dependency and diversity thesis

What do both forms of relativism share?

There are two components to the relativist's position.*

1. Diversity Thesis

The Diversity Thesis is nothing more than the observation that not everybody agrees what the most important values are, or what obligations humans have to one another, or what actions are forbidden by moral law, etc. In other words, the Diversity Thesis merely affirms that different people believe different things about morality.

This thesis is, I think, obvious to everybody. It does not need to be argued for -- only described. There are two versions of this thesis.

First -- social diversity. Different cultures have different moral commitments. This version is obvious to anybody who has traveled abroad, or who comes from an immigrant family. Perhaps somebody can share something from their own experience -- do you have a example of a moral principle which is more closely adhered to than is popular in the states? Or can you think of a principle which is followed in the States that is not valued highly in the place of your own origin?

Second -- individual diversity. Isn't it clear that even within a given culture there are a diversity of moral perspectives? Is there a single moral world view among Irish Catholics? I can assure you that there is not. How about African Americans? Surely there are some who are liberal democrats, and there are others who are conservative republicans. Alan Keyes, a candidate for president in the most recent election, is one of the most conservative public intellectuals in the nation. Let's narrow down the cultural group -- Catholic moral theologians. This is a pretty small demographic group. They are all male, mostly white, all Catholics, all trained in the same religious tradition, all having gone through the same type of academic training. Still, there is a rich diversity of voices in that chorus of writers. There are some who believe that artificial birth control (the pill, condoms, etc.) is contrary to God's law, while others among them believe that even active euthanasia is sometimes morally acceptable. Now that is diversity! One might think that here, if anywhere, you'd find a great deal of unanimity [I've never been able to say that out loud!]. The members of this cultural group share so much. Their experiences and commitments overlap deeply, and yet we find disagreement, argument, dissention.

Now, none of this, absolutely none of this, should lead one to think that ethical relativism is true. All it says -- thus far -- is that people disagree with each other. In order for ethical relativism to be true, the dependency thesis needs to be true also.

2 . Dependency Thesis

The Dependency Thesis is the more important of the two doctrines. It asserts that the validity of moral obligations, moral values, etc. depends upon the beliefs of (a) moral agents (subjectivism), or (b) cultural groups.

The conclusion that is drawn, then, is: There are no universally valid moral principles, objective standards which apply to all people.

Let's look a bit closer at this thesis, for it is really the more important of the two. It says that whenever I am morally obligated to perform some action, whenever I am morally forbidden to perform an action, or whenever I am called (by my moral commitments) to live out some virtue or other, all this obligation is based on the belief that I am so obligated. The belief ground of my obligation is simply my belief. Let me rephrase -- the dependency thesis asserts that moral obligation of any kind is grounded in the particular beliefs that I (or we) happen to hold.

So if you are a relativist, whether of the cultural or the individualist type, then you believe not only that people tend to disagree, but also that the validity of their obligations rests on nothing more than the fact that they perceive themselves to be under those particular obligations.

This is as good a definition of relativism as any. And notice that it is a negative statement; it takes the form of a denial. And what it denies is a good way of telling what it is opposed to: universal objectivism (or universalism, for short).

=============================================================

Proceed to the next section of the chapter by clicking here>> section.

© Copyright Stephen O Sullivan and Philip A. Pecorino  2002. All Rights reserved.

Reason and Meaning

Philosophical reflections on life, death, and the meaning of life, summary of cultural relativism.

Philosophical Ethics 

Ethics is that part of philosophy which deals with the good and bad, or right and wrong in human conduct. It asks questions like: What is morality? Is morality objective or subjective? What is the relationship between self-interest and morality? Why should I be moral?

We can divide philosophical ethics into four parts. Meta-ethics analyzes moral concepts, moral justification, and the meaning of moral language. Descriptive ethics describes the moral systems of various cultures. Normative ethics considers moral norms, standards or criteria that underlie moral theories. Applied ethics applies normative theories to moral problems in law, medicine, business, computer science, the environment and more. Over the next few weeks we will discuss normative ethics, or moral theories. We’ll begin with relativism.

