essay on trust

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Trust is important, but it is also dangerous. It is important because it allows us to depend on others—for love, for advice, for help with our plumbing, or what have you—especially when we know that no outside force compels them to give us these things. But trust also involves the risk that people we trust will not pull through for us, for if there were some guarantee they would pull through, then we would have no need to trust them. [ 1 ] Trust is therefore dangerous. What we risk while trusting is the loss of valuable things that we entrust to others, including our self-respect perhaps, which can be shattered by the betrayal of our trust.

Because trust is risky, the question of when it is warranted is of particular importance. In this context, “warranted” means justified or well-grounded meaning, respectively, that the trust is rational (e.g., it is based on good evidence) or that it successfully targets a trustworthy person. If trust is warranted in these senses, then the danger of it is either minimized as with justified trust or eliminated altogether as with well-grounded trust. Leaving the danger of trust aside, one could also ask whether trust is warranted in the sense of being plausible. Trust may not be warranted in a particular situation because it is simply not plausible; the conditions necessary for it do not exist, as is the case when people feel only antagonism toward one another. This entry on trust is framed as a response to the general question of when trust is warranted, where “warranted” is broadly construed to include “justified”, “well-grounded” and “plausible”.

A complete philosophical answer to this question must explore the various philosophical dimensions of trust, including the conceptual nature of trust and trustworthiness, the epistemology of trust, the value of trust, and the kind of mental attitude trust is. To illustrate how each of these matters is relevant, note that trust is warranted, that is,

• plausible, again, only if the conditions required for trust exist (e.g., some optimism about one another’s ability). Knowing what these conditions are requires understanding the nature of trust.
• well-grounded, only if the trustee (the one trusted) is trustworthy, which makes the nature of trustworthiness important in determining when trust is warranted.
• justified, sometimes when the trustee is not in fact trustworthy, which suggests that the epistemology of trust is relevant.
• justified, often because some value will emerge from the trust or because it is valuable in and of itself. Hence, the value of trust is important.
• plausible, only when it is possible for one to develop trust, given one’s circumstances and the sort of mental attitude trust is. For instance, trust may not be the sort of attitude that one can will oneself to have without any evidence of a person’s trustworthiness.

This piece explores these different philosophical issues about trust. It deals predominantly with interpersonal trust, which arguably is the dominant paradigm of trust. Although some philosophers write about trust that is not interpersonal, including trust in groups (Hawley 2017), institutional trust (i.e., trust in institutions; see, e.g., Potter 2002; Govier 1997; Townley and Garfield 2013), trust in government (e.g., Hardin 2002; Budnik 2018) or science (e.g., Oreskes 2019), self-trust (Govier 1993; Lehrer 1997; Foley 2001; McLeod 2002; Goering 2009; Jones 2012b; Potter 2013), and trust in robots (e.g., Coeckelbergh 2012, Sullins 2020), most would agree that these forms of “trust” are coherent only if they share important features of (i.e., can be modeled on) interpersonal trust. The assumption going forward therefore is that the dominant paradigm is interpersonal.

In addition, while this entry focuses mainly on trust and trustworthiness, it also covers distrust (more so in this version than in previous versions). Distrust has received surprisingly little attention from philosophers, although it has recently become a topic of serious concern for some of them, particularly those who are interested in the politics of trust and distrust in societies marked by oppression and privilege. Relevant issues include when distrust is warranted by people who experience oppression and how misplaced distrust (i.e., in the oppressed) can be overcome by people who are privileged. This entry delves into these matters and also summarizes the few theories that exist about the nature of distrust.

1.1 Motives-based theories

1.2 non-motives-based theories, 1.3 distrust, 2.1 truth- vs. end-directed rationality, 2.2 internalism vs. externalism, 2.3 social and political climate, 3. the value of trust, 4. trust and the will, 5. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the nature of trust and trustworthiness.

Trust is an attitude we have towards people whom we hope will be trustworthy, where trustworthiness is a property not an attitude. Trust and trustworthiness are therefore distinct although, ideally, those whom we trust will be trustworthy, and those who are trustworthy will be trusted. For trust to be plausible in a relationship, the parties to the relationship must have attitudes toward one another that permit trust. Moreover, for trust to be well-grounded, both parties must be trustworthy. (Note that here and throughout, unless specified otherwise, “trustworthiness” is understood in a thin sense according to which X is trustworthy for me just in case I can trust X .)

Trusting requires that we can, (1) be vulnerable to others—vulnerable to betrayal in particular; (2) rely on others to be competent to do what we wish to trust them to do; and (3) rely on them to be willing to do it. [ 2 ] Notice that the second two conditions refer to a connection between trust and reliance. For most philosophers, trust is a kind of reliance although it is not mere reliance (Goldberg 2020). Rather, trust involves reliance “plus some extra factor” (Hawley 2014: 5). Controversy surrounds this extra factor, which generally concerns why the trustor (i.e., the one trusting) would rely on the trustee to be willing to do what they are trusted to do.

Trustworthiness is likewise a kind of reliability, although it’s not obvious what kind. Clear conditions for trustworthiness are that the trustworthy person is competent and willing to do what they are trusted to do. Yet this person may also have to be willing for certain reasons or as a result of having a certain kind of motive for acting (e.g., they care about the trustor).

This section explains these various conditions for trust and trustworthiness and highlights the controversy that surrounds the condition about motive and relatedly how trust differs from mere reliance. Included at the end is some discussion about the nature of distrust.

Let me begin with the idea that the trustor must accept some level of vulnerability or risk (Becker 1996; Baier 1986). Minimally, what this person risks, or is vulnerable to, is the failure by the trustee to do what the trustor is depending on them to do. The trustor might try to reduce this risk by monitoring or imposing certain constraints on the behavior of the trustee; but after a certain threshold perhaps, the more monitoring and constraining they do, the less they trust this person. Trust is relevant “before one can monitor the actions of … others” (Dasgupta 1988: 51) or when out of respect for others one refuses to monitor them. One must be content with them having some discretionary power or freedom, and as a result, with being somewhat vulnerable to them (Baier 1986; Dasgupta 1988).

One might think that if one is relying while trusting—that is, if trust is a species of reliance—then accepted vulnerability would not be essential for trust. Do we not rely on things only when we believe they will actually happen? And if we believe that, then we don’t perceive ourselves as being vulnerable. Many philosophers writing on trust and reliance say otherwise. They endorse the view of Richard Holton, who writes, “When I rely on something happening … I [only] need to plan on it happening; I need to work around the supposition that it will [happen]” (Holton 1994: 3). I need not be certain of it happening and I could even have doubts that it will happen (Goldberg 2020). I could therefore accept that I am vulnerable. I could do that while trusting if trust is a form of reliance.

What does trusting make us vulnerable to, in particular? Annette Baier writes that “trusting can be betrayed, or at least let down, and not just disappointed” (1986: 235). In her view, disappointment is the appropriate response when one merely relied on someone to do something but did not trust them to do it. To elaborate, although people who monitor and constrain others’ behavior may rely on them, they do not trust them if their reliance can only be disappointed rather than betrayed. One can rely on inanimate objects, such as alarm clocks, but when they break, one is not betrayed though one might be disappointed. This point reveals that reliance without the possibility of betrayal (or at least “let down”) is not trust; people who rely on one another in a way that makes this reaction impossible do not trust one another.

But does trust always involve the potential for betrayal? “Therapeutic trust” may be an exception (Nickel 2007: 318; and for further exceptions, see, e.g., Hinchman 2017). To illustrate this type of trust, consider parents who

trust their teenagers with the house or the family car, believing that their [children] may well abuse their trust, but hoping by such trust to elicit, in the fullness of time, more responsible and responsive trustworthy behaviour. (McGeer 2008: 241, her emphasis; see also Horsburgh 1960 and Pettit 1995)

Therapeutic trust is not likely to be betrayed rather than merely be disappointed. It is unusual in this respect (arguably) and in other respects that will become evident later on in this entry. The rest of this section deals with usual rather than unusual forms of trust and trustworthiness.

Without relying on people to display some competence, we also can’t trust them. We usually trust people to do certain things, such as look after our children, give us advice, or be honest with us, which we wouldn’t do that if we thought they lacked the relevant skills, including potentially moral skills of knowing what it means to be honest or caring (Jones 1996: 7). Rarely do we trust people completely (i.e., A simply trusts B ). Instead, “trust is generally a three-part relation: A trusts B to do X ” (Hardin 2002: 9)—or “ A trusts B with valued item C ” (Baier 1986) or A trusts B in domain D (D’Cruz 2019; Jones 2019). [ 3 ] To have trust in a relationship, we do not need to assume that the other person will be competent in every way. Optimism about the person’s competence in at least one area is essential, however.

When we trust people, we rely on them not only to be competent to do what we trust them to do, but also to be willing or motivated to do it. We could talk about this matter either in terms of what the trustor expects of the trustee or in terms of what the trustee possesses: that is, as a condition for trust or for trustworthiness (and the same is true, of course, of the competence condition). For simplicity’s sake and to focus some of this section on trustworthiness rather than trust, the following refers to the motivation of the trustee mostly as a condition for trustworthiness.

Although both the competence and motivational elements of trustworthiness are crucial, the exact nature of the latter is unclear. For some philosophers, it matters only that the trustee is motivated, where the central problem of trustworthiness in their view concerns the probability that this motivation will exist or endure (see, e.g., Hardin 2002: 28; Gambetta 1988b). Jones calls these “risk-assessment views” about trust (1999: 68). According to them, we trust people whenever we perceive that the risk of relying on them to act a certain way is low and so we rely on (i.e., “trust”) them. They are trustworthy if they are willing, for whatever reason, to do what they are trusted to do. Risk-assessment theories make no attempt to distinguish between trust and mere reliance and have been criticized for this reason (see, e.g., Jones 1999).

By contrast, other philosophers say that just being motivated to act in the relevant way is not sufficient for trustworthiness; according to them, the nature of the motivation matters, not just its existence or duration. It matters in particular, they say, for explaining the trust-reliance distinction, which is something they aim to do. The central problem of trustworthiness for them is not simply whether but also how the trustee is motivated to act. Will that person have the kind of motivation that makes trust appropriate? Katherine Hawley identifies theories that respond to this question as “motives-based” theories (2014).

To complicate matters, there are “non-motives-based theories”, which are also not risk-assessment theories (Hawley 2014). They strive to distinguish between trust and mere reliance, though not by associating a particular kind of motive with trustworthiness. Since most philosophical debate about the nature of trust and trustworthiness centers on theories that are either motives-based or non-motives-based, let me expand on each of these categories.

Philosophers who endorse this type of theory differ in terms of what kind of motive they associate with trustworthiness. For some, it is self-interest, while for others, it is goodwill or an explicitly moral motive, such as moral integrity or virtue. [ 4 ]

For example, Russell Hardin defines trustworthiness in terms of self-interest in his “encapsulated interests” account (2002). He says that trustworthy people are motivated by their own interest to maintain the relationship they have with the trustor, which in turn encourages them to encapsulate the interests of that person in their own interests. In addition, trusting people is appropriate when we can reasonably expect them to encapsulate our interests in their own, an expectation which is missing with mere reliance.

