having engaged in social activism, talk about social justice issues with family and friends and personally identify as social activists. It seems that Roosevelt’s social justice mission influenced students by impacting both positive attitudes toward social justice and facilitating the integration of social justice concerns into their personal and professional lives. Feeling a part of the Roosevelt community mattered because it allowed them to share in this core community value.

Thus, the mission and values of Roosevelt University are having an impact on our students’ actions. We are currently conducting additional studies where we hope to follow undergraduate students over time to see how their ideas and views of social justice might change as they move from freshman to senior year. We are also interviewing student activists to learn from their unique experiences, motivations and perceptions of their own work.

Indeed, it has been a pleasure to be able to assess and document the amazingly diverse and creative activism that is going on at Roosevelt. In addition to the examples listed above, Roosevelt students have participated in walk-outs and rallies in Grant Park, lobbied at the state capital, made videos to help educate others about traditionally marginalized groups, conducted interventions to promote health and wellness in our communities, and organized programs that give our students and people in the community a voice. We have so much to learn from our students!

An important part of social justice education is to trust that students are able to evaluate the information we provide and use it in a way that is valid, realistic and relevant to their own lives. Because students are able to come up with so many unique and creative ways to address injustices in their interpersonal and professional lives, professors should not provide answers, but rather should pose questions to help students recognize the real challenges in our society. We can encourage them to critically evaluate their own views and the views of others and provide them with a range of interventions and interpersonal skills that they can then use to confront a range of social problems and issues in their own ways. We also need to recognize that this is hard, risky work.

An important part of social justice education is to trust that students are able to evaluate the information we provide and use it in a way that is valid, realistic and relevant to their own lives.

Working for social justice is, by its nature, “radical” because it focuses on changing the status quo, challenging existing policies and can involve breaking rules. As educators, it is important that we not only talk about social justice but provide students with the skills they need to take action and be effective. Promoting favorable attitudes and teaching interpersonal intervention and activism skills will have a positive impact on students and help them fulfill the Roosevelt mission of creating “socially conscious citizens” who change the world.

Contact Susan Torres-Harding at [email protected]

November 23, 2018 at 10:53 am

extremely nice one……..

[…] Faculty Essay: What is social justice? – Roosevelt Review – Faculty Essay; Scholarship Spotlight; Issue. Fall 2015; Spring 2015; Fall 2014; Faculty Essay: What is social justice … assessing the development of social justice … […]

What Is Social Justice?

Understanding social justice.

Main Principles

Areas of Focus

Equity vs. equality, social justice in law.

Social Justice FAQs

The Bottom Line

Social justice meaning and main principles explained.

Erika Rasure is globally-recognized as a leading consumer economics subject matter expert, researcher, and educator. She is a financial therapist and transformational coach, with a special interest in helping women learn how to invest.

Investopedia / Dennis Madamba

Social justice refers to a fair and equitable division of resources, opportunities, and privileges in society. Originally a religious concept, it has come to be conceptualized more loosely as the just organization of social institutions that deliver access to economic benefits. It is sometimes referred to as "distributive justice."

Social justice is a broad term, and there are many variations in how advocates apply the perspective. However, social determinants like the racial wealth gap or inequitable access to health care feature heavily in social justice analysis. Some applications related to social justice, such as critical race theory, have become a battleground for American politics.

Key Takeaways

Social justice refers to the fair division of resources, opportunities, and privileges in society.
It emphasizes fairness in how society divides its social resources.
One of the most famous examinations of social justice is John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) .
Gender inequality, racism, and LGBTQ+ discrimination are frequent subjects of social justice advocacy.
Some applications of social justice, like critical race theory, have become embattled in the American culture wars.

The phrase "social justice" draws its roots from Christian theology, with the first noted use occurring in the early 1840s in Theoretical Treatise on Natural Law by Luigi Taparelli. Taparelli was an Italian Jesuit priest writing during the rise of Risorgimento , a 19th-century Italian nationalist movement, and debates around the unification of Italy.

Taparelli’s version of social justice was simply an application of justice to social affairs and held that people should do what’s right based on a conceptualization of morality based on natural theology and religion, and for much of its history social justice has been a religious concept.

Not all notions of social justice emphasized religion, though. With the social impact of the Industrial Revolution , the term grew. Later theorists would focus on social justice as a moral obligation for people within a society to work for the common good; the most famous example is discussed below.

The term, which has been historically contentious, has become more popular since the end of the 20th century. Some scholars point toward the neoliberal policies of the Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan administrations as a possible reason for this change.

An Old Concept

Though the phrase is attributed to Luigi Taparelli, social justice builds on older concepts. Taparelli relied heavily on the work of Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas (who was relying on the work of the Macedonian philosopher Aristotle).

One of the most influential explorations of social justice comes from the 20th-century American philosopher John Rawls. In A Theory of Justice (1971) , which he labeled as a theory of social justice, Rawls outlined his vision of “justice as fairness.”

For Rawls, this meant that people ought to consider the rules for a fair allotment of social goods within a society as well as the levels of inequality that can be allowed within a society. Rawls famously used the concept of a "veil of ignorance," a pretense of ignorance about where one will end up in any given society that Rawls thought ought to be used to arrange society, as well as the "principle of difference," which holds that social and economic inequalities can be acceptable if they benefit the whole of society.

The basic element of fairness is crucial, especially in the access to social resources, sometimes called “social goods.” While it may sound abstract, how social goods are distributed is immensely impactful. Importantly, the “social determinants” of outcomes are considered central to whether or not a system is just.

In public health, for example, the place of birth can alter what health care options a person has and, therefore, also how long that person lives. To account for this, social justice advocates in healthcare might focus on extending the probability that people will be healthy despite resource inadequacies they may face for historical or economic reasons.

Main Principles of Social Justice

While there is no single definition of social justice, most approaches share the broad goals of inclusion and fairness. In order to achieve those goals, they establish a set of ethical principles for a just society.

These principles may include:

Equal access to social goods is one of the most fundamental principles of social justice. This holds that society's resources should be equally available to all. For example, many social justice theorists believe that people should have equal access to education, health care, and employment opportunities. Public servants can uphold this principle by ensuring that everyone has access to these resources.

Equity is the principle that people should have the same opportunities to succeed, despite any past injustices or systemic discrimination. This may mean that resources are distributed in a way that addresses the specific needs of underprivileged communities or people.

Diversity is the principle that government and business leaders should be broadly representative of the communities they serve. This means that not only should there be women and people of color in positions of power, but also that minority communities should be equally represented in public institutions. On a policy level, this principle may entail prohibitions on discrimination or providing resources in multiple languages.

Participation

Participation is the principle that everyone in a community should have a voice in making important decisions. In many societies, public policies are set by a small group of powerful people, without consulting the communities they represent. This may have the unintended effect of excluding a large part of the community.

Public policymakers can address this shortcoming by consulting the advocates of minority communities and considering their needs.

Human Rights

The final principle of social justice, and arguably the most fundamental, is human rights. In addition to political rights, such as freedom of conscience, it also requires freedom from police abuse and respect for one's reproductive rights and bodily autonomy.

Careers in Social Justice

The most common jobs relating to social justice are related to public administration and social work since these occupations deal directly with providing access to social and government resources. People who work in these professions should be conscious of the explicit and implicit biases that may reduce access to these resources for some members of society.

But it is also possible to advocate for social justice in other fields. For example, lawyers can help ensure equitable access to the justice system by representing clients who are traditionally underserved by existing institutions, and lobbyists can push for legislation that addresses community injustices. Other social justice-oriented occupations include mental health workers, victim advocates, and community developers.

While social justice seeks to ensure equality and fairness for all, it may focus on those groups that have been the victims of historical oppression. The following are some areas of focus for social justice workers:

Racial Equality

Racial equality is one of the most common issues in social justice, and many countries have a history of discrimination or oppression of minority ethnic or racial groups. Members of these groups may be at an economic disadvantage or suffer from unequal access to education, health services, or other essential institutions.

Gender Equality

Almost every country suffers from some sort of gender inequality, whether in the form of wage gaps , glass ceilings , or other forms of gender-based discrimination. In addition, women are also more likely to suffer from violence or sexual assault. or face threats to reproductive rights. Gender equality also affects other rights, such as racial equality. Many social justice advocates consider this a key aspect of social reform.

LGBTQ+ Equality

Starting in the 20th century, LGBTQ+ rights emerged as another issue for social justice advocates. Members of the LGBTQ+ community face high levels of violence and discrimination and may be denied access to healthcare or employment.

Although they are both related to the distribution of social goods and privileges within a society, equality and equity have taken on slightly different meanings in conversations around social justice. Equality, in this context, means that people are given the same access to opportunities, regardless of historical or other forms of injustice that may alter how much someone can access those opportunities. Equity, in contrast, tries to account for an imbalanced social system by providing the resources to create an equal outcome.

It is social justice’s adoption of equity that most of its critics focus on, but those in favor of the concept suggest that equity is a vital part of ensuring a just society. Paula Braveman, a researcher at the University of California, San Francisco, for instance, has commented that “health equity” and social justice in health are interchangeable. The goal of social justice in health care, she implies, “[is that] no one is denied the possibility to be healthy for belonging to a group that has historically been economically/socially disadvantaged.”

In law, social justice perspectives have become a touchpoint for the American culture wars. Critical race theory (CRT), an approach to law that actively seeks to account for how racial prejudices affect legal outcomes, has drawn particular outcry.

The term was developed by American legal theorists such as Kimberlé Crenshaw to analyze how racism is advanced by American legal structures, even in some cases in the absence of racist individuals. Central to CRT is the notion that race is not validated by science, and that the law has maintained an unjust order.

The Critics

Detractors of critical race theory have claimed that it is merely a way of permitting discrimination. According to the Brookings Institute, a public policy think tank, opponents of critical race theory tend to view the claim that American institutions are racist as a way of accusing White people of being individually racist, rather than as an attempt at broad analysis about the effect of institutions on social outcomes.

Campaigns against CRT have become increasingly vocal in state legislatures across the U.S., with many banning its teaching in primary and secondary schools. To date, 36 states have moved to install legislation to ban teaching about racial bias in the U.S., and 17 have moved to expand that teaching, according to a state legislative tracker created by Chalkbeat, a nonprofit newsroom focused on the American education system.

In 2020, President Donald Trump had also forbidden diversity and equity training from federal contracts, which has been described as an "equity gag order." That executive order conflated diversity training and CRT, calling both "divisive." The ban was reversed in 2021.

What Does Social Justice Mean?

Social justice is the belief that the social benefits and privileges of a society ought to be divided fairly.

Why Is Social Justice Important?

Advocates say that social justice is worth pursuing because it defends people from suffering deprivations due to unfair prejudices and because it tries to provide everyone with the essentials for a good life.

How Is Social Justice Related to Equity?

The concept of equity focuses on outcomes. It’s related to the belief that social determinants massively affect how people’s lives turn out and that, therefore, a truly fair arrangement of society will account for the tangible ways that this harms socially and economically disadvantaged groups.

Social justice is a political and philosophical movement aiming for a more division of resources and opportunities. By addressing historical injustices and directing resources to underserved communities, social justice advocates hope to establish a more fair and equal society.

United Nations. " Social Justice in an Open World ," Page 13.

Center for Economic and Social Justice. " Defining Economic Justice and Social Justice ."

Intercollegiate Studies Institute. " The Origins of Social Justice: Taparelli D'Azeglio ."

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. " Original Position ."

Kent State Online. " The Five Principles of Social Justice ."

Online MSW Programs. " Introduction to Social Justice in Social Work ."

Human Rights Careers. " What Does Social Justice Mean? "

Stanford Social Innovation Review. " What the Heck Does 'Equity' Mean? "

National Institute of Health. " What Are Health Disparities and Health Equity? We Need to Be Clear ."

American Bar Association. " A Lesson on Critical Race Theory ."

Brookings Institute. " Why Are States Banning Critical Race Theory? "

Chalkbeat. " CRT Map: Efforts to restrict teaching racism and bias have multiplied across the U.S ."

UCLA Law. " Biden Reverses Trump Executive Order Banning Diversity Training ."

Human Rights Careers. " 10 Reasons Why Social Justice Is Important ."

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How Education and Training Affect the Economy 2 of 30
Education vs. Experience: Which One Gets the Job? 3 of 30
Unemployment Rate by State 4 of 30
Can a Family Survive on the U.S. Minimum Wage? 5 of 30
The Economics of Labor Mobility 6 of 30
Forced Retirement: What it is, How it Works, FAQ 7 of 30
Predatory Lending: How to Avoid, Examples and Protections 8 of 30
Unbanked: What It Means, Statistics, Solutions 9 of 30
Underbanked: What It Is and Who They Are 10 of 30
Underinsurance: What it is, How it Works, FAQ 11 of 30
The History of Unions in the United States 12 of 30
What Is Middle Class Income? Thresholds, Is It Shrinking 13 of 30
What's Poverty? Meaning, Causes, and How to Measure 14 of 30
Gini Index Explained and Gini Coefficients Around the World 15 of 30
Measuring Inequality: Forget Gini, Go with the Palma Ratio Instead 16 of 30
Lorenz Curve 17 of 30
What Is the Human Development Index (HDI)? 18 of 30
What Are the Criticisms of the Human Development Index (HDI)? 19 of 30
Poverty Trap: Definition, Causes, and Proposed Solutions 20 of 30
Conflict Theory Definition, Founder, and Examples 21 of 30
America's Middle Class Is Losing Ground Financially 22 of 30
Hollowing Out: What It Means, How It Works 23 of 30
Social Justice Meaning and Main Principles Explained 24 of 30
Economic Justice: Meaning, Examples of How to Achieve It 25 of 30
Welfare Economics Explained: Theory, Assumptions, and Criticism 26 of 30
Egalitarianism: Definition, Ideas, and Types 27 of 30
The Nordic Model: Pros and Cons 28 of 30
Equity-Efficiency Tradeoff: Definition, Causes, and Examples 29 of 30
The Economic Message Behind Martin Luther King Jr.'s 'Dream' Speech 30 of 30

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8 Tips For Writing A Social Justice Essay

Social justice covers a variety of issues involving race, gender, age, sexual orientation, income equality and much more. How do you write an essay on a social justice issue that’s engaging, informative and memorable? Here are eight tips you should take to heart when writing:

When writing a social justice essay, you should brainstorm for ideas, sharpen your focus, identify your purpose, find a story, use a variety of sources, define your terms, provide specific evidence and acknowledge opposing views.

#1. Brainstorm creatively

Before you start writing your social justice essay, you need a topic. Don’t hesitate to look far and wide for inspiration. Read other social justice essays, look at recent news stories, watch movies and talk to people who are also interested in social justice. At this stage, don’t worry about the “trendiness” of your idea or whether a lot of people are already writing about it. Your topic will evolve in response to your research and the arguments you develop. At the brainstorming stage, you’re focused on generating as many ideas as possible, thinking outside the box and identifying what interests you the most. Take a free online course to get a better understanding of social justice.

