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Socrates’s Concept of the Self

Socrates was an ancient Greek philosopher considered to be the forerunner of Western philosophy. He was, in particular, a scholar, teacher and philosopher who influenced countless of thinkers throughout generations. His method of questioning, famously known as the “Socratic Method”, laid the groundwork for Western systems of logic in particular and philosophy in general.

Plato was considered to be his greatest student. In fact, it was Plato who wrote his philosophy. As is well known, Socrates did not write anything. It was Plato who systematically articulated Socrates’s philosophy through his famous dialogues, which also chronicled Socrates’s life.

Socrates was eventually accused of corrupting the youth of Athens and sentenced to death by drinking hemlock. He could have opted for exile, but chose death instead. It can be surmised that Socrates used his death as a final lesson for his students to face the adversities of life calmly and squarely rather than flee like chickens and ducks when faced with storms in life.

Socrates was fully convinced that philosophy must obtain practical results for the greater wellbeing of society. And for Socrates, the very first step towards the realization of this goal is the acquisition of wisdom through “knowing one’s Self”. As Socrates famously said, ultimate wisdom comes from knowing oneself.

So, how does Socrates view the self ?

The key to understanding Socrates’s concept of the self is through the philosopher’s take on the “Soul”.

But Socrates’s concept of the soul should not be viewed from the vantage point of Christianity, that is, a religious conception of the soul. It is important to note that the ancient Greeks lived long before the existence of Christianity so that for them, the concept of the soul did not have the same religious connotations that it has for us today.

But what does Socrates actually mean by soul?

Of course, we cannot know for certain what Socrates really meant by the term soul. But most scholars in philosophy agreed with Frederick Copleston, a famous historian of philosophy, who believes that when Socrates speaks of the soul, the philosopher refers to a “thinking and willing subject”.

With this conception of the soul as a thinking and willing subject, it is safe to assume that the soul for Socrates is the intellectual and moral personality of humans. So, when Socrates said that the soul is the essence of the human person, he meant that it is the essence of humans to think and will. For this reason, the soul or the self for Socrates is the responsible agent in knowing and acting rightly or wrongly.

This is because for Socrates, the soul is the seat of knowledge and ignorance, of goodness and badness. Again, as the seat of knowledge and ignorance, of goodness and badness, the soul, for Socrates, is the essence of the human person. In other words, for Socrates, the soul is the person’s true self. In fact, Socrates said that when we turn inward in search for self-knowledge, we would eventually discover our true self. Viewed from this vantage point, the self is our “inner being”.

Now, because the soul or the self is the essence of the human person, and because it constitutes our personality, Socrates urges us to take care of our soul.

But why should we take care of our soul?

According to Socrates, we need to take care of our soul to attain the “Good Life”. As we can see, this is the ultimate goal of Socrates’s philosophy. As Socrates said, the human person must see to it that her life is geared towards knowledge of the Good Life. And for Socrates, the Good Life simply means being wise and virtuous. This explains why for Socrates, the Good Life is attained through the acquisition of knowledge, wisdom, and virtue.

Now, it is important to note that for Socrates, knowledge of the Goof Life cannot be acquired exogenously, but endogenously. For this reason, it is paramount that we devote considerable amount of attention, energy, and resources to making our soul as good and beautiful as possible. This conviction is expressed most visibly in perhaps Socrates’s most famous statement: “The unexamined life is not worth living.”

This gives us a clear idea of what Socrates meant by knowledge in this context: “to know” is “to know oneself”. Indeed, for us to attain the Good Life, we need to examine our life. The reason for this is quite obvious: virtue (which for Socrates is identical with knowledge) is intrinsic to the human person, and which can be accessed through self-examination. Since virtue is intrinsic to the human person, Socrates was convinced that the human person can discover the truth, that is, the truth of the Good Life. And once the human person discovers the truth, she then does what she thinks is the right thing to doꟷthus the famous Socratic dictum: “Knowing what is right is doing what is right.”

If knowing what is right is doing what is right, what about the problem of evil?

This seems to be a problem in Socrates’s concept of the self. Socrates seems to think that humans were angels, that once they know the right thing to do, they act accordingly.

Of course, Socrates was very much aware of the existence of evil in the world. However, for Socrates, those who commit evil acts are ignorant of the truth. They are ignorant in the sense that they don’t have an immediate realization of the “Good”. Thus, again, examining one’s self is the most important task one can undertake, for it alone will give her the knowledge necessary to answer the question “how one ought to live her life”. So, the famous Socratic dictum “Knowing what is right is doing what is right” means that once the person knows her “Self”, she may then learn how to care for it.

Finally, and contrary to the opinion of the masses, one’s true self, according to Socrates, should not be identified with what one owns, with one’s social status, reputation, or even with one’s body. For Socrates, it is the state of the soul, that is, the person’s inner being, which determines the quality of one’s life. It’s not money, fame, elegant clothes, nice house, beautiful and expensive car, or high-tech gadgets that makes life meaningful, but knowledge, wisdom, and virtue.

Therefore, the true self, for Socrates, is one that is lived in accordance with knowledge, wisdom, and virtue. The true self is the virtuous self.

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Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness

Nicholas D. Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness , Cambridge University Press, 2021, 182pp., $99.99 (hbk), ISBN 9781316515532.

Reviewed by Nicholas R. Baima, Harriet L. Wilkes Honors College, Florida Atlantic University

When faced with anything painful or pleasurable, anything bringing glory or disrepute, realize that the crisis is now, that the Olympics have started, and waiting is no longer an option; that the chance for progress, to keep or lose, turns on the events of a single day. That’s how Socrates got to be the person he was, by depending on reason to meet his every challenge. You’re not yet Socrates, but you can still live as if you want to be him.

Epictetus, Enchiridion 51.2–3, trans. Dobbins

For Plato’s Socrates, happiness ( eudaimonia ) requires virtue, and virtue requires knowledge. Unfortunately for the non-divine, the Socratic dialogues do not present an optimistic outlook regarding the human pursuit of happiness. Socrates’ quest for the knowledge of virtue is replete with failure. Famously, Socrates denies understanding what virtue is and seeks out experts who profess to know. But, alas, the alleged experts can’t provide an account that withstands elenchos , or cross-examination. We, the readers, are in a precarious situation: we are told that in order to be happy, we must become virtuous, but we aren’t given concrete advice on how to do that (see Benson 2013b). Moreover, if virtue eludes Socrates, “the best, the wisest, and the most upright” of people ( Phaedo 118a), what chance do chumps like myself have? Such thinking has led some scholars to argue that Socrates actually believes we are better off dead (Ch. 6; Jones 2013, 2016; cf. Apology 40c–41a; Crito 47d–48a; Gorgias 507c; Phaedo 64c–66d, 82e–83a; Republic 1.353e–354a; Christensen 2020).

Before contemporary followers of Socrates start drinking hemlock at the first sign of apparent divine permission ( Phaedo 62c), we should hear out Nicholas Smith, who offers a far more optimistic interpretation: on his reading, we all can make genuine progress toward virtue and thus achieve a degree of happiness. Smith’s interesting and insightful book asks readers to reconsider how they understand Socratic knowledge. Smith argues that we are led astray when we think of Socratic knowledge as being sentential or propositional (“knowledge-that”) (see also, Smith 2019), rather than as being craft-like (“knowledge-how”). Propositional knowledge is binary—you either have it or you don’t—while craft knowledge is gradable—you can have more or less of it. If we think of Socratic knowledge as propositional, then the inability to provide a sound definition places knowledge of virtue and thus happiness beyond human reach. But if we think of it as something you can be better or worse at, like riding a bike, then we can have some share of it and thereby have some degree of happiness.

The craft knowledge reading affords several interpretative advantages. For starters, it naturally explains why Socrates would use crafts as an analogy for virtue. It also helps explain how Socrates is both an exemplar of virtue, which is a kind of knowledge, and yet still ignorant: since knowledge comes in degrees, Socrates could be smarter than the average bear, but less than a divine being. In addition, thinking of knowledge as gradable explains why Socrates would exhort us “to become as wise as possible” ( Euthydemus 286a). If knowledge is an all-or-nothing achievement, then it becomes difficult to make sense of this favorite passage of Smith’s.

However, Socrates’ search for the knowledge of virtue seems to be a search for the definition of virtue, and definitional knowledge seems to fit something like the propositional model better than the craft-like model. After all, the Socratic method seems to involve asking purported experts of F what F is. Hence, it appears that, for Socrates, a necessary condition for knowing F is knowing the definition of F (see Benson 2013a). Smith argues, however, that definitional knowledge isn’t always a feature of craft knowledge in Socrates’ discussions. When Socrates and Callicles discuss expertise in swimming, definitional knowledge doesn’t seem relevant ( Gorgias 511b–c). Smith writes, “So does Socrates believe that the epist ē m ē (knowledge, expertise) or technē (craft, skill) of swimming consists in the ability to say what swimming is? Obviously not: one might know perfectly well what swimming is and not be able to swim” (14). That said, Smith notes that “Socrates does seem to think that if someone really were a master of the craft of virtue, that person could explain what the virtue is and teach others how to obtain it” (15).

If we concede that people with lesser craft knowledge of F might not be able to explain F, and people who have mastered F can explain it, then what becomes of the distinction between true belief and knowledge ( Meno 98a)? After all, this distinction seems to hinge on the person with knowledge being able to give an explanatory account, and this explanatory account is operative in the division between knacks, which aim at persuasion, and crafts, which aim at knowledge ( Gorgias 465a). And, if knowledge comes in degrees, how can we make sense of Socrates’ claim that it is always true ( Gorgias 454d)? By no means are these irresolvable problems; rather, they are an invitation to say more about how Socratic craft knowledge relates to these ideas.

After providing an explanation and defense of Socratic craft knowledge, Smith unpacks what moral improvability looks like. Chapter 2 does so by explaining Socrates’ claim that he has taken up the true craft of politics ( Gorgias 521d). For Smith, this amounts to more than Socrates having the mere ambition to become wise; it involves actually acquiring some degree of wisdom (cf. Shaw 2011). Chapter 3 connects epistemology to moral psychology by exploring Socrates’ claim that no one voluntarily acts wrongly but only does so out of ignorance. In exploring this idea, Smith develops an affective account of belief formation. He explains how non-rational states—fear, shame, anger, etc.—affect the development of belief, and since all wrongdoing results from ignorance, these non-rational states can shape us for better or worse. Chapter 4 expands upon the work in Chapter 3 by clarifying Socratic ignorance and elenchos . Smith explores Socrates’ epistemic modesty and how it can shape ethical improvement, as well as how we can make decisions from the standpoint of ignorance (see Baima and Paytas 2021).

Chapters 5 and 6 link the craft knowledge interpretation to happiness. Chapter 5 examines whether virtue is sufficient for happiness, and Chapter 6 whether it is necessary. With respect to the sufficiency claim, Smith argues that virtue is sufficient for doing well but not for happiness. While it is true that Socrates treats these as equivalent in the Euthydemus , Smith worries that our conception of happiness has a higher standard than the one Socrates had in mind. To illustrate this point, he provides the example of “Sully” Sullenberger, the commercial pilot who performed an emergency landing on the Hudson River, saving all 155 people on the flight. Though “We may well imagine that Sully was relieved that no one died that day [. . .] no one—and certainly not Sully—would have described his condition as a ‘happy’ one. Even so, he did well that day” (107). As such, if we treat them as equivalent, we are not only likely to misunderstand Socrates’ account, but we are also likely to underappreciate how we are vulnerable to external circumstances.

Also, in this chapter (which is my favorite), Smith develops an account of Socratic harm and human vulnerability. This isn’t an easy task since Socrates seemingly excludes normal “harms” from his account. According to Socrates, to harm someone means to make them worse off with respect to virtue ( Republic 1.335b–c). This is why a worse person, someone like Anytus or Meletus, cannot harm a better person, someone like Socrates, even if they kill him ( Apology 41c–d). Smith argues, however, that there are ways in which external factors can make us vulnerable to becoming vicious. We could, for instance, be corrupted morally through bad teaching and parents.

Smith’s Socrates is far more humane and reasonable than he is often taken to be, which is appealing, and no doubt Socrates is sensitive to the ways in which individuals can be corrupted through improper teaching or even illness. For example, in the Republic , Socrates says, “But I am afraid that, if I slip from the truth, just where it’s most important not to, I’ll not only fall myself but drag my friends down as well [. . .] for I suspect that it’s a lesser crime to kill someone involuntarily than to mislead people about fine, good, and just institutions” (5.451a–b). And in the Phaedo and Gorgias , he notes how our embodied state poses various limitations on our ability to reason correctly (Baima forthcoming).

Though I am sympathetic to what Smith says here and believe that parts of it accord with the text, I have lingering doubts. Socrates seems to emphasize the ways in which virtue inoculates us far more than the ways in which we are vulnerable to external factors. In fact, much of the debate between Socrates and Callicles seems to be about this very issue. Callicles warns Socrates about how his neglect of public opinion makes him vulnerable to death and the inability to protect those he loves, and Socrates responds by telling him that the only thing worth protecting is the quality of one’s soul. Accordingly, I’d suggest that rather than thinking that virtue isn’t sufficient for happiness, we should recognize that external factors can affect whether and to what degree we are virtuous. This would allow us to maintain the claim that the virtuous are immune to harm and to make sense of how we can still be vulnerable to external circumstances, as these circumstances can hinder or help our cultivation of virtue.

With respect to the necessity claim, Smith argues that virtue is necessary for happiness, but we shouldn’t understand this as an all-or-nothing concept (ch. 6). Hence we are left with a more positive account of the Socratic mission—one in which we can make genuine progress toward virtue and happiness. Smith defends this reading by carefully dissecting passages from the Apology and by exploring how Socrates thinks about craft expertise.

After explaining and defending his craft interpretation of Socrates, Smith concludes by examining the philosophical merits of his view. Smith begins by noting that charity—interpreting a text in a plausible way—is “only a relatively minor desideratum,” for it is not the job of “scholars to ‘rescue’ some historical figure from some error they plainly make. We might reasonably speculate about how that figure could have avoided that particular error, but charity certainly cannot trump the obvious sense of the text” (159). Of course, Smith is correct that if we are doing scholarship, and the text clearly says X, we shouldn’t make it say Y just so our beloved philosopher doesn’t look foolish.

However, this oversimplifies the matter. Seldom is it the case that making sense of the text is straightforward—if it were, it wouldn’t require interpretation. Careful readers will notice that key parts of Plato’s writings are in tension with each other, and some statements of the characters are puzzling. In trying to make sense of these tensions and puzzling passages, scholars need to rely on what is philosophically plausible. Of course, Smith is correct that scholarship shouldn’t rescue the philosopher being studied at all costs and that we can separate the question of (a) whether X is the correct view of a philosopher from (b) whether X is the correct view. However, in doing (a), some amount of philosophical analysis is required to make sense of the ideas, and this will involve some amount of considering what is plausible, or charitable. For instance, defending the interpretative claim that Socrates has in mind craft knowledge not only requires looking at Socrates’ description of crafts but what would plausibly fit within those descriptions (consider the quote above about swimming). Indeed, some of the perceptive and important scholarship in this book is deeply informed by Smith’s astute philosophical abilities.

Leaving aside this interpretative quibble, the afterword is an honest exploration of the plausibility of Socrates’ view divorced from any consideration of interpretative adequacy. The discussion is refreshing, and I wish more philosophers of ancient studies were willing to engage in similar conversations. It is, of course, valuable to know what Socrates and Plato meant, but it is also beneficial to see whether it is true or useful. One important reason to study Socrates and Plato is that they have something valuable to contribute to contemporary philosophical problems.

Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness examines the most important questions in Socrates’ philosophy, providing keen insights and positing new challenges to commonly held interpretations. In particular, graduate students and scholars of ancient philosophy working in the analytic style will greatly benefit from Smith’s careful exegesis and incisive philosophical analysis. More generally, we all stand to benefit from “the Socratic view that we will become better people to the degree that we take up his quest ‘to become as wise as possible’ ( Euthydemus 286a)” (165).

Baima, N. R. Forthcoming. “The Ethical Function of the Gorgias ’ Concluding Myth.” In J. C. Shaw (ed), Plato’s Gorgias: A Critical Guide . Cambridge.

Baima, N. R. and T. Paytas. 2021. Plato’s Pragmatism: Rethinking the Relationship Between Ethics and Epistemology . Routledge.

Benson, H. H. 2013a. “The Priority of Definition.” In J. Bussanich and N. D. Smith (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates . Bloomsbury, 136–155.

–––––2013b. “What Should Euthyphro Do?” History of Philosophy Quarterly 30: 115–146.

Christensen, A. 2020. “As the God Leads: The Ethics of Platonic Suicide.” Ancient Philosophy 40: 267–284.

Epictetus. 2008. Discourses and Selected Writings . Trans. R. Dobbins. Penguin.

Jones, R. E. 2013a. “Felix Socrates?” Philosophia 43: 77–98.

–––––. 2016. “Socrates’ Bleak View of the Human Condition.” Ancient Philosophy 36: 97–105.

Plato. 1997. Plato’s Complete Works . Eds. J. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson. Hackett.

Shaw. J. C. 2011. “Socrates and the True Political Craft.” Classical Philology 106: 187–207.

Smith, N. D. 2019. Summoning Knowledge in Plato’s Republic . Oxford.

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Socrates and Self-Knowledge

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Boris Hennig, Socrates and Self-Knowledge, The Philosophical Quarterly , Volume 68, Issue 271, April 2018, Pages 421–424, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx019

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The idea of this book is to closely examine all passages where Socrates talks about the Delphic precept, ‘Know Thyself’, and see what picture of self-knowledge emerges. Given that Socrates is a key figure in the transmission of this precept, it is very likely that such a project leads to significant results.

After a discussion of the inscription itself, Moore discusses the relevant passages in the Charmides , the Alcibiabes I, the Phaedrus , the Philebus , Xenophon's Memorabilia , and other texts. A detailed discussion of the Apology is missing; however, it might have been helpful. There are far more things to be praised than questioned in the book. In its details, it is rich, well crafted, and largely convincing. The reader of this review should keep this in mind while I concentrate on a couple of things I am less than fully satisfied with.

Socratic self-knowledge is not simply a sort of introspective, first personal knowledge (p. 2). Moore captures this by arguing that it amounts to self-constitution (p. 140). He is right, but I think his insight is compromised in three ways.

First, Moore concludes that a study of Socratic self-knowledge can therefore only cover one subset of a wide range of disparate topics (p. 247). I think this is overly modest as a final word. Socratic self-knowledge might well unify and underly many, if not all, other forms of self-knowledge.

Secondly, Moore tends to describe Socratic self-knowledge as a parallel exercise of two separate capacities: ‘a double judgment, of the theoretical and the practical’ (p. 238; cf. 41). Confronted with the question of whether Socratic self-knowledge is a species of practical or theoretical knowledge, one may indeed conclude that it has to be both. However, one might also argue that Socratic self-knowledge is more fundamental than either of them. I take it that Moore would agree with the latter, since his analyses tend to confirm it (p. 230). If so, however, it is slightly misleading to speak of a ‘double judgment’.

Thirdly, Moore understates the normative force of the ‘practical’ element. He does say that self-knowledge has a ‘practical face’ (p. 5), but what he discusses under this rubric only concerns the means by which it is achieved : ‘self-knowledge comes about especially in conversation with other people’ (p. 6). That self-knowledge results from praxis does not make it any more ‘practical’ (i.e., normative) in itself. Later on, Moore identifies self-knowledge with (1) a knowledge of one's central commitments and (2) an awareness of the extent to which one complies with them. To my taste, this is still not normative enough. Both of these concern what happens to be the case.

That Moore reduces Socratic self-knowledge to a knowledge of one's actual commitments becomes most apparent in his discussion of the Phaedrus . In the beginning of this dialogue, Socrates mentions that he has no time for rectifying myths, because he devotes all his time to knowing himself. On the face of it, this looks like an opposition between two rather different sorts of activity. Moore resists this initially plausible reading, arguing that Socrates refers to myth-rectification in order ‘to provide a model for his coming to self-knowledge’ (p. 141). He gives several reasons for his position, none of which is entirely convincing. For instance, that Socrates uses the same language to describe myth-rectification and self-knowledge (p. 162) does not show much, nor does the fact that both require leisure (p. 166), or that both aim at plausibility (p. 179). For all that, myth-rectification and self-knowledge might still be very different kinds of activity. Moore further argues that both the self-examiner and the myth-rectifier revise their own beliefs, one belief at a time (p. 157; 174–5). This is not convincing because one may perfectly well rectify other people's myths, and rectify several of them at once.

More importantly, the degree of similarity Moore sees between myth-rectification and self-examination reveals that he operates with a peculiar notion of what a self actually is. A myth-rectifier, after all, is concerned with a set of beliefs. Therefore, if myth-rectification and self-knowledge are the same sort of business, the object of self-knowledge will likewise be a set of beliefs . And this in fact how Moore sees it (p. 177). Accordingly, self-rectification will work as follows. We start by realizing what we happen to take to be true and good. In conversation with others, we revise these beliefs and desires, with a reasonable chance of ending up closer to believing what is actually true and desiring what is actually good. This amounts to self-constitution for the simple reason that the self is identified with the set of beliefs and desires that is being revised.

This account is problematic for two reasons. First, it implicitly rests on an identification of the self with a set of beliefs and commitments. This sounds like Hume, not like Plato. Beliefs and commitments are what people have , not what they are . Socrates puts considerable weight on the distinction between who we are and what we have ( Apology 36c, Alcibiades 128d), and although he does not explicitly say so, it is rather plausible (to me) to count beliefs and desires among the things that we have. If so, to know our commitments is not to know our selves.

Second, the sort of self-knowledge that Moore describes does not involve knowledge of the good. It amounts to knowing what one happens to be committed to, not what one had better be committed to. To be sure, Moore does establish a clear connection between self-knowledge and knowledge of the good. If we acquire self-knowledge by putting our commitments to the test of conversation, and our conversation partner has a better grasp of the good, their knowledge of the good will cause us to have a better understanding of the good. This, however, merely shows that self-knowledge and knowledge of the good are causally related.

I suppose that Moore does not want to identify self-knowledge with knowledge of the good because he wants it to be knowledge of a particular person, not of something impersonal (cf. p. 32–3). However, I think that when Socrates says that to know oneself one should look at the best in a philosophical friend ( Alcibiades 133b), he implies that self-knowledge must at least involve knowledge of the good. His point is, very roughly, that we must accept the best in the other, their use of reason, as our own. This means that, in order to be significant, our knowledge of the good must take the form of self-knowledge. In this sense, our knowledge of ourselves and our knowledge of the good must be the same. It is not merely a matter of knowing one's actual commitments and the degree to which one complies with them. It must involve practical knowledge, in the sense of knowing who to be.

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Socrates and self-knowledge

Research output : Book/Report › Book

In this book, the first systematicstudy of Socrates's reflections on self-knowledge, Christopher Moore examines the ancient precept 'Know yourself' and, drawing on Plato, Aristophanes, Xenophon, and others, reconstructs and reassesses the arguments about self-examination, personal ideals, and moral maturity at the heart of the Socratic project. What has been thought to be a purely epistemological or metaphysical inquiry turns out to be deeply ethical, intellectual, and social. Knowing yourself is more than attending to your beliefs, discerning the structure of your soul, or recognizing your ignorance-it is constituting yourself as a self who can be guided by knowledge toward the good life. This is neither a wholly introspective nor a completely isolated pursuit: we know and constitute ourselves best through dialogue with friends and critics. This rich and original study will be of interest to researchers in the philosophy of Socrates, selfhood, and ancient thought.

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Arts and Humanities

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10.1017/CBO9781316401248

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Self-knowledge Arts & Humanities 100%
Moral Maturity Arts & Humanities 72%
Ancient Thought Arts & Humanities 66%
Xenophon Arts & Humanities 58%
Aristophanes Arts & Humanities 55%
Ignorance Arts & Humanities 52%
Good Life Arts & Humanities 50%
Precepts Arts & Humanities 49%

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AB - In this book, the first systematicstudy of Socrates's reflections on self-knowledge, Christopher Moore examines the ancient precept 'Know yourself' and, drawing on Plato, Aristophanes, Xenophon, and others, reconstructs and reassesses the arguments about self-examination, personal ideals, and moral maturity at the heart of the Socratic project. What has been thought to be a purely epistemological or metaphysical inquiry turns out to be deeply ethical, intellectual, and social. Knowing yourself is more than attending to your beliefs, discerning the structure of your soul, or recognizing your ignorance-it is constituting yourself as a self who can be guided by knowledge toward the good life. This is neither a wholly introspective nor a completely isolated pursuit: we know and constitute ourselves best through dialogue with friends and critics. This rich and original study will be of interest to researchers in the philosophy of Socrates, selfhood, and ancient thought.

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Constantin Brancusi. Socrates Image © The Museum of Modern Art; Licensed by Scala/Art Resource, NY ©2005 Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York/ADAGP, Paris reproduced with permission of the Brancusi Estate

The philosopher Socrates remains, as he was in his lifetime (469–399 B.C.E.), [ 1 ] an enigma, an inscrutable individual who, despite having written nothing, is considered one of the handful of philosophers who forever changed how philosophy itself was to be conceived. All our information about him is second-hand and most of it vigorously disputed, but his trial and death at the hands of the Athenian democracy is nevertheless the founding myth of the academic discipline of philosophy, and his influence has been felt far beyond philosophy itself, and in every age. Because his life is widely considered paradigmatic not only for the philosophic life but, more generally, for how anyone ought to live, Socrates has been encumbered with the adulation and emulation ordinarily reserved for religious figures – strange for someone who tried so hard to make others do their own thinking and for someone convicted and executed on the charge of irreverence toward the gods. Certainly he was impressive, so impressive that many others were moved to write about him, all of whom found him strange by the conventions of fifth-century Athens: in his appearance, personality, and behavior, as well as in his views and methods.

So thorny is the difficulty of distinguishing the historical Socrates from the Socrateses of the authors of the texts in which he appears and, moreover, from the Socrateses of scores of later interpreters, that the whole contested issue is generally referred to as the Socratic problem . Each age, each intellectual turn, produces a Socrates of its own. It is no less true now that, “The ‘real’ Socrates we have not: what we have is a set of interpretations each of which represents a ‘theoretically possible’ Socrates,” as Cornelia de Vogel (1955, 28) put it. In fact, de Vogel was writing as a new analytic paradigm for interpreting Socrates was about to become standard—Gregory Vlastos’s model (§2.2), which would hold sway until the mid 1990s. Who Socrates really was is fundamental to virtually any interpretation of the philosophical dialogues of Plato because Socrates is the dominant figure in most of Plato’s dialogues.

1. Socrates’s strangeness

2.1 three primary sources: aristophanes, xenophon, and plato, 2.2 contemporary interpretative strategies, 2.3 implications for the philosophy of socrates, 3. a chronology of the historical socrates in the context of athenian history and the dramatic dates of plato’s dialogues.

Resources for Teaching

General overviews and reference

Analytic philosophy of socrates, continental interpretations, interpretive issues, specialized studies, other internet resources, related entries.

Standards of beauty are different in different eras, and in Socrates’s time beauty could easily be measured by the standard of the gods, stately, proportionate sculptures of whom had been adorning the Athenian acropolis since about the time Socrates reached the age of thirty. Good looks and proper bearing were important to a man’s political prospects, for beauty and goodness were linked in the popular imagination. The extant sources agree that Socrates was profoundly ugly, resembling a satyr more than a man—and resembling not at all the statues that turned up later in ancient times and now grace Internet sites and the covers of books. He had wide-set, bulging eyes that darted sideways and enabled him, like a crab, to see not only what was straight ahead, but what was beside him as well; a flat, upturned nose with flaring nostrils; and large fleshy lips like an ass. Socrates let his hair grow long, Spartan-style (even while Athens and Sparta were at war), and went about barefoot and unwashed, carrying a stick and looking arrogant. He didn’t change his clothes but efficiently wore in the daytime what he covered himself with at night. Something was peculiar about his gait as well, sometimes described as a swagger so intimidating that enemy soldiers kept their distance. He was impervious to the effects of alcohol and cold weather, but this made him an object of suspicion to his fellow soldiers on campaign. We can safely assume an average height (since no one mentions it at all), and a strong build, given the active life he appears to have led. Against the iconic tradition of a pot-belly, Socrates and his companions are described as going hungry (Aristophanes, Birds 1280–83). On his appearance, see Plato’s Theaetetus 143e, and Symposium 215a–c, 216c–d, 221d–e; Xenophon’s Symposium 4.19, 5.5–7; and Aristophanes’s Clouds 362. Brancusi’s oak sculpture, standing 51.25 inches including its base, captures Socrates’s appearance and strangeness in the sense that it looks different from every angle, including a second “eye” that cannot be seen if the first is in view. (See the Museum of Modern Art’s page on Brancusi’s Socrates which offers additional views.) Also true to Socrates’s reputation for ugliness, but less available, are the drawings of the contemporary Swiss artist, Hans Erni.

In the late fifth century B.C.E., it was more or less taken for granted that any self-respecting Athenian male would prefer fame, wealth, honors, and political power to a life of labor. Although many citizens lived by their labor in a wide variety of occupations, they were expected to spend much of their leisure time, if they had any, busying themselves with the affairs of the city. Men regularly participated in the governing Assembly and in the city’s many courts; and those who could afford it prepared themselves for success at public life by studying with rhetoricians and sophists from abroad who could themselves become wealthy and famous by teaching the young men of Athens to use words to their advantage. Other forms of higher education were also known in Athens: mathematics, astronomy, geometry, music, ancient history, and linguistics. One of the things that seemed strange about Socrates is that he neither labored to earn a living, nor participated voluntarily in affairs of state. Rather, he embraced poverty and, although youths of the city kept company with him and imitated him, Socrates adamantly insisted he was not a teacher (Plato, Apology 33a–b) and refused all his life to take money for what he did. The strangeness of this behavior is mitigated by the image then current of teachers and students: teachers were viewed as pitchers pouring their contents into the empty cups that were the students. Because Socrates was no transmitter of information that others were passively to receive, he resists the comparison to teachers. Rather, he helped others recognize on their own what is real, true, and good (Plato, Meno , Theaetetus )—a new, and thus suspect, approach to education. He was known for confusing, stinging, and stunning his conversation partners into the unpleasant experience of realizing their own ignorance, a state sometimes superseded by genuine intellectual curiosity.