Hardin’s theory may be valuable in explaining many different types of trust relationships, including those between people who can predict little about one another’s motives beyond where their self-interest lies. Still, his theory is problematic. To see why, consider how it applies to a sexist employer who has an interest in maintaining relationships with women employees, who treats them reasonably well as a result, but whose interest stems from a desire to keep them around so that he can daydream about having sex with them. This interest conflicts with an interest the women have in not being objectified by their employer. At the same time, if they were not aware of his daydreaming—say they are not—then he can ignore this particular interest of theirs. He can keep his relationships with them going while ignoring this interest and encapsulating enough of their other interests in his own. And this would make him trustworthy on Hardin’s account. But is he trustworthy? The answer is “no” or at least the women themselves would say “no” if they knew the main reason for their employment. The point is that being motivated by a desire to maintain a relationship (the central motivation of a trustworthy person on the encapsulated interests view) may not require one to adopt all of the interests of the trustor that would actually make one trustworthy to that person. In the end, the encapsulated interests view seems to describe only reliability, not trustworthiness. The sexist employer may reliably treat the women well, because of his interest in daydreaming about them, but he is not trustworthy because of why he treats them well.

A different type of theory is what Jones calls a “will-based” account, which finds trustworthiness only where the trustee is motivated by goodwill (Jones 1999: 68). This view originates in the work of Annette Baier and is influential, even outside of moral philosophy (e.g., in bioethics and law, especially fiduciary law; see, e.g., Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993, O’Neill 2002, and Fox-Decent 2005). According to it, a trustee who is trustworthy will act out of goodwill toward the trustor, to what or to whom the trustee is entrusted with, or both. While many readers might find the goodwill view problematic—surely we can trust people without presuming their goodwill!—it is immune to a criticism that applies to Hardin’s theory and also to risk-assessment theories. The criticism is that they fail to require that the trustworthy person care about (i.e., feel goodwill towards) the trustor, or care about what the trustor cares about. As we have seen, such caring appears to be central to a complete account of trustworthiness.

The particular reason why care may be central is that it allows us to grasp how trust and reliance differ. The above suggested that they differ because only trust can be betrayed (or at least let down). But why is that true? Why can trust be betrayed, while mere reliance can only be disappointed? The answer Baier gives is that betrayal is the appropriate response to someone on whom one relied to act out of goodwill, as opposed to ill will, selfishness, or habit bred out of indifference (1986: 234–5; see also Baier 1991). Those who say that trusting could involve relying on people to act instead on motives like ill will or selfishness will have trouble distinguishing between trust and mere reliance.

While useful in some respects, Baier’s will-based account is not perfect. Criticisms have been made that suggest goodwill is neither necessary nor sufficient for trustworthiness. It is not necessary because we can trust other people without presuming that they have goodwill (e.g., O’Neill 2002; Jones 2004), as we arguably do when we put our trust in strangers.

As well as being unnecessary, goodwill may not be sufficient for trustworthiness, and that is true for at least three reasons. First, someone trying to manipulate you—a “confidence trickster” (Baier 1986)—could “rely on your goodwill without trusting you”, say, to give them money (Holton 1994: 65). You are not trustworthy for them, despite your goodwill, because they are not trusting you but rather are just trying to trick you. Second, basing trustworthiness on goodwill alone cannot explain unwelcome trust. We do not always welcome people’s trust, because trust can be burdensome or inappropriate. When that happens, we object not to these people’s optimism about our goodwill (who would object to that?), but only to the fact that they are counting on us. Third, we can expect people to be reliably benevolent toward us without trusting them (Jones 1996: 10). We can think that their benevolence is not shaped by the sorts of values that for us are essential to trustworthiness. [ 5 ]

Criticisms about goodwill not being sufficient for trustworthiness have prompted revisions to Baier’s theory and in some cases to the development of new will-based theories. For example, in response to the first criticism—about the confidence trickster—Zac Cogley argues that trust involves the belief not simply that the trustee will display goodwill toward us but that this person owes us goodwill (2012). Since the confidence trickster doesn’t believe that their mark owes them goodwill, they don’t trust this person, and neither is this person trustworthy for them. In response to the second criticism—the one about unwelcome trust—Jones claims that optimism about the trustee’s goodwill must be coupled with the expectation that the trustee will be “favorably moved by the thought that [we are] counting on her” (1996: 9). Jones does that in her early work on trust where she endorses a will-based theory. Finally, in response to the third concern about goodwill not being informed by the sorts of values that would make people trustworthy for us, some maintain that trust involves an expectation about some shared values, norms, or interests (Lahno 2001, 2020; McLeod 2002, 2020; Mullin 2005; Smith 2008). (To be clear, this last expectation tends not to be combined with goodwill to yield a new will-based theory.)

One final criticism of will-based accounts concerns how “goodwill” should be interpreted. In much of the discussion above, it is narrowly conceived so that it involves friendly feeling or personal liking. Jones urges us in her early work on trust to understand goodwill more broadly, so that it could amount to benevolence, conscientiousness, or the like, or friendly feeling (1996: 7). But then in her later work, she worries that by defining goodwill so broadly we

turn it into a meaningless catchall that merely reports the presence of some positive motive, and one that may or may not even be directed toward the truster. (2012a: 67)

Jones abandons her own will-based theory upon rejecting both a narrow and a broad construal of goodwill. (The kind of theory she endorses now is a trust responsive one; see below.) If her concerns about defining goodwill are valid, then will-based theories are in serious trouble.

To recapitulate about encapsulated-interest and will-based theories, they say that a trustworthy person is motivated by self-interest or goodwill, respectively. Encapsulated-interest theories struggle to explain how trustworthiness differs from mere reliability, while will-based theories are faced with the criticism that goodwill is neither necessary nor sufficient for trustworthiness. Some philosophers who say that goodwill is insufficient develop alternative will-based theories. An example is Cogley’s theory according to which trust involves a normative expectation of goodwill (2012).

The field of motives-based theories is not exhausted by encapsulated-interest and will-based theories, however. Other motives-based theories include those that describe the motive of trustworthy people in terms of a moral commitment, moral obligation, or virtue. To expand, consider that one could make sense of the trustworthiness of a stranger by presuming that the stranger is motivated not by self-interest or goodwill, but by a commitment to stand by their moral values. In that case, I could trust a stranger to be decent by presuming just that she is committed to common decency. Ultimately, what I am presuming about the stranger is moral integrity, which some say is the relevant motive for trust relations (those that are prototypical; see McLeod 2002). Others identify this motive similarly as moral obligation, and say it is ascribed to the trustee by the very act of trusting them (Nickel 2007; for a similar account, see Cohen and Dienhart 2013). Although compelling in some respects, the worry about these theories is that they moralize trust inappropriately by demanding that the trustworthy person have a moral motive (see below and also Mullin 2005; Jones 2017).

Yet one might insist that it is appropriate to moralize trust or at least moralize trustworthiness, which we often think of as a virtuous character trait. Nancy Nyquist Potter refers to the trait as “full trustworthiness”, and distinguishes it from “specific trustworthiness”, which is trustworthiness that is specific to certain relationships (and equivalent to the thin sense of trustworthiness I have used throughout; 2002: 25). To be fully trustworthy, one must have a disposition to be trustworthy toward everyone, according to Potter. Let us call this the “virtue” account.

It may sound odd to insist that trustworthiness is a virtue or, in other words, a moral disposition to be trustworthy (Potter 2002: 25; Hardin 2002: 32). What disposition exactly is it meant to be? A disposition normally to honor people’s trust? That would be strange, since trust can be unwanted if the trust is immoral (e.g., being trusted to hide a murder) or if it misinterprets the nature of one’s relationship with the trustee (e.g., being trusted to be friends with a mere acquaintance). Perhaps trustworthiness is instead a disposition to respond to trust in appropriate ways, given “who one is in relation” to the trustor and given other virtues that one possesses or ought to possess (e.g., justice, compassion) (Potter 2002: 25). This is essentially Potter’s view. Modeling trustworthiness on an Aristotelian conception of virtue, she defines a trustworthy person as “one who can be counted on, as a matter of the sort of person he or she is, to take care of those things that others entrust to one and (following the Doctrine of the Mean) whose ways of caring are neither excessive nor deficient” (her emphasis; 16). [ 6 ] A similar account of trustworthiness as a virtue—an epistemic one, specifically—can be found in the literature on testimony (see Frost-Arnold 2014; Daukas 2006, 2011).

Criticism of the virtue account comes from Karen Jones (2012a). As she explains, if being trustworthy were a virtue, then being untrustworthy would be a vice, but that can’t be right because we can never be required to exhibit a vice, yet we can be required to be untrustworthy (84). An example occurs when we are counted on by two different people to do two incompatible things and being trustworthy to the one demands that we are untrustworthy to the other (83). To defend her virtue theory, Potter would have to insist that in such situations, we are required either to disappoint someone’s trust rather than be untrustworthy, or to be untrustworthy in a specific not a full sense. [ 7 ]

Rather than cling to a virtue theory, however, why not just accept the thin conception of trustworthiness (i.e., “specific trustworthiness”), according to which X is trustworthy for me just in case I can trust X ? Two things can be said. First, the thick conception—of trustworthiness as a virtue—is not meant to displace the thin one. We can and do refer to some people as being trustworthy in the specific or thin sense and to others as being trustworthy in the full or thick sense. Second, one could argue that the thick conception explains better than the thin one why fully trustworthy people are as dependable as they are. It is ingrained in their character. They therefore must have an ongoing commitment to being accountable to others, and better still, a commitment that comes from a source that is compatible with trustworthiness (i.e., virtue as opposed to mere self-interest).

An account of trustworthiness that includes the idea that trustworthiness is a virtue will seem ideal only if we think that the genesis of the trustworthy person’s commitment matters. If we believe, like risk-assessment theorists, that it matters only whether, not how, the trustor will be motivated to act, then we could assume that ill will can do the job as well as a moral disposition. Such controversy explains how and why motives-based and risk-assessment theories diverge from one another.

A final category are theories that base trustworthiness neither on the kind of motivation a trustworthy person has nor on the mere willingness of this person to do what they are relied on to do. These are non-motives-based and also non-risk-assessment theories. The conditions that give rise to trustworthiness according to them reside ultimately in the stance the trustor takes toward the trustee or in what the trustor believes they ought to be able to expect from this person (i.e., in normative expectations of them). These theories share with motives-based theories the goal of describing how trust differs from mere reliance.

An example is Richard Holton’s theory of trust (1994). Holton argues that trust is unique because of the stance the trustor takes toward the trustee: the “participant stance”, which involves treating the trustee as a person—someone who is responsible for their actions—rather than simply as an object (see also Strawson 1962 [1974]). In the case of trust specifically, the stance entails a readiness to feel betrayal (Holton 1994: 4). Holton’s claim is that this stance and this readiness are absent when we merely rely on someone or something.

Although Holton’s theory has garnered positive attention (e.g., by Hieronymi 2008; McGeer 2008), some do find it dissatisfying. For example, some argue that it does not obviously explain what would justify a reaction of betrayal, rather than mere disappointment, when someone fails to do what they are trusted to do (Jones 2004; Nickel 2007). They could fail to do it just by accident, in which case feelings of betrayal would be inappropriate (Jones 2004). Others assert, by contrast, that taking the participant stance toward someone

does not always mean trusting that person: some interactions [of this sort] lie outside the realm of trust and distrust. (Hawley 2014: 7)

To use an example from Hawley, my partner could come to rely on me to make him dinner every night in a way that involves him taking the participant stance toward me. But he needn’t trust me to make him dinner and so needn’t feel betrayed if I do not. He might know that I am loath for him to trust me in this regard: “to make this [matter of making dinner] a matter of trust” between us (Hawley 2014: 7).