You can take a creative brainstorming approach! A blog on Hubspot offers 15 creative ideas such as storyboarding, which involves laying out ideas in a narrative form with terms, images and other elements. You can also try freewriting, which is when you choose something you’re interested in. Next, write down everything you already know, what you need to know but don’t already, why the topic matters and anything else that comes to mind. Freewriting is a good exercise because it helps you decide if there’s any substance to a topic or if it’s clear there’s not enough material for a full essay.

#2. Sharpen your topic’s focus

The best essays narrow on a specific social justice topic and sharpen its focus, so it says something meaningful and interesting. This is often challenging, but wrestling with what exactly you want your essay to say is worth the effort. Why? An essay with a narrow, sharp focus has a clearer message. You’re also able to dig deeper into your topic and provide better analysis. If your topic is too broad, you’re forced to skim the surface, which produces a less interesting essay.

How do you sharpen your essay’s focus? Grace Fleming provides several tips on ThoughtCatalog . First, you can tell your topic is too broad if it can be summarized in just 1-2 words. As an example, “health inequity” is way too broad. Fleming suggests applying the questions, “Who, what, where, when, why and how,” to your topic to narrow it down. So, instead of just “health inequity,” you might end up with something like “The impact of health inequity in maternal healthcare systems on Indigenous women.” Your topic’s focus may shift or narrow even further depending on the research you find.

Writing a human rights topic research paper? Here are five of the most useful tips .

#3. Identify your purpose

As you unearth your topic and narrow its focus, it’s important to think about what you want your essay to accomplish. If you’re only thinking about your essay as an assignment, you’ll most likely end up with a product that’s unfocused or unclear. Vague sentiments like “Everyone is writing about social justice” and “Social justice is important” are also not going to produce an essay with a clear purpose. Why are you writing this essay? Are you wanting to raise awareness of a topic that’s been historically ignored? Or do you want to inspire people to take action and change something by giving them concrete how-to strategies? Identifying your purpose as soon as possible directs your research, your essay structure and how you style your writing.

If you’re not sure how to find your purpose, think about who you’re writing for. An essay written for a university class has a different audience than an essay written for a social justice organization’s social media page. If there are specific instructions for your essay (professors often have requirements they’re looking for), always follow them closely. Once you’ve identified your purpose, keep it at the front of your mind. You’ll produce an essay that’s clear, focused and effective.

#4. Find a human story

The best social justice essays don’t only provide compelling arguments and accurate statistics; they show your topic’s real-world impact. Harvard’s Kennedy School’s communications program describes this process as “finding a character.” It’s especially useful when you’re writing something persuasive. Whatever your topic, try to find the human stories behind the ideas and the data. How you do that depends on the nature of your essay. As an example, if you’re writing something more academic, focusing too much on the emotional side of a story may not be appropriate. However, if you’re writing an essay for an NGO’s fundraising campaign, focusing on a few people’s stories helps your reader connect to the topic more deeply.

How do you choose what stories to feature? Harvard suggests choosing someone you have access to either through your research or as an interview subject. If you get the opportunity to interview people, make sure you ask interesting questions that dig beneath the surface. Your subject has a unique perspective; you want to find the information and stories only they can provide.

#5. Rely on a variety of sources

Depending on your essay’s purpose and audience, there might be certain sources you’re required to use. In a piece for Inside Higher Ed, Stephanie Y. Evans describes how her students must use at least 10 source types in their final paper assignment. Most of the time, you’ll have a lot of freedom when it comes to research and choosing your sources. For best results, you want to use a wide variety. There are a few reasons why. The first is that a variety of sources gives you more material for your essay. You’ll access different perspectives you wouldn’t have found if you stuck to just a few books or papers. Reading more sources also helps you ensure your information is accurate; you’re fact-checking sources against one another. Expanding your research helps you address bias, as well. If you rely only on sources that reflect your existing views, your essay will be much less interesting.

While we’re talking about sources, let’s touch on citations. If you’re writing an essay for school, your teacher will most likely tell you what citation method they want you to use. There are several depending on the discipline. As an example, in the United States, social science disciplines like sociology and education tend to use the American Psychological Association (APA) style. Some places are very rigid about citation styles, while others are more relaxed. If you’re writing an essay where your citation won’t be checked, you still need to give credit to any ideas, thoughts, or research that’s not yours. Proper citation builds trust with your reader and boosts your credibility.

Here are more tips on writing a human rights essay!

#6. Define your key terms

To make your essay as clear and effective as possible, you want every reader on the same page right at the beginning. Defining your key terms is an important step. As Ian Johnston writes, creating an effective argument requires “the establishment of clear, precise, and effective definitions for key terms in the arguments.” You may have to adapt an existing definition or write your own. Johnston offers principles such as adjusting a definition based on the knowledge of who you’re writing for, focusing on what a term is and not just on its effects, and expanding a definition so it covers everything a reader needs to know.

How do you decide which terms are important in your essay? First, never assume a reader understands a term because it’s “obvious.” The most obvious terms are often the ones that need the clearest definitions. If your reader doesn’t know exactly what you’re talking about when you use a term like “health equity,” your essay won’t be as effective. In general, you want to define any terms relevant to your topic, terms that are used frequently and terms with distinct meanings in the context of your essay.

#7. Provide specific evidence and examples

Social justice issues are grounded in reality, so an essay should reflect that. Don’t spend your whole paper being philosophical or hypothetical. As an example, let’s say you’re writing an essay about desertification in Mali. Don’t discuss desertification as an abstract concept. Include real statistics and case studies on desertification in Mali, who it’s affecting the most and what is being done about it. For every argument you make, present supporting evidence and examples.

The strength of your evidence determines the strength of your arguments. How do you find strong evidence? Cite This For Me lists a handful of examples , such as studies, statistics, quotes from subject matter experts and/or reports, and case studies. Good evidence also needs to be accurate and in support of your argument. Depending on your essay topic, how current a piece of evidence is also matters. If you’re not relying on the most current evidence available, it can weaken your overall argument. Evidence should also be as specific as possible to your topic. Referring back to our desertification in Mali essay, that means locating examples of how desertification affects people in Mali , not in Chad or Russia.

Academic essay writing requires specific skills. Here’s an online introductory course on academic writing .

#8. Acknowledge your critics

Not every social justice essay requires an acknowledgment of opposing viewpoints, but addressing critics can strengthen your essay. How? It lets you confront your critics head-on and refute their arguments. It also shows you’ve researched your topic from every angle and you’re willing to be open-minded. Some people worry that introducing counterarguments will weaken the essay, but when you do the work to truly dissect your critic’s views and reaffirm your own, it makes your essay stronger.

The University of Pittsburgh offers a four-step strategy for refuting an argument. First, you need to identify the claim you’re responding to. This is often the trickiest part. Some writers misrepresent the claims of their critics to make them easier to refute, but that’s an intellectually dishonest method. Do your best to understand what exactly the opposing argument is claiming. Next, make your claim. You might need to provide specific evidence, which you may or may not have already included in your essay. Depending on the claim, your own thoughts may be a strong enough argument. Lastly, summarize what your claim implies about your critics, so your reader is left with a clear understanding of why your argument is the stronger one.

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Guiding Organizations and Social Justice
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Social Work and Social Justice: A Conceptual Review

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Brittanie E Atteberry-Ash, Social Work and Social Justice: A Conceptual Review, Social Work , Volume 68, Issue 1, January 2023, Pages 38–46, https://doi.org/10.1093/sw/swac042

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As a profession, social work has codified within its ethical guidance and educational policies a commitment to social justice. While a commitment to social justice is asserted in several of our profession’s guiding documents, social work continues to lack consensus on both the meaning and merit of social justice, resulting is disparate and sometimes discriminatory practice even under a “social justice” label. This study examines how social justice has been operationalized in social work via a conceptual review of the literature. Findings show that social work leans heavily on John Rawls’s definition of social justice, Martha Nussbaum’s and Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach, and the definition of social justice included in The Social Work Dictionary . Unfortunately, none of these adequately align with the National Association of Social Workers’ Code of Ethics , which drives the profession. This conceptual review is a call to social workers to join together in defining the guiding principle of the profession.

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The idea of justice occupies centre stage both in ethics, and in legal and political philosophy. We apply it to individual actions, to laws, and to public policies, and we think in each case that if they are unjust this is a strong, maybe even conclusive, reason to reject them. Classically, justice was counted as one of the four cardinal virtues (and sometimes as the most important of the four); in modern times John Rawls famously described it as ‘the first virtue of social institutions’ (Rawls 1971, p.3; Rawls, 1999, p.3). We might debate which of these realms of practical philosophy has first claim on justice: is it first and foremost a property of the law, for example, and only derivatively a property of individuals and other institutions? But it is probably more enlightening to accept that the idea has over time sunk deep roots in each of these domains, and to try to make sense of such a wide-ranging concept by identifying elements that are present whenever justice is invoked, but also examining the different forms it takes in various practical contexts. This article aims to provide a general map of the ways in which justice has been understood by philosophers, past and present.

We begin by identifying four core features that distinguish justice from other moral and political ideas. We then examine some major conceptual contrasts: between conservative and ideal justice, between corrective and distributive justice, between procedural and substantive justice, and between comparative and non-comparative justice. Next we turn to questions of scope: to who or what do principles of justice apply? We ask whether non-human animals can be subjects of justice, whether justice applies only between people who already stand in a particular kind of relationship to one another, and whether individual people continue to have duties of justice once justice-based institutions have been created. We then examine three overarching theories that might serve to unify the different forms of justice: utilitarianism, contractarianism, and egalitarianism. But it seems, in conclusion, that no such theory is likely be successful.

More detailed discussions of particular forms of justice can be found in other entries: see especially distributive justice , global justice , intergenerational justice , international distributive justice , justice and bad luck , justice as a virtue , and retributive justice .

1.1 Justice and Individual Claims

1.2 justice, charity and enforceable obligation, 1.3 justice and impartiality, 1.4 justice and agency, 2.1 conservative versus ideal justice, 2.2 corrective versus distributive justice, 2.3 procedural versus substantive justice, 2.4 comparative versus non-comparative justice, 3.1 human vs non-human animals, 3.2 relational vs non-relational justice, 3.3 individuals vs institutions, 3.4 recognition vs. redistribution, 4.1 accommodating intuitions about justice, 4.2 utilitarian theories of justice: three problems, 5.1 gauthier, 5.3 scanlon, 6.1 justice as equality, 6.2 responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, 6.3 relational egalitarianism, 7. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries, 1. justice: mapping the concept.

‘Justice’ has sometimes been used in a way that makes it virtually indistinguishable from rightness in general. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between ‘universal’ justice that corresponded to ‘virtue as a whole’ and ‘particular’ justice which had a narrower scope (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Book V, chs. 1–2). The wide sense may have been more evident in classical Greek than in modern English. But Aristotle also noted that when justice was identified with ‘complete virtue’, this was always ‘in relation to another person’. In other words, if justice is to be identified with morality as such, it must be morality in the sense of ‘what we owe to each other’ (see Scanlon 1998). But it is anyway questionable whether justice should be understood so widely. At the level of individual ethics, justice is often contrasted with charity on the one hand, and mercy on the other, and these too are other-regarding virtues. At the level of public policy, reasons of justice are distinct from, and often compete with, reasons of other kinds, for example economic efficiency or environmental value.

As this article will endeavour to show, justice takes on different meanings in different practical contexts, and to understand it fully we have to grapple with this diversity. But it is nevertheless worth asking whether we find a core concept that runs through all these various uses, or whether it is better regarded as a family resemblance idea according to which different combinations of features are expected to appear on each occasion of use. The most plausible candidate for a core definition comes from the Institutes of Justinian , a codification of Roman Law from the sixth century AD, where justice is defined as ‘the constant and perpetual will to render to each his due’. This is of course quite abstract until further specified, but it does throw light upon four important aspects of justice.

First, it shows that justice has to do with how individual people are treated (‘to each his due’). Issues of justice arise in circumstances in which people can advance claims – to freedom, opportunities, resources, and so forth – that are potentially conflicting, and we appeal to justice to resolve such conflicts by determining what each person is properly entitled to have. In contrast, where people’s interests converge, and the decision to be taken is about the best way to pursue some common purpose – think of a government official having to decide how much food to stockpile as insurance against some future emergency – justice gives way to other values. In other cases, there may be no reason to appeal to justice because resources are so plentiful that we do not need to worry about allotting shares to individuals. Hume pointed out that in a hypothetical state of abundance where ‘every individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites can want’, ‘the cautious, jealous virtue of justice would never once have been dreamed of’ (Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals , pp. 183–4). Hume also believed – and philosophical controversy on this point persists until today – that justice has no place in close personal relationships, such as the family, where (it is alleged) each identifies with the others’ interests so strongly that there is no need and no reason for anyone to make claims of personal entitlement. (See Sandel 1982 for a defence of this view; for a critique, see Okin 1989. See also the entry on feminist perspectives on reproduction and the family) .

That justice is a matter of how each separate person is treated appears to create problems for theories such as utilitarianism that judge actions and policies on the basis of their overall consequences aggregated across people – assuming that these theories wish to incorporate rather than discard the idea of justice. In Section 4 below we examine how utilitarians have attempted to respond to this challenge.

Although justice is centrally a matter of how individuals are treated, it is also possible to speak of justice for groups – for example when the state is allocating resources between different categories of citizens. Here each group is being treated as though it were a separate individual for purposes of the allocation.

Second, Justinian’s definition underlines that just treatment is something due to each person, in other words that justice is a matter of claims that can be rightfully made against the agent dispensing justice, whether a person or an institution. Here there is a contrast with other virtues: we demand justice, but we beg for charity or forgiveness. This also means that justice is a matter of obligation for the agent dispensing it, and that the agent wrongs the recipient if the latter is denied what is due to her. It is a characteristic mark of justice that the obligations it creates should be enforceable: we can be made to deliver what is due to others as a matter of justice, either by the recipients themselves or by third parties. However it overstates the position to make the enforceability of its requirements a defining feature of justice (see Buchanan 1987). On the one hand, there are some claims of justice that seem not to be enforceable (by anyone). When we dispense gifts to our children or our friends, we ought to treat each recipient fairly, but neither the beneficiaries themselves nor anyone else can rightfully force the giver to do so. On the other hand, in cases of extreme emergency, it may sometimes be justifiable to force people to do more than justice requires them to do – there may exist enforceable duties of humanity. But these are rare exceptions. The obligatory nature of justice generally goes hand-in-hand with enforceability.