It did not help matters that Socrates seemed to have a higher opinion of women than most of his companions had, speaking of “men and women,” “priests and priestesses,” likening his work to midwifery, and naming foreign women as his teachers: Socrates claimed to have learned rhetoric from Aspasia of Miletus, the de facto spouse of Pericles (Plato, Menexenus ); and to have learned erotics from the priestess Diotima of Mantinea (Plato, Symposium ). Socrates was unconventional in a related respect. Athenian citizen males of the upper social classes did not marry until they were at least thirty, and Athenian females were poorly educated and kept sequestered until puberty, when they were given in marriage by their fathers. Thus the socialization and education of males often involved a relationship for which the English word ‘pederasty’ (though often used) is misleading, in which a youth approaching manhood, fifteen to seventeen, became the beloved of a male lover a few years older, under whose tutelage and through whose influence and gifts, the younger man would be guided and improved. It was assumed among Athenians that mature men would find youths sexually attractive, and such relationships were conventionally viewed as beneficial to both parties by family and friends alike. A degree of hypocrisy (or denial), however, was implied by the arrangement: “officially” it did not involve sexual relations between the lovers and, if it did, then the beloved was not supposed to derive pleasure from the act—but ancient evidence (comedies, vase paintings, et al.) shows that both restrictions were often violated (Dover 1989, 204). What was odd about Socrates is that, although he was no exception to the rule of finding youths attractive (Plato, Charmides 155d, Protagoras 309a–b; Xenophon, Symposium 4.27–28), he refused the physical advances of even his favorite, Alcibiades (Plato, Symposium 219b–d), and kept his eye on the improvement of their, and all the Athenians’, souls (Plato, Apology 30a–b), a mission he said he had been assigned by the oracle of Apollo at Delphi, if he was interpreting his friend Chaerephon’s report correctly (Plato, Apology 20e–23b), a preposterous claim in the eyes of his fellow citizens. Socrates also acknowledged a rather strange personal phenomenon, a daimonion or internal voice that prohibited his doing certain things, some trivial and some important, often unrelated to matters of right and wrong (thus not to be confused with the popular notions of a superego or a conscience). The implication that he was guided by something he regarded as divine or semi-divine was all the more reason for other Athenians to be suspicious of Socrates.

Socrates was usually to be found in the marketplace and other public areas, conversing with a variety of different people—young and old, male and female, slave and free, rich and poor, citizen and visitor—that is, with virtually anyone he could persuade to join with him in his question-and-answer mode of probing serious matters. Socrates’s lifework consisted in the examination of people’s lives, his own and others’, because “the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being,” as he says at his trial (Plato, Apology 38a). Socrates pursued this task single-mindedly, questioning people about what matters most, e.g., courage, love, reverence, moderation, and the state of their souls generally. He did this regardless of whether his respondents wanted to be questioned or resisted him. Athenian youths imitated Socrates’s questioning style, much to the annoyance of some of their elders. He had a reputation for irony, though what that means exactly is controversial; at a minimum, Socrates’s irony consisted in his saying that he knew nothing of importance and wanted to listen to others, yet keeping the upper hand in every discussion. One further aspect of Socrates’s much-touted strangeness should be mentioned: his dogged failure to align himself politically with oligarchs or democrats; rather, he had friends and enemies among both, and he supported and opposed actions of both (see §3).

2. The Socratic problem: Who was Socrates really?

The Socratic problem is a rat’s nest of complexities arising from the fact that various people wrote about Socrates whose accounts differ in crucial respects, leaving us to wonder which, if any, are accurate representations of the historical Socrates. “There is, and always will be, a ‘Socratic problem’. This is inevitable,” said Guthrie (1969, 6), looking back on a gnarled history between ancient and contemporary times that is narrated in detail by Press (1996), but barely touched on below. The difficulties are increased because all those who knew and wrote about Socrates lived before any standardization of modern categories of, or sensibilities about, what constitutes historical accuracy or poetic license. All authors present their own interpretations of the personalities and lives of their characters, whether they mean to or not, whether they write fiction or biography or philosophy (if the philosophy they write has characters), so other criteria must be introduced for deciding among the contending views of who Socrates really was. A look at the three primary ancient sources of information about Socrates (§2.1) will provide a foundation for appreciating how contemporary interpretations differ (§2.2) and why the differences matter (§2.3).

One thing is certain about the historical Socrates: even among those who knew him in life, there was profound disagreement about what his actual views and methods were. This is evident in the three contemporaneous sources below; and it is hinted at in the few titles and scraps by other authors of the time who are now lumped together as ‘minor Socratics’, not for the quality of their work but because so little or none of it is extant. We shall probably never know much about their views of Socrates (see Giannantoni 1990). [ 2 ] After Socrates’s death, the tradition became even more disparate. As Nehamas (1999, 99) puts it, “with the exception of the Epicureans, every philosophical school in antiquity, whatever its orientation, saw in him either its actual founder or the type of person to whom its adherents were to aspire.”

Aristophanes (±450–±386)

Our earliest extant source—and the only one who can claim to have known Socrates in vigorous midlife—is the playwright Aristophanes. His comedy, Clouds , was produced within a year of the battle of Delium (423) at which Socrates fought as a hoplite, and when both Xenophon and Plato were infants. In the play, the character called Socrates heads a Think-o-Rama in which young men study the natural world, from insects to stars, and study slick argumentative techniques as well, lacking all respect for the Athenian sense of propriety. The actor wearing the mask of Socrates makes fun of the traditional gods of Athens (lines 247–48, 367, 423–24), mimicked later by the young protagonist, and gives naturalistic explanations of phenomena Athenians viewed as divinely directed (lines 227–33; cf. Theaetetus 152e, 153c–d, 173e–174a; Phaedo 96a–100a). Worst of all, he teaches dishonest techniques for avoiding repayment of debt (lines 1214–1302) and encourages young men to beat their parents into submission (lines 1408–46).

Comedy by its very nature is a tricky source for information about anyone. Yet, in favor of Aristophanes as a source for Socrates is that Xenophon and Plato were some forty-five years younger than Socrates, so their acquaintance could only have been during Socrates’s later years. Could Socrates really have changed so much? Can the lampooning of the younger Socrates found in Clouds and other comic poets be reconciled with Plato’s characterization of a philosopher in his fifties and sixties? Some have said yes, pointing out that the years between Clouds and Socrates’s trial (399) were years of war and upheaval, changing everyone. The Athenian intellectual freedom of which Pericles been so proud at the beginning of the war (Thucydides 2.37–39) had been eroded completely by the end (see §3). Thus, what had seemed comical a quarter century earlier, Socrates hanging in a basket on-stage, talking nonsense, was ominous in memory by then. A good reason to believe that Aristophanes’s representation of Socrates is not merely a comic exaggeration but systematically misleading in retrospect is Kenneth Dover’s view that Clouds amalgamates in one character, Socrates, features now well known to be unique to specific other fifth-century intellectuals (1968, xxxii-lvii). Perhaps Aristophanes chose Socrates to represent garden-variety intellectuals because Socrates’s physiognomy was strange enough by itself to get a laugh. Aristophanes sometimes speaks in his own voice in his plays, giving us good reason to believe he genuinely objected to social instability brought on by the freedom Athenian youths enjoyed to study with professional rhetoricians, sophists (see §1), and natural philosophers, e.g., those who, like the presocratics, studied the cosmos or nature. Such professions could be lucrative. That Socrates eschewed any earning potential in philosophy does not seem to have been significant to the great writer of comedies.

Aristophanes’s depiction of Socrates is important because Plato’s Socrates says at his trial ( Apology 18a–b, 19c) that most of his jurors have grown up believing the falsehoods attributed to him in the play. Socrates calls Aristophanes more dangerous than the three men who brought charges against him because Aristophanes had poisoned the jurors’ minds while they were young. Aristophanes did not stop accusing Socrates in 423 when Clouds placed third behind another play in which Socrates was mentioned as barefoot; rather, he soon began writing a revision, which he circulated but never produced. Complicating matters, the revision is our only extant version of the play. Aristophanes appears to have given up on reviving Clouds in about 416, but his comic ridicule of Socrates continued. Again in 414 with Birds , and in 405 with Frogs , Aristophanes complained of Socrates’s deleterious effect on the youths of the city, including Socrates’s neglect of the poets. Aristophanes even coins a verb, to socratize , conveying a range of unsavory behaviors. [ 3 ]

Xenophon (±425–±386)

Another source for the historical Socrates is the soldier-historian, Xenophon. Xenophon says explicitly of Socrates, “I was never acquainted with anyone who took greater care to find out what each of his companions knew” ( Memorabilia 4.7.1); and Plato corroborates Xenophon’s statement by illustrating throughout his dialogues Socrates’s adjustment of the level and type of his questions to the particular individuals with whom he talked. If it is true that Socrates succeeded in pitching his conversation at the right level for each of his companions, the striking differences between Xenophon’s Socrates and Plato’s is largely explained by the differences between their two personalities. Xenophon was a practical man whose ability to recognize philosophical issues is almost imperceptible, so it is plausible that his Socrates is a practical and helpful advisor. That is the side of Socrates Xenophon experienced. Xenophon’s Socrates differs additionally from Plato’s in offering advice about subjects in which Xenophon was himself experienced, but Socrates was not: moneymaking (Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.7) and estate management (Xenophon, Oeconomicus ), suggesting that Xenophon may have entered into the writing of Socratic discourses (as Aristotle labeled the genre, Poetics 1447b11) making the character Socrates a mouthpiece for his own views. His other works mentioning or featuring Socrates are Anabasis , Apology , Hellenica , and Symposium .

Something that has strengthened Xenophon’s prima facie claim as a source for Socrates’s life is his work as a historian; his Hellenica ( History of Greece ) is one of the chief sources for the period 411–362, after Thucydides’s history abruptly ends in the midst of the Peloponnesian wars. Although Xenophon tends to moralize and does not follow the superior conventions introduced by Thucydides, still it is sometimes argued that, having had no philosophical axes to grind, Xenophon may have presented a more accurate portrait of Socrates than Plato does. But two considerations have always weakened that claim: (1) The Socrates of Xenophon’s works is so pedestrian that it is difficult to imagine his inspiring fifteen or more people to write Socratic discourses in the period following his death. (2) Xenophon could not have chalked up many hours with Socrates or with reliable informants. He lived in Erchia, about 15 kilometers and across the Hymettus mountains from Socrates’s haunts in the urban area of Athens, and his love of horses and horsemanship (on which he wrote a still-valuable treatise) took up considerable time. He left Athens in 401 on an expedition to Persia and, for a variety of reasons (mercenary service for Thracians and Spartans; exile), never resided in Athens again. And now a third is in order. (3) It turns out to have been ill-advised to assume that Xenophon would apply the same criteria for accuracy to his Socratic discourses as to his histories. [ 4 ] The biographical and historical background Xenophon deploys in his memoirs of Socrates fails to correspond to such additional sources as we have from archaeology, history, the courts, and literature. The widespread use of computers in classical studies, enabling the comparison of ancient persons, and the compiling of information about each of them from disparate sources, has made incontrovertible this observation about Xenophon’s Socratic works. Xenophon’s memoirs are pastiches, several of which simply could not have occurred as presented.

Plato (424/3–347)

Philosophers have usually privileged the account of Socrates given by their fellow philosopher, Plato. Plato was about twenty-five when Socrates was tried and executed, and had probably known the old man most of his life. It would have been hard for a boy of Plato’s social class, registered in the political district (deme) of Collytus within the city walls, to avoid Socrates. The extant sources agree that Socrates was often to be found where youths of the city spent their time. Further, Plato’s representation of individual Athenians has proved over time to correspond remarkably well to both archaeological and literary evidence: in his use of names and places, familial relations and friendship bonds, and even in his rough dating of events in almost all the authentic dialogues where Socrates is the dominant figure. The dialogues have dramatic dates that fall into place as one learns more about their characters and, despite incidental anachronisms, it turns out that there is more realism in the dialogues than most have suspected. [ 5 ] The Ion , Lysis , Euthydemus , Meno , Menexenus , Theaetetus , Euthyphro , Cratylus , the frame of Symposium , Apology , Crito , Phaedo (although Plato says he was not himself present at Socrates’s execution), and the frame of Parmenides are the dialogues in which Plato had greatest access to Athenians he depicts.

It does not follow, however, that Plato represented the views and methods of Socrates (or anyone, for that matter) as he recalled them, much less as they were originally uttered. There are a number of cautions and caveats that should be in place from the start. (i) Plato may have shaped the character Socrates (or other characters) to serve his own purposes, whether philosophical or literary or both. (ii) The dialogues representing Socrates as a youth and young man took place, if they took place at all, before Plato was born and when he was a small child. (iii) One should be cautious even about the dramatic dates of Plato’s dialogues because they are calculated with reference to characters whom we know primarily, though not only, from the dialogues. (iv) Exact dates should be treated with a measure of skepticism for numerical precision can be misleading. Even when a specific festival or other reference fixes the season or month of a dialogue, or birth of a character, one should imagine a margin of error. Although it becomes obnoxious to use circa or plus-minus everywhere, the ancients did not require or desire contemporary precision in these matters. All the children born during a full year, for example, had the same nominal birthday, accounting for the conversation at Lysis 207b, odd by contemporary standards, in which two boys disagree about who is the elder. Philosophers have often decided to bypass the historical problems altogether and to assume for the sake of argument that Plato’s Socrates is the Socrates who is relevant to potential progress in philosophy. That strategy, as we shall soon see, gives rise to a new Socratic problem (§2.2).

What, after all, is our motive for reading a dead philosopher’s words about another dead philosopher who never wrote anything himself? This is a way of asking a popular question, Why do history of philosophy? —which has no settled answer. One might reply that our study of some of our philosophical predecessors is intrinsically valuable , philosophically enlightening and satisfying. When we contemplate the words of a dead philosopher, a philosopher with whom we cannot engage directly—Plato’s words, say—we seek to understand not merely what he said and assumed, but what his statements imply, and whether they are true. Others’ words can prompt the exploration of new and rich veins of philosophy. Sometimes, making such judgments about the text requires us to learn the language in which the philosopher wrote, more about his predecessors’ ideas and those of his contemporaries. The truly great philosophers, and Plato was one of them, are still capable of becoming our companions in philosophical conversation, our dialectical partners. Because he addressed timeless, universal, fundamental questions with insight and intelligence, our own understanding of such questions is heightened whether we agree or disagree. That explains Plato, one might say, but where is Socrates in this picture? Is he interesting merely as a predecessor to Plato? Some would say yes, but others would say it is not Plato’s but Socrates’s ideas and methods that mark the real beginning of philosophy in the West, that Socrates is the better dialectical guide, and that what is Socratic in the dialogues should be distinguished from what is Platonic (§2.2). But how? That again is the Socratic problem .

If it were possible to confine oneself exclusively to Plato’s Socrates, the Socratic problem would nevertheless reappear because one would soon discover Socrates himself defending one position in one Platonic dialogue, its contrary in another, and using different methods in different dialogues to boot. Inconsistencies among the dialogues seem to demand explanation, though not all philosophers have thought so (Shorey 1903). Most famously, the Parmenides attacks various theories of forms that the Republic , Symposium , and Phaedo develop and defend. In some dialogues (e.g., Laches ), Socrates only weeds the garden of its inconsistencies and false beliefs, but in other dialogues (e.g., Phaedrus ), he is a planter as well, advancing structured philosophical claims and suggesting new methods for testing those claims. There are differences on smaller matters as well. For example, Socrates in the Gorgias opposes, while in the Protagoras he supports, hedonism; the details of the relation between erotic love and the good life differ from Phaedrus to Symposium ; the account of the relation between knowledge and the objects of knowledge in Republic differs from the Meno account; despite Socrates’s commitment to Athenian law, expressed in the Crito , he vows in the Apology that he will disobey the lawful jury if it orders him to stop philosophizing. A related problem is that some of the dialogues appear to develop positions familiar from other philosophical traditions (e.g., that of Heraclitus in Theaetetus and Pythagoreanism in Phaedo ). Three centuries of efforts to solve versions of the Socratic problem are summarized in the following supplementary document:

Early Attempts to Solve the Socratic Problem

Contemporary efforts recycle bits and pieces—including the failures—of these older attempts.