Some philosophers have expanded on Holton’s theory in a way that might deflect some criticism of it. Margaret Urban Walker emphasizes that in taking a participant stance, we hold people responsible (2006: 79). We expect them to act not simply as we assume they will , but as they should . We have, in other words, normative rather than merely predictive expectations of them. Call this a “normative-expectation” theory, which again is an elaboration on the participant-stance theory. Endorsed by Walker and others (e.g., Jones 2004 and 2012a; Frost-Arnold 2014), this view explains the trust-reliance distinction in terms of the distinction between normative and predictive expectations. It also describes the potential for betrayal in terms of the failure to live up a normative expectation.

Walker’s theory is non-motives-based because it doesn’t specify that trustworthy people must have a certain kind of motive for acting. She says that trustworthiness is compatible with having many different kinds of motives, including, among others, goodwill, “pride in one’s role”, “fear of penalties for poor performance”, and “an impersonal sense of obligation” (2006: 77). What accounts for whether someone is trustworthy in her view is whether they act as they should, not whether they are motivated in a certain way. (By contrast, Cogley’s normative-expectation theory says that the trustworthy person both will and ought to act with goodwill. His theory is motives-based.)

Prominent in the literature is a kind of normative-expectation theory called a “trust- (or dependence-) responsive” theory (see, e.g., Faulkner and Simpson 2017: 8; Faulkner 2011, 2017; Jones 2012a, 2017, 2019; McGeer and Petit 2017). According to this view, being trustworthy involves being appropriately responsive to the reason you have to do X —what you are being relied on (or “counted on”; Jones 2012a) to do—when it’s clear that someone is in fact relying on you. The reason you have to do X exists simply because someone is counting on you; other things being equal, you should do it for this reason. Being appropriately responsive to it, moreover, just means that you find it compelling (Jones 2012a: 70–71). The person trusting you expects you to have this reaction; in other words, they have a normative expectation that the “manifest fact of [their] reliance will weigh on you as a reason for choosing voluntarily to X ” (McGeer and Pettit 2017: 16). This expectation is missing in cases of mere reliance. When I merely rely on you, I do not expect my reliance to weigh on you as I do when I trust you.

Although trust-responsive theories might seem motives-based, they are not. One might think that to be trustworthy, they require that you to be motivated by the fact that you are being counted on. Instead, they demand only that you be appropriately responsive to the reason you have to do what you are being depended on to do. As Jones explains, you could be responsive in this way and act ultimately out of goodwill, conscientiousness, love, duty, or the like (2012a: 66). The reaction I expect of you, as the trustor, is compatible with you acting on different kinds of motives, although to be clear, not just any motive will do (not like in Walker’s theory); some motives are ruled out, including indifference and ill will (Jones 2012a: 68). Being indifferent or hateful towards me means that you are unlikely to view me counting on you as a reason to act. Hence, if I knew you were indifferent or hateful, I would not expect you to be trust responsive.

Trust-responsive theories are less restrictive than motives-based theories when it comes to defining what motives people need to be trustworthy. At the same time, they are more restrictive when it comes to stating whether, in order to be trustworthy or trusted, one must be aware that one is being counted on. One couldn’t be trust responsive otherwise. In trusting you, I therefore must “make clear to you my assumption that you will prove reliable in doing X ” (McGeer and Pettit 2017: 16). I do not have to do that by contrast if, in trusting you, I am relying on you instead to act with a motive like goodwill. Baier herself allows that trust can exist where the trustee is unaware of it (1986: 235; see also Hawley 2014; Lahno 2020). For her, trust is ubiquitous (Jones 2017: 102) in part for this reason; we trust people in a myriad of different ways every single day, often without them knowing it. If she’s right about this fact, then trust-responsive theories are incomplete.

These theories are also vulnerable to objections raised against normative-expectation theories, because they are again a type of normative-expectation theory. One such concern comes from Hawley. In writing about both trust and distrust, she states that

we need a story about when trust, distrust or neither is objectively appropriate—what is the worldly situation to which (dis)trust] is an appropriate response? When is it appropriate to have (dis)trust-related normative expectations of someone? (2014: 11)

Normative-expectation theories tend not to provide an answer. And trust-responsive theories suggest only that trust-related normative expectations are appropriate when certain motives are absent (e.g., ill will), which may not to be enough.

Hawley responds to the above concern within her “commitment account” of trust (2014, 2019). This theory states that in trusting others, we believe that they have a commitment to doing what we are trusting them to do (2014: 10), a fact which explains why we expect them to act this way, and also why we fail to do so in cases like that of my partner relying on me to make dinner; he knows I have no commitment to making his dinner (or anyone else’s) repeatedly. For Hawley, the relevant commitments

can be implicit or explicit, weighty or trivial, conferred by roles and external circumstances, default or acquired, welcome or unwelcome. (2014: 11)

They also needn’t actually motivate the trustworthy person. Her theory is non-motives-based because it states that to

be trustworthy, in some specific respect, it is enough to behave in accordance with one’s commitment, regardless of motive. (2014: 16)

Similarly, to trust me to do something, it is enough to believe that I

have a commitment to do it, and that I will do it, without believing that I will do it because of my commitment. (2014: 16; her emphasis)

Notice that unlike trust-responsive theories, the commitment account does not require that the trustee be aware of the trust in order to be trustworthy. This person simply needs to have a commitment and to act accordingly. They don’t even need to be committed to the trustor, but rather could be committed to anyone and one could trust them to follow through on that commitment (Hawley 2014: 11). So, relying on a promise your daughter’s friend makes to her to take her home from the party would count as an instance of trust (Hawley 2014: 11). In this way, the commitment account is less restrictive than trust-responsive theories are. In being non-motives-based, Hawley’s theory is also less restrictive than any motives-based theory. Trust could truly be ubiquitous if she’s correct about the nature of it.

Like the other theories considered here, however, the commitment account is open to criticisms. One might ask whether Hawley gives a satisfactory answer to the question that motivates her theory: when can we reasonably have the normative expectations of someone that go along with trusting them? Hawley’s answer is, when this person has the appropriate commitment, where “commitment” is understood very broadly. Yet where the relevant commitment is implicit or unwelcome, it’s unclear that we can predict much about the trustee’s behavior. In cases like these, the commitment theory may have little to say about whether it is reasonable to trust.

A further criticism comes from Andrew Kirton (2020) who claims that we sometimes trust people to act contrary to what they are committed to doing. His central example involves a navy veteran, an enlisted man, whose ship sunk at sea and who trusted those who rescued them (navy men) to ignore a commitment they had to save the officers first, because the officers were relatively safe on lifeboats compared to the enlisted men who were struggling in the water. Instead the rescuers adhered to their military duty, and the enlisted man felt betrayed by them for nearly letting him drown. Assuming it is compelling, this example shows that trust and commitment can come apart and that Hawley’s theory is incomplete. [ 8 ]

The struggle to find a complete theory of trust has led some philosophers to be pluralists about trust—that is, to say, “we must recognise plural forms of trust” (Simpson 2012: 551) or accept that trust is not just one form of reliance, but many forms of it (see also Jacoby 2011; Scheman 2020; McLeod 2020). Readers may be led to this conclusion from the rundown I’ve given of the many different theories of trust in philosophy and the objections that have been raised to them. Rather than go in the direction of pluralism, however, most philosophers continue to debate what unifies all trust such that it is different from mere reliance. They tend to believe that a unified and suitably developed motives-based theory or non-motives-based theory can explain this difference, although there is little consensus about what this theory should be like.

In spite of there being little settled agreement in philosophy about trust, there are thankfully things we can say for certain about it that are relevant to deciding when it is warranted. The trustor must be able to accept that by trusting, they are vulnerable usually to betrayal. Also, the trustee must be competent and willing to do what the trustor expects of them and may have to be willing because of certain attitudes they have. Last, in paradigmatic cases of trust, the trustor must be able to rely on the trustee to exhibit this competence and willingness.

As suggested above, distrust has been somewhat of an afterthought for philosophers (Hawley 2014), [ 9 ] although their attention to it has grown recently. As with trust and trustworthiness, philosophers would agree that distrust has certain features, although the few who have developed theories of distrust disagree ultimately about the nature of it.

The following are features of distrust that are relatively uncontroversial (see D’Cruz 2020):

• Distrust is not just the absence of trust since it is possible to neither distrust nor trust someone (Hawley 2014: 3; Jones 1996: 16; Krishnamurthy 2015). There is gap between the two—“the possibility of being suspended between” them (Ullmann-Margalit 2004 [2017: 184]). (For disagreement, see Faulkner 2017.)
• Although trust and distrust are not exhaustive, they are exclusive; one cannot at the same time trust and distrust someone about the same matter (Ullmann-Margalit 2004 [2017: 201]).
• Distrust is “not mere nonreliance” (Hawley 2014: 3). I could choose not to rely on a colleague’s assistance because I know she is terribly busy, not because I distrust her.
• Relatedly, distrust has a normative dimension. If I distrusted a colleague for no good reason and they found out about it, then they would probably be hurt or angry. But the same reaction would not accompany them knowing that I decided not to rely on them (Hawley 2014). Being distrusted is a bad thing (Domenicucci and Holton 2017: 150; D’Cruz 2019: 935), while not being relied on needn’t be bad at all.
• Distrust is normally a kind of nonreliance, just as trust is a kind (or many kinds) of reliance. Distrust involves “action-tendencies” of avoidance or withdrawal (D’Cruz 2019: 935–937), which make it incompatible with reliance—or at least complete reliance. We can be forced to rely on people we distrust, yet even then, we try to keep them at as safe a distance as possible.

Given the relationship between trust and distrust and the similarities between them (e.g., one is “richer than [mere] reliance” and the other is “richer than mere nonreliance”; Hawley 2014: 3), one would think that any theory of trust should be able to explain distrust and vice versa. Hawley makes this point and criticizes theories of trust for not being able to make sense of distrust (2014: 6–9). For example, will-based accounts imply that distrust must be nonreliance plus an expectation of ill will, yet the latter is not required for distrust. I could distrust someone because he is careless, not because he harbors ill will toward me (Hawley 2014: 6).

Hawley defends her commitment account of trust, in part, because she believes it is immune to the above criticism. It says that distrust is nonreliance plus the belief that the person distrusted is committed to doing what we will not rely on them to do. In spite of them being committed in this way (or so we believe), we do not rely on them (2014: 10). This account does not require that we impute any particular motive or feeling to the one distrusted, like ill will. At the same time, it tells us why distrust is not mere nonreliance and also why it is normative; the suspicion of the one distrusted is that they will fail to meet a commitment they have, which is bad.

Some have argued that Hawley’s theory of distrust is subject to counterexamples, however (D’Cruz 2020; Tallant 2017). For example, Jason D’Cruz describes a financier who “buys insurance on credit defaults, positioning himself to profit when borrowers default” (2020: 45). The financier believes that the borrowers have a commitment not to default, and he does not rely on them to meet this commitment. The conclusion that Hawley’s theory would have us reach is that he distrusts the borrowers, which doesn’t seem right.