The third aspect of justice to which Justinian’s definition draws our attention is the connection between justice and the impartial and consistent application of rules – that is what the ‘constant and perpetual will’ part of the definition conveys. Justice is the opposite of arbitrariness. It requires that where two cases are relevantly alike, they should be treated in the same way (We discuss below the special case of justice and lotteries). Following a rule that specifies what is due to a person who has features X , Y , Z whenever such a person is encountered ensures this. And although the rule need not be unchangeable – perpetual in the literal sense – it must be relatively stable. This explains why justice is exemplified in the rule of law, where laws are understood as general rules impartially applied over time. Outside of the law itself, individuals and institutions that want to behave justly must mimic the law in certain ways (for instance, gathering reliable information about individual claimants, allowing for appeals against decisions).

Finally, the definition reminds us that justice requires an agent whose will alters the circumstances of its objects. The agent might be an individual person, or it might be a group of people, or an institution such as the state. So we cannot, except metaphorically, describe as unjust states of affairs that no agent has contributed to bringing about – unless we think that there is a Divine Being who has ordered the universe in such a way that every outcome is a manifestation of His will. Admittedly we are tempted to make judgements of what is sometimes called ‘cosmic injustice’ – say when a talented person’s life is cut cruelly short by cancer, or our favourite football team is eliminated from the competition by a freak goal – but this is a temptation we should resist.

This agency condition, however, is less restrictive than it might at first appear. It by no means excludes the possibility that agents can create injustice by omission – for example by failing to create the institutions or to enact the policies that would deliver vital resources to those who need them. Thus it is now common to speak of ‘systemic injustice’ in the case of bad outcomes that no-one intends to occur but that could be prevented by a shift in social norms or institutional practices. The agents in these cases are all those who by acting together to change these things could invert the injustice, but have so far failed to do so.

2. Justice: Four Distinctions

We have so far looked at four elements that are present in every use of the concept of justice. Now it is time to consider some equally important contrasts.

Philosophers writing on justice have observed that it has two different faces, one conservative of existing norms and practices, the other demanding reform of these norms and practices (see Sidgwick 1874/1907, Raphael 2001). Thus on the one hand it is a matter of justice to respect people’s rights under existing law or moral rules, or more generally to fulfil the legitimate expectations they have acquired as a result of past practice, social conventions, and so forth; on the other hand, justice often gives us reason to change laws, practices and conventions quite radically, thereby creating new entitlements and expectations. This exposes an ambiguity in what it means to ‘render each his due’. What is ‘due’ might be what a person can reasonably expect to have given existing law, policy, or social practice, or it might be what the person should get under a regime of ideal justice: this could mean what the person deserves, or needs, or is entitled to on grounds of equality, depending on which ideal principle is being invoked.

Conceptions of justice vary according to the weight they attach to each of these faces. At one extreme, some conceptions interpret justice as wholly concerned with what individuals can claim under existing laws and social conventions: thus for Hume, justice was to be understood as adherence to a set of rules that assign physical objects to individuals (such as being the first possessor of such an object) (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , Book III, Part II). These rules can be explained by reference to the natural associations that form in people’s minds between persons and external objects, and although the system of justice as a whole can be shown to be socially useful, there are no relevant independent standards by which its principles can be assessed (Hume briskly dismissed equality and merit as principles for allocating property to persons). In similar vein, Hayek argued that justice was a property of individual behaviour, understood as compliance with the ‘rules of just conduct’ that had evolved to enable a market economy to function effectively. For Hayek, to speak of ‘social justice’ as an ideal standard of distribution was as meaningless as to speak of a ‘moral stone’ (Hayek 1976, p. 78)

At the other extreme stand conceptions of justice which posit some ideal principle of distribution such as equality, together with a ‘currency’ specifying the respect in which justice requires people to be made equally well off, and then refuse to acknowledge the justice of any claims that do not arise directly from the application of this principle. Thus claims deriving from existing law or practice are dismissed unless they happen to coincide with what the principle requires. More often, however, ideal justice is seen as proposing principles by which existing institutions and practices can be assessed, with a view to reforming them, or in the extreme case abolishing them entirely, while the claims that people already have under those practices are given some weight. Rawls, for example, whose two principles of justice count as ideal principles for this purpose, is at pains to stress that they are not intended to be applied in a way that disregards people’s existing legitimate expectations. About the ‘difference principle’, which requires social and economic inequalities to be regulated so that they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society, he says:

It applies to the announced system of public law and statutes and not to particular transactions or distributions, nor to the decisions of individuals and associations, but rather to the institutional background against which these transactions and decisions take place. There are no unannounced and unpredictable interferences with citizens’ expectations and acquisitions. Entitlements are earned and honored as the public system of rules declares. (Rawls 1993, p. 283)

Here we see Rawls attempting to reconcile the demands of conservative and ideal justice. Yet he does not directly address the question of what should happen when changing circumstances mean that the difference principle requires new laws or policies to be enacted: do those whose prior entitlements or expectations are no longer met have a claim to be compensated for their loss? We could call this the question of transitional justice (though this phrase is often used now in a more specific sense to refer to the process of reconciliation that may occur following civil war or other armed conflicts: see the entry on transitional justice ).

A second important contrast, whose pedigree reaches back at least as far as Aristotle, is between justice as a principle for assigning distributable goods of various kinds to individual people, and justice as a remedial principle that applies when one person wrongly interferes with another’s legitimate holdings. Thus suppose Bill steals Alice’s computer, or sells Alice faulty goods which he claims to be in perfect order: then Alice suffers a loss, which justice demands that Bill should remedy by returning the computer or fulfilling his contract honestly. Corrective justice, then, essentially concerns a bilateral relationship between a wrongdoer and his victim, and demands that the fault be cancelled by restoring the victim to the position she would have been in had the wrongful behaviour not occurred; it may also require that the wrongdoer not benefit from his faulty behaviour. Distributive justice, on the other hand, is multilateral: it assumes a distributing agent, and a number of persons who have claims on what is being distributed. Justice here requires that the resources available to the distributor be shared according to some relevant criterion, such as equality, desert, or need. In Aristotle’s example, if there are fewer flutes available than people who want to play them, they should be given to the best performers (Aristotle, The Politics , p. 128). In modern debates, principles of distributive justice are applied to social institutions such as property and tax systems, which are understood as producing distributive outcomes across large societies, or even the world as a whole.

The conceptual distinction between distributive and corrective justice seems clear, but their normative relationship is more difficult to pin down (see Perry 2000, Ripstein 2004, Coleman 1992, chs. 16–17). Some have claimed that corrective justice is merely instrumental to distributive justice: its aim is to move from a situation of distributive injustice brought about by the faulty behaviour to one that is more nearly (if not perfectly) distributively just. But this view runs into a number of objections. One is that so long as Alice has a legitimate title to her computer, her claim of corrective justice against Bill does not depend on her having had, prior to the theft, the share of resources that distributive justice ideally demands. She might be richer than she deserves to be, yet corrective justice still require that the computer be returned to her. In other words, corrective justice may serve to promote conservative rather than ideal justice, to use the distinction introduced in 2.1. Another objection is that corrective justice requires the wrongdoer himself to restore or compensate the person he has wronged, even if the cause of distributive justice could be better served by transferring resources from a third party – giving Alice one of even-more-undeservedly-rich Charles’s computers, for example. This underlines the bilateral nature of corrective justice, and also the fact that it comes into play in response to faulty behaviour on someone’s part. Its primary demand is that people should not lose out because others have behaved wrongfully or carelessly, but it also encompasses the idea that ‘no man should profit by his own wrong’. If Alice loses her computer in a boating accident, she might, under an insurance scheme, have a claim of distributive justice to a new machine, but she has no claim of corrective justice.

If corrective justice cannot be subsumed normatively under distributive justice, we need to explain its value. What is achieved when we make Bill return the computer to Alice? Aristotle ( Nicomachean Ethics , Book V, ch. 4) suggested that corrective justice aims to restore the two parties to a position of equality; by returning the computer we cancel both Bill’s unjustified gain and Alice’s unjustified loss. But this assumes that the computer can be returned intact. Corrective justice requires that Alice be made no worse off than she was before the theft, even if that means Bill suffering an absolute loss (e.g. by paying for a new computer if he has damaged Alice’s). Aristotle himself recognized that the idea of evening out gain and loss made no literal sense in a case where one person assaults another and has to compensate him for his injury – there is no ‘gain’ to be redistributed. It seems, then, that the value of corrective justice must lie in the principle that each person must take responsibility for his own conduct, and if he fails to respect the legitimate interests of others by causing injury, he must make good the harm. In that way, each person can plan her life secure in the knowledge that she will be protected against certain kinds of external setbacks. Philosophers and lawyers writing on corrective justice disagree about what standard of responsibility should apply – for example whether compensation is required only when one person wilfully or negligently causes another to suffer loss, or whether it can also be demanded when the perpetrator displays no such fault but is nevertheless causally responsible for the injury.

A third distinction that must be drawn is between the justice of the procedures that might be used to determine how benefits and burdens of various kinds are allocated to people, and the justice of the final allocation itself. It might initially seem as though the justice of a procedure can be reduced to the justice of the results produced by applying it, but this is not so. For one thing, there are cases in which the idea of an independently just outcome makes no sense. A coin toss is a fair way of deciding who starts a game, but neither the Blues nor the Reds have a claim of justice to bat first or kick off. But even where a procedure has been shaped by a concern that it should produce substantively just outcomes, it may still have special properties that make it intrinsically just. In that case, using a different procedure to produce the same result might be objectionable. In an influential discussion, John Rawls contrasted perfect procedural justice , where a procedure is such that if it is followed a just outcome is guaranteed (requiring the person who cuts a cake to take the last slice himself is the illustration Rawls provides), imperfect procedural justice , where the procedure is such that following it is likely, but not certain, to produce the just result, and pure procedural justice , such as the coin-tossing example, where there is no independent way to assess the outcome – if we call it just, it is only on the grounds that it has come about by following the relevant procedure (Rawls 1971, 1999, § 14).

Theories of justice can then be distinguished according to the relative weight they attach to procedures and substantive outcomes. Some theories are purely procedural in form. Robert Nozick distinguished between historical theories of justice, end-state theories, and patterned theories in order to defend the first against the second and third (Nozick 1974). An end-state theory defines justice in terms of some overall property of a distribution (of resources, welfare, etc.) – for example whether it is egalitarian, or whether the lowest position in the distribution is as high as it can be, as Rawls’ difference principle requires. A patterned theory looks at whether what each receives as part of a distribution matches some individual feature such as their desert or their need. By contrast, an historical theory asks about the process by which the final outcome has arisen. In Nozick’s particular case, a distribution of resources is said to be just if everyone within its scope is entitled to what they now own, having acquired it by legitimate means – such as voluntary contract or gift – from someone who was also entitled to have it, leading back eventually to a just act of acquisition – such as labouring on a plot of land – that gave the first owner his valid title. The shape of the final distribution is irrelevant: according to Nozick, justice is entirely a matter of the sequence of prior events that created it (for critical assessments of Nozick’s position, see Paul 1982, Wolff 1991, Cohen 1995, chs. 1–2).

For most philosophers, however, the justice of a procedure is to a large extent a function of the justice of the outcomes that it tends to produce when applied. For instance, the procedures that together make up a fair trial are justified on the grounds that for the most part they produce outcomes in which the guilty are punished and the innocent are acquitted. Yet even in these cases, we should be wary of assuming that the procedure itself has no independent value. We can ask of a procedure whether it treats the people to whom it is applied justly, for example by giving them adequate opportunities to advance their claims, not requiring them to provide personal information that they find humiliating to reveal, and so forth. Studies by social psychologists have shown that in many cases people care more about being treated fairly by the institutions they have to deal with than about how they fare when the procedure’s final result is known (Lind and Tyler 1988).

Justice takes a comparative form when to determine what is due to one person we need to look at what others can also claim: to determine how large a slice of pie is rightfully John’s, we have to know how many others have a claim to the pie, and also what the principle for sharing it should be – equality, or something else. Justice takes a non-comparative form when we can determine what is due to a person merely by knowing relevant facts about that particular person: if John has already been promised the whole of the pie, then that is what he can rightfully claim for himself. Some theories of justice seem to imply that justice is always a comparative notion – for example when it is said that justice consists in the absence of arbitrary inequality – whereas others imply that it is always non-comparative. But conceptually, at least, both forms seem admissible; indeed we can find cases in which it appears we have to choose between doing justice comparatively and doing it non-comparatively (see Feinberg 1974; for a critical response, see Montague 1980). For example, we might have several candidates all of whom are roughly equally deserving of an academic honour, but the number of honours we are permitted to award is smaller than the number of candidates. If we honour some but not others, we perpetrate a comparative injustice, but if to avoid doing so we honour no-one at all, then each is treated less well than they deserve, and so unjustly from a non-comparative perspective.

Theories of justice can then be categorised according to whether they are comparative, non-comparative, or neither. Principles of equality – principles requiring the equal distribution of some kind of benefit – are plainly comparative in form, since what is due to each person is simply an equal share of the benefit in question rather than any fixed amount. In the case of principles of desert, the position is less straightforward. These principles take the form ‘ A deserves X by virtue of P ’, where X is a mode of treatment, and P is a personal characteristic possessed by A (Feinberg 1970). In the case of both X and P , we can ask whether they are to be identified comparatively or non-comparatively. Thus what A deserves might either be an entitlement, or an absolute amount of some benefit – ‘a living wage’, say – or it might be a share of some collective benefit, or a multiple or fraction of what others are receiving – ‘twice what B is getting’, say. Turning to P , or what is often called the desert basis, this may be a feature of A that we can identify without reference to anyone else, or it may be a comparative feature, such as being the best student in a graduating class. So desert-based claims of justice might take one of four different forms depending on whether the basis of desert and/or the deserved mode of treatment is comparative or non-comparative (see Olsaretti 2003 for essays that address this question; for a more advanced treatment, see Kagan 2012, Part III).

Among principles of justice that are straightforwardly non-comparative are ‘sufficiency’ principles which hold that what justice requires is that each person should have ‘enough’, on some dimension or other – for instance, have all of their needs fulfilled, or have a specified set of capabilities that they are able to exercise (for a general defence of sufficiency, though not one that links it specifically to justice, see Frankfurt 2015; for a critique, see Casal 2007). Such principles, however, need to be supplemented by other principles, not only to tell us what to do with the surplus (assuming there is one) once everyone has sufficient resources, but also to guide us in situations where there are too few resources to bring everyone up to the sufficiency threshold. Should we, for example, maximise the number of people who achieve sufficiency, or minimise the aggregate shortfall suffered by those in the relevant group? Unless we are prepared to say that these are not matters of justice, a theory of justice that contains only the sufficiency principle and nothing else looks incomplete.