Now you might agree that  my previous assault on relativism has been successful, but still claim that while some truths are objective—logical, mathematical, and natural scientific ones for example—other so-called truths are relative—ethical truths for instance. Such considerations lead us to moral relativism, the theory that there are no absolute, objective, and universally binding moral truths . According to the moral relativist, there exist conflicting moral claims that are both true. (X is right, and x is wrong.) In short, the ethical relativist denies that there is any objective truth about right and wrong. Ethical judgments are not true or false because there is no objective moral truth—x is right—for a moral judgment to correspond with. In brief, morality is relative, subjective, and non-universally binding, and disagreements about ethics are like disagreements about what flavor of ice cream is best.

And what specifically might morality be relative to? Usually morality is thought to be relative to a group’s or individual’s: beliefs, emotions, opinions, wants, desires, interests, preferences, feelings, etc. Thus, we distinguish between two kinds of moral relativism: cultural moral relativism and personal moral relativism. (I’ll discuss the first one today, and the second one tomorrow.)

What is Cultural Moral Relativism?  

Cultural moral relativism i s the theory that moral judgments or truths are relative to cultures . Consequently, what is right in one society may be wrong in another and vice versa. (For culture, you may substitute: nation; society; group, sub-culture, etc.) This is another theory with ancient roots. Herodotus, the father of history, describes the Greeks encounter with the Callatians who ate their dead relatives. Naturally, the Greeks found this practice revolting. But the Callatians were equally repelled by the Greek practice of cremation causing Herodotus to conclude that ethics is culturally relative. World literature sounds a recurring theme: different cultures have different moral codes , an insight confirmed by the evidence of cultural differences. The Incas practiced human sacrifice, Eskimos shared their wives with strangers and killed newborns, Japanese samurai tried out his new sword on an innocent passer-by, Europeans enslaved masses of Africans, and female circumcision is performed today in parts of North Africa.

Cultural moral relativism contains two theses: 1) the diversity thesis— moral beliefs, practices, and values are diverse or vary from one culture to another; and 2) the dependency thesis —moral obligations   depends upon cultures, since they are the final arbiters of moral truth. In short, cultural relativism implies that no cultural values have any objective, universal validity, and it would be arrogant for one culture to make moral judgments about other cultures.

The thesis of diversity is descriptive; it describes the way things are. Moral beliefs, rules, and practices, in fact, depend upon facets of culture like social, political, religious, and economic institutions. By contrast the thesis of dependency is prescriptive ; it describes how things ought to be. Morality should depend on culture because there is nothing else upon which it is based. Now we might argue for cultural relativism as follows:

Argument 1 – (from the diversity thesis)

• Different cultures have different moral codes;
• Thus, there is no morality independent of culture.

The weakness of this argument is that  the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premise . The fact that cultures disagree about morality doesn’t show that morality is relative. After all, cultures disagree about whether abortion is moral or immoral, but their disagreement doesn’t mean there is no truth about the matter. It might be that one culture is just mistaken. Consider how cultures might disagree as to whether the earth or sun is at the center of our solar system. Their disagreement doesn’t mean there is no truth about the matter. Similarly, societies might disagree about whether they should put their young to death, but that disagreement proves nothing, other than societies disagree. So cultural disagreements are not enough to prove cultural relativism. Consider another argument:

Argument 2 – (from the dependency thesis)

• What is often regarded as the moral truths depends on cultural beliefs;
• Thus, there is no moral truth independent of culture.

The argument commits the fallacy that logicians call “begging the question.” This occurs when you assume the truth of what you are trying to prove. (For example, if you ask me why I think abortion is wrong and I say, because it’s bad, I’ve begged the question.) In argument 2, one is trying to show that right and wrong depend on culture. It begs the question to say that right and wrong depend on culture because they depend on culture.

Now might we make a stronger case for the relativist if we put the two theses together?

Premise 1 – Right and wrong vary between cultures (diversity). Premise 2 – Right and wrong depend upon a cultural context (dependency). Conclusion – Thus, right and wrong are relative to culture.  