A different kind of theory of distrust can be found in the work of Meena Krishnamurthy (2015), who is interested specifically in the value that distrust has for political democracies, and for political minorities in particular (2015). She offers what she calls a “narrow normative” account of distrust that she derives from the political writings of Martin Luther King Jr. The account is narrow because it serves a specific purpose: of explaining how distrust can motivate people to resist tyranny. It is normative because it concerns what they ought to do (again, resist; 392). The theory states that distrust is the confident belief that others will not act justly. It needn’t involve an expectation of ill will; King’s own distrust of white moderates was not grounded in such an expectation (Krishnamurthy 2015: 394). To be distrusting, one simply has to believe that others will not act justly, whether out of fear, ignorance, or what have you.

D’Cruz complains that Krishnamurthy’s theory is too narrow because it requires a belief that the one distrusted will fail to do something (i.e., act justly) (2020); but one can be distrustful of someone—say a salesperson who comes to your door (Jones 1996)—without predicting that they will do anything wrong or threatening. D’Cruz does not explain, however, why Krishnamurthy needs to account for cases like these in her theory, which again is meant to serve a specific purpose. Is it important that distrust can take a form other than “ X distrusts Y to [do] Φ” for it to motivate political resistance (D’Cruz 2020: 45)? D’Cruz’s objection is sound only if the answer is “yes”.

Nevertheless, D’Cruz’s work is helpful in showing what a descriptive account of distrust should look like—that is, an account that unlike Krishnamurthy’s, tracks how we use the concept in many different circumstances. He himself endorses a normative-expectation theory, according to which distrust involves

a tendency to withdraw from reliance or vulnerability in contexts of normative expectation, based on a construal of a person or persons as malevolent, incompetent, or lacking integrity. (2019: 936)

D’Cruz has yet to develop this theory fully, but once he does so, it will almost certainly be a welcome addition to the scant literature in philosophy on distrust.

In summary, among the relatively few philosophers who have written on distrust, there is settled agreement about some of its features but not about the nature of distrust in general. The agreed-upon features tell us something about when distrust is warranted (i.e., plausible). For distrust in someone to be plausible, one cannot also trust that person, and normally one will not be reliant on them either. Something else must be true as well, however. For example, one must believe that this person is committed to acting in a certain way but will not follow through on this commitment. The “something else” is crucial because distrust is not the negation of trust and neither is it mere nonreliance.

Philosophers have said comparatively little about what distrust is, but a lot about how distrust tends to be influenced by negative social stereotypes that portray whole groups of people as untrustworthy (e.g., Potter 2020; Scheman 2020; D’Cruz 2019; M. Fricker 2007). Trusting attitudes are similar—who we trust can depend significantly on social stereotypes, positive ones—yet there is less discussion about this fact in the literature on trust. This issue concerns the rationality (more precisely, the ir rationality) of trust and distrust, which makes it relevant to the next section, which is on the epistemology of trust.

2. The Epistemology of Trust

Writings on this topic obviously bear on the issue of when trust is warranted (i.e., justified). The central epistemological question about trust is, “Ought I to trust or not?” That is, given the way things seem to me, is it reasonable for me to trust? People tend to ask this sort of question only in situations where they can’t take trustworthiness for granted—that is, where they are conscious of the fact that trusting could get them into trouble. Examples are situations similar to those in which they have been betrayed in the past or unlike any they have ever been in before. The question, “Ought I to trust?” is therefore particularly pertinent to a somewhat odd mix of people that includes victims of abuse or the like, as well as immigrants and travelers.

The question “Ought I to distrust?” has received comparatively little attention in philosophy despite it arguably being as important as the question of when to trust. People can get into serious trouble by distrusting when they ought not to, rather than just by trusting when they ought not to. The harms of misplaced distrust are both moral and epistemic and include dishonoring people, being out of harmony with them, and being deprived of knowledge via testimony (D’Cruz 2019; M. Fricker 2007). Presumably because they believe that the harms of misplaced trust are greater (D’Cruz 2019), philosophers—and consequently I, in this entry—focus more on the rationality of trusting, as opposed to distrusting.

Philosophical work that is relevant to the issue of how to trust well appears either under the general heading of the epistemology or rationality of trust (e.g., Baker 1987; Webb 1992; Wanderer and Townsend 2013) or under the specific heading of testimony—that is, of putting one’s trust in the testimony of others. This section focuses on the epistemology of trust generally rather than on trust in testimony specifically. There is a large literature on testimony (see the entry in this encyclopedia) and on the related topic of epistemic injustice, both of which I discuss only insofar as they overlap with the epistemology of trust.

Philosophers sometimes ask whether it could ever be rational to trust other people. This question arises for two reasons. First, it appears that trust and rational reflection (e.g., on whether one should be trusting) are in tension with one another. Since trust inherently involves risk, any attempt to eliminate that risk through rational reflection could eliminate one’s trust by turning one’s stance into mere reliance. Second, trust tends to give us blinkered vision: it makes us resistant to evidence that may contradict our optimism about the trustee (Baker 1987; Jones 1996 and 2019). For example, if I trust my brother not to harm anyone, I will resist the truth of any evidence to the contrary. Here, trust and rationality seem to come apart.

Even if some of our trust could be rational, one might insist that not all of it could be rational for various reasons. First, if Baier is right that trust is ubiquitous (1986: 234), then we could not possibly subject all of it to rational reflection. We certainly could not reflect on every bit of knowledge we’ve acquired through the testimony of others, such as that the earth is round or Antarctica exists (Webb 1993; E. Fricker 1995; Coady 1992). Second, bioethicists point out that some trust is unavoidable and occurs in the absence of rational reflection (e.g., trust in emergency room nurses and physicians; see Zaner 1991). Lastly, some trust—namely the therapeutic variety—purposefully leaps beyond any evidence of trustworthiness in an effort to engender trustworthiness in the trustee. Is this sort of trust rational? Perhaps not, given that there isn’t sufficient evidence for it.

Many philosophers respond to the skepticism about the rationality of trust by saying that rationality, when applied to trust, needs to be understood differently than it is in each of the skeptical points above. There, “rationality” means something like this: it is rational to believe in something only if one has verified that it will happen or done as much as possible to verify it. For example, it is rational for me to believe that my brother has not harmed anyone only if the evidence points in that direction and I have discovered that to be the case. As we’ve seen, problems exist with applying this view of rationality to trust, yet it is not the only option; this view is both “truth-directed” and “internalist”, while the rationality of trust could instead be “end-directed” or “externalist”. Or it could be internalist without requiring that we have done the evidence gathering just discussed. Let me expand on these possibilities, starting with those that concern truth- or end-directed rationality.

In discussing the rationality of trust, some authors distinguish between these two types of rationality (also referred to as epistemic vs. strategic rationality; see, e.g., Baker 1987). One could say that we are rational in trusting emergency room physicians, for example, not necessarily because we have good reason to believe that they are trustworthy (our rationality is not truth-directed), but because by trusting them, we can remain calm in a situation over which we have little control (our rationality is therefore end-directed). Similarly, it may be rational for me to trust my brother not because I have good evidence of his trustworthiness but rather because trusting him is essential to our having a loving relationship. [ 10 ]

Trust can be rational, then, depending on whether one conceives of rationality as truth-directed or end-directed. Notice that it matters also how one conceives of trust, and more specifically, whether one conceives of it as a belief in someone’s trustworthiness (see section 4 ). If trust is a belief, then whether the rationality of trust can be end-directed will depend on whether the rationality of a belief can be end-directed. To put the point more generally, how trust is rationally justified will depend on how beliefs are rationally justified (Jones 1996).

Some of the literature on trust and rationality concerns whether the rationality of trust can indeed be end-directed and also what could make therapeutic trust and the like rational. Pamela Hieronymi argues that the ends for which we trust cannot provide reasons for us to trust in the first place (2008). Considerations about how useful or valuable trust is do not bear on the truth of a trusting belief (i.e., a belief in someone’s trustworthiness). But Hieronymi claims that trust, in a pure sense at least, always involves a trusting belief. How then does she account for trust that is motivated by how therapeutic (i.e., useful) the trust will be? She believes that trust of this sort is not pure or full-fledged trust. As she explains, people can legitimately complain about not being trusted fully when they are trusted in this way, which occurs when other people lack confidence in them but trust them nonetheless (2008: 230; see also Lahno 2001: 184–185).

By contrast, Victoria McGeer believes that trust is more substantial or pure when the available evidence does not support it (2008). She describes how trust of this sort—what she calls “substantial trust”—could be rational and does so without appealing to how important it might be or to the ends it might serve, but instead to whether the trustee will be trustworthy. [ 11 ] According to McGeer, what makes “substantial trust” rational is that it involves hope that the trustees will do what they are trusted to do, which “can have a galvanizing effect on how [they] see themselves, as trustors avowedly do, in the fullness of their potential” (2008: 252; see also McGeer and Pettit 2017). Rather than complain (as Hieronymi would assume that trustees might) about trustors being merely hopeful about their trustworthiness, they could respond well to the trustors’ attitude toward them. Moreover, if it is likely that they will respond well—in other words, that they will be trust-responsive—then the trust in them must be epistemically rational. That is particularly true if being trustworthy involves being trust-responsive, as it does for McGeer (McGeer and Pettit 2017).

McGeer’s work suggests that all trust—even therapeutic trust—can be rational in a truth-directed way. As we’ve seen, there is some dispute about whether trust can be rational in just an end-directed way. What matters here is whether trust is the sort of attitude whose rationality could be end-directed.

Philosophers who agree that trust can be rational (in a truth- or end-directed way or both) tend to disagree about the extent to which reasons that make it rational must be accessible to the trustor. Some say that these reasons must be available to this person in order for their trust to be rational; in that case, the person is or could be internally justified in trusting as they do. Others say that the reasons need not be internal but can instead be external to the trustor and lie in what caused the trust, or, more specifically, in the epistemic reliability of what caused it. The trustor also needn’t have access to or be aware of the reliability of these reasons. The latter’s epistemology of trust is externalist, while the former’s is internalist.

Some epistemologists write as though trust is only rational if the trustor themselves has rationally estimated the likelihood that the trustee is trustworthy. For example, Russell Hardin implies that if my trust in you is rational, then

I make a rough estimate of the truth of [the] claim … that you will be trustworthy under certain conditions … and then I correct my estimate, or “update,” as I obtain new evidence on you. (2002: 112)

On this view, I must have reasons for my estimate or for my updates (Hardin 2002: 130), which could come from inductive generalizations I make about my past experience, from my knowledge that social constraints exist that will encourage your trustworthiness or what have you. Such an internalist epistemology of trust is valuable because it coheres with the commonsense idea that one ought to have good reasons for trusting people (i.e., reasons grounded in evidence that they will be trustworthy) particularly when something important is at stake (E. Fricker 1995). One ought, in other words, to be epistemically responsible in one’s trusting (see Frost-Arnold 2020).

Such an epistemology is also open to criticisms, however. For example, it suggests that rational trust will always be partial rather than complete, given that the rational trustor is open to evidence that contradicts their trust on this theory, while someone who trusts completely in someone else lacks such openness. The theory also implies that the reasons for trusting well (i.e., in a justified way) are accessible to the trustor, at some point or another, which may simply be false. Some reasons for trust may be too “cunning” for this to be the case. Relevant here is the reason for trusting discussed by Philip Pettit (1995): that trust signals to people that they are being held in esteem, which is something they will want to maintain; they will honor the trust because they are naturally “esteem-seeking”. (Note that consciously having this as a reason for trusting—of using people’s need for esteem to get what you want from them—is incompatible with actually trusting (Wanderer and Townsend 2013: 9), if trust is motives-based and the required motive is something other than self-interest.)