Some theories of justice cannot readily be classified either as comparative or as non-comparative. Consider one part of Rawls’ theory of social justice, the difference principle, which as noted above requires that social and economic inequalities be arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (Rawls 1971, 1999, §12–13). Under this principle, ideally just shares are calculated by determining what each person would receive under the set of social institutions whose economic effect is to raise the worst off person to the highest possible level. This is neither a fixed amount, nor one that depends in any direct sense on what other individuals are receiving, or should receive. Applying the difference principle does require making comparisons, but these are comparisons between the effects of different social institutions – say different tax laws, or different ways of defining property rights – not between individual people and the amounts of benefit they are receiving. We might call theories of this kind ‘holistic’ or ‘systemic’.

3. The Scope of Justice

When we raise questions about the scope of justice, we are asking about when principles of justice take effect and among whom . We have already, when discussing Hume, encountered the idea that there might be circumstances in which justice becomes irrelevant – circumstances in which resources are so abundant that it is pointless to allocate individual shares, or, as Hume also believed, in which resources are so scarce that everyone is permitted to grab what he can in the name of self-preservation. But even in circumstances that are less extreme than these, questions about scope arise. Who can make claims of justice, and who might have the corresponding obligation to meet them? Does this depend on the kind of thing that is being claimed? If comparative principles are being applied, who should be counted as part of the comparison group? Do some principles of justice have universal scope – they apply whenever agent A acts towards recipient B , regardless of the relationship between them – while others are contextual in character, applying only within social or political relationships of a certain kind? The present section examines some of these questions in greater detail.

What does a creature have to do, or be like, to be included within the scope of (at least some) principles of justice? Most past philosophers have assumed that the line should be drawn so as to exclude all non-human animals, but more recently some have been prepared to defend ‘justice for animals’ (Nussbaum 2006, ch. 6; Garner 2013). Against this, Rawls asserts that although we have ‘duties of compassion and humanity’ towards animals and should refrain from treating them cruelly, nonetheless they are ‘outside the scope of the theory of justice’ (Rawls 1971, p. 512; Rawls 1999, p. 448). How could this claim be justified?

We can focus our attention either on individual features that humans possess and animals lack, and that might be thought relevant to their inclusion within the scope of justice, or on asymmetries in the relationship between humans and other animals. To begin with the latter, Hume claimed that the domination humans exercised over animals – such that an animal could only possess something by virtue of our permission – meant that we were ‘bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them’ (Hume, Enquiry , p. 190). For Rawls and those influenced by him, principles of distributive justice apply among agents who are related to one another as participants in a ‘cooperative venture for mutual advantage’, and this might seem to exclude animals from the scope of such principles. Critics of this view have pointed to cases of human-animal co-operation (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, Valentini 2014); however these arguments focus mainly or entirely on the special case of dogs , and it seems implausible to generalise from them in an attempt to show that human-animal relationships generally have a co-operative character.

But the claim that justice only applies to participants in co-operative practices is anyway vulnerable to the objection that it risks excluding seriously disabled people, people living in isolated communities, and future generations from the scope of justice, so it does not seem compelling as a claim about justice in general (see further below). Might there be other reasons why animals cannot make claims of justice on us? Another Rawls-inspired suggestion is that animals lack the necessary moral powers, in particular the capacity to act on principles of justice themselves. They cannot distinguish what is justly owed to them from what is not; and they cannot determine what they owe to others – whether to humans or to other non-human animals – as a matter of justice. This suggestion interprets justice as involving a kind of reciprocity: an agent to whom justice is due must also in principle be an agent who could dispense justice to others, by virtue of having the relevant capacity, even if for physical reasons – such as suffering from severe disability – they cannot do so in practice.

If this suggestion is rejected, and we allow that some animals, at least, should be included within the scope of justice, we can then ask about the form that justice should take in their cases. Using the distinction drawn in 2.4 above, it appears that justice for animals must be non-comparative. For example, we might attribute rights to the animals over whom we exercise power – rights against cruel treatment, and rights to food and shelter, for instance. This would involve using a sufficiency principle to determine what animals are owed as a matter of justice. It is much less plausible to think that comparative principles might apply, such that giving special treats to one cat but not another could count as an injustice.

The Rawlsian view introduced in the previous section, which holds that principles of social justice apply among people who are engaged together in a co-operative practice, is a leading example of a relational theory of justice. Other theories offer different accounts of the relevant justice-generating feature: for example, Nagel has argued that principles of distributive justice apply among people who by virtue of being citizens of the same state are required both to comply with, and accept responsibility for, the coercive laws that govern their lives (Nagel 2005). In both cases, the claim being made is that when people stand in a certain relationship to one another, they become subject to principles of justice whose scope is limited to those within the relationship. In particular, comparative principles apply within the relationship, but not beyond it. If A stands in a relationship (of the right kind) to B , then it becomes a matter of justice how A is treated relative to B , but it does not matter in the same way how A is treated relative to C who stands outside of the relationship. Justice may still require that C be given treatment of a certain kind, but that will be justice in its non-comparative guise.

Whether justice is relational in either of the ways that Rawls and Nagel suggest has large implications for its scope. In particular it bears on the question whether there is such a thing as global distributive justice, or, in contrast, whether distributive principles only apply to people who are related together as members of the same society or citizens of the same state. For example, might the global inequalities that exist between rich and poor in today’s world be unjust simply as inequalities, or are they unjust only insofar as they prevent poor people from living lives that we judge to be acceptable? (see entries on international distributive justice and global justice ) So much hangs on the question whether, and if so in virtue of what, distributive justice has a relational character. What reason can be given for thinking that it does?

Suppose we have two people A and B , of whom one is significantly better off than another – has greater opportunities or a higher income, say. Why should this be a concern of justice? It seems it will not be a concern unless it can be shown that the inequality between A and B can be attributed to the behaviour of some agent, individual or collective, whose actions or omissions have resulted in A being better off than B – in which case we can ask whether the inequality between them is justifiable, say on grounds of their respective deserts. This reiterates the claim in 1.4 above that without an agent to whom the outcome can be attributed there can only be justice or injustice in a metaphorical, ‘cosmic’, sense. Relational theorists claim that when people associate with one another in the relevant way, they become agents of justice. On a small scale they can organize informally to ensure that each receives what is due to him relative to the rest. On a larger scale, distributive justice requires the creation of legal and other institutions to achieve that outcome. Moreover failure to co-ordinate their actions in this way is likely to be a source of injustice by omission.

Debates about the scope of justice then become debates about whether different forms of human association are of the right kind to create agency in the relevant sense. Take the question of whether principles of social justice should apply to market transactions. If we see the market as a neutral arena in which many individual people freely pursue their own purposes, then the answer will be No. The only form of justice that arises will be justice in the conduct of each agent, who must avoid inflicting harm on others, must fulfil her contracts, and so forth. Whereas if we see the market as governed by a humanly-constructed system of rules that the participants collectively have the power to change – by legislation, for example – then we cannot avoid asking whether the outcomes it currently produces meet relevant standards of distributive justice, whatever we take these to be. A similar issue arises in the debate about over principles of global justice referred to above: is the current world order such that it makes sense to regard humanity as a whole as a collective agent responsible for the distributive outcomes it allows to occur?

Once institutions are established for the purpose (among other things) of delivering justice on a large scale, we can ask what duties of justice individual people have in consequence. Is their duty simply to support the institutions, and comply with whatever rules of conduct apply to them personally? Or do they have further duties to promote justice by acting directly on the relevant principles in their daily lives? No one doubts that some duties of justice fall directly on individuals, for example duties not to deceive or defraud when engaging in commercial transactions (and duties of corrective justice where behaviour is faulty), or duties to carry out one’s fair share of an informally organized project from which one expects to benefit, such as cleaning up the neighbourhood park. Others fall on them because they are performing a role within a social institution, for example the duty of an employer not to discriminate on grounds of race or gender when hiring workers, or the duty of a local government officer to assign public housing to those in greatest need. But what is much more in dispute is whether individual people have more extensive duties to promote social justice (for contrasting views, see Cohen 2008, ch. 3, Murphy 1998, Rawls 1993, Lecture VII, Young 2011, ch. 2).

Consider two cases: the first concerns parents who confer advantages on their children in ways that undermine fair equality of opportunity. If the latter principle of justice requires, to cite Rawls, that ‘those who have the same level of talent and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin’ (Rawls 2001, p. 44) then there are myriad ways in which some parents can bestow advantages on their children that other parents cannot – financial benefits, educational opportunities, social contacts, and so forth – that are likely to bring greater success in later life. Are parents therefore constrained as a matter of justice to avoid conferring at least some of these advantages, or are they free to benefit their children as they choose, leaving the pursuit of equal opportunities entirely in the hands of the state (for a careful analysis, see Brighouse and Swift 2014)?

The second example concerns wage differentials. Might individuals whose talents can bring them high rewards in the labour market have a duty not to make use of their bargaining power, but instead be willing to work for a fair wage – which if fairness is understood in egalitarian terms might mean the same wage as everyone else (perhaps with extra compensation for those whose labour is unusually burdensome)? Rawls, as we saw above, argued that economic justice meant arranging social and economic inequalities to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and in formulating the principle in this way he assumed that some inequalities might serve as incentives to greater production that would also raise the position of the worst-off group in society. But if individuals were willing to forego incentives, and so economic inequalities served no useful purpose, then the arrangement that worked to the greatest benefit of the (otherwise) least advantaged would be one of strict equality. Cohen (2008) argues that Rawls’ position is internally inconsistent. As citizens designing our institutions we are supposed to be guided by the difference principle, but as private actors in the marketplace, we are permitted to ignore that principle and bargain for higher wages, even though doing so will work to the disadvantage of the worst-off group. Justice, according to Cohen, requires us to embrace an ethos of service that disdains material incentives.

Why might we hesitate before agreeing that in cases such as these, justice requires people to refrain from doing things that they are permitted to do by the public rules of their society (passing on benefits to their children; seeking higher wages)? One reason is that the refraining is only going to have a significant effect if it is practised on a large scale, and individuals have no assurance that others will follow their example; meanwhile they (or their children) will lose out relative to the less scrupulous. A connected reason has to do with publicity: it may be hard to detect whether people are following the required ethos or not (see Williams 1998). Is the person who sends her child to a private school because she claims he has special needs that the local state school cannot meet being sincere, or is she just trying to buy him comparative advantage? How can we tell whether the person who claims more money, but merely, he says, as compensation for the unusual stress that his work involves, is reporting honestly? (for Cohen’s response, see Cohen 2008, ch. 8) It appears, then, that there are principles of justice that apply to what Rawls calls ‘the basic structure of society [as] a public system of rules’ that do not apply in the same way to the personal behaviour of the individuals who live within that structure. Attending to the scope , as well as the content , of justice is important.

Recent philosophical writing on justice has drawn attention to forms of injustice that do not involve the material treatment that people receive, either from other persons or from institutions, but the harms they suffer through failures of recognition. They are impacted by social norms and social practices that diminish their sense of agency and induce them to see themselves as of lesser value than others. Here then justice is understood as being adequately and appropriately recognized, and injustice as involving failures of recognition, or in some cases ‘misrecognition’, when a person is placed in a category or assigned an identity that is not their own. In one influential formulation of this idea, ‘it is unjust that some individuals and groups are denied the status of full partners in social interaction simply as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of cultural value in whose construction they have not equally participated and which disparage their distinctive characteristics or the distinctive characteristics assigned to them’ (Fraser in Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 29).

What, then, does it mean to be recognized? In general it means to be viewed and treated by others in the way that is appropriate to the features that you possess, but most philosophers regard recognition as multidimensional. In particular, they distinguish between being recognized as an equal, where a person is accorded the kind of standing that gives them an equal status with other members of the relevant group, and being recognized for having characteristics, achievements or an identity that may be uniquely their own. Recognition in this second sense may involve the unequal granting of social esteem. Justice as recognition, therefore, is internally complex. At the social level, Axel Honneth distinguishes ‘three forms of social recognition, based in the sphere-specific principles of love, equal legal treatment, and social esteem’ (Fraser and Honneth 2003 p. 180)

The question that arises is how best to understand the relationship between justice of this kind and distributive justice, involving the allocation of material resources and so forth. For Honneth, justice as recognition is understood expansively so that it can also capture issues of economic justice, the thought being that the harm inflicted when, say, labour is not adequately rewarded can be understood as a failure to offer adequate recognition of the worker’s social contribution. For Nancy Fraser, by contrast, recognition and redistribution are seen as two mutually irreducible but jointly necessary conditions for social justice. Failures of recognition can be experienced by some among the economically privileged – such as ‘the African-American Wall Street banker who cannot get a taxi to pick him up’ (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 34). Justice as recognition requires cultural shifts in the way that different forms of identity and different types of achievement are valued that are independent of the institutional changes required to achieve distributive justice.

A particular form of recognitional injustice is epistemic injustice as diagnosed by Miranda Fricker (Fricker 2007). This occurs when someone is wronged in their capacity as a source of knowledge, and it takes two main forms: testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice. As Fricker explains ‘testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word; hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone as at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences’ (Fricker 2007, p. 1). She argues that testimonial injustice matters for two reasons. First, the person who suffers from it is less able to protect or advance their interests – for example they are less likely to be believed when having to defend themselves in court. Second, since others are unwilling to regard them as competent sources of knowledge, they may lose trust in their own capacity to know, leading in some cases to ‘prolonged self-doubt and loss of intellectual confidence’.

Hermeneutical injustice arises in the context of unequal relationships in which the subordinated party lacks the concept or concepts needed to make sense of their experience (and thereby to challenge their subordination). Fricker uses the example of a woman who suffered sexual harassment at the time before feminists had developed that concept, and so had no adequate word to describe what she was experiencing. Hermeneutical injustice matters most when it is systematic, brought about by power inequalities that leave certain groups ‘hermeneutically marginalised’. However she treats epistemic justice as a virtue that individual hearers can develop, in contrast to recognition theorists like Fraser and Honneth for whom achieving recognitional justice requires collective action to change social and cultural norms on the part of misrecognized groups.

4. Utilitarianism and Justice

Can justice be understood in utilitarian terms? This may in the first place depend on how we interpret utilitarianism. We treat it here as a normative theory whose aim is to supply a criterion – the greatest happiness principle – that can be used, directly or indirectly, both by individuals and by institutions (such as states) in deciding what to do, rather than simply as a tool for evaluating states of affairs. Utilitarianism cannot plausibly provide a theory of justice unless it is interpreted in this action-guiding way, in light of what was said above about justice and agency. We also assume that the most likely candidate will be a rule-utilitarian view that treats principles of justice as belonging to the set of rules which when followed by the relevant agents will tend to produce the greatest total utility (for different ways of formulating this view, see the entry on rule consequentialism) .