Critique of Cultural Moral Relativism – Premise 1

This seems better; at least the conclusion follows from the premises. But are these premises true? Let’s consider the first premise (diversity). Nothing seems more obvious than the fact of cultural differences. Eskimos believed in infanticide; most Americans do not. Most Americans believe executing criminals is morally justifiable; most French find the practice barbaric. Clearly, there are different cultural mores. But maybe the differences between cultural values are not as great as they seem.

Consider that Eskimos live in harsh climates where food is in short supply and mothers nurse their babies for years. There simply isn’t enough food for all their children, nor enough backs upon which nomadic people can carry their children. So Eskimos want their children to live just like we do, and it is the harsh and unusual condition that force them to make difficult choices. Sometimes they kill a weaker child so that both the stronger and weaker children won’t die. We may disagree with the practice, but we can imagine doing the same in similar circumstances. Thus, the underlying principle—life is valuable—has been applied differently in different contexts. Maybe cultures aren’t so different after all.

Consider that there is more crime in America than in France. Most Americans seem to believe that criminals deserve to be punished for their crimes, that severe punishment brings peace to the victim’s family, that capital punishment is a deterrent to crime, etc. The French are more likely to renounce retribution or doubt that capital punishment brings victim’s families peace or deters crime. But notice again. Both cultures are steered by a principle—act justly—even though they apply the principle differently. So upon closer inspection, there doesn’t seem to be as much disagreement as it first appeared. So the differences in cultural values might be more apparent than real.

Now suppose we could show that there are moral principles that all cultures share? Wouldn’t that show that morality was not relative to culture? Many scientists claim that there are moral principles common to all cultures. 1 For instance, all cultures share: regulations on sexual behavior; prohibitions against unjust killing; requirements of familial obligations and child care; emphasis on truth-telling; and reward for reciprocity and cooperation. If we take these two ideas together—cultural moral differences aren’t as great as they appear, and all cultures share some moral values—then the diversity thesis is false . And if the first premise is false, then the conclusion of the cultural relativist’s argument doesn’t follow.

However notice that even if the first premise is false , that doesn’t prove that moral objectivism is true. Cultures that share the same moral values could all be wrong! So the empirical evidence concerning similarities and differences between moral codes isn’t relevant to the question of whether morality is absolute or relative. And that means that while we haven’t proven the truth of cultural absolutism, we have undermined the cultural relativist. For the evidence about diversity of culture is irrelevant, then we have undermined the relativist’s first premise, and with it the conclusion of his/her argument.

Critique of Cultural Moral Relativism – Premise 2

While undermining the first premise sufficiently undermines cultural relativism, let’s turn to the second premise (dependency) to see if it fares any better. Now it does appear true that some moral “truths” depend on culture—for example, regulations on sexual behaviors or funeral practices. But it is not self-evident that all moral truth depends on culture. Moral truth may be independent of culture in the same way that other truths are independent of culture. Ethics may be objectively grounded in reason, the god’s commands, the most happiness for the most people, human nature, or something else.

But rather than trying to contradict all the relativist’s arguments for the second premise, consider the implications of taking cultural relativism seriously. If cultural relativism is true then all of the following (counter-intuitive) are true. 1) We cannot make cross-cultural judgments . We could not consistently criticize a culture for killing all those over forty, exterminating ethnic groups, or banishing children to the Antarctic. 2 ) We cannot make intra-cultural judgments . We cannot say, even within our culture, whether we should send children to their death or to school, whether we should torture our criminals or reward them. 3) The idea of moral progress is incoherent . All you can say is that cultures change, not that one is better than another. The old culture practiced slavery; we do not, and that’s the end of it. The appearance of moral progress is illusory.

But all of this is counter-intuitive. We might think that cultures can do what they want regarding funeral practices, but what about human sacrifice? Aren’t there some things that are just plain wrong, in both other cultures and our own? Don’t you believe that society is better now because it has outlawed slavery? Cultural relativism answers no to both questions. But can such a strongly counterintuitive theory be correct?