Others say that reasons for trust are usually too numerous and varied to be open to the conscious consideration of the trustor (e.g., Baier 1986). There can be very subtle reasons to trust or distrust someone—for example, reasons that have to do with body language, with systematic yet veiled forms of oppression, or with a complicated history of trusting others about which one can’t easily generalize. Factors like these can influence trustors without them knowing it, sometimes making their trust irrational (e.g., because it is informed by oppressive biases), and other times making it rational.

The concern about there being complex reasons for trusting explain why some philosophers defend externalist epistemologies of trust. Some do so explicitly (e.g., McLeod 2002). They argue for reliabilist theories that make trust rationally justified if and only if it is formed and sustained by reliable processes (i.e., “processes that tend to produce accurate representations of the world”, such as drawing on expertise one has rather than simply guessing; Goldman 1992: 113; Goldman and Beddor 2015 [2016]). Others gesture towards externalism (Webb 1993; Baier 1986), as Baier does with what she calls “a moral test for trust”. The test is that

knowledge of what the other party is relying on for the continuance of the trust relationship would … itself destabilize the relation. (1986: 255)

The other party might be relying on a threat advantage or the concealment of their untrustworthiness, in which case the trust would probably fail the test. Because Baier’s test focuses on the causal basis for trust, or for what maintains the trust relation, it is externalist. Also, because the trustor often cannot gather the information needed for the test without ceasing to trust the other person (Baier 1986: 260), the test cannot be internalist.

Although an externalist theory of trust deals well with some of the worries one might have with an internalist theory, it has problems of its own. One of the most serious issues is the absence of any requirement that trustors themselves have good (motivating) reasons for trusting, especially when their trust makes them seriously vulnerable. Again, it appears that common sense dictates the opposite: that sometimes as trustors, we ought to be able to back up our decisions about when to trust. The same is true about our distrust presumably: that sometimes we ought to be able to defend it. Assuming externalists mean for their epistemology to apply to distrust and not just to trust, their theory violates this bit of common sense as well. Externalism about distrust also seems incompatible with a strategy that some philosophers recommend for dealing with biased distrust. The strategy is to develop what they call “corrective trust” (e.g., Scheman 2020) or “humble trust” (D’Cruz 2019), which demands a humble skepticism toward distrust that aligns with oppressive stereotypes and efforts at correcting the influence of these stereotypes (see also M. Fricker 2007). The concern about an externalist epistemology is that it does not encourage this sort of mental work, since it does not require that we reflect on our reasons for distrusting or trusting.

There are alternatives to the kinds of internalist and externalist theories just discussed, especially within the literature on testimony. [ 12 ] For example, Paul Faulkner develops an “assurance theory” of testimony that interprets speaker trustworthiness in terms of trust-responsiveness. Recall that on a trust-responsiveness theory of trust, being trusted gives people the reason to be trustworthy that someone is counting on them. They are trustworthy if they are appropriately responsive to this reason, which, in the case of offering testimony, involves giving one’s assurance that one is telling the truth (Adler 2006 [2017]). Faulkner uses the trust-responsiveness account of trust, along with a view of trust as an affective attitude (see section 4 ), to show “how trust can ground reasonable testimonial uptake” (Faulkner and Simpson 2017: 6; Faulkner 2011 and 2020).

He proposes that A affectively trust S if and only if A depends on S Φ-ing, and expects his dependence on S to motivate S to Φ—for A ’s dependence on S to be the reason for which S Φs …. As a result, affective trust is a bootstrapping attitude: I can choose to trust someone affectively and my doing so creates the reasons which justify the attitude. (Faulkner and Simpson 2017: 6)

Most likely, A (the trustor) is aware of the reasons that justify his trust or could be aware of them, making this theory an internalist one. The reasons are also normative and non-evidentiary (Faulkner 2020); they concern what S ought to do because of A ’s dependence, not what S will do based on evidence that A might gather about S . This view doesn’t require that A have evidentiary reasons, and so it is importantly different than the internalist epistemology discussed above. But it is then also subject to the criticisms made of externalist theories that they don’t require the kind of scrutiny of our trusting attitudes that we tend to expect and probably ought to expect in societies where some people are stereotyped as more trusting than others.

Presumably to avoid having to defend any particular epistemology of trust, some philosophers provide just a list of common justifiers for it (i.e., “facts or states of affairs that determine the justification status of [trust]”; Goldman 1999: 274), which someone could take into account in deciding when to trust (Govier 1998; Jones 1996). Included on these lists are such factors as the social role of the trustee, the domain in which the trust occurs, an “agent-specific” factor that concerns how good a trustor the agent tends to be (Jones 1996: 21), and the social or political climate in which the trust occurs. Philosophers have tended to emphasize this last factor as a justification condition for trust, and so let me elaborate on it briefly.

Although trust is paradigmatically a relation that holds between two individuals, forces larger than those individuals inevitably shape their trust and distrust in one another. Social or political climate contributes to how (un)trustworthy people tend to be and therefore to whether trust and distrust are justified. For example, a climate of virtue is one in which trustworthiness tends to be pervasive, assuming that virtues other than trustworthiness tend to enhance it (Baier 2004). [ 13 ] A climate of oppression is one in which untrustworthiness is prevalent, especially between people who are privileged and those who are less privileged (Baier 1986: 259; Potter 2002: 24; D’Cruz 2019). “Social trust”, as some call it, is low in these circumstances (Govier 1997; Welch 2013).

Social or political climate has a significant influence on the default stance that we ought to take toward people’s trustworthiness (see, e.g., Walker 2006). We need such a stance because we can’t always stop to reflect carefully on when to trust (i.e., assuming that some rational reflection is required for trusting well). Some philosophers say that the correct stance is trust and do so without referring to the social or political climate; Tony Coady takes this sort of position, for example, on our stance toward others’ testimony (Coady 1992). Others disagree that the correct stance could be so universal and claim instead that it is relative to climate, as well as to other factors such as domain (Jones 1999).

Our trust or distrust may be prima facie justified if we have the correct default stance, although most philosophers assume that it could only be fully justified (in a truth- or end-directed way) by reasons that are internal to us (evidentiary or non-evidentiary reasons) or by the causal processes that created the attitude in the first place. Whichever epistemology of trust we choose, it ought to be sensitive to the tension that exists between trusting somebody and rationally reflecting on the grounds for that trust. It would be odd, to say the least, if what made an attitude justified destroyed that very attitude. At the same time, our epistemology of trust ought to cohere as much as possible with common sense, which dictates that we should inspect rather than have pure faith in whatever makes us seriously vulnerable to other people, which trust can most definitely do.

Someone who asks, “When is trust warranted?” might be interested in knowing what the point of trust is. In other words, what value does it have? Although the value it has for particular people will depend on their circumstances, the value it could have for anyone will depend on why trust is valuable, generally speaking. Trust can have enormous instrumental value and may also have some intrinsic value. In discussing its instrumental value, this section refers to the “goods of trust”, which can benefit the trustor, the trustee, or society in general. They are therefore social and/or individual goods. What is more and as emphasized throughout, these goods tend to accompany justified trust, rather than any old trust. [ 14 ] Like the other sections of this entry, this one focuses predominantly though not exclusively on trust; it also mentions recent work on the value of distrust.

Consider first the possibility that trust has intrinsic value. If trust produced no goods independent of it, would there be any point in trusting? One might say “yes”, on the grounds that trust is (or can be; O’Neil 2012: 311) a sign of respect for others. (Similarly, distrust is a sign of disrespect; D’Cruz 2019.) If true, this fact about trust would make it intrinsically worthwhile, at least so long as the trust is justified. Presumably, if it was unjustified, then the respect would be misplaced and the intrinsic value would be lost. But these points are speculative, since philosophers have said comparatively little about trust being worthwhile in itself as opposed to worthwhile because of what it produces, or because of what accompanies it. The discussion going forward centers on the latter, more specifically on the goods of trust.

Turning first to the instrumental value of trust to the trustor , some argue that trusting vastly increases our opportunities for cooperating with others and for benefiting from that cooperation, although of course we would only benefit if people we trusted cooperated as well (Gambetta 1988b; Hardin 2002; Dimock 2020). Trust enhances cooperation, while perhaps not being necessary for it (Cook et al. 2005; Skyrms 2008). Because trust removes the incentive to check up on other people, it makes cooperation with trust less complicated than cooperation without it (Luhmann 1973/1975 [1979]).

Trust can make cooperation possible, rather than simply easier, if trust is essential to promising. Daniel Friedrich and Nicholas Southwood defend what they call the “Trust View” of promissory obligation (2011), according to which “making a promise involves inviting another individual to trust one to do something” (2011: 277). If this view is correct, then cooperation through promising is impossible without trust. Cooperation of this sort will also not be fruitful unless the trust is justified.

Trusting provides us with goods beyond those that come with cooperation, although again, for these goods to materialize, the trust must be justified. Sometimes, trust involves little or no cooperation, so that the trustor is completely dependent on the trustee while the reverse is not true. Examples are the trust of young children in their parents and the trust of severely ill or disabled people in their care providers. Trust is particularly important for these people because they tend to be powerless to exercise their rights or to enforce any kind of contract. The trust they place in their care providers also contributes to them being vulnerable, and so it is essential that they can trust these people (i.e., that their trust is justified). The goods at stake for them are all the goods involved in having a good or decent life.

Among the specific goods that philosophers associate with trusting are meaningful relationships or attachments (rather than simply cooperative relationships that further individual self-interests; Harding 2011, Kirton forthcoming) as well as knowledge and autonomy. [ 15 ] To expand, trust allows for the kinds of secure attachments that some developmental psychologists (“attachment” theorists) believe are crucial to our well-being and to our ability to be trusting of others (Bowlby 1969–1980; Ainsworth 1969; see Kirton 2020; Wonderly 2016). Particularly important here are parent-child relationships (McLeod et al. 2019).

Trust is also crucial for knowledge, given that scientific knowledge (Hardwig 1991), moral knowledge (Jones 1999), and almost all knowledge in fact (Webb 1993) depends for its acquisition on trust in the testimony of others. The basic argument for the need to trust what others say is that no one person has the time, intellect, and experience necessary to independently learn facts about the world that many of us do know. Examples include the scientific fact that the earth is round, the moral fact that the oppression of people from social groups different from our own can be severe (Jones 1999), and the mundane fact that we were born on such-in-such a day (Webb 1993: 261). Of course, trusting the people who testify to these facts could only generate knowledge if the trust was justified. If we were told our date of birth by people who were determined oddly to deceive us about when we were born, then we would not know when we were born.

Autonomy is another good that flows from trust insofar as people acquire or exercise autonomy only in social environments where they can trust people (or institutions, etc.) to support their autonomy. Feminists in particular tend to conceive of autonomy this way—that is, as a relational property (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). Many feminists emphasize that oppressive social environments can inhibit autonomy, and some say explicitly that conditions necessary for autonomy (e.g., adequate options, knowledge relevant to one’s decisions) exist only with the help of people or institutions that are trustworthy (e.g., Oshana 2014; McLeod and Ryman 2020). Justified trust in others to ensure that these conditions exist is essential for our autonomy, if autonomy is indeed relational. [ 16 ]

Goods of trust that are instrumental to the well-being of the trustee also do not materialize unless the trust is justified. Trust can improve the self-respect and moral maturity of this person. Particularly if it involves reliance on a person’s moral character, trust can engender self-respect in the trustee (i.e., through them internalizing the respect signaled by that trust). Being trusted can allow us to be more respectful not only toward ourselves but also toward others, thus enhancing our moral maturity. The explicit goal of therapeutic trust is precisely to bring about this end. The above ( section 2 ) suggests that therapeutic trust can be justified in a truth-directed way over time, provided that the trust has its intended effect of making the trustee more trustworthy (McGeer 2008; Baker 1987: 12). Clearly, for therapeutic trust to benefit the trustee, it would have to be justified in this way, meaning that the therapy would normally have to work.