Most utilitarians have regarded it as part of their task in defending utilitarianism to show that it can both accommodate and explain much of what we intuitively believe about justice. This is certainly true of two of the greatest among them, John Stuart Mill and Sidgwick, both of whom went to considerable lengths to show that familiar principles of justice could be given a utilitarian rationale (Mill Utilitarianism , ch. 5; Sidgwick 1874/1907, Book III, ch.5). Bentham, in contrast, was more cavalier: ‘justice, in the only sense in which it has a meaning, is an imaginary personage, feigned for the convenience of discourse, whose dictates are the dictates of utility, applied to certain particular cases’ ( The Principles of Morals and Legislation , pp. 125–6). If we follow the lead of Mill and Sidgwick in wishing to take seriously how justice is commonly understood, the utilitarian has two challenges to face. First he or she must show that the demands of justice as commonly understood correspond roughly to the rules that when followed by persons, or implemented by institutions, are most conducive to the greatest happiness. They need not mirror the latter exactly, because utilitarians will argue, as both Mill and Sidgwick did, that our intuitions about justice are often ambiguous or internally inconsistent, but there must be enough overlap to warrant the claim that what the utilitarian theory can accommodate and explain is indeed justice . (As Sidgwick (1874/1907, p. 264) put it, ‘we may, so to speak, clip the ragged edge of common usage, but we must not make excision of any considerable portion’.) Second, some explanation must be given for the distinctiveness of justice. Why do we have a concept that is used to mark off a particular set of requirements and claims if the normative basis for these requirements and claims is nothing other than general utility? What accounts for our intuitive sense of justice? The task confronting the utilitarian, then, is to systematize our understanding of justice without obliterating it.

By way of illustration, both Mill and Sidgwick recognize that desert , of both reward and punishment, is a key component of common understandings of justice, but they argue that if we remain at the level of common sense when we try to analyse it, we run into irresolvable contradictions. For instance, we are inclined to think that a person’s deserts should depend on what they have actually achieved – say the economic value of what they have produced – but also, because achievement will depend on factors for which the person in question can claim no credit, such as inborn talent, that their deserts should depend only on factors for which they are directly responsible, such as the amount of effort they expend. Each of these conceptions, when put into practice, would lead to a quite different schedule of rewards, and the only means to escape the impasse, these utilitarians claim, is to ask which schedule will generate most utility by directing people’s choices and efforts in the most socially productive way. Similar reasoning applies to the principles of punishment: the rules we should follow are the rules that are most conducive to the ends for which punishment is instituted, such as deterring crime.

To explain the distinctiveness of justice, Mill suggests that it designates moral requirements that, because of their very great importance to human well-being, people have a right to have discharged, and are therefore matters of perfect obligation. A person who commits an injustice is always liable to punishment of some kind, he argues. So he explains our sense of justice in terms of the resentment we feel towards someone who breaches these requirements. Sidgwick, who laid greater stress than Mill on the connection between justice and law, also underlined the relationship between justice and gratitude, on one side, and resentment, on the other, in order to capture the way in which our concern for justice seems to differ from our concern for utility in general.

Yet despite these efforts to reconcile justice and utility, three serious obstacles still remain. The first concerns what we might call the currency of justice: justice has to do with the way that tangible benefits and burdens are assigned, and not with the happiness or unhappiness that the assignees experience. It is a matter of justice, for example, that people should be paid the right amount for the jobs that they do, but, special circumstances aside, it is no concern of justice that John derives more satisfaction from his fairly-earned income than Jane does from hers (but see Cohen 1989 for a different view). There is so to speak, a division of labour, under which rights, opportunities, and material benefits of various kinds are allocated by principles of justice, while the conversion of these into units of utility (or disutility) is the responsibility of each individual recipient (see Dworkin 2000, ch. 1). Utilitarians will therefore find it hard to explain what from their point of view seems to be the fetishistic concern of justice over how the means to happiness are distributed, rather than happiness itself.

The second obstacle is that utilitarianism judges outcomes by totalling up utility levels, and has no independent concern for how that utility is distributed between persons. So even if we set aside the currency issue, utilitarian theory seems unable to capture justice’s demand that each should receive what is due to her regardless of the total amount of benefit this generates. Defenders of utilitarianism will argue that when the conduct-guiding rules are being formulated, attention will be paid to distributive questions. In particular, when resources are being distributed among people we know little about individually, there are good reasons to favour equality, since in most cases resources have diminishing marginal utility – the more of them you have, the less satisfaction you derive from additional instalments. Yet this is only a contingent matter. If some people are very adept at turning resources into well-being – they are so-called ‘utility monsters’ – then a utilitarian should support a rule that privileges them. This seems repugnant to justice. As Rawls famously put the general point, ‘each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on justice which….even the welfare of every one else cannot override’ (Rawls 1971, p. 28; Rawls 1999, pp. 24–25).

The third and final difficulty stems from utilitarianism’s thoroughgoing consequentialism. Rules are assessed strictly in the light of the consequences of adopting then, not in terms of their intrinsic properties. Of course, when agents follow rules, they are meant to do what the rule requires rather than to calculate consequences directly. But for a utilitarian, it is never going to be a good reason for adopting a rule that it will give people what they deserve or what they are entitled to, when desert or entitlement are created by events in the past, such as a person’s having performed a worthwhile action or entered an agreement. Backward-looking reasons have to be transmuted into forward-looking reasons in order to count. If a rule such as pacta sunt servanda (‘agreements must be kept’) is going to be adopted on utilitarian grounds, this is not because there is any inherent wrongness in defaulting on a compact one has made, but because a rule that compacts must be kept is a useful one, since it allows people to co-ordinate their behaviour knowing that their expectations about the future are likely to be met. But justice, although not always backward-looking in the sense explained, often is. What is due to a person is in many cases what they deserve for what they have done, or what they are entitled to by virtue of past transactions. So even if it were possible to construct a forward-looking rationale for having rules that closely tracked desert or entitlement as these are normally understood, the utilitarian still cannot capture the sense of justice – why it matters that people should get what is due to then – that informs our common-sense judgements.

Utilitarians might reply that their reconstruction preserves what is rationally defensible in common sense beliefs while what it discards are elements that cannot survive sustained critical reflection. But this would bring them closer to Bentham’s view that justice, as commonly understood, is nothing but a ‘phantom’.

5. Contractarianism and Justice

The shortcomings of utilitarianism have prompted several recent philosophers to revive the old idea of the social contract as a better way of bringing coherence to our thinking about justice. The idea here is not that people actually have entered a contract to establish justice, or that they should proceed to do so, but that we can understand justice better by asking the question: what principles to govern their institutions, practices and personal behaviour would people choose to adopt if they all had to agree on them in advance? The contract, in other words, is hypothetical; but the search for agreement is meant to ensure that the principles chosen would, when implemented, not lead to outcomes that people could not accept. Thus whereas a utilitarian might, under some circumstances, be prepared to support slavery – if the misery of the slaves were outweighed by the heightened pleasures of the slave-owners – contractarians claims that no-one could accept a principle permitting slavery, lest they themselves were destined to be slaves when the principle was applied.

The problem that contractarians face is to show how such an agreement is possible. If we were to ask people, in the real world, what principles they would prefer to live under, they are likely to start from a position of quite radical disagreement, given their interests and their beliefs. Some might even be willing to endorse slavery, if they were fairly certain that they would not end up as slaves themselves, or if they were sado-masochists who viewed the humiliations inflicted on slaves in a positive light. So in order to show how agreement could be achieved, contractarians have to model the contracting parties in a particular way, either by limiting what they are allowed to know about themselves or about the future, or by attributing to them certain motivations while excluding others. Since the modelling can be done differently, we have a family of contractarian theories of justice, three of whose most important members are the theories of Gauthier, Rawls and Scanlon.

Gauthier (1986) presents the social contract as a bargain between rational individuals who can gain through co-operating with one another, but who are competing over the division of the resulting surplus. He assumes that each is interested only in trying to maximise his own welfare, and he also assumes that there is a non-co-operative baseline from which the bargaining begins – so nobody would accept a solution that left her less well off than in the baseline condition. Each person can identify the outcome under which they fare best – their maximum gain – but they have no reason to expect others to accept that. Gauthier argues that rational bargainers will converge on the principle of Minimax Relative Concession , which requires each to concede the same relative proportion of their maximum possible gain relative to the non-co-operative baseline. Thus suppose there is a feasible arrangement whereby each participant can achieve two-thirds of their maximum gain, but no arrangement under which they all do better than that, then this is the arrangement that the principle recommends. Each person has made the same concession relative to the outcome that is best for them personally – not accepting the same absolute loss of welfare, let it be noted, but the same proportionate loss.

There are some internal difficulties with Gauthier’s theory that need to be recorded briefly (for a full discussion, see Barry 1989, esp. Part III). One is whether Minimax Relative Concession is in fact the correct solution to the bargaining problem that Gauthier introduces, as opposed to the standard Nash solution which (in a simple two-person case) selects the outcome in which the product of the two parties’ utilities is maximised (for discussion of different solutions to the bargaining problem, see the entry on contemporary approaches to the social contract , § 3.2). A second is whether Gauthier is able to justify positing a ‘Lockean’ baseline, under which each is assumed to respect the natural rights of the others, as the starting point for bargaining over the surplus – as opposed to a more conflictual ‘Hobbesian’ baseline in which individuals are permitted to use their natural powers to threaten one another in the process of establishing what each could expect to get in the absence of co-operation. But the larger question is whether a contract modelled in this way is an appropriate device for delivering principles of justice. On the one hand, it captures the idea that the practice of justice should work to everyone’s advantage, while requiring all those involved to moderate the demands they make on one another. On the other hand, it prescribes a final distribution of benefit that appears morally arbitrary, in the sense that A ’s bargaining advantage over B – which stems from the fact that his maximum possible gain is greater than hers – allows him to claim a higher level of benefit as a matter of justice . This seems implausible: there may be prudential reasons to recommend a distribution that reflects the outcome that self-interested and rational bargainers would arrive at, but claims of justice need a different basis.

John Rawls’ theory of justice is the most widely-cited example of a contractarian theory, but before outlining it, two words of caution are necessary. First, the shape of the theory has evolved from its first incarnation in Rawls (1958) through his major work A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971) and on to Rawls (1993) and Rawls (2001). Second, although Rawls has consistently claimed that the principles of justice he defends are the principles that would be selected by people in a suitably designed ‘original position’ in which they are asked to choose the social and political institutions they will live under – this is what qualifies his theory as contractarian – it is less clear how important a role the contract itself plays in his thinking. His principles, which are discussed elsewhere (see the entry on John Rawls) , can be defended on their own merits as a theory of social justice for a modern liberal society, even if their contractual grounding proves to be unsound. Rawls presents the contracting parties as seeking to advance their own interests as they decide which principles to favour, but under two informational constraints. First, they are not allowed to know their own ‘conception of the good’ – what ends they personally find it most valuable to pursue – so the principles must be couched in terms of ‘primary goods’, understood as goods that it is better to have more rather than less of whatever conception of the good you favour. Second, they are placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ that deprives them of any knowledge of personal characteristics, such as their gender, their place in society, or the talents and skills they possess. This means that they have no basis on which to bargain for advantage, and have to consider themselves as generic persons who might be male or female, talented or untalented, and so forth. In consequence, Rawls argues, all will choose to live under impartial principles that work to no-one’s advantage in particular.

The problem for Rawls, however, is to show that the principles that would be selected in such an original position are in fact recognizable as principles of justice . One might expect the parties to calculate how to weigh the primary goods (which Rawls catalogues as ‘rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth’) against each other, and then to choose as their social principle ‘maximise the weighted sum of primary goods, averaged across all persons’. This, however, would bring the theory very close to utilitarianism, since the natural method of weighing primary goods is to ask how much utility having a given quantity of each is likely, on average, to bring (for the claim that utilitarianism would be chosen in a Rawlsian original position, see Harsanyi 1975). Since Rawls wishes to reject utilitarianism, he has to adjust the psychology of the parties in the original position so that they reason differently. Thus he suggests that, at least in developed societies, people have special reason to prioritise liberty over the other goods and to ensure that it is equally distributed: he argues that this is essential to safeguard their self-respect. In later writing his argument is less empirical: now the parties to the contract are endowed with ‘moral powers’ that must be exercised, and it is then fairly easy to show that this requires them to have a set of basic liberties.

When he turns to the distribution of income and wealth, Rawls has to show why his choosers would pick the difference principle, which considers only the position of the worst-off social group, over other principles such as maximising average income across the whole society. In Theory of Justice he does this by attributing special psychological features to the choosers that make it appropriate for them to follow the ‘maximin’ rule for decisions under uncertainty (choose the option whose worst possible outcome is least bad for you). For example, they are said to be much more concerned to achieve the minimum level of income that the difference principle would guarantee them than to enjoy increases above that level. In his later work, he abandons this reliance on maximin reasoning and gives greater prominence to another argument hinted at in Theory . This portrays the contracting parties as starting out from the presumption that income and wealth should be distributed equally, but then recognizing that all can benefit by permitting certain inequalities to arise. When these inequalities are governed by the difference principle, they can be justified to everyone, including the worst off, thus creating the conditions for a more stable society. But we need then to ask why equal distribution should be treated as the benchmark, departures from which require special justification. When Rawls says that it is ‘not reasonable’ for any of the parties initially to expect more than an equal share (Rawls 1971, p. 150; Rawls 1999, p. 130), is this simply a corollary of their position as rational choosers behind a veil of ignorance, or has Rawls in addition endowed them with a substantive sense of justice that includes this presumption of equality?

Although Rawls throughout presents his theory of justice as contractarian, we can now see that the terms of the contract are in part determined by prior normative principles that Rawls engineers the parties to follow. So in contrast to Gauthier, it is no longer simply a case of self-interested contractors negotiating their way to an agreement. Rawls candidly admits that the contractual situation has to be adjusted so that it yields results that match our pre-existing convictions about justice. But then we may ask how much work the contractual apparatus is really doing (see Barry 1989, ch. 9 for a critical appraisal).

Scanlon (1998) does not attempt to deliver a theory of justice in the same sense as Rawls, but his contractarian account of that part of morality that specifies ‘what we owe to each other’ covers much of the same terrain (for an explicit attempt to analyse justice in Scanlonian terms, see Barry 1995). Like Rawls, Scanlon is concerned to develop an alternative to utilitarianism, and he does so by developing a test that any candidate moral principle must pass: it must be such that no-one could reasonably reject it as the basis for informed, unforced general agreement (see the entry on contractualism ). Scanlon’s contractors are not positioned behind a veil of ignorance. They are able to see what effect adopting any proposed principle would have on them personally. If that effect is unacceptable to them, they are permitted to reject it. Each person has, so to speak, a veto on any general principle for regulating conduct. Those that survive this test are defensible as principles of justice – Scanlon concedes that there might be alternative sets of such principles appropriate to different social conditions.