The Twentieth Century

Until relatively recently in modern times, it was hoped that confident elimination of what could be ascribed purely to Socrates would leave standing a coherent set of doctrines attributable to Plato (who appears nowhere in the dialogues as a speaker). Many philosophers, inspired by the nineteenth century scholar Eduard Zeller, expect the greatest philosophers to promote grand, impenetrable schemes. Nothing of the sort was possible for Socrates, so it remained for Plato to be assigned all the positive doctrines that could be extracted from the dialogues. In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, there was a resurgence of interest in who Socrates was and what his own views and methods were. The result is a narrower, but no less contentious, Socratic problem. Two strands of interpretation dominated views of Socrates in the twentieth century (Griswold 2001; Klagge and Smith 1992). Although there has been some healthy cross-pollination and growth since the mid 1990s, the two were so hostile to one another for so long that the bulk of the secondary literature on Socrates, including translations peculiar to each, still divides into two camps, hardly reading one another: literary contextualists and analysts. The literary-contextual study of Socrates, like hermeneutics more generally, uses the tools of literary criticism—typically interpreting one complete dialogue at a time; its European origins are traced to Heidegger and earlier to Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. The analytic study of Socrates, like analytic philosophy more generally, is fueled by the arguments in the texts—typically addressing a single argument or set of arguments, whether in a single text or across texts; its origins are in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) was the doyen of the hermeneutic strand, and Gregory Vlastos (1907–1991) of the analytic.

Literary contextualism

Faced with inconsistencies in Socrates’s views and methods from one dialogue to another, the literary contextualist has no Socratic problem because Plato is seen as an artist of surpassing literary skill, the ambiguities in whose dialogues are intentional representations of actual ambiguities in the subjects philosophy investigates. Thus terms, arguments, characters, and in fact all elements in the dialogues should be addressed in their literary context. Bringing the tools of literary criticism to the study of the dialogues, and sanctioned in that practice by Plato’s own use of literary devices and practice of textual critique ( Protagoras 339a–347a, Republic 2.376c–3.412b, Ion , and Phaedrus 262c–264e), most contextualists ask of each dialogue what its aesthetic unity implies, pointing out that the dialogues themselves are autonomous, containing almost no cross-references. Contextualists who attend to what they see as the aesthetic unity of the whole Platonic corpus, and therefore seek a consistent picture of Socrates, advise close readings of the dialogues and appeal to a number of literary conventions and devices said to reveal Socrates’s actual personality. For both varieties of contextualism, the Platonic dialogues are like a brilliant constellation whose separate stars naturally require separate focus.

Marking the maturity of the literary contextualist tradition in the early twenty-first century is a greater diversity of approaches and an attempt to be more internally critical (see Hyland 2004).

Analytic developmentalism

Beginning in the 1950s, Vlastos (1991, 45–80) recommended a set of mutually supportive premises that together provide a plausible framework in the analytic tradition for Socratic philosophy as a pursuit distinct from Platonic philosophy. [ 6 ] Although the premises have deep roots in early attempts to solve the Socratic problem (see the supplementary document linked above), the beauty of Vlastos’s particular configuration is its fecundity. The first premise marks a break with a tradition of regarding Plato as a dialectician who held his assumptions tentatively and revised them constantly; rather,

Plato held philosophical doctrines , and
Plato’s doctrines developed over the period in which he wrote,

accounting for many of the inconsistencies and contradictions among the dialogues (persistent inconsistencies are addressed with a complex notion of Socratic irony.) In particular, Vlastos tells a story “as hypothesis, not dogma or reported fact” describing the young Plato in vivid terms, writing his early dialogues while convinced of “the substantial truth of Socrates’s teaching and the soundness of its method.” Later, Plato develops into a constructive philosopher in his own right but feels no need to break the bond with his Socrates, his “father image.” (The remainder of Plato’s story is not relevant to Socrates.) Vlastos labels a small group of dialogues ‘transitional’ to mark the period when Plato was beginning to be dissatisfied with Socrates’s views. Vlastos’s third premise is

It is possible to determine reliably the chronological order in which the dialogues were written and to map them to the development of Plato’s views.

The evidence Vlastos uses varies for this claim, but is of several types: stylometric data, internal cross references, external events mentioned, differences in doctrines and methods featured, and other ancient testimony (particularly that of Aristotle). The dialogues of Plato’s Socratic period, called “elenctic dialogues” for Socrates’s preferred method of questioning, are Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras, and book 1 of the Republic. The developmentalists’ Platonic dialogues are potentially a discrete sequence, the order of which enables the analyst to separate Socrates from Plato on the basis of different periods in Plato’s intellectual evolution. Finally,

Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates only what Plato himself believes at the time he writes each dialogue.

“As Plato changes, the philosophical persona of his Socrates is made to change” (Vlastos 1991, 53)—a view sometimes referred to as the “mouthpiece theory.” Because the analyst is interested in positions or doctrines (particularly as conclusions from, or tested by, arguments), the focus of analysis is usually on a particular philosophical view in or across dialogues, with no special attention given to context or to dialogues considered as wholes; and evidence from dialogues in close chronological proximity is likely to be considered more strongly confirming than that from dialogues of other developmental periods. The result of applying the premises is a firm list (contested, of course, by others) of ten theses held by Socrates, all of which are incompatible with the corresponding ten theses held by Plato (1991, 47–49).

Many analytic ancient philosophers in the late twentieth century mined the gold Vlastos had uncovered, and many of those who were productive in the developmentalist vein in the early days went on to constructive work of their own (see Bibliography).

It is a risky business to say where ancient philosophy is now, but an advantage of an entry in a dynamic reference work is that authors are allowed, nay, encouraged to update their entries to reflect recent scholarship and sea changes in their topics. For many analytic philosophers, John Cooper (1997, xiv) sounded the end of the developmentalist era when he described the early- and middle-period dialogue distinctions as “an unsuitable basis for bringing anyone to the reading of these works. To use them in that way is to announce in advance the results of a certain interpretation of the dialogues and to canonize that interpretation under the guise of a presumably objective order of composition—when in fact no such order is objectively known. And it thereby risks prejudicing an unwary reader against the fresh, individual reading that these works demand.” When he added, “it is better to relegate thoughts about chronology to the secondary position they deserve and to concentrate on the literary and philosophical content of the works, taken on their own and in relation to the others,” he proposed peace between the literary contextualist and analytic developmentalist camps. As in any peace agreement, it takes some time for all the combatants to accept that the conflict has ended—but that is where we are.

In short, one is now more free to answer, Who was Socrates really? in the variety of ways that it has been answered in the past, in one’s own well-reasoned way, or to sidestep the question, philosophizing about the issues in Plato’s dialogues without worrying too much about the long toes of any particular interpretive tradition. Those seeking the views and methods of Plato’s Socrates from the perspective of what one is likely to see attributed to him in the secondary literature (§2.2) will find it useful to consult the related entry on Plato’s shorter ethical works .

The larger column on the left below provides some of the biographical information from ancient sources with the dramatic dates of Plato’s dialogues interspersed [in boldface] throughout. In the smaller column on the right are dates of major events and persons familiar from fifth century Athenian history. Although the dates are as precise as allowed by the facts, some are estimated and controversial (Nails 2002).

This brings us to the spring and summer of 399, to Socrates’s trial and execution. Twice in Plato’s dialogues ( Symposium 173b, Theaetetus 142c–143a), fact-checking with Socrates took place as his friends sought to commit his conversations to writing before he was executed. [spring 399 Theaetetus ] Prior to the action in the Theaetetus , a young poet named Meletus had composed a document charging Socrates with the capital crime of irreverence ( asebeia ): failure to show due piety toward the gods of Athens. This he delivered to Socrates in the presence of witnesses, instructing Socrates to present himself before the king archon within four days for a preliminary hearing (the same magistrate would later preside at the pre-trial examination and the trial). At the end of the Theaetetus , Socrates was on his way to that preliminary hearing. As a citizen, he had the right to countersue, the right to forgo the hearing, allowing the suit to proceed uncontested, and the right to exile himself voluntarily, as the personified laws later remind him ( Crito 52c). Socrates availed himself of none of these rights of citizenship. Rather, he set out to enter a plea and stopped at a gymnasium to talk to some youngsters about mathematics and knowledge.

When he arrived at the king archon’s stoa, Socrates fell into a conversation about reverence with a diviner he knew, Euthyphro [399 Euthyphro ] , and afterwards answered Meletus’s charge. This preliminary hearing designated the official receipt of the case and was intended to lead to greater precision in the formulation of the charge. In Athens, religion was a matter of public participation under law, regulated by a calendar of religious festivals; and the city used revenues to maintain temples and shrines. Socrates’s irreverence, Meletus claimed, had resulted in the corruption of the city’s young men ( Euthyphro 3c–d). Evidence for irreverence was of two types: Socrates did not believe in the gods of the Athenians (indeed, he had said on many occasions that the gods do not lie or do other wicked things, whereas the Olympian gods of the poets and the city were quarrelsome and vindictive); Socrates introduced new divinities (indeed, he insisted that his daimonion had spoken to him since childhood). Meletus handed over his complaint, and Socrates entered his plea. The king-archon could refuse Meletus’s case on procedural grounds, redirect the complaint to an arbitrator, or accept it; he accepted it. Socrates had the right to challenge the admissibility of the accusation in relation to existing law, but he did not, so the charge was published on whitened tablets in the agora and a date was set for the pre-trial examination—but not before Socrates fell into another conversation, this one on the origins of words (Smith 2022). [399 Cratylus ] From this point, word spread rapidly, probably accounting for the spike of interest in Socratic conversations recorded in Theaetetus and Symposium . [399 Symposium frame] But Socrates nevertheless is shown by Plato spending the next day in two very long conversations promised in Theaetetus (210d). [399 Sophist , Statesman ]

At the pre-trial examination, Meletus paid no court fees because it was considered a public duty to prosecute irreverence. To discourage frivolous suits, however, Athenian law imposed a heavy fine on plaintiffs who failed to obtain at least one fifth of the jury’s votes, as Socrates later points out ( Apology 36a–b). Unlike closely timed jury trials, pre-trial examinations encouraged questions to and by the litigants, to make the legal issues more precise. This procedure had become essential because of the susceptibility of juries to bribery and misrepresentation. Originally intended to be a microcosm of the citizen body, juries by Socrates’s time were manned by elderly, disabled, and impoverished volunteers who needed the meager three-obol pay.

In the month of Thargelion [May-June 399 Apology ] a month or two after Meletus’s initial summons, Socrates’s trial occurred. On the day before, the Athenians had launched a ship to Delos, dedicated to Apollo and commemorating Theseus’s legendary victory over the Minotaur ( Phaedo 58a–b). Spectators gathered along with the jury ( Apology 25a) for a trial that probably lasted most of the day, each side timed by the water clock. Plato does not provide Meletus’s prosecutorial speech or those of Anytus and Lycon, who had joined in the suit; or the names of witnesses, if any ( Apology 34a implies Meletus called none). Apology —the Greek ‘ apologia ’ means ‘defense’—is not edited as are the court speeches of orators. For example, there are no indications in the Greek text (at 35d and 38b) that the two votes were taken; and there are no breaks (at 21a or 34b) for witnesses who may have been called. Also missing are speeches by Socrates’s supporters; it is improbable that he had none, even though Plato does not name them.

Socrates, in his defense, mentioned the harm done to him by Aristophanes’s Clouds (§2.1). Though Socrates denied outright that he studied the heavens and what is below the earth, his familiarity with the investigations of natural philosophers and his own naturalistic explanations of such phenomena as earthquakes and eclipses make it no surprise that the jury remained unpersuaded. And, seeing Socrates out-argue Meletus, the jury probably did not make fine distinctions between philosophy and sophistry. Socrates three times took up the charge that he corrupted the young, insisting that, if he corrupted them, he did so unwillingly; but if unwillingly, he should be instructed, not prosecuted ( Apology 25e–26a). The jury found him guilty. By his own argument, however, Socrates could not blame the jury, for it was mistaken about what was truly in the interest of the city (cf. Theaetetus 177d–e) and thus required instruction.

In the penalty phase of the trial, Socrates said, “If it were the law with us, as it is elsewhere, that a trial for life should not last one but many days, you would be convinced, but now it is not easy to dispel great slanders in a short time” ( Apology 37a–b). This isolated complaint stands opposed to the remark of the personified laws that Socrates was “wronged not by us, the laws, but by men” ( Crito 54c). It had been a crime since 403/2 for anyone even to propose a law or decree in conflict with the newly inscribed laws, so it was ironic for the laws to tell Socrates to persuade or obey them ( Crito 51b–c). In a last-minute capitulation to his friends, he offered to allow them to pay a fine of six times his net worth (Xenophon Oeconomicus 2.3.4–5), thirty minae . The jury rejected the proposal. Perhaps the jury was too incensed by Socrates’s words to vote for the lesser penalty; after all, he needed to tell them more than once to stop interrupting him. It is more likely, however, that superstitious jurors were afraid that the gods would be angry if they failed to execute a man already found guilty of irreverence. Sentenced to death, Socrates reflected that it might be a blessing: either a dreamless sleep, or an opportunity to converse in the underworld.

While the sacred ship was on its journey to Delos, no executions were allowed in the city. Although the duration of the annual voyage varied with conditions, Xenophon says it took thirty-one days in 399 ( Memorabilia 4.8.2); if so, Socrates lived thirty days beyond his trial, into the month of Skirophorion. A day or two before the end, Socrates’s childhood friend Crito tried to persuade Socrates to escape. [June–July 399 Crito ] Socrates replied that he “listens to nothing … but the argument that on reflection seems best” and that “neither to do wrong or to return a wrong is ever right, not even to injure in return for an injury received” ( Crito 46b, 49d), not even under threat of death (cf. Apology 32a), not even for one’s family ( Crito 54b). Socrates could not point to a harm that would outweigh the harm he would be inflicting on the city if he now exiled himself unlawfully when he could earlier have done so lawfully ( Crito 52c); such lawbreaking would have confirmed the jury’s judgment that he was a corrupter of the young ( Crito 53b–c) and brought shame on his family and friends.

The events of Socrates’s last day, when he “appeared happy both in manner and words as he died nobly and without fear” ( Phaedo 58e) were related by Phaedo to the Pythagorean community at Phlius some weeks or months after the execution. [June–July 399 Phaedo ] The Eleven, prison officials chosen by lot, met with Socrates at dawn to tell him what to expect ( Phaedo 59e–60b). When Socrates’s friends arrived, Xanthippe and their youngest child, Menexenus, were still with him. Xanthippe commiserated with Socrates that he was about to enjoy his last conversation with his companions; then, performing the ritual lamentation expected of women, was led home. Socrates spent the day in philosophical conversation, defending the soul’s immortality and warning his companions not to restrain themselves in argument, “If you take my advice, you will give but little thought to Socrates but much more to the truth. If you think that what I say is true, agree with me; if not, oppose it with every argument” ( Phaedo 91b–c). On the other hand, he warned them sternly to restrain their emotions, “keep quiet and control yourselves” ( Phaedo 117e).