Finally, there are social goods of trust that are linked with the individual goods of cooperation and moral maturity. The former goods include the practice of morality, the very existence of society perhaps, as well as strong social networks. Morality itself is a cooperative activity, which can only get off the ground if people can trust one another to try, at least, to be moral. For this reason, among others, Baier claims that trust is “the very basis of morality” (2004: 180). It could also be the very basis of society, insofar as trust in our fellow citizens to honor social contracts makes those contracts possible.

A weaker claim is that trust makes society better or more livable. Some argue that trust is a form of “social capital”, meaning roughly that it enables “people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations” (Fukuyama 1995: 10; quoted in Hardin 2002: 83). As a result, “high-trust” societies have stronger economies and stronger social networks in general than “low-trust” societies (Fukuyama 1995; Inglehart 1999). Of course, this fact about high-trust societies could only be true if, on the whole, the trust within them was justified—that is, if trustees tended not to “defect” and destroy chances for cooperating in the future.

The literature on distrust suggests that there are goods associated with it too. For example, there is the social good discussed by Krishnamurthy of “securing democracy by protecting political minorities from tyranny” (2015: 392). Distrust as she understands it (a confident belief that others will not act justly) plays this positive role when it is justified, which is roughly when the threat of tyranny or unjust action is real. Distrust in general is valuable when it is justified—for the distrustors at least, who protect themselves from harm. By contrast, the people distrusted tend to experience negative effects on their reputation or self-respect (D’Cruz 2019).

Both trust and distrust are therefore valuable particularly when they are justified. The value of justified trust must be very high if without it, we can’t have morality or society and can’t be morally mature, autonomous, knowledgeable, or invested with opportunities for collaborating with others. Justified distrust is also essential, for members of minority groups especially. Conversely, trust or distrust that is unjustified can be seriously problematic. Unjustified trust, for example, can leave us open to abuse, terror, and deception.

Trust may not be warranted (i.e., plausible) because the agent has lost the ability to trust or simply cannot bring themselves to trust. People can lose trust in almost everyone or everything as a result of trauma (Herman 1991). The trauma of rape, for example, can profoundly reduce one’s sense that the world is a safe place with caring people in it (Brison 2002). By contrast, people can lose trust just in particular people or institutions. They can also have no experience trusting in certain people or institutions, making them reluctant to do so. They or others might want them to become more trusting. But the question is, how can that happen? How can trust be restored or generated?

The process of building trust is often slow and difficult (Uslaner 1999; Baier 1986; Lahno 2020), and that is true, in part, because of the kind of mental attitude trust is. Many argue that it is not the sort of attitude we can simply will ourselves to have. At the same, it is possible to cultivate trust. [ 17 ] This section focuses on these issues, including what kind of mental attitude trust is (e.g., a belief or an emotion). Also discussed briefly is what kind of mental attitude distrust is. Like trust, distrust is an attitude that people may wish to cultivate, particularly when they are too trusting.

Consider first why one would think that trust can’t be willed. Baier questions whether people are able “to trust simply because of encouragement to trust” (1986: 244; my emphasis). She writes,

“Trust me!” is for most of us an invitation which we cannot accept at will—either we do already trust the one who says it, in which case it serves at best as reassurance, or it is properly responded to with, “Why should and how can I, until I have cause to?”. (my emphasis; 1986: 244)

Baier is not a voluntarist about trust, just as most people are not voluntarists about belief. In other words, she thinks that we can’t simply decide to trust for purely motivational rather than epistemic reasons (i.e., merely because we want to, rather than because we have reason to think that the other person is or could be trustworthy; Mills 1998). That many people feel compelled to say, “I wish I could trust you”, suggests that Baier’s view is correct; wishing or wanting is not enough. But Holton interprets Baier’s view differently. According to him, Baier’s point is that we can never decide to trust, not that we can never decide to trust for motivational purposes (1994). This interpretation ignores, however, the attention that Baier gives to situations in which all we have is encouragement (trusting “simply because of encouragement”). The “cause” she refers to (“Why should and how can I, until I have cause to [trust]?”; 1986: 244) is an epistemic cause. Once we have one of those, we can presumably decide whether to trust on the basis of it. [ 18 ] But we cannot decide to trust simply because we want to, according to Baier.

If trust resembles belief in being non-voluntary, then perhaps trust itself is a belief. Is that right? Many philosophers claim that it is (e.g., Hieronymi 2008; McMyler 2011; Keren 2014), while others disagree (e.g., Jones 1996; Faulkner 2007; D’Cruz 2019). The former contend that trust is a belief that the trustee is trustworthy, at least in the thin sense that the trustee will do what he is trusted to do (Keren 2020). Various reasons exist in favour of such theories, doxastic reasons (see Keren 2020) including that these theories suggest it is impossible to trust a person while holding the belief that this person is not trustworthy, even in the thin sense. Most of us accept this impossibility and would want any theory of trust to explain it. A doxastic account does so by saying that we can’t believe a contradiction (not knowingly anyway; Keren 2020: 113).

Those who say that trust is not a belief claim that it is possible to trust without believing the trustee is trustworthy. [ 19 ] Holton gives the nice example of trusting a friend to be sincere without believing that the friend will be sincere (1994: 75). Arguably, if one already believed that to be the case, then one would have no need to trust the friend. It is also possible to believe that someone is trustworthy without trusting that person, which suggests that trust couldn’t just be a belief in someone’s trustworthiness (McLeod 2002: 85). I might think that a particular person is trustworthy without trusting them because I have no cause to do so. I might even distrust them despite believing that they are trustworthy (Jones 1996, 2013). As Jones explains, distrust can be recalcitrant in parting “company with belief” (D’Cruz 2019: 940; citing Jones 2013), a fact which makes trouble for doxastic accounts not just of trust but of distrust too (e.g., Krishnamurthy 2015). The latter must explain how distrust could be a belief that someone is untrustworthy that could exist alongside the belief that the person is trustworthy.

Among the alternatives to doxasticism are theories stating that trust is an emotion, a kind of stance (i.e., the participant stance; Holton 1994), or a disposition (Kappel 2014; cited in Keren 2020). The most commonly held alternative is the first: that trust is an emotion. Reasons in favour of this view include the fact that trust resembles an emotion in having characteristics that are unique to emotions, at least according to an influential account of them (de Sousa 1987; Calhoun 1984; Rorty 1980; Lahno 2001, 2020). For example, emotions narrow our perception to “fields of evidence” that lend support to the emotions themselves (Jones 1996: 11). When we are in the grip of an emotion, we therefore tend to see facts that affirm its existence and ignore those that negate it. To illustrate, if I am really angry at my mother, then I tend to focus on things that justify my anger while ignoring or refusing to see things that make it unjustified. I can only see those other things once my anger subsides. Similarly with trust: if I genuinely trust my mother, my attention falls on those aspects of her that justify my trust and is averted from evidence that suggests she is untrustworthy (Baker 1987). The same sort of thing happens with distrust, according to Jones (Jones 2019). She refers to this phenomenon as “affective looping”, which, in her words, occurs when “a prior emotional state provides grounds for its own continuance” (2019: 956). She also insists that only affective-attitude accounts of trust and distrust can adequately explain it (2019).

There may be a kind of doxastic theory, however, that can account for the affective looping of trust, if not of distrust. Arnon Keren, whose work focuses specifically on trust, defends what he calls an “impurely doxastic” theory. He describes trust as believing in someone’s trustworthiness and responding to reasons (“preemptive” ones) against taking precautions that this person will not be trustworthy (Keren 2020, 2014). Reasons for trust are themselves reasons of this sort, according to Keren; they oppose actions like those of carefully monitoring the behavior of the trustee or weighing the available evidence that this person is trustworthy. The trustor’s response to these preemptive reasons would explain why this person is resistant (or at least not attune) to counter evidence to their trust (Keren 2014, 2020).

Deciding in favour of an affective-attitude theory or a purely or impurely doxastic one is important for understanding features of trust like affective looping. Yet it may have little bearing on whether or how trust can be cultivated. For, regardless of whether trust is a belief or an emotion, presumably we can cultivate it by purposefully placing ourselves in a position that allows us to focus on evidence of people’s trustworthiness. The goal here could be self-improvement: that is, becoming more trusting, in a good way so that we can reap the benefits of justified trust. Alternatively, we might be striving for the improvement of others: making them more trustworthy by trusting them therapeutically. Alternatively still, we could be engaging in “corrective trust”. (See the above discussions of therapeutic and corrective trust.)

This section has centered on how to develop trust and how to account for facts about it such as the blinkered vision of the trustor. Similar facts about distrust were also mentioned: those that concern what kind of mental attitude it is. Theorizing about whether trust and distrust are beliefs, emotions or something else allows us to appreciate why they have certain features and also how to build these attitudes. The process for building them, which may be similar regardless of whether they are beliefs or emotions, will be relevant to people who don’t trust enough or who trust too much.

This entry as a whole has examined an important practical question about trust: “When is trust warranted?” Also woven into the discussion has been some consideration of when distrust is warranted. Centerstage has been given to trust, however, because philosophers have debated it much more than distrust.

Different answers to the question of when trust is warranted give rise to different philosophical puzzles. For example, in response, one could appeal to the nature of trust and trustworthiness and consider whether the conditions are ripe for them (e.g., for the proposed trustor to rely on the trustee’s competence). But one would first have to settle the difficult issue of what trust and trustworthiness are, and more specifically, how they differ from mere reliance and reliability, assuming there are these differences.

Alternatively, in deciding whether trust is warranted, one could consider whether trust would be rationally justified or valuable. One would consider these things simultaneously when rational justification is understood in an end-directed way, making it dependent on trust’s instrumental value. With respect to rational justification alone, puzzles arise when trying to sort out whether reasons for trust must be internal to trustors or could be external to them. In other words, is trust’s epistemology internalist or externalist? Because good arguments exist on both sides, it’s not clear how trust is rationally justified. Neither is it entirely clear what sort of value trust can have, given the nature of it. For example, trust may or may not have intrinsic moral value depending on whether it signals respect for others.

Lastly, one might focus on the fact that trust cannot be warranted when it is impossible, which is the case when the agent does not already exhibit trust and cannot simply will themselves to have it. While trust is arguably not the sort of attitude that one can just will oneself to have, trust can be cultivated. The exact manner or extent to which it can be cultivated, however, may depend again on what sort of mental attitude it is.

Since one can respond to the question, “When is trust warranted?” by referring to each of the above dimensions of trust, a complete philosophical answer to this question is complex. The same is true about the question of when to distrust, because the same dimensions (the epistemology of distrust, its value, etc.) are relevant to it. Complete answers to these broad questions about trust and distrust would be philosophically exciting and also socially important. They would be exciting both because of their complexity and because they would draw on a number of different philosophical areas, including epistemology, philosophy of mind, and value theory. The answers would be important because trust and distrust that are warranted contribute to the foundation of a good society, where people thrive through healthy cooperation with others, become morally mature human beings, and are not subject to social ills like tyranny or oppression.