Summary and Transition

Thus cultural relativism is as incoherent and unsubstantiated as epistemological relativism, as I argued yesterday. The logical arguments for cultural relativism fail, and we have good reasons to doubt the truth of the premises of cultural relativism. Finally, cultural relativism contradicts our moral intuition. While we can’t prove that cultural relativism is mistaken—you can only really do this in logic or mathematics—we have shown that there are many reasons to doubt the theory, and few reasons to accept it.

Share this:

3 thoughts on “ summary of cultural relativism ”.

I’d like to offer an odd point of view on this question, although I hasten to point out that I have no expertise, and my analysis is nowhere near as careful or thorough as your own. Treat this idea as a curious stimulus for thought, not a clearly established thesis.

I look at reality and I see no morality. It’s not in this tree; I don’t find it when I dig a hole, nor does it seem to be under the sea or in the stars. It is a strictly human concept; in fact, it is a human. To my narrow physicist’s point of view, this means that it is not objectively real; it’s merely a human perception.

Of course, there are plenty of human perceptions that *are* real in some sense. English is a language; so is Urdu; and they are certainly real in the sense that they are used in the real world. In fact, I think that languages provide us with a useful analogy. Moral systems are arbitrary in the same sense that languages are arbitrary. That is, there is absolutely nothing in the physical world that dictates that the sound “cat” intrinsically refers to our pets. “Gato” and “feles” are just as arbitrary. Nevertheless, language is constrained to follow an innate “deep structure” that is universal to all humans.

In the same fashion, we could argue that morality is arbitrary yet constrained by certain universal principles. I here argue that morality has been subjected to exactly the same evolutionary pressures that applied to humans as individuals. Cultures with stupid moral systems were superseded by cultures with more pragmatic moral systems. The prohibition against murder, for example, is obviously of great pragmatic value for any society. Similar principles elicit prohibitions against many other behaviors.

As you point out, applications of the deep principles can manifest themselves in surprisingly different fashions in different physical environments. Yet there remains one fundamental principle: societies evolve moral systems that optimize their ability to survive and prosper in the physical environment in which they find themselves.

Anyway, for what it’s worth, that’s how I perceive the existence of moral systems. I understand how many people feel a need for some objective moral system to exist, something that we could find graven in stone that would give us peace of mind in knowing what truly is right and wrong. I maintain that no such stone can ever exist.

I’m sure that, with your vastly greater experience wrestling with these issues, you can pick out some blunders in my thinking, so I’d love to see your reactions.

Most of these issues are addressed in my ethics book or at good sites like Wikipedia, Stanford Enc. of Phil, or the internet enc. of phil. Everything you say is spot on and you could have a new career as an ethicist. Ethics is so important, we so need more moral and intelligent people. Basically you have adopted an anti-realist position in meta-ethics in your comments.

Moral Anti-Realism (or Moral Irrealism) is the meta-ethical doctrine that there are no objective moral values. It is usually defined in opposition to Moral Realism, which holds that there are indeed objective moral values, that evaluative statements are factual claims which are either true or false, and that their truth or falsity is independent of our perception of them or our beliefs, feelings or other attitudes towards them. Thus, Moral Anti-Realism can involve either a denial that moral properties exist at all, or the acceptance that they do exist, but that their existence is mind-dependent and not objective or independent.

You do hedge your bets slightly with this quote “In the same fashion, we could argue that morality is arbitrary yet constrained by certain universal principles.” This position was defended by another non-professional philosopher Michael Shermer in his wonderful and readable book “The Science of Good & Evil.” I think you would like it.

The position you adopt is popular but not the most popular position. Here are the stats from the site “what phils believe” Meta-ethics: moral realism 56.4%; moral anti-realism 27.7%; other 15.9%.

Finally you mention evolution and we are of one mind here. I am an evolutionary ethicist and you can read all about that too. I think game design might have to go on hold while you become an ethicist.

CRAWFORD INVENTS WHEEL!! SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS AGHAST!! “We never thought of that!” Seen as “the death of distance”!!