It might seem, however, that giving each person a veto would lead straightforwardly to deadlock, since anyone might reject a principle under which he fared badly relative to some alternative. Here the idea of reasonable rejection becomes important. It would not, Scanlon thinks, be reasonable to reject a principle under which one does badly if the alternatives all involve someone else faring worse still. One needs to take account of other people’s reasons for rejecting these alternatives. It might then appear that Scanlon’s contractualism yields the difference principle, which requires the worst-off group in society to be as well of as they can be. But this is not the conclusion that Scanlon draws (though he acknowledges that there might be special reasons to follow Rawls in requiring basic social institutions to follow the difference principle). The claims of other groups must be considered too. If a policy greatly benefits many others, while slightly worsening the position of a few, though without leaving them very badly off, it may well not be rejectable. Scanlon’s position leaves some room for aggregation – it makes a difference how many people will be benefitted if a principle is followed – though not the simple form of aggregation that utilitarians defend.

Scanlon also says that a person can have a reason for rejecting a principle if it treats them unfairly, say by benefitting some but not others for arbitrary reasons. This presupposes a norm of fairness that the contractarian theory does not itself attempt to explain or justify. So it looks as though the purpose of the theory is to provide a distinctive account of moral reasoning (and moral motivation) but not to defend any substantive principles of distributive justice. In this respect, Scanlon’s contractualism is less ambitious than either Gauthier’s or Rawls’.

6. Egalitarianism and Justice

In the recent past, many philosophers have sought to establish a close connection between justice and equality: they ask the question ‘what kind of equality does justice require?’, and to that several competing answers have been given (see, for example Cohen 1989, Dworkin 2000, Sen 1980). But we should not be too hasty to assume that what justice demands is always equality, whether of treatment or of outcome. Perhaps it does so only in a formal sense. As we saw in sect 1.3, justice requires the impartial and consistent application of rules, from which it follows that when two people are alike in all relevant respects, they must be treated equally. But, as Aristotle among others saw, justice also involves the idea of proportional treatment, which implies recipients getting unequal amounts of whatever good is at issue (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Book V, ch. 3). If A is twice as deserving or twice as needy as B , justice may require that she receives more than B does. So here formal equality of treatment – the same rule applied to both – leads to an unequal outcome. Again, when justice takes the conservative form of respect for existing entitlements or legitimate expectations (see para 2.1) there is no reason to anticipate that what is due to different people will be substantively the same.

So we need to ask about the circumstances in which justice requires a substantively equal distribution of advantages. One rather obvious case occurs when the members of the group within which the distribution is going to occur have no relevant distinguishing features, so there are no grounds on which some can claim greater shares of benefit than others. Suppose a group experiences a windfall gain for which no-one can claim any credit: a pot of gold somehow appears in their midst. Then unless any member can make a justice-related claim for a larger-than-equal share – say that she has special needs that she lacks sufficient resources to meet – an equal distribution of the gold is what justice demands, since any other distribution would be arbitrary. Equality here is the default principle that applies in the absence of any special claims that can be presented as reasons of justice.

Equality also acts as a default in circumstances where, although people may indeed have unequal claims to whatever good is being distributed, we have no reliable way of identifying and measuring those claims. By sharing the good equally, we can at least ensure that every claim has been partially satisfied. Thus suppose we have limited supplies of a drug that can treat malaria, and a number of patients displaying symptoms of the disease, but lacking specialised medical knowledge we cannot tell whether one person’s condition is more serious than another’s; then by sharing out the drug equally, we can guarantee that each person at least receives the highest fraction of what they really need. Any other distribution must leave at least one person with less (this of course assumes that there is no threshold amount of the drug beneath which it is ineffective; if that assumption is wrong, justice under the stated conditions might require a lottery in which the chosen ones receive threshold-size doses).

If justice requires equality only by default, it might seem to apply only in a narrow range of cases. How could egalitarian justice be made more robust? One approach involves declaring a wider range of factors irrelevant to just distribution. Thus one formulation of the principle holds that no-one should be worse-off than anyone else as a result of their ‘morally arbitrary’ characteristics, where a characteristic is morally arbitrary when its possessor cannot claim credit for having it. This captures a widespread intuition that people should not be advantaged or disadvantaged by virtue of their race or gender, but extends it (more controversially) to all personal features with a genetic basis, such as natural talents and inborn dispositions. In doing so, it discounts most claims of desert, since when people are said to deserve benefits of various kinds, it is usually for performing actions or displaying qualities that depend upon innate characteristics such as strength or intelligence. In the following section, we will see how egalitarian theories of justice have tried to incorporate some desert-like elements by way of response. But otherwise justice as equality and justice as desert appear to be in conflict, and the challenge is to show what can justify equal treatment in the face of inequalities of desert.

A second approach answers this challenge by explaining why it is positively valuable to afford people equal treatment even if they do display features that might appear to justify differential treatment. A prominent advocate of this approach is Dworkin, who argues that fundamental to justice is a principle of equal concern and respect for persons, and what this means in more concrete term is that equal resources should be devoted to the life of each member of society (Dworkin 2000). (The reference to membership here is not redundant, because Dworkin understands egalitarian justice as a principle that must be applied within sovereign states specifically – so in the terms of 3.2, this is a relational view of justice.) The thought is that showing persons equal respect may sometimes require us to afford them equal treatment, even in the face of relevant grounds for discrimination. Thus we insist on political equality – one person, one vote – even though we know that there are quite large differences in people’s competence to make political decisions.

As noted above, justice as simple equality of treatment seems open to the objection that it fails to acknowledge the agency of the recipients, who may have acted in ways that appear to qualify them to receive more (or less) of whatever benefit is being distributed. To answer this objection, several recent philosophers have presented alternative versions of ‘responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism’ – a family of theories of justice that treat equal distribution as a starting point but allow for departures from that baseline when these result from the responsible choices made by individuals (see Knight and Stemplowska 2011 for examples). These theories differ along several dimensions: the ‘currency of justice’ used to define the baseline of equality, the conditions that must be fulfilled for a choice to qualify as responsible, and which among the consequences that follow from a choice should count when the justice of an outcome is being assessed (it may in particular appear unjust to allow people to suffer the full consequences of bad choices that they could not reasonably have anticipated). The label that is often used to describe a sub-class of these theories is ‘luck egalitarianism’. According to luck egalitarians, justice requires that no-one should be disadvantaged relative to others on account of ‘brute’ bad luck, whereas inequalities that arise through the exercise of personal responsibility are permissible (for a full discussion of luck egalitarianism, see the entry on justice and bad luck ). ‘Brute’ luck is interpreted widely to include not only external circumstances such as one person’s initially having access to more resources than another, but also internal factors such as possessing natural abilities or disabilities, or having involuntarily acquired expensive tastes. All such inequalities are to be ironed out by redistribution or compensation, while people’s choices about how to use the assets they are granted should be respected, even if this leads to significant inequality in the long run.

Luck egalitarianism has proved surprisingly influential in recent debates on justice, despite the evident difficulties involved in, for example, quantifying ‘brute luck disadvantage’ in such a way that a compensatory scheme could be established. There are, however, a number of problems it has to face. By giving scope to personal responsibility, it seeks to capture what is perhaps the most attractive part of the conventional idea of desert – that people should be rewarded for making good choices and penalised for making bad ones – while filtering out the effects of having (undeserved) natural talents. But in reality the choices that people make are influenced by the talents and other qualities that they happen to have already. So if we allow someone to reap advantages by, for example, devoting long hours to learning to play the piano at a high level, we must recognize that this is a choice that she would almost certainly not have made unless early experiment showed that she was musically gifted. We cannot say what she would have chosen to do in a counterfactual world in which she was tone deaf. There seems then to be no coherent half-way house between accepting full-blooded desert and denying that people can justly claim relative advantage through the exercise of responsibility and choice (see further Miller 1999, ch. 7) .

A second problem is that one person’s exercise of responsibility may prove advantageous or disadvantageous to others, even though they have done nothing to bring this change about, so from their point of view it must count as ‘brute’ luck. This will be true, for example, in any case in which people are competing to excel in some field, where successful choices made by A will worsen the comparative position of B , C , and D . Or again, if A acts in a way that benefits B , but does nothing comparable to improve the position of C and D , then an inequality is created that counts as ‘brute bad luck’ from the perspective of the latter. One of the most influential exponents of luck egalitarianism seems to have recognized the problem in a late essay: ‘unlike plain egalitarianism, luck egalitarianism is paradoxical, because the use of shares by people is bound to lead to a distribution flecked by luck’ (Cohen 2011, p. 142).

We have seen that equality can sometimes be understood as required by justice; but it can also be valued independently. Indeed there can be circumstances in which the two values collide, because what justice demands is inequality of outcome. The kind of inequality that is independently valuable is social equality, best understood as a property of the relationships that prevail within a society: people regard and treat each other as social equals, and the society’s institutions are designed to foster and reflect such attitudes. A society of equals contrasts with one in which people belong to different ranks in a social hierarchy, and behave towards one another as their relative ranking prescribes. Different reasons can be given for objecting to social inequality, and conversely for valuing social equality (see Scanlon 2003).

Those who find equality valuable for reasons other than reasons of distributive justice are often described as ‘relational egalitarians’ (see Anderson 1999, Wolff 1998, Fourie, Schuppert and Wallimann-Helmer 2015). It is tempting to regard relational egalitarianism as a rival theory of justice to the luck egalitarian theory outlined in §6.2, but it may be more illuminating to see it instead as providing an alternative account of why we should care about limiting material inequality. Thus, faced with a world like the one we currently inhabit in which income differences are very large, justice theorists are likely to criticize these inequalities on grounds that they are not deserved, or arise from brute luck, etc., whereas relational egalitarians will say that they create a divided society in which people are alienated from each other, and cannot interact in a mutually respectful way. Relational equality does not address issues of distribution directly, and so cannot function as a theory of justice itself, but it can provide grounds for preferring one theory of justice to its rivals – namely that implementing that particular theory is more likely to create or sustain a society of equals.

We saw at the beginning of this article that justice can take a number of different forms, depending on the practical context in which it is being applied. Although we found common elements running through this diversity of use – most readily captured in Justinian’s ‘suum cuique ’ formula – these were formal rather than substantive. In these circumstances, it is natural to look for an overarching framework into which the various contextually specific conceptions of justice can all be fitted. Three such frameworks were examined: utilitarianism, contractarianism and egalitarianism. None, however, passed what we might call the ‘Sidgwick/Rawls test’, namely that of incorporating and explaining the majority at least of our considered convictions about justice – beliefs that we feel confident in holding about what justice requires us to do in a wide and varied range of circumstances (for Rawls’ version of the test see the entry on reflective equilibrium ). So unless we are willing to jettison many of these convictions in order to uphold one or other general framework, we will need to accept that no comprehensive theory of justice is available to us; we will have to make do with partial theories – theories about what justice requires in particular domains of human life. Rawls himself, despite the bold title of his first book ( A Theory of Justice ), came to recognize that what he had outlined was at best a theory of social justice applied to the basic institutional structure of a modern liberal state. Other forms of justice – familial, allocative, associational, international – with their associated principles would be applicable in their respective domains (for an even more explicitly pluralist account of justice, see Walzer 1983; for a fuller defence of a contextual approach to justice, see Miller 2013, esp. ch. 2).

One way to loosen up our thinking about justice is by paying greater attention to the history of the concept. We can learn a great deal by reading what Aristotle, or Aquinas, or Hume, has to say about the concept, but as we do so, we also see that elements we would expect to find are missing (there is nothing about rights in Aristotle, for example), while others that we would not anticipate are present. This may in some part be due to the idiosyncrasies of each thinker, but more importantly it reflects differences in the form of social life in which each was embedded – its economic, legal and political structure, especially. Various attempts have been made to write histories of justice that are more than just catalogues of what individual thinkers have said: they aim to trace and explain systematic shifts in the way that justice has been interpreted (for contrasting examples, see MacIntyre 1988, Fleischacker 2004, Johnston 2011). These should not be read as enlightenment stories in which our understanding of justice steadily improves as the centuries roll by. MacIntyre’s view, for example, is that modern liberal societies cannot sustain the practices within which notions of justice find their proper home. We can get a better grasp of what justice means to us by seeing the various conceptions that compete for our attention as tied to aspects of our social world that did not exist in the past, and are equally liable to disappear in the future.

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Home — Essay Samples — Sociology — Social Justice — A Definition Of Social Justice

A Definition of Social Justice

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Defining Social Justice

L ast year marked the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Friedrich Hayek, among whose many contributions to the twentieth century was a sustained and animated put-down of most of the usages of the term “social justice.” I have never encountered a writer, religious or philosophical, who directly answers Hayek’s criticisms. In trying to understand social justice in our own time, there is no better place to start than with the man who, in his own intellectual life, exemplified the virtue whose common misuse he so deplored. The trouble with “social justice” begins with the very meaning of the term. Hayek points out that whole books and treatises have been written about social justice without ever offering a definition of it. It is allowed to float in the air as if everyone will recognize an instance of it when it appears. This vagueness seems indispensable. The minute one begins to define social justice, one runs into embarrassing intellectual difficulties. It becomes, most often, a term of art whose operational meaning is, “We need a law against that.” In other words, it becomes an instrument of ideological intimidation, for the purpose of gaining the power of legal coercion. Hayek points out another defect of twentieth-century theories of social justice. Most authors assert that they use it to designate a virtue (a moral virtue, by their account). But most of the descriptions they attach to it appertain to impersonal states of affairs—“high unemployment” or “inequality of incomes” or “lack of a living wage” are cited as instances of “social injustice.” Hayek goes to the heart of the matter: social justice is either a virtue or it is not. If it is, it can properly be ascribed only to the reflective and deliberate acts of individual persons. Most who use the term, however, ascribe it not to individuals but to social systems. They use “social justice” to denote a regulative principle of order; again, their focus is not virtue but power. The term “social justice” was first used in 1840 by a Sicilian priest, Luigi Taparelli d’Azeglio, and given prominence by Antonio Rosmini Serbati in La Costitutione Civile Secondo la Giustizia Sociale in 1848. John Stuart Mill gave this anthropomorphic approach to social questions almost canonical status for modern thinkers thirteen years later in Utilitarianism :

Society should treat all equally well who have deserved equally well of it, that is, who have deserved equally well absolutely. This is the highest abstract standard of social and distributive justice; towards which all institutions , and the efforts of all virtuous citizens, should be made in the utmost degree to converge . [Emphasis added.]