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• –––, 2013, “Narrative Selves, Relations of Trust, and Bipolar Disorder”, Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology , 20(1): 57–65.
• –––, 2020, “Interpersonal Trust”, in Simon 2020: 243–255.
• Rorty, Amélia Oksenberg, 1980, “Explaining Emotions”, in Explaining Emotions , Amélia Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 103–126.
• Scheman, Nancy, 2020, “Trust and Trustworthiness”, in Simon 2020: 28–40.
• Simon, Judith (ed.), 2020, The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy , New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315542294
• Simpson, Thomas W., 2012, “What Is Trust?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 93(4): 550–569. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01438.x
• Skyrms, Brian, 2008, “Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract”, Synthese , 160(1): 21–25. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9075-3
• Smith, Matthew Noah, 2008, “Terrorism, Shared Rules and Trust”, Journal of Political Philosophy , 16(2): 201–219. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00273.x
• Strawson, P. F., 1962 [1974], “Freedom and Resentment”, Proceedings of the British Academy , 48: 1–25. Reprinted in his Freedom and Resentment , London: Methuen, 1974, pp. 1–25.
• Sullins, John P., 2020, “Trust in Robots”, in Simon 2020: 313–325.
• Tallant, Jonathan, 2017, “Commitment in Cases of Trust and Distrust”, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy , 6(4): 261–267. doi:10.1002/tht3.259
• Townley, Cynthia and Jay L. Garfield, 2013, “Public Trust”, in Trust: Analytic and Applied Perspectives , Pekka Makela and Cynthia Townley (eds), Amsterdam: Rodopi Press, pp. 95–107.
• Ullmann-Margalit, Edna, 2004 [2017], “Trust, Distrust, and In Between”, in Distrust (Russell Sage Foundation series on trust), Russell Hardin (ed.), New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 60–82. Reprinted in her Normal Rationality: Decisions and Social Order , Avishai Margalit and Cass R. Sunstein (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 184–202.
• Uslaner, Eric M., 1999, “Democracy and Social Capital”, in Warren 1999: 121–150. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511659959.005
• Walker, Margaret Urban, 2006, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Wanderer, Jeremy and Leo Townsend, 2013, “Is it Rational to Trust?” Philosophy Compass , 8(1): 1–14. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00533.x
• Warren, Mark E. (ed.), 1999, Democracy and Trust , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511659959
• Webb, Mark Owen, 1992, “The Epistemology of Trust and the Politics of Suspicion”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 73(4): 390–400. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1992.tb00346.x
• –––, 1993, “Why I Know About As Much As You: A Reply to Hardwig”:, The Journal of Philosophy , 90(5): 260–270. doi:10.2307/2940913
• Welch, Shay, 2013, “Transparent Trust and Oppression”, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , 16(1): 45–64. doi:10.1080/13698230.2011.597582
• Wonderly, Monique Lisa, 2016, “On Being Attached”, Philosophical Studies , 173(1): 223–242. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0487-0
• Zaner, Richard M., 1991, “The Phenomenon of Trust in the Patient-Physician Relationship”, in Ethics, Trust, and the Professions: Philosophical and Cultural Aspects , Edmund D. Pellegrino, Robert M. Veatch, and John P. Langan (eds.), Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp. 45–67.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• “ A Question of Trust ”, 2002 BBC Reith Lecture by Onora O’Neill.
• Russell Sage Foundation Program on Trust .
• “ Building Trust ”, by Donald J. Johnston, OECD Observer , December 2003, 240/241.
• “ Trust and Mistrust ”, with Jorah Dannenberg, Philosophy Talk , 29 December 2013.
• “ On Trust and Philosophy ”, OpenLearn, The Open University.
• “ The Philosophy of Trust: Key Findings ”, The Trust Project at Northwestern University.

Aristotle, General Topics: ethics | autonomy: in moral and political philosophy | autonomy: personal | emotion | epistemology: social | faith | feminist philosophy, interventions: social epistemology | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on autonomy | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on the self | friendship | justification, epistemic: internalist vs. externalist conceptions of | reliabilist epistemology | rights: of children | scientific knowledge: social dimensions of | testimony: epistemological problems of

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Julie Ponesse, Ken Chung, and Hale Doguoglu for their research assistance, to Andrew Botterell for his helpful comments, and to the Lupina Foundation and Western University for funding.

Copyright © 2020 by Carolyn McLeod

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Essay on Trust | Importance & Benefits of having Trust in Life

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Sincerity is about being honest with yourself and others, keeping your word and doing the right thing even when no one is watching. People who are not sincere tend to be dishonest and insincere about their feelings and intentions.

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Essay on Trust | Meaning, Purpose & Importance of having Trust in Life

Trust is placing confidence or reliance on someone or something; dependability. Sincerity means genuineness; honesty. So trust and sincerity are two factors that matter in relationships. Trust has to be earned, it isn’t given freely to anyone who requests it. It takes time to earn trust but can be lost in seconds.

Sincerity tends to go hand in hand with trustworthiness. If you want people to trust you, you have to prove that you can be trusted, and if you can’t be trusted, why should people trust you? This is the main difference between trust and sincerity. Trustworthiness implies being reliable and having the competence to do something well. People trust those they can rely on, those who are competent enough and reliable.

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Importance of Trust in Life

Trust is one of the most important factors in any relationship. Without trust, there can be no friendship or love. Trust forms the basis for sympathy and happiness. Trust is the glue that binds people together and space between them.

Trusting someone implies believing in his or her capabilities, so if you trust someone you are giving them the responsibility to do something, and they represent you in that task. If you fail to carry out this responsibility, you will lose the other’s trust. This is why trust is important not only in personal life but also at work, where it is essential to get things done. If you don’t trust someone, there is no point in giving him or her an important assignment.

When you tell a lie to someone, you betray his or her trust. It feels terrible to be betrayed like that. Consequently, people are really careful whom they give their trust to and whom do not. If you lose someone’s trust, it is difficult to regain it again and the relationship may never be the same as it used to be. It is important to realize that if you do not have the trust of others, your life may become very difficult in many ways.

Benefits of Trust in Life

When you trust someone, it means that you believe in his or her abilities and qualities. In fact, you are giving this person the responsibility of representing you in some task that is important to you. If this person fails to carry out this responsibility, he or she will lose your trust and it will be difficult for him or her to regain it. The main benefits of trust are:

• Trust is the basis for all relationships because no relationship can be functional if there is no trust between the involved parties.
• Trust is essential for getting things done efficiently in any field of endeavor.
• When you trust someone, it shows that you believe in his or her capabilities to do something for you.
• You can rely on a trusted person because he or she will never let you down in any situation.
• Trust in a relationship makes it easier for the involved parties to deal with any issues that they may face.

Developing Trust in Life

The only way to develop trust in a relationship is by being trustworthy. If you want people to trust you, you have to prove that you can be trusted, and if you cannot be trusted, why should people trust you? This means that trust is earned. So the first step is to become trustworthy, which means being honest with yourself and others, keeping your word and doing the right thing even when no one is watching.

People who are not sincere tend to be dishonest and insincere about their feelings and intentions. If you want people to trust you, it is a good idea to be sincere about your feelings and intentions towards them. Sincerity tends to go hand in hand with trustworthiness, which means that when you are sincere with someone, he or she is likely to trust you.

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Trust is very important in life because it helps you to get things done efficiently and enjoy healthy relationships.  The only way to gain people’s trust is by being trustworthy. Being trustworthy means having the integrity and honesty to do the right thing even if it means going against your own desires.

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Reviewed by Psychology Today Staff

Trust—or the belief that someone or something can be relied on to do what they say they will—is a key element of social relationships and a foundation for cooperation . It is critical for romantic relationships , friendships, interactions between strangers, and social groups on a large scale, and a lack of trust in such scenarios can come with serious consequences. Indeed, society as a whole would likely fail to function in the absence of trust.

• Why Trust Matters
• Deciding Who to Trust
• The Roots of Distrust
• How to Improve and Repair Trust

The sense that one can depend on another person lays the groundwork for social exchanges yielding benefits like affection, a sense of security, and achievements that would be impossible alone. When trust is absent—or someone betrays the trust that has been invested in them—the possibility of a successful future relationship diminishes.

Trust comes in as many varieties as there are links between people. In well-functioning relationships, individuals can trust that a parent or romantic partner will show them love, that business partners will hold up their end of a deal, and that someone in a position of power will wield it responsibly. To an extent, people also trust complete strangers—doctors, taxi drivers, first-time babysitters—to follow social rules and not to take advantage of them or their loved ones despite the opportunity.

Trust is a cornerstone of any social relationship , whether romantic, professional, or between friends. People who trust each other can work together more effectively at home, at work, or elsewhere. They are also more willing to share intimate information, which can reduce the risk of anxiety and depression and build a stronger sense of self.

Trust is key for collaboration , the open exchange of ideas, and a strong workplace culture. Workplaces high in trust have less turnover, improved relationships, and less susceptibility to groupthink . Workers in low-trust organizations are less likely to speak up or to help others who need it, which can weaken morale and the company’s bottom line.

Trust is, in many ways, the key to social harmony. Group members who trust each other will be more willing to cooperate, and will thus be able to achieve more than individual members alone; trust also cultivates a larger sense of safety and allows individuals to devote energy to social improvements, rather than self-protection.

Because motivations and responses vary widely across situations, it’s likely not possible to say whether or not most people can be trusted  all of the time. However, the belief that most people are generally trustworthy, known as “generalized trust,” appears to be correlated with higher intelligence , better health, and overall life satisfaction.

Trustworthiness is a key element of moral character , along with other positive traits like honesty, courage, and a prediction for fairness. Those who behave with integrity are more likely to earn the trust of others, which is often the cornerstone of a strong first impression and, ultimately, a healthy and rewarding relationship.

Recent neuroscience research on the mechanisms of trust suggests that human brains are naturally prone to trusting others. In one study, brain regions associated with positive emotions and decision-making lit up when someone trusted a close associate to play a game fairly, indicating that feelings of trust trigger social reward centers in the brain.

Yes, levels of trust vary widely between cultures. Americans, for instance, have been found to be more trusting than Germans or the Japanese. Levels of trust can even vary within societies; Northern Italians, for example, have been found to be more willing than Southern Italians to keep money in banks, which indicates greater societal trust.

Trust involves a degree of vulnerability. In trusting that a co-worker will follow through on a promise to help with a project, one risks the possibility that the colleague will renege at the last minute. Trusting a romantic partner to remain faithful opens a person up to the risk of crushing betrayal.

When trust is warranted, however, the return on investment can be great and significantly benefit mental well-being. Thus, the ability to determine who one can and cannot trust—and to appropriately update these perceptions over time—is vital. But it’s often not an easy judgment to make—especially because some individuals excel at winning the trust of people they intend to victimize.

How, then, can we know who to trust? It could be useful to consider specific characteristics when deciding whether, how much, and in what ways to trust another person. Judging someone's intentions can be helpful, but intentions—as well as confidence —can be misleading. Trusting someone to help solve a difficult problem requires that one make an assessment of their competence, too.