Socrates had no interest in whether his corpse was burned or buried, but he bathed at the prison’s cistern so the women of his household would be spared from having to wash his corpse. After meeting with his family again in the late afternoon, he rejoined his companions. The servant of the Eleven, a public slave, bade Socrates farewell by calling him “the noblest, the gentlest, and the best” of men ( Phaedo 116c). The poisoner described the physical effects of the Conium maculatum variety of hemlock used for citizen executions (Bloch 2001), then Socrates cheerfully took the cup and drank. Phaedo, a former slave echoing the slave of the Eleven, called Socrates, “the best, … the wisest and the most upright” ( Phaedo 118a).

4. Socrates outside philosophy

Socrates is an inescapable figure in intellectual history worldwide. Readers interested in tracking this might start with Trapp’s two volumes (2007). Strikingly, Socrates is invoked also in nonacademic contexts consistently over centuries, across geographical and linguistic boundaries globally, and throughout a wide range of media and forms of cultural production.

Though not commonplace today, Socrates was once routinely cited alongside Jesus. Consider Benjamin Franklin’s pithy maxim in his Autobiography, “Humility: Imitate Jesus and Socrates,” and the way the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., defends civil disobedience in Letter from Birmingham Jail by arguing that those who blame him for bringing imprisonment on himself are like those who would condemn Socrates for provoking the Athenians to execute him or condemn Jesus for having triggered his crucifixion. In the visual arts, artist Bror Hjorth celebrates Walt Whitman by giving him Jesus and Socrates as companions. This wood relief, Love, Peace and Work, was commissioned in the early 1960s by the Swedish Workers’ Educational Association for installation in its new building in Stockholm and was selected to appear on a 1995 postage stamp. A more light-hearted linking is Greece’s entry into the 1979 Eurovision Song Contest, Elpida’s Socrates Supersta r, the lyrics of which mention that Socrates was earlier than Jesus.

At times, commending Socrates asserted the distinctiveness of Western Civilization. For example, an illustrated essay on Socrates inaugurates a 1963 feature called “They Made Our World” in LOOK , a popular U.S. magazine. Today Socrates remains an icon of the Western ideal of an intellectual and is sometimes invoked as representative of the ideal of a learned person more universally. Whether he is being poked fun at, extolled, pilloried, or just acknowledged, Socrates features in a wide range of projects intended for broad audiences as a symbol of the very idea of the life of the mind, which, necessarily from a Socratic viewpoint, is also a moral life (but not necessarily a conventionally successful life).

There may be no more succinct expression of this standing than James Madison’s comments on the tyrannical impulses of crowds in Federalist 55: “Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates; every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.” The persistence of this position in the cultural imagination is clear in his many appearances as a sober knower (e.g., Roberto Rossellini’s 1971 film) and a giant among giants, as in, for example, his imagined speech, penned by Gilbert Murray, where he is placed first among the “immortals” featured in the 1953 recording, This I Believe ,compiled by journalist Edward R. Murrow and linked to his wildly successful radio broadcast of the same name. But Socrates also persistently appears in funny settings. For example, an artist makes the literally brainless, good-natured scarecrow featured in the 1961 animation, Tales from the Wizard of Oz , answer to the name ‘Socrates’; and the Beatles make Jeremy Hillary Boob, Ph.D., their sweet fictional character in the 1968 film Yellow Submarine , respond to a question with the quip, “A true Socratic query, that!” A more robust recent example that mobilizes the longevity of Socrates’ association with reflection and ethical behavior is Walter Mosley’s crime fiction featuring Socrates Fortlow. His three books follow a Black ex-con in Los Angeles with a violent past and a fierce determination to live life as a thinking person and to do good; the character says his mother named him ‘Socrates’ because she wanted him to grow up smart, a reference to a naming custom practiced by former slaves. The association of Socrates with great intellect and moral rectitude is still kicking, as a quick glance at the collection of Socrates-themed merchandise available from a wide array of vendors will attest. Further, in the mode of “the exception proves the rule,” observe that in DC Comics, Mr. Socrates is a criminal genius able to control Superman by subduing him with a device that disables him mentally.

In antiquity, Socrates did not act as a professional teacher of doctrines; he did, however, self-identify as a knowledge-seeker for the sake of himself and the benefit of those with whom he engaged, young or not. So firmly entrenched internationally in today’s vernacular is his association with education that his name is used to brand professional enterprises as varied as curricula designed for elementary school, college, law school, institutional initiatives that serve multiple disciplines, think tank retreats, café gatherings, electronic distance learning platforms, training programs for financial and marketing consultants, some parts of cognitive behavioral therapy, and easy-to-use online legal services. We find a less commercial example in Long Walk to Freedom (1994) in which the great South African statesman Nelson Mandela reports that, during his incarceration for anti-apartheid activism, his fellow prisoners educated themselves while laboring in rock quarries and that “the style of teaching was Socratic in nature;” a leader would pose a question for them to discuss in study sessions. Another example is Elliniko Theatro’s S ocrates Now, a solo performance based on Plato’s Apology that integrates audience discussion.

In U.S. education at all levels these days, Socratic questioning implies no effort on the part of a leading figure to elicit from the participants any severe discomfort with current opinions (that is, to sting like a gadfly or to expose a disquieting truth), but instead uses the name ‘Socrates’ to invest with gravitas collaborative learning that addresses moral questions and relies on interactive techniques. The unsettling and dangerous aspects of Socratic practice turn up in politicized contexts where a distinction between dissent and disloyalty is at issue. Appeals to Socrates in these settings most often highlight the personal risks run by an intellectually exemplary critic of the unjust acts of an established authority. This is a recurring theme in politically minded allusions to Socrates globally. A wave of such work took hold in the U.S., Britain and Canada around WWII, the McCarthy Era, and Cold War. Creative artists in literature, radio, theater, and television summoned Socrates to probe what it means to be an unyielding advocate of free speech and free inquiry—even a martyr to belief in the necessity of these freedoms to meaningful and virtuous human life. In these sources, his strange appearance, behavior, and views, especially his relentlessly critical, even irritating, truth-seeking, and anti-ideological posture are presented as testing Athenian democracy’s capacity to abide by these ideals. They suggest that the indictment, trial, and execution are stains on Athenian democracy and that a worrisome historical parallel is unfolding. These full-blown interpretations of the life of Socrates require wrestling with the whole issue of the historical Socrates; a claim to historical accuracy was a crucial part of any case for his story’s being credible as a warning.

Visually, we find monuments and other sculptural tributes to a less overtly political Socrates in cities and small towns across the globe in public spaces devoted to learning and contemplation. A stand-out for its unusual focus is Antonio Canova’s 1797 bas-relief, “Socrates rescues Alcibiades in the battle of Potidaea,” in which Socrates strikes a powerful pose as a hoplite. An 1875 piece by Russian imperial sculptor Mark Antokolski foregrounds the personal cost of Socrates’s commitment to philosophy, portraying him alone, a drained cup of hemlock at his side, slumped over dead. Reproductions of, and drawings based on, ancient copies of what are thought to be a fourth-century B.C.E. statue of Socrates by the Athenian Lysippus (e.g., the British Museum’s Statuette of Socrates) are also in wide circulation. A particularly interesting one can be found in graphic artist Ralph Steadman’s Paranoids , a 1986 book of Polaroid caricatures of famous people. But the most influential image of the philosopher today is the riveting, widely reproduced, 1787 painting, “The Death of Socrates,” by Jacques Louis David, now in the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. It captures the philosopher’s own claim to be reverent, his courageous decision to take the cup of hemlock in his own hand, and the grief his unjust fate stirred in others.

David’s neo-classical history-painting has come to be a defining image of Socrates. This is curious because, while the design of the painting abounds with careful references to the primary sources, it ignores those sources’ description of Socrates himself — the ones cited in section 1 on Socrates’s strangeness — rendering the old philosopher classically handsome instead. Attending to the primary sources has led some readers to wonder whether Socrates might have had an African heritage. For example, in the 1921 “The Foolish and the Wise: Sallie Runner is Introduced to Socrates,” a short story in the NAACP journal edited by W. E. B. Du Bois, author Leila Amos Pendleton tackles the issue. Her character, a bright girl employed as a maid, responds to her employer’s account of the physical appearance of the great man born before Jesus that Miss Audrey intends to tell Sallie all about: “He was a cullod gentmun, warn’t he?” This prompts the following exchange: “Oh no, Sallie, he wasn’t colored.” “Wal, ef he been daid all dat long time, Miss Oddry, how kin yo’ tell his color?” “Why he was an Athenian, Sallie. He lived in Greece.” Nails (1989) depicted Socrates as an African village elder in a recreation of Republic 1. In the visual arts, drawings and watercolors by the Swiss artist Hans Erni resolutely portray Socrates as ugly as the sources describe him. Socrates also sometimes resonates as Black (or queer, or touched), independent of any discussion of physical attributes; this follows from his renown for refusing to be defined by the stultifying norms of his day.

In Plato’s Phaedo , Socrates says a recurring dream instructs him to “compose music and work at it” and that he had always interpreted it to mean something like keep doing philosophy because “philosophy was the greatest kind of music and that’s what I was working at” (60e–61a). In prison awaiting execution, he says he experimented with new ways of doing philosophy; he tried turning some of Aesop’s fables into verse. We might view some of the deeply thoughtful, even loving, engagements with Socrates in music and dance in light of this passage. “Socrates” is the fifth movement of Leonard Bernstein’s Serenade after Plato’s Symposium (1954). He is the explicit inspiration for two works of choreography by Mark Morris, Death of Socrates in 1983, and Socrates in 2010, both of which work with 1919 compositions by Erik Satie that directly reference Socrates. And we have a work produced in 2022 at HERE in New York, The Hang, the stunning product of a collaboration by playwright Taylor Mac and composer Matt Ray.

Conjurings of Socrates appear outside philosophy as both brief but dense references to discrete features of this puzzling figure, and sustained portraits that wrestle with his enigmatic character. Details of the sources mentioned above, and other sources that may be useful, are included in the following supplementary document.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, has Plato’s works in Greek, in translation, and with notes. It has the works of Aristophanes and Xenophon as well.
“ The Uses and Disadvantages of Socrates ”, Christopher Rowe’s 1999 Inaugural Lecture at the University of Durham.
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an article devoted to Socrates.

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Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Ancient Philosophy of the Self

© 2008
Pauliina Remes 0 ,
Juha Sihvola 1

Uppsala University, Sweden University of Helsinki, Finland

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Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland

First article collection by leading experts to introduce ancient discussions on self and person, ranging from Socrates to the Christian thinkers St Paul and St Augustine
Continues a current debate between prominent scholars concerning how to approach selfhood in antiquity
Provides an inclusive sample of possible ways of approaching self and personhood in antiquity, firmly anchored in ancient testimonia
Includes contributions from the leading scholars currently working on self, person, or connected themes
Provides expert guiding to the main influences ancient discussions on self and person had in the monotheistic Latin and Arabic middle ages

Part of the book series: The New Synthese Historical Library (SYNL, volume 64)

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Table of contents (12 chapters)

Front matter, approaches to self and person in antiquity, graeco-roman varieties of self.

Richard Sorabji

The Ancient Self: Issues and Approaches

Christopher Gill

Assumptions of Normativity: Two Ancient Approaches to Agency

Miira Tuominen

From Plato to Plotinus

Socratic authority.

Raphael Woolf

Protean Socrates: Mythical Figures in the Euthydemus

Mary Margaret McCabe

Aristotle on the Individuality of Self

Juha Sihvola

What Kind of Self Can a Greek Sceptic Have?

Richard Bett

Inwardness and Infinity of Selfhood: From Plotinus to Augustine

Pauliina Remes

Christian and Islamic Themes

Philosophy of the self in the apostle paul.

Troels Engberg-Pedersen

Two Kinds of Subjectivity in Augustine’s Confessions : Memory and Identity, and the Integrated Self

Gerard J. P. O’Daly

The Self as Enemy, the Self as Divine: A Crossroads in the Development of Islamic Anthropology

Taneli Kukkonen

Locating the Self Within the Soul – Thirteenth-Century Discussions

Mikko Yrjönsuuri

Back Matter

Ancient Philosophy
metaphysics

About this book

Editors and affiliations, uppsala university, sweden, university of helsinki, finland, about the editors, bibliographic information.

Book Title : Ancient Philosophy of the Self

Editors : Pauliina Remes, Juha Sihvola

Series Title : The New Synthese Historical Library

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8596-3

Publisher : Springer Dordrecht

eBook Packages : Humanities, Social Sciences and Law , Philosophy and Religion (R0)

Hardcover ISBN : 978-1-4020-8595-6 Published: 13 September 2008

Softcover ISBN : 978-90-481-7927-5 Published: 30 November 2010

eBook ISBN : 978-1-4020-8596-3 Published: 26 August 2008

Series ISSN : 1879-8578

Series E-ISSN : 2352-2585

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Number of Pages : IX, 272

Topics : Classical Philosophy , Epistemology , History of Philosophy , Medieval Philosophy , Philosophy of Man , Philosophy of Religion

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Reflections on the Socratic notion of the self

2012, Care of the self in early Greek philosophy

The ancient Greek notion of “care of the self” and the self-knowledge it presupposes is premised on the concept of introspection. Introspection obviously involves “consciousness”; more precisely, it implies a “conscious” notion of the “self.” Consciousness itself can be notorious difficult to define and explain. In this paper, I examine some of the historical precedents for “caring for the self” as we find them in Plato’s earlier dialogues, notably the Apology, and the kind of consciousness it presupposes. This was an invited paper for a panel on “Care of the self in early Greek philosophy” organized by Annie Larivée for the 80th Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New Brunswick, May 2011. I’ve added a few references to my more recent work on the topic.