Mill imagines that societies can be virtuous in the same way that individuals can be. Perhaps in highly personalized societies of the ancient type, such a usage might make sense—under kings, tyrants, or tribal chiefs, for example, where one person made all the crucial social decisions. Curiously, however, the demand for the term “social justice” did not arise until modern times, in which more complex societies operate by impersonal rules applied with equal force to all under “the rule of law.” The birth of the concept of social justice coincided with two other shifts in human consciousness: the “death of God” and the rise of the ideal of the command economy. When God “died,” people began to trust a conceit of reason and its inflated ambition to do what even God had not deigned to do: construct a just social order. The divinization of reason found its extension in the command economy; reason (that is, science) would command and humankind would collectively follow. The death of God, the rise of science, and the command economy yielded “scientific socialism.” Where reason would rule, the intellectuals would rule. (Or so some thought. Actually, the lovers of power would rule.) From this line of reasoning it follows that “social justice” would have its natural end in a command economy in which individuals are told what to do, so that it would always be possible to identify those in charge and to hold them responsible. This notion presupposes that people are guided by specific external directions rather than internalized, personal rules of just conduct. It further implies that no individual should be held responsible for his relative position. To assert that he is responsible would be “blaming the victim.” It is the function of “social justice” to blame somebody else, to blame the system , to blame those who (mythically) “control” it. As Leszek Kolakowski wrote in his magisterial history of communism, the fundamental paradigm of Communist ideology is guaranteed to have wide appeal: you suffer ; your suffering is caused by powerful others ; these oppressors must be destroyed. We need to hold someone accountable, Hayek notes, even when we recognize that such a protest is absurd. We are not wrong, Hayek concedes, in perceiving that the effects of the individual choices and open processes of a free society are not distributed according to a recognizable principle of justice. The meritorious are sometimes tragically unlucky; the evil prosper; good ideas don’t pan out, and sometimes those who backed them, however noble their vision, lose their shirts. But a system that values both trial-and-error and free choice is in no position to guarantee outcomes in advance. Furthermore, no one individual (and certainly no politburo or congressional committee or political party) can design rules that would treat each person according to his merit or even his need. No one has sufficient knowledge of all relevant personal details, and as Kant writes, no general rule has a grip fine enough to grasp them. Hayek made a sharp distinction, however, between those failures of justice that involve breaking agreed-upon rules of fairness and those that consist in results that no one designed, foresaw, or commanded. The first sort of failure earned his severe moral condemnation. No one should break the rules; freedom imposes high moral responsibilities. The second, insofar as it springs from no willful or deliberate act, seemed to him not a moral matter but an inescapable feature of all societies and of nature itself. When labeling unfortunate results as “social injustices” leads to an attack upon the free society, with the aim of moving it toward a command society, Hayek strenuously opposes the term. The historical records of the command economies of Nazism and communism justify his revulsion at that way of thinking. Hayek recognized that at the end of the nineteenth century, when the term “social justice” came to prominence, it was first used as an appeal to the ruling classes to attend to the needs of the new masses of uprooted peasants who had become urban workers. To this he had no objection. What he did object to was careless thinking. Careless thinkers forget that justice is by definition social. Such carelessness becomes positively destructive when the term “social” no longer describes the product of the virtuous actions of many individuals, but rather the utopian goal toward which all institutions and all individuals are “made in the utmost degree to converge” by coercion. In that case, the “social” in “social justice” refers to something that emerges not organically and spontaneously from the rule-abiding behavior of free individuals, but rather from an abstract ideal imposed from above. G iven the strength of Hayek’s argument against the term, it may seem odd to assert that he himself was a practitioner of social justice—even if one adds, as one must, “social justice rightly understood.” Still, Hayek plainly saw in his vocation as a thinker a life of service to his fellow men. Helping others to understand the intellectual keys to a free and creative society is to render them a great benefit. Hayek’s intellectual work was not merely a matter of his own self-interest, narrowly understood, but was aimed at the good of the human city as a whole. It was a work of justice in a social dimension—in other words, a work of virtue. To explain what Hayek did, then, we need a conception of social justice that Hayek never considered. Social justice rightly understood is a specific habit of justice that is “social” in two senses. First, the skills it requires are those of inspiring, working with, and organizing others to accomplish together a work of justice. These are the elementary skills of civil society, through which free citizens exercise self-government by doing for themselves (that is, without turning to government) what needs to be done. Citizens who take part commonly explain their efforts as attempts to “give back” for all that they have received from the free society, or to meet the obligations of free citizens to think and act for themselves. The fact that this activity is carried out with others is one reason for designating it as a specific type of justice; it requires a broader range of social skills than do acts of individual justice. The second characteristic of “social justice rightly understood” is that it aims at the good of the city, not at the good of one agent only. Citizens may band together, as in pioneer days, to put up a school or build a bridge. They may get together in the modern city to hold a bake sale for some charitable cause, to repair a playground, to clean up the environment, or for a million other purposes that their social imaginations might lead them to. Hence the second sense in which this habit of justice is “social”: its object, as well as its form, primarily involves the good of others. One happy characteristic of this definition of the virtue of social justice is that it is ideologically neutral. It is as open to people on the left as on the right or in the center. Its field of activity may be literary, scientific, religious, political, economic, cultural, athletic, and so on, across the whole spectrum of human social activities. The virtue of social justice allows for people of good will to reach different—even opposing—practical judgments about the material content of the common good (ends) and how to get there (means). Such differences are the stuff of politics. We must rule out any use of “social justice” that does not attach to the habits (that is, virtues) of individuals. Social justice is a virtue, an attribute of individuals, or it is a fraud. And if Tocqueville is right that “the principle of association is the first law of democracy,” then social justice is the first virtue of democracy, for it is the habit of putting the principle of association into daily practice. Neglect of it, Hayek wrote, has moral consequences:

It is one of the greatest weaknesses of our time that we lack the patience and faith to build up voluntary organizations for purposes which we value highly, and immediately ask the government to bring about by coercion (or with means raised by coercion) anything that appears as desirable to large numbers. Yet nothing can have a more deadening effect on real participation by the citizens than if government, instead of merely providing the essential framework of spontaneous growth, becomes monolithic and takes charge of the provision for all needs, which can be provided for only by the common effort of many.

Michael Novak holds the George Frederick Jewett Chair in Religion and Public Policy at the American Enterprise Institute. This essay is adapted from a lecture delivered at the University of Chicago’s Committee on Social Thought.

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Let us be unequivocal about social justice in nursing

Associated data.

• Professional nursing is rooted in social justice responsibilities.
• Student nurses should be aware of and take actions for social justice issues that affect people's health.
• Awareness of and actions for social justice are not explicit in nursing documents in the United Kingdom.
• The Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) and schools of nursing should integrate social justice in the nursing curriculum.

A search for the phrase social justice on the website of the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) will produce 406 results, however none of these results refer to the phrase. I did this search to collect information about references in the NMC documents that portrays the organisation's interest and position on social justice issues in nursing. A start with search for references to social justice in the NMC documents is justified by its statutory responsibilities and legal purposes to the public. One way that the NMC demonstrates this responsibility is by setting standards that schools or universities of nursing should adhere to in framing their curriculum. The failure of the NMC to make a clear reference to social justice challenges its stance on promoting public or social responsibilities of nurses. This contrast the significance that has been attached to social justice by other reputable national and international nursing organisations, such as, the Canadian Nurses Association, American Nurses Association and International Council of Nurses. The recognition of social justice as nursing responsibility by these organisations are evident in the forms of explicit references in documents and creation of specific documents on the topic. The failure of the NMC to make specific reference to and adopt definitive pronouncement on social justice contributes to the elusiveness of the topic in nursing scholarship in the United Kingdom.

I have research interest in social justice in nursing and now exploring the possibilities of this topic for my doctoral studies and would welcome further dialogue with the nursing community. My research interests cover issues relating to nursing responsibilities, visibility in nursing documents and integration into nursing curriculum. These issues have implications for nursing education, practice and research, and for the health and wellbeing of individuals and populations.

It is plausible to state that the nursing profession is rooted in social justice responsibilities, as exemplified by the pioneering activities of Mary Seacole, Florence Nightingale, Lillian Wald, among others. The caring and many times the advocacy roles of these pioneers continues to resonate in present day nursing practices, and extend beyond intersections of social class, ethnicity, race, gender, or similar backgrounds.

Social justice in health and nursing care can be understood in several contexts based on seminal definitions and theories. The term refers to equitable distribution and redistribution of resources for positive health outcomes, recognition and removal of social and political barriers that impinge on health and promoting parity of participation in decision-making for the allocation and utilisation of health resources. These are situations that relate to practices, policies and systems that create and perpetuate poverty, unemployment, homelessness, discrimination, lack of education, among other social malaise. The social consequences of these conditions can lead to poor health and negative health outcomes for individuals and communities.

In practising social justice, as an example, for a person living with diabetes or other diseases for that matter, the nurse is mandated to not only provide hands-on or bedside nursing care, but also initiate and advocate for health policies and social systems that eradicate the causes of diabetes or other diseases. In the current global COVID-19 pandemic, several instances have brought to the fore the disparities in health care and health outcomes for people in care homes versus those in National Health Service (NHS) hospitals, and Black and Ethnic Minority health care providers versus their European White counterparts. For these and similar reasons, it is incumbent on the NMC to make clear statements in their documents and even create charter dedicated to social justice issues in the nursing profession. Such courageous, timely and necessary action by an organisation with international standing will not only influence schools of nursing in the UK to develop curriculums that distinctly integrate the topic, but also make clarion call for similar national organisations to follow suit. A step in this direction will help student nurses and our future nurses to become aware of the critical conditions that are the causes of poor health which can be due to unfair, unjust and unequal social and political policies, systems and practices.

This argument can extend to the position that with the persisting health disparities in the UK and across the globe, it is imperative that nurses should not only become aware of, but also engage in actions that transforms social injustices that affects people's health. There is emphasis in the nursing curriculum for students to understand and reflect on ethical issues that they encounter in their practice. As a stand-alone, awareness or reflection on unjust social health situations do not bring about necessary progressive transformation. In other words, awareness or reflection that is devoid of appropriate action is devoid of progressive change. Therefore, critical nursing learning activities should make space for theories or knowledge to be translated into practices that promote sustainable changes for improvement in health outcomes. This form of learner experience can be understood as praxis , that is, the use of theory to engage in practices that promote positive transformation. The learning opportunities for nursing students to become aware of and engage in actions for social justice or against social injustice, are neither explicit in the NMC standards nor in nursing curriculums. This situation hinders the ability of student nurses to consciously recognise and participate in activities for correcting structural inequalities and inequities that manifest as poor health and negative health outcomes.

The key viewpoints in this piece are associated with the curriculum, social justice and praxis in nursing. Firstly, I agree with the view that social justice should be the responsibility of nursing because issues of social justice affects the health and wellbeing of people. Secondly, it is my view that the current nursing curriculum is silent and ambiguous on practices and educational activities that promote social justice in the profession. Thirdly, I believe that our experiences of COVID-19 heighten the necessity for nurses and nursing institutions to make unequivocal statements about the place and relevance of social justice in our profession. Finally, I suggest that clear provision is made in nursing documents and curriculums to guide engagement in praxis that promote social justice in practice, education and research. In response to these viewpoints, I am now exploring the possibilities of these topics for a doctoral study and would welcome further dialogue with the nursing community. The dialogue can focus on but not limited to viewpoints on: What is the position of the NMC on social justice? How visible are issues of social justice in the NMC standards? How to integrate issues of social justice in the nursing curriculum? What learning activities promote awareness of and actions for social justice in nursing? Dialogue on these and similar questions will elucidate critical factors that enable student nurses and nursing professionals to increase their awareness of and engagement in actions for social justice.

Appendix A Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nepr.2020.102849 .

Appendix A. Supplementary data

The following is the Supplementary data to this article:

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Introduction to Social Justice in Social Work

Social workers are passionate about serving others. They apply this passion to advocating for vulnerable groups of people like children, seniors and those with disabilities. Because of this, social work is tied to social justice, which often leads efforts to protect the rights of the previously mentioned groups.

This article discusses what social justice is, why it’s important, and how social justice applies to the social work field.

What Is Social Justice?

Social justice has to do with the belief that all people should have equal rights and opportunity. However, there is a lot of confusion about what exactly this means. To more fully understand social justice, it helps to examine its history.

History of social justice

The concept of social justice has religious roots , originating in 1843 from the Italian philosopher and priest Luigi Taparelli d’Azeglio, according to the Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI), a nonprofit educational organization. ISI notes that the Catholic Church formally adopted “social justice” as part of its teaching through Pope Pius XI’s 1931 encyclical, “ Quadragesimo Anno .” These early discussions of social justice addressed the growing gap between the rich and poor after the industrial revolution and into the progressive era.

After the Great Depression, the social work profession experienced a shift in priorities and adopted a social justice focus. In his Social Work Today article, “ Keeping Social Justice in Social Work ,” Dr. Frederic Reamer explains how many social workers “worked primarily in public welfare agencies and other social programs begun under the New Deal and designed to address society’s poorest and most vulnerable citizens.”

The idea of social justice received more attention after John Rawl, an American political philosopher, published “ A Theory of Justice ” in 1971. Its guiding principle was that people have “an equal right to the most extensive system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.” Rawl’s ideas and theories of social justice have continued to be pertinent in economics and politics. For example, the United Nations and The International Forum for Social Development mention Rawl’s justice ideas throughout the 2006 publication, “ Social Justice in an Open World: The Role of the United Nations .”

Definition of social justice: Social justice is a type of justice rooted in the idea that all people should have equal rights, opportunity and treatment.

Definition of social injustice: Social injustice is when actions are taken that infringe upon a group’s rights, marginalize their opportunities or treat them unfairly.

Why Is Social Justice Important?

Social justice promotes fairness and equity across many aspects of society. For example, it promotes equal economic, educational and workplace opportunities. It’s also important to the safety and security of individuals and communities.

According to the National Education Association (NEA) Diversity Toolkit , “The absence of social justice results in social oppression.” The NEA notes this could be in the form of “racism, sexism, ageism, classism, ableism, and heterosexism.” It also suggests the following strategies for promoting social justice:

Concentrate on diversity
Confront the implications of oppression
Learn and address the attitudes and behaviors that sustain oppression
Adopt an inclusive mindset

Social workers apply the above strategies to advance growth and change among vulnerable groups, such the senior, LGBTQ, homeless, veteran and refugee communities.

Issues in social justice

Social justice issues span many areas. The Pachamama Alliance , an organization that advocates for indigenous and nature rights, says social justice issues can stem from prejudices in areas such as race, gender, age, sexual orientation, religion, nationality, education and mental or physical ability. Social workers must engage these issues as they promote social development and change.

The National Association of Social Workers (NASW) notes five areas of social justice priorities : voting rights, criminal justice/ juvenile justice, environmental justice, immigration and economic justice. Other common social justice priorities are related to health care, education and workers’ rights. While liberals and conservatives feel differently about social justice issues and how to address them, social workers are committed to addressing the social injustices they encounter.

What Is Social Justice in Social Work?

Social justice and social work cannot be separated. Social workers use their strong communication and empathy skills to relate with patients undergoing stress and trauma, which could be related to social injustices. They ensure people are treated with respect and promote social justice within schools, hospitals, community centers, nursing homes and more.