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Notify me of new posts by email.

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed .

Louis Pojman destroys relativism

October 6, 2012.

Louis Pojman: Against Relativism and For Objectivism

source:  http://www2.drury.edu/cpanza/relativism.pdf

I. Philosophical arguments aspire to the form of deductive validity.

This means that philosophers strive to make their arguments deductively valid. A deductively valid argument is one where, if the premises are true, the conclusion can’t possibly be false (it has the right logical form such that this will be the case). So what a philosopher tries to do is construct a valid argument form, and then make sure that the premises ARE true. In such a case, the conclusion cannot be false. If so, no better argument for that conclusion can be given.

II. Pojman’s Strategy Against the Argument for relativism:

P1. Beliefs about what is right and wrong differ across cultures (the Diversity thesis). P2. What is right and wrong is dependent upon, or relative to, culture (the Dependency thesis). — C1. Thus, there is no objective right and wrong.

Pojman recognizes that this is a valid argument. As such, IF the premises are true, the conclusion (which denies moral objectivism) must be true. If moral objectivism must be false, then moral relativism must be true. Pojman tries to attack this argument. The attack has two stages.

STAGE ONE: show that one or more of the premises (of the relativist’s argument) are NOT true. If Pojman can do this, then even if the argument is valid, the truth of the conclusion will not necessarily follow (because it would only follow IF the premises were true). *Note: Even if Pojman is successful, showing that the conclusion is not necessarily true does not entail that it is false. It simply shows that the conclusion could be false.

STAGE TWO: show that the conclusion is false by showing that the reverse of the conclusion must be true. In other words, Pojman’s project here will be to show that moral objectivism must be true. If it must be true, then the claim that there is no objective right and wrong cannot be true. If he succeeds in both stages, the argument for relativism is defeated.

III. Pojman’s Stage One Argument

Pojman must show that one or more of the premises in the argument for relativism is (or are) false. Now Pojman realizes that the first premise (called P1 in the argument for relativism) is not objectionable. What this means is that there is no reason why Pojman would need to find it false. As a matter of fact, Pojman thinks it is true. If you go to various cultures, you will find various different definitions of right and wrong. Is this harmful to moral objectivism?

If Pojman acknowledges that P1 is true, does this harm moral objectivism? No. Recall why Ruth Benedict’s argument (which is really just P1) doesn’t work to get you relativism on its own. The reason is this: one cannot validly move from a statement about beliefs to a statement about fact. If you could, then this argument would be conclusive: P1. Beliefs about what is right and wrong differ across cultures — C1. Thus, there is no objective right and wrong

The conclusion here is NOT necessarily true, even if the premise P1 is true. That means thatthe argument is not valid. We know it is not valid because it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. To see how, just construct another argument with a similar form (this is called an argument from analogy):

P1. Beliefs about the shape of the Earth differ across cultures — C1. Thus, there is no objective right and wrong about the shape of the Earth.

Clearly, this argument is not valid. It is possible for people to disagree about the shape of the Earth, but this does not entail that there is no objective answer about the shape of the Earth. So Pojman reasons that if this is so, and the argument for relativism using just P1 as a premise has the same form, then the claim that people differ about moral beliefs does not entail that there is no objective answer about what is right and wrong.

So Pojman allows for P1 to be true, since it does not harm objectivism about morality. Clearly, then, the worrisome premise is P2, called the dependency thesis. The dependency thesis is the claim that what is right and wrong is itself relative to culture (this differs from P1 – it is not a claim about beliefs, it is a claim about the nature of right and wrong itself). Clearly P2 entails relativism about morality. If P2 is true, then C1 cannot be false.

Pojman recognizes, however, that P2 – the dependency thesis – has two forms, what he calls ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ dependency. Before he attacks P2 he must be sure that he is attacking the right version of P2.

Here’s an example.

In America and in Europe we share the belief that one ought to be polite to strangers. Let’s call this belief X. Now this does not mean that the way in which politeness is expressed in America and in Europe is the same. As a matter of fact, they differ.