Related Papers

Ápeiron. Estudios de filosofía, monográfico «Presocráticos»

Gerard Naddaf

In this paper, I examine the religion of the early Greek philosophers, and Socrates contribution to the debate. I argue that all of the early Greek philosophers expressed teleological tendencies similar to what we find in Plato's later dialogues, and they would thus have a similar cosmic religious outlook, including a shared understanding of the ultimate point of religious practices such as singing hymns and praying. Nous or mind, which is also manifest in the order of nature, is the final arbiter for all. In conjunction, what all these ontologies have in common is the conviction the seeds of human consciousness, cognition, and value were inherent in the originative principle. They have a theory of everything that seems akin to what Thomas Nagel calls "natural teleology," but without the atheism. I begin by putting the Greek discovery of nature (phusis) into perspective, and then turn to the first philosophers and examine the correlation between phusis, theos, psuchê, and nous in their respective works. I'll discuss in this context Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Alcmaeon, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras. These are, for the most part, the natural philosophers to whom Socrates refers in the famous "autobiographical" passage in the Phaedo (96a-99d) when he describes the enthusiasm for natural philosophy (peri phuseôs historia) he had when he was young (neos ôn, 96a6). I examine this passage in some detail and argue that there is an element of bad faith on the part of Socrates because he is ignoring the conscious or unconscious teleological tendencies in the philosophers' respective accounts, of which he must have been aware. Then, after looking at the accusations against Socrates in Plato's Apology, I turn to the portrait of Socrates in Aristophanes' Clouds where he is characterized as a meteorosophistês (360) and examine in this context the culture of the period. I also examine Socrates teleological tendencies in Xenophon's Memorabilia, and compare them both with the early Greek philosophers and with Plato's teleological tendencies in the Timaeus. I argue that Plato is closer to the early Greek philosophers than to Socrates, even though his teleology is more providential. Finally, I discuss the connection between peri phuseôs narrations and religious practices such as hymns and sacrifices, and argue that here too Plato is a closer match with the religious tendencies of early Greek philosophers. https://www.apeironestudiosdefilosofia.com/numero-11

Keynote paper 10th London Ancient Science Conference, Institute of Classical Studies, University College London, Inst

There is a striking passage in Plato’s Laws that claims “it’s a risk to appeal to prayer, if you lack intelligence” (euchêi chrêsthai sphaleron einai noun mê kektêmenon, 688b6-7). In other words, what you wish for in your prayers should be supported by your rational judgement (phronêsei, 687e7-8). This was, I believe, axiomatic for Plato from his youth, and it seems that Socrates held the same position from his youth: he claims in the Crito (46b) that he is the kind of man who has always been (ou monon nun, alla kai aei) persuaded by the argument (logôi) that on reflection seemed best to him (logizomenôi beltistos phainêtai). Although Socrates claims in the Apology that God has instructed him by means of oracles, dreams, and other forms of divine manifestation that he should practise philosophy (Apology 33c; 29d; 38a), there is nothing in this or other Socratic encounters with the divine to suggest that he believed “supernatural” beings could or would counter the laws of nature. For both Plato and Socrates, the gods are by nature good (Republic 379b) and perfect (381b), and thus, like “natural” laws, they do not change. Prayers and sacrifices offered up with the aim of changing a god’s behavior are thus useless. The position of Plato and Socrates thus accords with the standard naturalist interpretation of the Presocratics—that they believed the world functioned entirely according to natural laws. I agree with this interpretation, but I am nonetheless intrigued by the question of what the early Greek philosophers thought they were doing when they entered a temple to pray and/or sacrifice to the gods. We must consider it more than probable that they did so, notwithstanding their bold and revolutionary thesis. It is highly unlikely that the early Greek philosophers (before 450 BC) would have even entertained notions that we associate with atheism. In this regard, I tend to agree with Andrew Gregory’s claim in his recent book The Presocratics and the Supernatural (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013) that “not only could presocratic intellectuals devise their own theologies apart from the Greek religious tradition, they could devise their own means of prayer and notions of piety as well, entirely in accord with their naturalistic theologies” (109). But what were those means of prayer and notions of piety? In this paper I’ll argue that the answer lies in the strong similarity between the Presocratics and the Platonic texts cited above. In both instances, it is by seeing the connection of phusis with the divine that we gain both a nous of our own and a model to follow—and thus the capacity to act rationally and piously, by conforming our actions to the divine order of the universe. I’ll thus be examining in context a number of the early Greek natural philosophers, but also, in context, Socrates famous “autobiographical” passage in the Phaedo (96a-99d) in which Socrates describes his enthusiasm for natural philosophy (peri phuseôs historia) when he was young (neos ôn, 96a6). We’ll see that in many respects the natural philosophers were all engaged in a kind of theologia naturalis, but perhaps closer to what Thomas Nagel calls natural teleology. Finally, I’ll examine in context the notion and roles of hymns.

Reflections on Plato’s Poetics. Essays from Beijing (edited by Rick Benitez and Keping Wang), Academic Printing & Publishing: Berrima Glen Berrima NSW, 2016, 111-136.

In this paper, I want to focus on the notion of psuchê or soul and the myths of the afterlife from Homer to Plato. It is likely that for the Greeks in general their first idea of psuchê and what happens to it after death was the Homeric one. And because of the natural role of mimêsis in poetic performance, this notion would become all the more engrained in the “minds” of the vast majority of Greeks. But the history of soul and the afterlife is more intriguing and complex than simply being a series of footnotes to Homer. A number of other competing notions of the soul and the afterlife began to emerge shortly after the Homeric poems/songs appeared. These too are steeped in myth and ritual and the “song” culture too. And then we have the Milesians, or first philosophers. There is a dramatic shift here again. With this group, soul appears as a universal moving principle, which will later become in Plato a key to his whole enterprise. Plato never ceases to grapple with the notion of psuchê, and he never ceases to innovate on what he understands by this idea. Nonetheless, for Plato at every stage of his thinking, soul can only be represented by eschatological or cosmological myths. It is inaccessible to explanation. This is ironic when we consider that psuchê is the subject and common principle of his physics, his epistemology, and his psychology/anthropology. And even when soul becomes the cornerstone of the hypothesis of a distinction between the sensible and the intelligible with soul understood as a reality intermediary between the two others, this occurs in the context of a cosmological myth. It is still an unverifiable account. My main focus in Plato will be on his notions of soul (individual and universal) and post-mortem retribution in the Apology, Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic, Phaedrus, Timaeus and Laws. I want to show that Plato’s final thoughts on the soul and the afterlife are a giant leap from earlier positions, and indeed from those of his predecessors. They come across as a kind of “new age” eschatology. Plato was the apostle of reincarnation, and it is interesting to see how this idea, which he borrowed from others, evolved over his dialogues. In addition, he is also the apostle of free will—an idea absent from the works of his predecessors. I also do not want to lose sight of the role of Plato as a poet and the role of poetic performance throughout this odyssey. There is, as I see it, a kind of perplexing culmination in the Laws. While providing us with a “scientific” eschatology, Plato nonetheless sees himself as a legislator-poet who wants to transform the entire lawcode into the ultimate poetic performance. There is, moreover, a constant struggle between his insistence on free will, on the one hand, and his insistence on using irrational persuasion, on the other, to motivate human souls to fulfill the world’s teleological purpose. For the table of contents, introduction and bibliography corresponding to this volume, see: http://www.academicprintingandpublishing.com/docs/Reflections%20on%20Plato%27s%20Poetics_Front_Intro._Biblio._Indices.pdf There is an unabridged Chinese edition of this essay in Plato’s Poetics (edited by Keping Wang), Beijing: University of Beijing Press, 2016, 145-199.

Kathryn Morgan

David Sayer

Ancient Philosophy

Christopher Moore

If Stobaeus provides an accurate record, Heraclitus makes the earliest reference to the Delphic ‘Know yourself’: ‘All people have a share in knowing themselves and being sound-minded’ ( νθρώποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν, fr. 116 DK = Stob. Flor. 3.5.6). A serious inquiry into the meaning of this fragment would have a range of benefits. First, it would help clarify the role of self-knowledge (also frr. 45, 101, 115) in coming to know the Heraclitean logos (fr. 1). In particular, it might be that by knowing oneself one comes to be ‘awake’ in the way Heraclitus claims necessary for knowing the logos, and thus for having wisdom. Second, it might point toward an intriguing account of epistemic reflexivity and thus even a nascent concept of selfhood, one heretofore obscured by investigations into a putatively material basis of the soul, distinctions between unity-in-diversity and flux theses, and appreciation of Heraclitus’ skepticism about the subjective interpretation of personal experience. This account might suggest that recognizing oneself as something that can and therefore ought to exercise its epistemic rights and responsibilities constitutes selfhood. Finally, it would set Heraclitus at the earliest moment in the epistemological tradition, allowing for a new story about the origins of the discipline extending more than a century before Plato.

Leonard Lawlor

In the final years of his life, Foucault defines his work in two interrelated ways. On the one hand, his work investigates "the history of thought" (HSB 9),1 where thought consists not only in what is said but also in what is done.2 Foucault is particularly interested in thought's (and the subject's) relation to truth, to veridiction (truth-telling) and to alethurgy (the "doing" or manifestation of truth). On the other hand, Foucault's investigations into the history of thought are subordinated to philosophy, where philosophy means "the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself" (UP 9). The critical work of philosophy aims "to enable one to get free of oneself," in other words, to think otherwise. The two-sided definition of Foucault's final thinking sets up the general framework within which his investigations of Socrates take place. In fact, Socrates occupies three positions in Foucault's final writings. First, Socrates represents a "moment" of transition or an "event" in the history of thought (HSB 9). This event also has two interrelated sides. On the one hand, for Foucault, it is the event when Western thought shifts from ascetical practices to cognitive practices. Western thought shifts from the care of the self to self-knowledge, from epimeleia heautou to gnôthi seauton. On the other hand, it is the event in Western thought when speaking-frankly (parrhêsia) shifts from being a political form of veridiction, within democracy, to being a philosophical form of veridiction. In a word, Socrates is not Solon (CT 77). At times, Foucault calls this transitional moment the "Socratic-Platonic moment" (HSB 30); at other times he simply calls it "the Platonic moment" (HSB 5), and at still other times, he calls it "the Platonic reversal" (CT 45). The simpler Platonic name for the event indicates the outcome of the transition: the 1 Foucault distinguishes the history of thought from the history of knowledge and the history of ideology. The history of thought is a history of "singular inventions" and ontologies of freedom. See GSO 310. 2 One can see the seeds of the history of thought in the History of Madness, where Foucault claims that his investigations there cannot be defined by the theory-practice dualism (Foucault 2006, 172). Here thought concerns the practices and discourses of the treatment of the mad and the discourses and practices of the conceptions of madness. 926-947_Moore_35-Lawlor.indd 926

This essay concerns Foucault's final publications in which he discusses Socrates. The essay will appear in The Brill Companion to the Reception of Socrates (2017).

Brill's Companion to the Reception of Socrates

This paper concerns the strange and interesting perspective on Socrates presented by Aristotle.

Invited paper XIII International Ontology Congress Physics and Ontology

In contemporary science and philosophy, the orthodox view is to consider “reductive materialism” the only legitimate way of accounting for all things, past, present and future — for, that is, what some may call “theories of everything.” According to this view, all psychological phenomena, including mind, life, and consciousness, are also reducible to physics and chemistry. In his recent controversial but important book, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False (Oxford: OUP, 2012), Thomas Nagel argues against “reductive materialism” and reductionist interpretation of biological evolution. But Nagel is also an atheist, so he’ll have nothing to do with the theistic option and its contention that the intentionality of a purposive being is at work behind the present order of things. Nagel argues instead for a special kind of teleology that he calls “natural teleology” as the only valid explanation. The existence of teleological laws means that certain physical outcomes have a much higher probability than the laws of physics alone would allow because they are on a path toward certain results. What interests me with Nagel’s proposal is that we find a historical precedent for it at the origins of philosophy and science in what is called the discovery or invention of nature or physis. In this paper, I’ll argue that when we turn to the history of philosophy before Aristotle, we see that this natural teleology, to borrow Nagel’s expression, led some thinkers to affirm reductive materialism, which in turn generated, as a reaction to it, theism as a philosophical position, a theism grounded in arguments for the existence of God/gods. In other words, there were no arguments for the existence of God before a case was made for atheism. In this battle of Titans, the concept of nature or physis was at the centre of the controversy, and the political and social ramifications were as acute then as they are now. The aim of this paper is to introduce the philosophers and scientists participating in this congress on physis to the different parties in the original dispute and to their terms of reference. But my presentation here will also have something to say about the emergence of a new form of thinking, if not a new kind of Homo sapiens: the advent of Homo philosophicus, and the self-conscious reflexivity this being presupposes.

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Philosophical Perspective of Self Essay

Introduction, rene descartes, meditations on first philosophy, second meditation summary and analysis, analysis and definition of “i”, other definitions of self, works cited.

Throughout history, the philosophical perspective of “self” has received myriad descriptions and analyses from many philosophers, researchers, and even scholars. In gaining this understanding, these people are important in explaining how the knowledge of this concept affects the world and how people perceive themselves and their ultimate relationships with others.

An understanding of “self,” therefore, affirms a person’s identity in a social environment, allowing him/her to recognize others besides oneself (Sorabji 13). In other words, the way human beings socialize solely depends on how they perceive themselves and others through daily social interactions.

Innumerable philosophers, including Socrates and Aristotle, have immensely contributed towards gaining clarity in defining “I.” Yet, it is believed that some have been quite outstanding with regard to their input. In this category lies Rene Descartes, whose findings remain essential in defining the concept of “self” and how this definition affects people’s thinking and interactions.

This paper goes far ahead in synthesizing Descartes’ findings to achieve a concise definition of the word “I” that seems reasonable and critical from a philosophical perspective of the “self.” This essay further digs into several research findings unearthed by renowned scholars and experts who have devoted their time and resources to studying and exploring the definition and how it influences interpersonal relationships in one’s life.

By compiling ideas from an array of thinkers, this philosophy of “self” essay intends to explore the implications of defining “I” in a given manner and how such a stance would affect our self-reflection and perceptions of ourselves or how we treat ourselves. The survey also focuses on how these definitions would affect our knowledge of ourselves and the world outside our “selves.”

Born in 1596 in France, Rene Descartes was a great philosopher, thinker, writer, and mathematician who spent his adulthood in the Republic of Dutch. He has arguably been dubbed as the father of modern philosophy with special emphasis on the Western school of thought (Smith 1).

As a result, his pieces of writing remain key reference materials for scholars across the global plane. For example, meditations continue to serve as principal textbooks in most universities’ philosophy departments today. His contribution to mathematics set unbeaten records, with his efforts being widely applied in calculus and geometry. In the development of natural sciences, his input cannot go unnoticed.

He believed philosophy was a mega entity encompassing all aspects of knowledge expressed through it. Although most of the works and thoughts have been widely considered, there has been a strong emphasis on Meditations on First Philosophy. As mentioned before, this essay will emphasize the second meditation in defining the concept of “I,” also known as “self.”

These meditations are considered the origin of modern Western philosophy. In this coverage, Descartes criticizes most of Aristotle’s arguments and designs questions that have remained debatable in the world of philosophy today. He breaks from the norm created by Aristotle that knowledge is achieved through human senses and that mental statuses usually resemble what they are. As such, Descartes is able to develop brand new concepts about the mind, ideas, and matter (Frankfurt 185).

In this portion of his findings, Descartes explains the nature of the human mind and that it is better than the body. His research revolves around the search for certainty and ignores every idea that carries any slightest doubt. Throughout his memory, Descartes believes that whatever he happens to see is actually meaningless and may not ever exist in real life (Descartes 17).

As a result, we can view place and movement as mistaken notions in human life since lack of certainty is the only certain thing that exists in his life. This is essential in defining ourselves and our existence.

Is it possible for Descartes to believe that he does not have a body and senses, yet he exists? What about the nonexistence of the physical world, as proposed by the author? Ironically, he can only posses these doubts of nonexistence if he truly exists.

In other words, one can only be misled by the devil from within if he does exist. As such, “I” has to exist in order to doubt and be deceived by the evil one. Nevertheless, it can generally be viewed that “I” is a necessary and true preposition when suggested by somebody or conceived in one’s own mind (Descartes 72).

After conceiving the existence of “I,” the mediator does not stop at this particular point but aims at defining and explaining the meaning of the “I am.” This approach makes it possible to be certain that we possess a soul which augments our thinking, nourishment, movement, and sensibility. Furthermore, human beings have a body (Frankfurt 185).

Regardless of these initial doubts, many people sink into a ditch of doubts and hang on to the fact that one has the ability to think. In other words, our existence does not solely depend on the above-mentioned attributes of human beings, but we have no doubt about our breathing power.

This implies that thinking is essential for a person to exist regardless of whether he has other qualities like body and soul, among others. By the fact that thinking defines “self,” it is possible to relate it with human existence and consider it inseparable from being. From a general perspective, we can view one’s self as simply “thinking something.”

The definition of “I” is enshrined in Descartes’ cogito argument based on its formulation in Latin, “cogito ergo sum,” translated as “I think, therefore, I am.” This line is quite famous in the history of philosophy and is most probably regarded as the origin of Western philosophy and other schools of thought that developed after Descartes. In this line, the mediator gets in touch with a grip of certainty after his continuous disbelief is manifested in the First Mediation (Frankfurt 186).