According to the NASW’s Code of Ethics , “The primary mission of the social work profession is to enhance human well-being and help meet the basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty.” The NASW lists social justice as one of the social work profession’s core values , which include:

Social justice
Dignity and worth of the person
Importance of human relationships

Each value is tied to an aspirational ethical principle. For social justice, the ethical principle is “Social workers challenge social injustice.” The Code of Ethics expands upon this principle:

Social workers pursue social change, particularly with and on behalf of vulnerable and oppressed individuals and groups of people. Social workers’ social change efforts are focused primarily on issues of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and other forms of social injustice. These activities seek to promote sensitivity to and knowledge about oppression and cultural and ethnic diversity. Social workers strive to ensure access to needed information, services, and resources; equality of opportunity; and meaningful participation in decision making for all people.

Social workers engage in social justice because they have to be attentive to the environmental and societal factors that contribute to people’s struggles. Reamer explains this in his Social Work Today article, writing about how social workers understand “that individual clients’ struggles with problems such as clinical depression, anxiety, domestic violence, substance abuse and poor health often stem from significant social and economic problems associated with poverty, unemployment, unaffordable housing, inflation and other environmental problems.”

Careers in Social Justice

Aside from social work, there are several other careers in social justice. If you’re looking for ways to help individuals and communities address injustices, you may want to consider the following social justice careers:

Mental health worker: Related closely to the field of psychiatric social work , a mental health worker or counselor provides treatment and support for those who are experiencing mental or behavioral problems. Mental health workers evaluate clients’ mental health, develop treatment plans and goals and work with clients to assist them in their recovery. They may also conduct outreach to help community members recognize signs of destructive behavior. Most mental health counselor positions require at least a bachelor’s degree , but many require a master’s degree as well.
Victim advocate: A victim advocate provides assistance to victims of crimes throughout the criminal justice process. They advocate on behalf of victims and ensure that their rights are not violated. Responsibilities may include offering emotional support, providing resources and referrals and assisting with criminal justice forms. Some schools offer certificate programs specifically focused on victim advocacy.
Community developer: Community developers—sometimes referred to as community service managers—are responsible for coordinating community-wide programs that support public well-being. This may include identifying necessary programs and planning and managing outreach activities. Community developers often work for nonprofit organizations or government agencies. This position incorporates elements of macro social work , as it focuses on implementing large-scale solutions to community injustices.
Lobbyist: Lobbyists represent certain political interests and work to sway politicians to vote for legislation that favors these interests. Lobbying may be considered a social justice career if you are representing legislation that seeks to address community injustices. To become a lobbyist, it may be beneficial to earn a degree in political science, journalism, law, communication or public relations. It can also be helpful to have work experience relating to the specific issues you want to represent.
Lawyer: Lawyers represent individuals and businesses on a variety of legal issues, including disputes related to social justice. As a lawyer, you’ll advise clients, conduct research on legal problems and present facts to a court. In most states, lawyers need to earn a Juris Doctor (J.D.) degree and pass a bar exam before practicing. If you’re interested in both social work and law, you may want to consider a dual Master of Social Work (MSW) and J.D. degree. These types of dual degrees are designed to provide you with an understanding of how legal policies affect complex social issues.

Resources for Further Learning

Regardless of what type of social work career you wish to pursue, if you decide to become a social worker , social justice will likely be an integral part of your work. Below are resources related to social justice in social work. How will social justice be part of your social work career?

Web resources

NASW’s Code of Ethics
NASW’s Social Justice Priorities
“ Social Justice and Social Work ” by Michael J. Austin
“ Social Work and Social Justice: A Structural Approach to Practice ” by Colleen Lundy
“ Social Justice Isn’t What You Think It Is ” by Michael Novak
“ Social Justice Theory and Practice for Social Work ” by Lynelle Watts and David Hodgson
“ Social Work, Social Justice, and Human Rights: A Structural Approach to Practice, Second Edition ” by Colleen Lundy

Last updated: March 2022

The Concept of Justice

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What is the use of defining justice? One could argue that a definition of justice should be the product of reflections about justice, rather than a starting point. In the case of evaluative concepts such as liberty, democracy and justice, the distinction between defining and advocating is extremely hard to make. Any such definition presupposes certain values and those values should be defended rather than contained in an inevitably arbitrary definition.

Legal System
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Procedural Justice
Distributive Justice

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Definition of Social Justice and Social Justice in Leadership Essay

Social justice is a concept that attempts to promote fairness in society. It encourages equal access to social privileges, opportunities, and wealth while eliminating discrimination. Activists play a great role in advocating and promoting social justice through fighting for equal rights and the elimination of issues affecting a certain community or group. However, the development and implementation of policies is the role of the administrators, including agencies, government, foundations, and non-profit organizations (Laura, 2018). They help shape public policies to deal with arising or existing issues, while political factors determine the effectiveness of social justice policies. This paper intends to discuss a personal view of social justice as it relates to aspiring educational and organizational leaders.

Promoting quality and equitable education to every student facilitates social, political, and economic development while ensuring that no one is left behind. Educational and organizational leaders should provide a favorable environment that favors everyone. In the education sector, it is necessary to support children from marginalized societies who are unable to access quality education. This means that effort should be made to finance their education and ensure that they are considered when seeking entry in public and private schools (Laura, 2018). Offering them equal access to quality education is one of the best ways to promote their position and opportunities to advance their economic status. Education leaders must note that knowledge acquired through learning can enable marginalized communities to acquire well-paying jobs (Kendi, 2019). This can play a role in enhancing fair distribution and equitable share of resources.

Leaders should strive to support anti-racism education through supporting curricular justice goals. Learning is considered the greatest equalizer in society because everyone learns about the existing rights and how they should be protected. It makes it possible for people to identify fundamental injustices in society and encourage the establishment of effective measures to address them (Laura, 2018). Achieving effective learning and knowledge acquisition requires the elimination of social injustices existing within the school system.

Classrooms should offer a good example of the meaning of social justice to help create a future society that promotes equality and fairness. Technological advancement has seen schools enroll students from around the globe, bringing the need for improving justice and effective integration. The increasing diversity implies that successful education leaders should strive to eliminate issues surrounding gender identity, class, race, ability, and sexuality (Goodman, 2011). Teachers must do more than just teaching students about the meaning of right and wrong. They should take corrective measures and focus on the elimination of existing barriers to ensure that every student is inspired, encouraged, and safe at school.

Organizational leaders should examine their policies and system, and ensure that they support social justice. They should ensure the best practices and provide an inclusive work environment by promoting fairness during the promotions and hiring process. Workers usually feel motivated when working for an organization that is concerned about fairness in every aspect. For instance, a skilled immigrant employee would feel motivated to work harder and support his team to achieve better results in case the company has well-established anti-racial injustice and black racism (Kendi, 2019). Moreover, organizations should realize that social-injustices hinder productivity since the affected individuals feel threatened and disoriented. Achieving success should start by ensuring that everyone is comfortable and contented with the environment.

Leaders are expected to establish effective approaches to promote fairness and equality in their organizations. They should evaluate the situation, identify areas that need improvement and develop a plan to support the achievement of social justice. Sharing what the organization is planning to do with the workers influences them to become part of the solution and support the process. Leaders should avoid being defensive about criticism but should focus on addressing the issue (Laura, 2018). It is necessary to encourage workers to share as much information as possible to understand the situation affecting the bottom workers (Rae, 2019). Leaders need to note that workers may fear telling the management the truth since it can be risky for their jobs. This means that they must use effective strategies to encourage everyone to speak and share beneficial information. Leaders for equity and social justice should be determined to enhance growth and lifelong learning, facilitate change, improve awareness, and eliminate oppression and prejudice.

As a reflective professional working toward social justice practices, I am making a determined effort to promote positive interactions by striving to eliminate discrimination and oppression. I have realized that social justice promotes coordination and positive integration that enable the achievement of set objectives. It helps accept and appreciate people from different places and learn to enhance productivity. I am becoming more concerned about issues affecting others and interest in improving their position.

In conclusion, social justice entails the promotion of equality and fairness through the provision of equal access to education, opportunities, resources, and integration. It promotes individual rights and ensures that certain communities or groups are not hindered from achieving their dream. Aspiring organizational and educational leaders have a great role to play in the establishment of effective policies and fair culture. They should ensure equal access to quality education while that it is provided in the best way possible. Since learning promotes impartiality and honesty, schools must offer a favorable environment. Diversity in schools means that leaders must make an extra effort to eliminate challenges in the learning systems. Organizational leaders should provide a favorable environment that is free from any form of oppression and injustices. Facilitating the development of appropriate policies can help promote social justice and offer equal growth opportunities.

Charmaraman, L., Jones, A. E., Stein, N., & Espelage, D. L. (2013). Is it bullying or sexual harassment? Knowledge, attitudes, and professional development experiences of middle school staff. Journal of School Health , 83 (6), 438-444. Web.

Goodman, D. J. (2011). Promoting diversity and social justice: Educating people from privileged groups . Routledge.

Kendi, I. X. (2019). How to be an antiracist . One world.

Laura, C. T. (2018). Enacting social justice leadership through teacher hiring. The Urban Review , 50 (1), 123-139. Web.

Rae, S. (2019). From inclusion to support: How to build a better workplace. The New York Times . Web.

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IvyPanda . "Definition of Social Justice and Social Justice in Leadership." August 18, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/definition-of-social-justice-and-social-justice-in-leadership/.

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Essay on Social Justice

Students are often asked to write an essay on Social Justice in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

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100 Words Essay on Social Justice

Understanding social justice.

Social justice is the fair treatment of all people in society. It’s about making sure everyone has equal opportunities, irrespective of their background or status.

Importance of Social Justice

Social justice is important because it promotes equality. It helps to reduce disparities in wealth, access to resources, and social privileges.

Role of Individuals

Every person can contribute to social justice. By treating others fairly, respecting diversity, and standing against discrimination, we can promote social justice.

In conclusion, social justice is vital for a balanced society. It ensures everyone has a fair chance to succeed in life.

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250 Words Essay on Social Justice

Social justice, a multifaceted concept, is the fair distribution of opportunities, privileges, and resources within a society. It encompasses dimensions like economic parity, gender equality, environmental justice, and human rights. The core of social justice is the belief that everyone deserves equal economic, political, and social opportunities irrespective of race, gender, or religion.

The Importance of Social Justice

Social justice is pivotal in fostering a harmonious society. It ensures that everyone has access to the basic necessities of life and can exercise their rights without discrimination. It is the cornerstone of peace and stability in any society. Without social justice, the divide between different socio-economic classes widens, leading to social unrest.

Challenges to Social Justice

Despite its importance, achieving social justice is fraught with challenges. Systemic issues like discrimination, poverty, and lack of access to quality education and healthcare are significant roadblocks. These challenges are deeply ingrained in societal structures and require collective efforts to overcome.

The Role of Individuals in Promoting Social Justice

Every individual plays a crucial role in promoting social justice. Through conscious efforts like advocating for equal rights, supporting policies that promote equality, and standing against discrimination, individuals can contribute to building a just society.

In conclusion, social justice is a fundamental principle for peaceful coexistence within societies. Despite the challenges, each individual’s conscious effort can contribute significantly to achieving this noble goal. The journey towards social justice is long and arduous, but it is a path worth treading for the betterment of humanity.

500 Words Essay on Social Justice

Introduction to social justice.

Social justice, a multifaceted concept, is often described as the fair and equitable distribution of resources and opportunities, where outside factors that categorize people into social strata are irrelevant. It encompasses the idea that all individuals should have equal access to wealth, health, well-being, justice, privileges, and opportunity irrespective of their legal, political, economic, or other circumstances.

Origins and Evolution of Social Justice

The concept of social justice emerged during the Industrial Revolution and subsequent civil revolutions as a counter to the vast disparities in wealth and social capital. It was a call for societal and structural changes, aiming to minimize socio-economic differences. The term was first used by Jesuit priest Luigi Taparelli in the mid-19th century, influenced by the teachings of Thomas Aquinas. Since then, the concept has evolved and expanded, encompassing issues like environmental justice, health equity, and human rights.

The Pillars of Social Justice

Social justice rests on four essential pillars: human rights, access, participation, and equity. Human rights are the fundamental rights and freedoms to which all individuals are entitled. Access involves equal opportunities in terms of resources, rights, goods, and services. Participation emphasizes the importance of all individuals contributing to and benefiting from economic, social, political, and cultural life. Equity ensures the fair distribution of resources and opportunities.

Social Justice in Today’s World

In the 21st century, social justice takes many forms and intersects with various areas such as race, gender, sexuality, and class. It is increasingly associated with the fight against systemic issues like racism, sexism, and classism. The Black Lives Matter movement, for instance, is a social justice movement fighting against systemic racism and violence towards black people. Similarly, the #MeToo movement is a fight for gender justice, aiming to end sexual harassment and assault.

Despite the progress, numerous challenges to social justice persist. Systemic and structural discrimination, political disenfranchisement, economic inequality, and social stratification are just a few. Moreover, the rise of populism and nationalism worldwide has further complicated the fight for social justice, as these ideologies often thrive on division and inequality.

Promoting social justice requires collective action. Individuals can contribute by becoming more aware of the injustices around them, advocating for policies that promote equity, and standing up against discrimination. Education plays a crucial role in this process, as it can foster a deeper understanding of social justice issues and equip individuals with the tools to effect change.

In conclusion, social justice is a powerful concept that advocates for a fairer, more equitable society. While significant strides have been made, numerous challenges remain, necessitating a continued commitment to promoting social justice. Through education and advocacy, individuals can play a crucial role in this ongoing effort. The pursuit of social justice, therefore, is not just a societal or institutional responsibility, but an individual one as well.

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definition of social justice essay

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What Is Social Justice?

Areas of Focus

The Bottom Line

Key Takeaways

An Old Concept

Main Principles of Social Justice

Participation

Human Rights

Careers in Social Justice

Racial Equality

Gender Equality

LGBTQ+ Equality

The Critics

What Does Social Justice Mean?

Why Is Social Justice Important?

How Is Social Justice Related to Equity?

8 Tips For Writing A Social Justice Essay

#1. Brainstorm creatively

#2. Sharpen your topic’s focus

#3. Identify your purpose

#4. Find a human story

#5. Rely on a variety of sources

#6. Define your key terms

#7. Provide specific evidence and examples

#8. Acknowledge your critics

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Social Work and Social Justice: A Conceptual Review

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1.1 Justice and Individual Claims

2. Justice: Four Distinctions

3. The Scope of Justice

4. Utilitarianism and Justice

5. Contractarianism and Justice

6. Egalitarianism and Justice

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A Definition of Social Justice

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Appendix A. Supplementary data

Introduction to Social Justice in Social Work

What Is Social Justice?

History of social justice

Why Is Social Justice Important?

Issues in social justice

What Is Social Justice in Social Work?

Careers in Social Justice

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The Concept of Justice

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Definition of Social Justice and Social Justice in Leadership Essay

Essay on Social Justice

100 Words Essay on Social Justice

Importance of Social Justice

Role of Individuals

250 Words Essay on Social Justice

The Importance of Social Justice

Challenges to Social Justice

The Role of Individuals in Promoting Social Justice