In Europe, politeness to a stranger might mean kissing the stranger on both cheeks. In America, this would be disturbing. Rather, a handshake would be polite, one which would be rude in Europe. From this we can ascertain that the right way to express politeness is relative to the country you are in.

Does moral objectivism need to be worried about ‘weak’ dependency? No. It can be true that moral belief X (politeness in this case) is objective and not relative to culture, even if the ways in which politeness is ‘rightly’ expressed is relative to culture.

What about strong dependence? This is the form of P2 Pojman wants to attack. It says not just that the ways in which moral beliefs are expressed is relative to culture, but that the moral beliefs themselves are relative to culture.

IV. The Case Against P2 or the Strong Dependency Thesis

The Strong Dependency Thesis is used by two camps of relativism to support why their positions are right. The two camps are:

1. Subjectivism: morality is dependent on individuals, not culture

2. Conventionalism: morality is dependent on culture

If Pojman’s argument against P2 is going to work, then it will have to turn out that both subjectivism and conventionalism are false. If they are both false, then P2 does not lead to any true theories (and thus P2 must be false). If either of the two is not false, then it will turn out that the strong dependency thesis could in fact be true, since it does lead to a theory that could be true.

So Pojman must attack both camps and show that they cannot work.

The Argument Against Subjectivism

Pojman’s Objection: The purpose of morality is to settle interpersonal conflicts. By definition, however, a subjectivist does not share a moral language with another person.-4- Moreover, as we see in chapter 3 of Rachels, subjectivism states that moral statements are just claims about feelings. And two people cannot be in disagreement about their feelings.

Thus subjectivism cannot settle interpersonal conflicts, because no interpersonal conflicts can exist. Since interpersonal conflicts on morality DO exist, and because we DO think morality is used to settle those disputes, subjectivism is false.

Against Conventionalism

Pojman recognizes that he cannot use the same argument that he used against subjectivism and lodge it against conventionalism. The reason is evident: if conventionalism is true, then people do in fact share moral language. So they can in fact settle interpersonal conflicts. So Pojman needs a different argument.

Pojman’s Objection: Conventionalism entails tolerance.  So there is at least one absolute value at the ehart of relativism – tolerance of others’ opinions.

V. Stage Two: Establishing the Truth of Moral Objectivism

Pojman’s argument for moral objectivism requires reducing morality to biology. What this means is this: Pojman thinks that there are certain moral rules that are entailed if we, as a species, wish to stay alive and flourish.

Example: if the human species is to survive, then a moral rule would be ‘one ought not to kill another’. If it were permissible to kill others, then the chances of species survival would be lower than if it were not permissible.

Here is Pojman’s argument: P1. Objective moral principles are those adherence to which meet the needs and promote the most significant needs of persons. P2. Some principles are such that adherence to them meets and promotes the significant needs of persons. -5- — C1. Thus, there are some objective moral rules.

Note that Pojman thinks the argument is valid. So if the premises are true, the conclusion cannot be false. If the conclusion in this case (there are some objective moral rules) cannot be false, then it must be true. If so, then the conclusion of the relativist=s argument (which denies objective moral rules) must be false. If so, the Pojman has succeeded in completely dismantling the relativist’s argument.

Study with us

Practise Questions 2020

Religious Studies Guides – 2020

Check out our great books in the Shop

Thank you so mush. I appreciate the information.

Leave a Reply Cancel

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed .

Differentiation, diversity and dependency in higher education

Research output : Thesis › PhD Thesis - Research UT, graduation UT

• METIS-100006

T1 - Differentiation, diversity and dependency in higher education

AU - Huisman, Jeroen

PY - 1995/10/20

Y1 - 1995/10/20

KW - METIS-100006

M3 - PhD Thesis - Research UT, graduation UT

SN - 90 5189 535 6

CY - Utrecht

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Dependency Essay

The dependency thesis states that what is good or bad depends on what the people of that particular society, regard as wrong or right. Another definition is that; the moral principles that have been accepted by a certain cultural are the correct ones, irrespective of what other cultures practice. If a certain community accepts that upon meeting someone older than yourself you should bow your head, then not bowing your head to an elder person is morally wrong (1).