In essence, the cogito exposes a different view of the world and states that the mind is the only thing in the world that can know itself. Notably, understanding our mind first before any other thing has remained rooted in Western philosophy, even though the main point of contention has been the connection between the mind and the real world. From this perspective, the mind is no longer an aid to understanding the world but an internally locked thing (Frankfurt 186).

In analyzing Descartes’ Second Meditation, it is of immense significance to note the existing differences between “I think, therefore I am” as described in the Discourse Method from the general formulation derived from meditations.

At this point of the synthesis, it is imperative to mention that the proposition “I am, I exist” holds only when it is put forward by a specific individual and conceived by the person’s mind. The mediation is further divided into an argument of three steps, which are: whatever thinks exists, I think therefore, and I exist (Frankfurt 188).

However, in understanding “self” through syllogistic reading and analysis, denied by Descartes in other pieces of writing is the fact that there is no reason why “whatever thinks exists” should not be doubtful as portrayed by the mediator. This reading approach further analyzes the cogito as a conclusion that has been reasoned out at a specific point in the doubtful mind of the mediator, even when inferences that have been well reasoned out are called to doubt (Frankfurt 189).

The question we need to ask ourselves in this definition of self is the path somebody takes to know the cogito when everything else is doubted. As a result, several proposals have been put forth as reading formats and methodologies aimed at simplifying this reading process and step (Frankfurt 202). It would be impossible for a person to say he/she exits or even thinks of existence without being in a real state.

Consequently, the truth is achieved by the utterance concerning the concept of existence. In this line of thought, it can be argued that the existence of a person can only be confirmed by oneself in the present tense, “I am.” It is also important to double emphasize the fact that cogito can only work when one is talking about thought. One cannot say: “I sleep, therefore I am,” since the act of sleeping can be doubted. In explaining this, one cannot doubt the act of thinking because doubt on its own is a form of thought.

Besides cogito , the mediator also affirms that he “thinks,” leading to an argument commonly referred to as sun res cogitans (Rorty 215). This comprises three controversial views regarding one being a “thinking thing.” In this approach, it is essential to comprehend the meaning of “thing” and “think” to establish their definitive relationship with “I am.”

There are two approaches to defining “self” at this point. This can be done both epistemologically and metaphysically. In other words, body and mind cannot be one since one has got either to know both of them or none of them. As a matter of fact, the existence of the body ceases since one is a “thinking thing with delinked body and mind. This gives way to the conclusion that one is a “thing that thinks.”

With preciseness, “I” can be defined as the “thing that thinks.” In addition, “I” possesses other attributes besides being able to think, understand, and be willing to do certain things. These qualities include but are not limited to imagination and the use of the senses. In the understanding of “I,” it is worth noting that senses and imagination cannot be trusted (Rorty 214). This is because imagination can trigger all forms of things that may not necessarily be real.

How can one identify wax? This is made possible through a sense of taste, color, smell, size, shape, and hardness, among others. When heated, the wax changes some properties but can be identified despite the deviation from the initial form. Due to the fact that wax can be identified even when its shape is infinitely changed, it suffices to mention that this cannot be possible via imagination but through the intellect alone and proper mental scrutiny.

Based on this argument, it can be concluded that the mind knows better than the body. In this approach, the human view is that one has to know the mind more than any other thing in his or her life as a way of understanding the self better (Rorty 214). There is no doubt in perceiving the identity of something, and these actions of thought clearly imply that the item exists in reality. Therefore, confirming one’s existence is the core of ascertaining the nature of the mind through the intellect alone.

As mentioned before, various authors have defined and described the concept of “self” throughout history. According to Sorabji, the idea of “self” is real in human history. He argues that the “self” comes to play when the owner of a body is intertwined with existing psychological states (Sorabji 13).

He further notes that in explaining the “self,” there is a stream of consciousness that lacks the owner. In his description of this analogy, Sorabji asserts that his definition of “self” fits other members like animals as embodied owners of the body. Based on this approach, Sorabji further double emphasizes the fact that there is a need to protect the human way of life and not only base it on its relationship with the “self” or the interaction between members of a given stream (Sorabji 13).

The broadness of “self” also encompasses the picture of human beings developing into male or female, baker or teacher, son or daughter, Indian or American, among other development attributes. Importantly, these cannot be visualized through the metaphysical conceptualization of the “self” because of its narrowness in determining the nature of the pictures to be adopted. Additionally, the pictures are not considered to be essential and are likely to be altered under extreme pressure (Sorabji 14).

However, visualized pictures are important in describing a complete image of selfhood, even though they can be philosophically studied differently. “I am” is also described by the use of unique features, which make human beings different from other creations (Sorabji 14). In essence, thoughts and actions people execute are usually a result of the self. It can be described as a substance that persists through time. This is to say that actions and thoughts experienced at different times of the day or in life may also concern the “self.”

In most cases, philosophical definitions of “self” are discussed based on the first-person attributes. This is because third-person definitions do not identify unique identification properties. Viewed from a different point, the “self” can be principally described through the discourse and conduct of a person.

As a result, intentions can only be deduced from something being observed through actions undertaken by an individual. Of great significance is the fact that the characteristics of a given “self” have the full potential of determining its real identity (Rorty 215).

Based on this analogy, it can be argued that “I” can be divided into various concepts as defined by specific qualities and attributes. For instance, the “self” can be viewed as an illusion (Sorabji 17). This is common in ancient spiritual traditions in which the human identity is conceived as a mere illusion for the existence of individual human beings. This identification further ensures that there is a boundary between humanity and other forms of creation, especially in terms of characteristics and abilities.

In general, individual existence is considered as the representation of a human being and advocates fighting for its rightful position in the world (Rorty 216). Moreover, “self” is linked with time and mind, which determine obsessive thinking based on the future than emphasizing the present. Most religions advocate for the dissolution of humans for human nature to prevail in the world. This is commonly known as nirvana, presence, or enlightenment.

Besides viewing the self as an illusion, other philosophers approach the concept by considering the “self” as an activity. Among these philosophers were Aristotle and Plato, who defined the human soul as the principal essence of humanity but posited against differences in existence.

Unlike Plato and other religious traditions who supported separate existence, Aristotle viewed the human “self” as an activity of the body which lacks the properties of becoming immortal (Sorabji 17). To be specific, the soul is viewed as the activity of any living body. In defining the soul, Aristotle divided his argument into four major parts, including the desiderative, calculative, rational, and scientific parts.

Another renowned philosopher and psychologist today who defines “self” is Dr. Phil. He believes that a person dwells on a state of fictional self or authentic self as created by the Supreme Being. According to Dr. Phil, most people define who they are by explaining what they are doing, where they are, or their role in society.

However, Dr. Phil argues that one’s authentic self encompasses the genuine existence of a person’s identity (McGraw 1). This is to say that an authentic self demonstrates core human qualities. Additionally, the self is made up of the part of an individual that is not defined by profession or a given role in society. It consists of an individual’s talents, skills, and wisdom.

The psychologist further argues that an authentic self revolves around a person’s uniqueness, including abilities, rather than what he/she is expected to do or become. This, therefore, implies that when an individual does not live to the standards of his authentic self, he adopts a fictional self that has emptiness and incompleteness (McGraw 1).

It is doubtless that the definition of “self” has a wide range of implications. For instance, this knowledge affects the way human beings view themselves differently from animals. It gives them an understanding of their uniqueness and potential in using their senses to recognize their surrounding and their imagination ability.

Additionally, the definition of self impacts how we interact with and perceive others. In other words, human beings are able to appreciate others regardless of their shortcomings and differences since each one of them possesses unique qualities and attributes.

Although numerous philosophers have devoted their lives to defining the “I am” concept, Rene Descartes is regarded as the father of Western philosophy and a great contributor to several schools of thought. In particular, Meditations on First Philosophy has widely been used as learning at teaching materials across the globe.

Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy . Sioux Falls: NuVision Publications, LLC, 2007. Print.

Frankfurt, Harry. Descartes’ Discussion of His Existence in the Second Mediation. United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis, 2004. Print.

McGraw, Phillip. “Self Matters.” Dr. Phil , 2012. Web.

Rorty, Amélie. Essays on Descartes’ Meditations . California: University of California Press, 1986. Print.

Smith, Kurt, “Descartes’ Life and Works.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012. Web. < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/descartes-works/ >.

Sorabji, Richard. Graeco-Roman Varieties of Self. New York, NY: Springer, 2008. Print.

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Descartes' Cogito Argument and Hume's Critique of the Self
Husserl's and Descartes' Philosophies
R.Descartes' and T.Aquinas' Views on God Existence
Meditation Two: Concerning the Nature of the Human Mind
Descartes and the Skeptics: An Incomplete Case
Descartes and Hume’s Ideologies in Contemporary Psychology
Physicalism as a Philosophical Approach
Rene Descartes: A Brief Perspective
David Hume: The Ideology of Self
Descartes' and Buddhist Ideas of Self-Existence
A Miracle as an Extraordinary Happening Occurring in the Physical World
Philosophy Is Worth Doing
Proof of an External World
Rene Descartes and John Locke
Sophist Reasoning: Reality Perception

Home — Essay Samples — Philosophy — Socrates — Socrates’ Contribution to Philosophy of Self-Knowledge

Socrates' Contribution to Philosophy of Self-knowledge

Categories: Self Reflection Socrates The Apology

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Crucial role of self-knowledge from socrates' viewpoint, socrates’ methodology of employing self-knowledge into his argument.

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6.2 Self and Identity

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

Apply the dilemma of persistence to self and identity.
Outline Western and Eastern theological views of self.
Describe secular views of the self.
Describe the mind-body problem.

Today, some might think that atomism and Aristotle’s teleological view have evolved into a theory of cells that resolves the acorn-oak tree identity problem. The purpose, or ergon, of both the acorn and the oak tree are present in the zygote, the cell that forms when male and female sex cells combine. This zygote cell contains the genetic material, or the instructions, for how the organism will develop to carry out its intended purpose.

But not all identity problems are so easily solved today. What if the author of this chapter lived in a house as a child, and years later, after traveling in the highly glamorous life that comes with being a philosopher, returned to find the house had burned down and been rebuilt exactly as it had been. Is it the same home? The generic questions that center on how we should understand the tension between identity and persistence include:

Can a thing change without losing its identity?
If so, how much change can occur without a loss of identity for the thing itself?

This section begins to broach these questions of identity and self.

The Ship of Theseus

Consider the following thought experiment. Imagine a wooden ship owned by the hero Theseus. Within months of launching, the need to replace decking would be evident. The salt content of sea water is highly corrosive. Accidents can also happen. Within a common version of the thought experiment, the span of one thousand years is supposed. Throughout the span, it is supposed that the entire decking and wooden content of the ship will have been replaced. The name of the ship remains constant. But given the complete change of materials over the assumed time span, in what sense can we assert that the ship is the same ship? We are tempted to conceptualize identity in terms of persistence, but the Ship of Theseus challenges the commonly held intuition regarding how to make sense of identity.

Similarly, as our bodies develop from zygote to adult, cells die and are replaced using new building materials we obtain though food, water, and our environment. Given this, are we the same being as we were 10 or 20 years ago? How can we identify what defines ourselves? What is our essence? This section examines answers proposed by secular and religious systems of belief.

Write Like a Philosopher

Watch the video “ Metaphysics: Ship of Theseus ” in the series Wi-Phi Philosophy . You will find five possible solutions for making sense of the thought experiment. Pick one solution and explain why the chosen solution is the most salient. Can you explain how the strengths outweigh the stated objections—without ignoring the objections?

Judeo-Christian Views of Self

The common view concerning identity in Judeo-Christian as well as other spiritual traditions is that the self is a soul. In Western thought, the origin of this view can be traced to Plato and his theory of forms. This soul as the real self solves the ship of Theseus dilemma, as the soul continuously exists from zygote or infant and is not replaced by basic building materials. The soul provides permanence and even persists into the afterlife.

Much of the Christian perspective on soul and identity rested on Aristotle’s theory of being, as a result of the work of St. Thomas Aquinas . Aquinas, a medieval philosopher, followed the Aristotelian composite of form and matter but modified the concept to fit within a Christianized cosmology. Drawing upon portions of Aristotle’s works reintroduced to the West as a result of the Crusades, Aquinas offered an alternative philosophical model to the largely Platonic Christian view that was dominant in his day. From an intellectual historical perspective, the reintroduction of the Aristotelian perspective into Western thought owes much to the thought of Aquinas.

In Being and Essence , Aquinas noted that there was a type of existence that was necessary and uncaused and a type of being that was contingent and was therefore dependent upon the former to be brought into existence. While the concept of a first cause or unmoved mover was present within Aristotle’s works, Aquinas identified the Christian idea of God as the “unmoved mover.” God, as necessary being, was understood as the cause of contingent being. God, as the unmoved mover, as the essence from which other contingent beings derived existence, also determined the nature and purpose driving all contingent beings. In addition, God was conceived of as a being beyond change, as perfection realized. Using Aristotelian terms, we could say that God as Being lacked potentiality and was best thought of as that being that attained complete actuality or perfection—in other words, necessary being.

God, as the ultimate Good and Truth, will typically be understood as assigning purpose to the self. The cosmology involved is typically teleological—in other words, there is a design and order and ultimately an end to the story (the eschaton ). Members of this tradition will assert that the Divine is personal and caring and that God has entered the narrative of our history to realize God’s purpose through humanity. With some doctrinal exception, if the self lives the good life (a life according to God’s will), then the possibility of sharing eternity with the Divine is promised.

Think Like a Philosopher

Watch this discussion with Timothy Pawl on the question of eternal life, part of the PBS series Closer to the Truth , “ Imagining Eternal Life ”.

Is eternal life an appealing prospect? If change is not possible within heaven, then heaven (the final resting place for immortal souls) should be outside of time. What exactly would existence within an eternal now be like? In the video, Pawl claimed that time has to be present within eternity. He argued that there must be movement from potentiality to actuality. How can that happen in an eternity?

Hindu and Buddhist Views of Self

Within Hindu traditions, atman is the term associated with the self. The term, with its roots in ancient Sanskrit, is typically translated as the eternal self, spirit, essence, soul, and breath (Rudy, 2019). Western faith traditions speak of an individual soul and its movement toward the Divine. That is, a strong principle of individuation is applied to the soul. A soul is born, and from that time forward, the soul is eternal. Hinduism, on the other hand, frames atman as eternal; atman has always been. Although atman is eternal, atman is reincarnated. The spiritual goal is to “know atman” such that liberation from reincarnation ( moksha ) occurs.

Hindu traditions vary in the meaning of brahman . Some will speak of a force supporting all things, while other traditions might invoke specific deities as manifestations of brahman . Escaping the cycle of reincarnation requires the individual to realize that atman is brahman and to live well or in accordance with dharma , observing the code of conduct as prescribed by scripture, and karma , actions and deeds. Union of the atman with brahman can be reach though yoga, meditation, rituals, and other practices.

Buddha rejected the concept of brahman and proposed an alternate view of the world and the path to liberation. The next sections consider the interaction between the concepts of Atman (the self) and Brahman (reality).

The Doctrine of Dependent Origination

Buddhist philosophy rejects the concept of an eternal soul. The doctrine of dependent origination , a central tenet within Buddhism, is built on the claim that there is a causal link between events in the past, the present, and the future. What we did in the past is part of what happened previously and is part of what will be.

The doctrine of dependent origination (also known as interdependent arising) is the starting point for Buddhist cosmology. The doctrine here asserts that not only are all people joined, but all phenomena are joined with all other phenomena. All things are caused by all other things, and in turn, all things are dependent upon other things. Being is a nexus of interdependencies. There is no first cause or prime mover in this system. There is no self—at least in the Western sense of self—in this system (O’Brien 2019a).

The Buddhist Doctrine of No Self ( Anatman )

One of many distinct features of Buddhism is the notion of anatman as the denial of the self. What is being denied here is the sense of self expressed through metaphysical terms such as substance or universal being. Western traditions want to assert an autonomous being who is strongly individuated from other beings. Within Buddhism, the “me” is ephemeral.

Listen to the podcast “ Graham Priest on Buddhism and Philosophy ” in the series Philosophy Bites.

Suffering and Liberation

Within Buddhism, there are four noble truths that are used to guide the self toward liberation. An often-quoted sentiment from Buddhism is the first of the four noble truths . The first noble truth states that “life is suffering” ( dukkha ).

But there are different types of suffering that need to be addressed in order to understand more fully how suffering is being used here. The first meaning ( dukkha-dukkha ) is commensurate with the ordinary use of suffering as pain. This sort of suffering can be experienced physically and/or emotionally. A metaphysical sense of dukkha is viparinama-dukkha . Suffering in this sense relates to the impermanence of all objects. It is our tendency to impose permanence upon that which by nature is not, or our craving for ontological persistence, that best captures this sense of dukkha. Finally, there is samkhara-dukkha , or suffering brought about through the interdependency of all things.

Building on an understanding of “suffering” informed only by the first sense, some characterize Buddhism as “life is suffering; suffering is caused by greed; suffering ends when we stop being greedy; the way to do that is to follow something called the Eightfold Path” (O’Brien 2019b). A more accurate understanding of dukkha within this context must include all three senses of suffering.

The second of the noble truths is that the cause of suffering is our thirst or craving ( tanha ) for things that lack the ability to satisfy our craving. We attach our self to material things, concepts, ideas, and so on. This attachment, although born of a desire to fulfill our internal cravings, only heightens the craving. The problem is that attachment separates the self from the other. Through our attachments, we lose sight of the impermanence not only of the self but of all things.

The third noble truth teaches that the way to awakening ( nirvana ) is through a letting go of the cravings. Letting go of the cravings entails the cessation of suffering ( dukkha ).

The fourth truth is founded in the realization that living a good life requires doing, not just thinking. By living in accordance with the Eightfold Path, a person may live such that “every action of body, mind, and speech” are geared toward the promotion of dharma.

Buddhism’s Four Noble Truths

Part of the BBC Radio 4 series A History of Ideas , this clip is narrated by Steven Fry and scripted by Nigel Warburton.

The Five Aggregates

How might the self ( atman ) experience the world and follow a path toward liberation? Buddhist philosophy posits five aggregates ( skandhas ), which are the thoughtful and iterative processes, through which the self interacts with the world.

Form ( rupa ): the aggregate of matter, or the body.
Sensation ( vedana ): emotional and physical feelings.
Perception ( samjna ): thinking, the processing of sense data; “knowledge that puts together.”
Mental formation ( samskara ): how thoughts are processed into habits, predispositions, moods, volitions, biases, interests, etc. The fourth skandhas is related to karma, as much of our actions flow from these elements.
Consciousness ( vijnana ): awareness and sensitivity concerning a thing that does not include conceptualization.

Although the self uses the aggregates, the self is not thought of as a static and enduring substance underlying the processes. These aggregates are collections that are very much subject to change in an interdependent world.

Secular Notions of Self

In theology, continuity of the self is achieved through the soul. Secular scholars reject this idea, defining self in different ways, some of which are explored in the next sections.

Bundle Theory

One of the first and most influential scholars in the Western tradition to propose a secular concept of self was Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776). Hume formed his thoughts in response to empiricist thinkers’ views on substance and knowledge. British philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) offered a definition of substance in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. In Book XXIII, Locke described substance as “a something, I know not what.” He asserted that although we cannot know exactly what substance is, we can reason from experience that there must be a substance “standing under or upholding” the qualities that exist within a thing itself. The meaning of substance is taken from the Latin substantia , or “that which supports.”

If we return to the acorn and oak example, the reality of what it means to be an oak is rooted in the ultimate reality of what it means to be an oak tree. The ultimate reality, like the oak’s root system, stands beneath every particular instance of an oak tree. While not every tree is exactly the same, all oak trees do share a something, a shared whatness, that makes an oak an oak. Philosophers call this whatness that is shared among oaks a substance.

Arguments against a static and enduring substance ensued. David Hume’s answer to the related question of “What is the self?” illustrates how a singular thing may not require an equally singular substance. According to Hume, the self was not a Platonic form or an Aristotelian composite of matter and form. Hume articulated the self as a changing bundle of perceptions. In his Treatise of Human Nature (Book 1, Part IV), Hume described the self as “a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.”

Hume noted that what has been mistaken for a static and enduring self was nothing more than a constantly changing set of impressions that were tied together through their resemblance to one another, the order or predictable pattern (succession) of the impressions, and the appearance of causation lent through the resemblance and succession. The continuity we experience was not due to an enduring self but due to the mind’s ability to act as a sort of theater: “The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations” (Hume 1739, 252).

Which theories of self—and substance—should we accept? The Greek theories of substance and the theological theories of a soul offer advantages. Substance allows us to explain what we observe. For example, an apple, through its substance, allows us to make sense of the qualities of color, taste, the nearness of the object, etc. Without a substance, it could be objected that the qualities are merely unintelligible and unrelated qualities without a reference frame. But bundle theory allows us to make sense of a thing without presupposing a mythical form, or “something I know not what!” Yet, without the mythical form of a soul, how do we explain our own identities?

Anthropological Views

Anthropological views of the self question the cultural and social constructs upon which views of the self are erected. For example, within Western thought, it is supposed that the self is distinct from the “other.” In fact, throughout this section, we have assumed the need for a separate and distinct self and have used a principle of continuity based on the assumption that a self must persist over time. Yet, non-Western cultures blur or negate this distinction. The African notion of ubuntu , for example, posits a humanity that cannot be divided. The Nguni proverb that best describes this concept is “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” sometimes translated as “a person is a person through other persons” (Gade 2011). The word ubuntu is from the Zulu language, but cultures from southern Africa to Tanzania, Kenya, and Democratic Republic of the Congo all have words for this concept. Anthropological approaches attempt to make clear how the self and the culture share in making meaning.

The Mind as Self

Many philosophers, Western and non-Western, have equated the self to the mind. But what is the mind? A monist response is the mind is the brain. Yet, if the mind is the brain, a purely biological entity, then how do we explain consciousness? Moreover, if we take the position that the mind is immaterial but the body is material, we are left with the question of how two very different types of things can causally affect the other. The question of “How do the two nonidentical and dissimilar entities experience a causal relationship?” is known as the mind-body problem. This section explores some alternative philosophical responses to these questions.

Physicalism

Reducing the mind to the brain seems intuitive given advances in neuroscience and other related sciences that deepen our understanding of cognition. As a doctrine, physicalism is committed to the assumption that everything is physical. Exactly how to define the physical is a matter of contention. Driving this view is the assertion that nothing that is nonphysical has physical effects.

Listen to the podcast “ David Papineau on Physicalism ” in the series Philosophy Bites.

Focus on the thought experiment concerning what Mary knows. Here is a summary of the thought experiment:

Mary is a scientist and specializes in the neurophysiology of color. Strangely, her world has black, white, and shades of gray but lacks color (weird, but go with it!). Due to her expertise, she knows every physical fact concerning colors. What if Mary found herself in a room in which color as we experience it is present? Would she learn anything? A physicalist must respond “no”! Do you agree? How would you respond?

John Locke and Identity

In place of the biological, Locke defined identity as the continuity lent through what we refer to as consciousness. His approach is often referred to as the psychological continuity approach, as our memories and our ability to reflect upon our memories constitute identity for Locke. In his Essay on Human Understanding , Locke (as cited by Gordon-Roth 2019) observed, “We must consider what Person stands for . . . which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.” He offered a thought experiment to illustrate his point. Imagine a prince and cobbler whose memories (we might say consciousness) were swapped. The notion is far-fetched, but if this were to happen, we would assert that the prince was now the cobbler and the cobbler was now the prince. Therefore, what individuates us cannot be the body (or the biological).

John Locke on Personal Identity

Part of the BBC Radio 4 series A History of Ideas , this clip is narrated by Gillian Anderson and scripted by Nigel Warburton.

The Problem of Consciousness

Christof Koch (2018) has said that “consciousness is everything you experience.” Koch offered examples, such as “a tune stuck in your head,” the “throbbing pain from a toothache,” and “a parent’s love for a child” to illustrate the experience of consciousness. Our first-person experiences are what we think of intuitively when we try to describe what consciousness is. If we were to focus on the throbbing pain of a toothache as listed above, we can see that there is the experiencing of the toothache. Curiously, there is also the experiencing of the experiencing of the toothache. Introspection and theorizing built upon first-person inspections affords vivid and moving accounts of the things experienced, referred to as qualia .

An optimal accounting of consciousness, however, should not only explain what consciousness is but should also offer an explanation concerning how consciousness came to be and why consciousness is present. What difference or differences does consciousness introduce?

Listen to the podcast “ Ted Honderich on What It Is to Be Conscious ,” in the series Philosophy Bites.

Rene Descartes and Dualism

Dualism , as the name suggests, attempts to account for the mind through the introduction of two entities. The dualist split was addressed earlier in the discussion of substance. Plato argued for the reality of immaterial forms but admitted another type of thing—the material. Aristotle disagreed with his teacher Plato and insisted on the location of the immaterial within the material realm. How might the mind and consciousness be explained through dualism?

Mind Body Dualism

A substance dualist, in reference to the mind problem, asserts that there are two fundamental and irreducible realities that are needed to fully explain the self. The mind is nonidentical to the body, and the body is nonidentical to the mind. The French philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650) offered a very influential version of substance dualism in his 1641 work Meditations on First Philosophy. In that work, Descartes referred to the mind as a thinking thing ( res cogitans ) and the body as an extended nonthinking thing ( res extensa ). Descartes associated identity with the thinking thing. He introduced a model in which the self and the mind were eternal.

Behaviorism

There is a response that rejects the idea of an independent mind. Within this approach, what is important is not mental states or the existence of a mind as a sort of central processor, but activity that can be translated into statements concerning observable behavior (Palmer 2016, 122). As within most philosophical perspectives, there are many different “takes” on the most correct understanding. Behaviorism is no exception. The “hard” behaviorist asserts that there are no mental states. You might consider this perspective the purist or “die-hard” perspective. The “soft” behaviorist, the moderate position, does not deny the possibility of minds and mental events but believes that theorizing concerning human activity should be based on behavior.

Before dismissing the view, pause and consider the plausibility of the position. Do we ever really know another’s mind? There is some validity to the notion that we ought to rely on behavior when trying to know or to make sense of the “other.” But if you have a toothache, and you experience myself being aware of the qualia associated with a toothache (e.g., pain, swelling, irritability, etc.), are these sensations more than activities? What of the experience that accompanies the experience?

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View PDF. Reflections on the origin of the Socratic notion of self-knowledge and care of the self The ancient Greek notion of "care of the self" and the self-knowledge it presupposes is premised on the concept of introspection.1 Introspection obviously involves "consciousness"; more precisely, it implies a "conscious" notion of the ...
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Socrates and self knowledge
Product filter button Description Contents Resources Courses About the Authors In this book, the first systematic study of Socrates' reflections on self-knowledge, Christopher Moore examines the ancient precept 'Know yourself' and, drawing on Plato, Aristophanes, Xenophon, and others, reconstructs and reassesses the arguments about self-examination, personal ideals, and moral maturity at the ...
Socrates and Self-Knowledge
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Socrates and Self-Knowledge
In this book, the first systematic study of Socrates' reflections on self-knowledge, Christopher Moore examines the ancient precept 'Know yourself' and, drawing on Plato, Aristophanes, Xenophon, and others, reconstructs and reassesses the arguments about self-examination, personal ideals, and moral maturity at the heart of the Socratic project.
Socrates' Life and Contributions to Philosophy Essay
Socrates, one of the most famous Greek thinkers, is an example of an individual who revolutionized philosophy and stayed committed to his principles in any circumstances. His key contributions to the field include the Socratic Method that facilitates the critical analysis of hypotheses, ideas about morality and wrongdoing, and the concepts of ...
Philosophical Perspective of the Self Essay
An understanding of "self," therefore, affirms a person's identity in a social environment, allowing him/her to recognize others besides oneself (Sorabji 13). In other words, the way human beings socialize solely depends on how they perceive themselves and others through daily social interactions. Innumerable philosophers, including ...
Socrates' Contribution to Philosophy of Self-knowledge
Socrates at least is aware of the limits of his knowledge, and he realizes that he is truly worth nothing with respect to wisdom. Self-knowledge is critical on the grounds that it causes you to understand yourself better. Through better self comprehension, you are ready to be responsible for your own life.
6.2 Self and Identity
In his Essay on Human Understanding, Locke (as cited by Gordon-Roth 2019) observed, "We must consider what Person stands for . . . which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places." He offered a thought experiment to ...
Why Socrates is the Father of Self Improvement
Arguably, Socrates was the father of personal development as well as Western philosophy. He is most associated with the Greek aphorism, "know thyself" and is quoted as saying, "To know thyself is the beginning of wisdom". Socrates. This premise is echoed in personal development literature, such as Stephen Covey's The 7 Habits of ...

Socrates’s Concept of the Self

Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness

The Ideas of Socrates

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Socrates and Self-Knowledge

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Socrates and self-knowledge

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1. Socrates’s strangeness

General overviews and reference

2. The Socratic problem: Who was Socrates really?

Aristophanes (±450–±386)

Xenophon (±425–±386)

Plato (424/3–347)

The Twentieth Century

Literary contextualism

Analytic developmentalism

4. Socrates outside philosophy

Acknowledgments

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Ancient Philosophy of the Self

Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland

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Table of contents (12 chapters)

The Ancient Self: Issues and Approaches

Assumptions of Normativity: Two Ancient Approaches to Agency

From Plato to Plotinus

Protean Socrates: Mythical Figures in the Euthydemus

Aristotle on the Individuality of Self

What Kind of Self Can a Greek Sceptic Have?

Inwardness and Infinity of Selfhood: From Plotinus to Augustine

Christian and Islamic Themes

Two Kinds of Subjectivity in Augustine’s Confessions : Memory and Identity, and the Integrated Self

The Self as Enemy, the Self as Divine: A Crossroads in the Development of Islamic Anthropology

Locating the Self Within the Soul – Thirteenth-Century Discussions

Back Matter

About this book

Reflections on the Socratic notion of the self

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6.2 Self and Identity

The Ship of Theseus

Write Like a Philosopher

Judeo-Christian Views of Self

Think Like a Philosopher

Hindu and Buddhist Views of Self

The Doctrine of Dependent Origination

The Buddhist Doctrine of No Self ( Anatman )

Suffering and Liberation

Buddhism’s Four Noble Truths

The Five Aggregates

Secular Notions of Self

Bundle Theory

Anthropological Views

The Mind as Self

Physicalism

John Locke and Identity

John Locke on Personal Identity

The Problem of Consciousness

Rene Descartes and Dualism

Mind Body Dualism