The dependency thesis has some strengths and weaknesses. One of the strengths is that; if by any chance you get entangled in another community, you become unaffected by some of the earlier obligations.

For example, in a Kenyan society, abortion is wrong. If a Kenyan girl is married to a Chinese, whose culture condones abortion, she will be free from the no abortion rule. When this Kenyan girl is married to a Chinese, she will have the choice of aborting if wished. According to the thesis, it is not right for one community to force its rule unto another person from a different community.

This means that a foreigner may live amidst another community, and continue practicing what he thinks is right. For example, a reporter from BBC will be able to report the lifestyle of the Fulani people, without himself being forced to abide to the traditions of the Fulani (3).

If somebody is supposed to adhere to his culture’s principles, it means that there is no supreme person who is supposed to judge everybody. This means there is nothing that entitles one human being to judge others. The thesis also advocates that we should see other people’s culture as important as ours.

This has enabled people to tolerate other people’s culture. Being able to tolerate other people’s culture has enabled people from different cultures to live together. For example, a Muslim and a Christian can be very good roommates even if they have different believes. Both cultures teach to respect other people’s culture (4).

One of the major draw back of this thesis is that, it gives room for one community rising over the other with catastrophic results. From the thesis, Hitler can be viewed to be equally moral as Gandhi. Both Hitler and Gandhi did and preached what they believed is right for their people.

If a certain community has a moral principle which allows one to kill another person, the results can be catastrophic. During the crusade mission in the 10 th century, Muslims and Christians slaughtered each other. Both of them were thinking that they were doing the right thing.

One irony in this case is that they were all killing, each other to please the same person. During the Rwandan genocide, the Hutus were made to believe that they needed to defend their country from Tutsis. Even though they were the majority, they went on to kill approximately 800,000 Tutsis (5).

The other flaw of this thesis is that, people who advocate for change are considered to be wrong. For example, can we say that Jesus was morally wrong sine he was not accepted by his community? People who may come up with ways that are supposed to make the living condition of a community better, maybe shut down since they may be going against what is accepted as morally right. Another fault is that a person can fail to be held responsible for doing something wrong, simply because he does not belong to any community (7).

Beebe, James. “Ethical Relativism.” ACSU . ACSU, 15 January 2003. Web.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2018, August 16). Strengths and Weaknesses of the Dependency. https://ivypanda.com/essays/strengths-and-weaknesses-of-the-dependency-thesis/

"Strengths and Weaknesses of the Dependency." IvyPanda , 16 Aug. 2018, ivypanda.com/essays/strengths-and-weaknesses-of-the-dependency-thesis/.

IvyPanda . (2018) 'Strengths and Weaknesses of the Dependency'. 16 August.

IvyPanda . 2018. "Strengths and Weaknesses of the Dependency." August 16, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/strengths-and-weaknesses-of-the-dependency-thesis/.

1. IvyPanda . "Strengths and Weaknesses of the Dependency." August 16, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/strengths-and-weaknesses-of-the-dependency-thesis/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Strengths and Weaknesses of the Dependency." August 16, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/strengths-and-weaknesses-of-the-dependency-thesis/.

• Islamic Art in Africa
• Sonni Ali: The King of the Songhai Empire
• The Ethical Dilemma: Aborting Babies With Handicaps
• The Functionalism Theory Assumptions of Terrorism
• The BBC's Public Service
• BBC Radio 1 Versus BBC Radio 1Xtra
• Performance of Mozart Violin Concerto No.3 in G
• Achondroplasia Genetic Disorder: Pedigree
• Law Ethics: The Use of Force During Emergencies
• Summary Atlas Shrugged Part One and Two
• My father's black pride
• Stoning in the Twenty-First Century: The Dangers of Cultural Relativism
• Social and Cultural Diversity and Stereotypes
• Cultural Competence Among Professionals
• What is Different to us, is the Same to Others