Trusting unknown people may seem ill-advised, but it’s something most people do every day. Researchers have proposed several potential explanations for why we trust strangers, including mutual benefit (we trust others based on the assumption that doing so will likely benefit both parties) and social norms (we trust others because we believe we’re expected to).

Trustworthy people share several key traits. The most obvious is their follow-through: they do what they say they will do. Research has also found that trustworthy people, especially leaders, tend to be transparent in their decision-making and motivation , listen to others’ input, and put the interests of others over their own self-interest.

Yes. High levels of certain personality traits, including agreeableness and conscientiousness , consistently predict trustworthiness. Other personality characteristics also play a role; for instance, guilt -proneness, or one’s tendency to anticipate feeling guilt after wrongdoing, is  highly predictive of trustworthiness in one study.

Yes, certain people are unusually prone to trusting others even when there are clear indicators that they are untrustworthy. This is often attributed to personality traits such as high levels of agreeableness or openness . Williams Syndrome, a rare disorder sometimes called the “opposite of autism,” leads those who live with it to treat everyone, even strangers, as trustworthy, which can lead to negative consequences.

Some people can be highly trusting of others, which is often a matter of personality; people higher on the personality trait of agreeableness, for example, tend to more readily indicate that they find other people trustworthy. But for others—particularly those who have been victimized or betrayed in the past—building trust can be a slow, laborious process; for some, it may feel downright impossible.

Many people who are consistently distrusting have good reason for being so. But a tendency not to trust others can have severe consequences in a number of domains—particularly interpersonal relationships—and can exacerbate loneliness , depression, or antisocial behavior. Though mistrustful individuals often feel as though they have a right to feel that way, working with a professional to identify the root cause of trust issues and take steps toward overcoming them can be immensely helpful for improving well-being and cultivating healthy relationships.

Anxiety can make it difficult to know who to trust. But while negative emotions, including anxiety, may result in excessive distrust , that’s not the only possible outcome. In one study, anxious participants actually found it more difficult to recognize untrustworthy people , and continued to collaborate with them even when their behavior did not warrant it.

Chronic distrust—colloquially known as “trust issues”—have several possible sources. For some, early relationships with caregivers taught them that their needs would not be met and that others would continuously let them down. Trauma can also damage trust ; traumatized individuals often find it difficult to let their guard down, even with loved ones. Trust issues may also be a matter of personality; naturally less agreeable people tend to be more prone to distrusting others.

Some people who struggle to trust can pinpoint a specific traumatic event that shattered their worldview. For others, it may be a matter of personality; less agreeable individuals, for instance, tend to be less trusting. Distrust may also be due to neglectful or distant caregivers relaying early-life messages that others cannot be consistently relied on.

Feeling eternally distrusted by a partner can be enormously painful. In some cases, personality disorders (such as borderline personality disorder ) may lead people to “test” their partner’s trustworthiness with repeated accusations. Other distrustful partners may have been hurt in the past, or grew up in an environment where a trusting nature was taken advantage of. 

On an interpersonal level, the ability to trust others who have earned it—and, in certain instances, to repair trust after it’s been broken—are essential to emotional well-being and strong, healthy relationships. On a larger scale, improving trust between group members can help workplaces, organizations, and societies function more smoothly by increasing social harmony and laying the groundwork for heightened productivity .

While improving trust isn’t always easy—and takes serious dedication from all parties involved—it is possible the majority of the time. Moving slowly when necessary, communicating honestly, and following through on promises are all key to building trust, whether between individuals, within an organization, or between countries.

Romantic partners, friends, or family members can build trust in their relationship through mutual respect; open, honest communication; engaging in an equal amount of give and take; and gradually displaying more vulnerability around each other. Following through on promises consistently also helps to build trust over time.

Yes, but it can be difficult. Betrayed individuals who are struggling to trust may find it helpful to work with a therapist. They can also take “calculated risks” around those they are considering trusting—sharing a small bit of intimate information and observing how it is received and how they feel—before gradually increasing their investment.

Partners can regain trust after infidelity through a process of rigorous honesty—from both parties—and through the slow, deliberate demonstration that the trust-breaker is sorry, has taken responsibility for their actions, and can be counted on going forward. Working with a therapist can help many couples navigate this process in a healthy, respectful way.

Learning to trust oneself requires self-compassion and patience. Many people who don’t trust their own instincts or second-guess their choices received early-life messages that they were unimportant, unintelligent, or otherwise “bad.” Deliberately identifying and challenging those messages—with the help of a trusted therapist, if necessary—is necessary to regaining self-trust.

Those looking to trust again—either after a significant betrayal or after a lifetime of smaller hurts —are advised to cultivate open, honest communication while gradually increasing the level of vulnerability they display with others. Once someone has demonstrated that they can be trusted with small intimacies, it will feel easier to let one’s guard down further.

While it’s not always possible for trust issues to be “cured,” their effects can certainly be lessened. Therapy , as well as a deliberate focus on practicing self-compassion and vulnerability, can help someone lessen their natural tendency to distrust others and build (or rebuild) healthy relationships.

Organizations can increase trust by promoting accountability, making both progress and setbacks public, engaging in ethical practices at each level of the organization, and seeking and incorporating input from all employees. After a misstep, those responsible can help restore trust by owning the mistake and outlining a clear plan for stopping it from recurring.

Building societal trust is both a top-down and a bottom-up process. From the top, governments can promote trust by increasing transparency around decision-making, not tolerating corruption, and encouraging and incorporating community input. From the bottom, positive actions that build “social capital” —like volunteering, altruism , and cooperation—have been associated with increased societal trust.

While we may romanticize the “perfect” partnership, relationships require effort, and both partners must work on it.

Modern marriage has evolved from a pragmatic arrangement to a romantic partnership. The happiest ones prioritize friendship, communication, respect, trust, and a growth mindset.

If you've been hurt in the past, it is natural to put up protective walls. Unfortunately, these walls keep everyone out—even safe people. Learn how to let others in again.

Sympathy sex isn't as good for you as it may feel in the moment. Here's why.

Learning that a coworker you thought of as a friend has betrayed you can be just as painful as being let down by a friend from another part of your life.

Four types of relationship behaviors can go awry when people have difficulty trusting others.

This could be the year in which our evolving understanding of happiness inspires us to elect happy people and change the world for the better.

The emotional, psychological, and physical repercussions of financial infidelity can affect the spouse who has concealed their actions in addition to the betrayed spouse.

We should use our technology to enhance our capacities for trust. We are not doing this well, and we run the risk of misusing technology by generating mistrust.

Personal Perspective: What does it take to make an atheist into a pantheist? A trip inside.

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Home — Essay Samples — Life — Life Experiences — Trust

Essays on Trust

The importance of writing an essay on trust.

Writing an essay on trust is important because it allows individuals to explore the concept of trust in depth and understand its significance in various aspects of life. Trust is the foundation of healthy relationships, effective teamwork, and successful businesses. By writing an essay on trust, one can delve into its definition, factors that influence trust, and the impact of trust on personal and professional relationships.

When writing an essay on trust, it is essential to start with a clear and concise that outlines the importance of trust and provides a brief overview of what will be discussed in the essay. The body of the essay should explore different aspects of trust, such as the role of trust in interpersonal relationships, the impact of trust on organizational culture, and the importance of trust in leadership.

It is important to support the arguments with relevant examples and evidence to validate the points being made. Additionally, it is crucial to consider the opposing viewpoints and address them in a balanced manner to present a comprehensive understanding of trust.

Furthermore, when concluding the essay, it is vital to summarize the key points and reiterate the significance of trust in various contexts. A strong leaves a lasting impression on the reader and reinforces the importance of trust in personal and professional life.

Overall, writing an essay on trust is important as it allows individuals to gain a deeper understanding of the concept and its implications. By following these writing tips, one can effectively convey the significance of trust and its impact on relationships and society.

• The Importance of Trust in Personal Relationships

Trust is the foundation of any healthy and successful relationship. Whether it's a romantic partnership, friendship, or familial bond, trust is essential for building and maintaining strong connections with others. In this essay, we will explore the role of trust in personal relationships and the impact it has on our overall well-being.

• Trust in the Workplace: Building a Positive Organizational Culture

Trust is a crucial component of a positive and productive work environment. When employees trust their leaders and colleagues, they are more likely to collaborate effectively, communicate openly, and perform at their best. This essay will examine the importance of trust in the workplace and how it contributes to a positive organizational culture.

• The Role of Trust in Leadership

Effective leadership is built on a foundation of trust. Leaders who are able to inspire trust in their team members are more likely to have their support and loyalty. In this essay, we will discuss the characteristics of trustworthy leaders and the impact of trust on organizational success.

• Trust and Ethical Decision Making

Trust and ethical behavior go hand in hand. When individuals trust that others will act with integrity and honesty, they are more likely to engage in ethical decision-making themselves. This essay will explore the relationship between trust and ethical behavior, and how trust influences the choices we make in our personal and professional lives.

• The Psychology of Trust: Understanding the Science Behind Trust

Trust is a complex psychological and emotional concept. In this essay, we will delve into the science behind trust, including the factors that contribute to the development of trust, the role of oxytocin in building trust, and the impact of trust on our mental and emotional well-being.

• Trust and Technology: Navigating the Digital Age

In an increasingly digital world, trust plays a significant role in our interactions with technology and online platforms. This essay will examine the challenges and opportunities of building trust in the digital age, including the impact of trust on e-commerce, social media, and cybersecurity.

• Rebuilding Trust: Strategies for Restoring Broken Relationships

Trust can be fragile, and when it is broken, it can be difficult to rebuild. In this essay, we will explore the strategies and techniques for restoring trust in relationships, including communication, accountability, and forgiveness.

• Trust and Diversity: Fostering Inclusive and Trusting Communities

Building trust in diverse and multicultural communities is essential for creating inclusive and equitable societies. This essay will discuss the connection between trust and diversity, and the importance of fostering trust in building cohesive and harmonious communities.

• The Economics of Trust: Exploring the Link Between Trust and Economic Development

Trust has a significant impact on economic development and prosperity. In this essay, we will examine the relationship between trust and economic growth, including the role of trust in fostering investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation.

• Trust and Health: The Impact of Trust on Well-being and Healing

Trust plays a crucial role in the patient-provider relationship and the delivery of healthcare services. This essay will explore the connection between trust and health, including the impact of trust on patient outcomes, adherence to treatment plans, and overall well-being.

• Trust and Education: Building Trusting and Supportive Learning Environments

Trust is essential for creating a positive and supportive learning environment. In this essay, we will discuss the importance of trust in education, including the impact of trust on student-teacher relationships, academic achievement, and school culture.

• Trust and Government: The Role of Trust in Political Stability and Governance

Trust is a key factor in maintaining political stability and effective governance. This essay will examine the relationship between trust and government, including the impact of trust on public institutions, democratic processes, and citizen engagement.

• Trust and Conflict Resolution: The Role of Trust in Building Peaceful Societies

Trust is essential for resolving conflicts and building peaceful societies. In this essay, we will explore the connection between trust and conflict resolution, including the role of trust-building initiatives, reconciliation processes, and peacebuilding efforts.

• Trust and Media: Building Credible and Trustworthy Information Sources

In today's digital age, trust in media and information sources is more important than ever. This essay will discuss the role of trust in media, including the impact of trust on journalism, news consumption, and the spread of misinformation.

• Trust and the Environment: Fostering Trust in Environmental Conservation and Sustainability

Trust is a crucial factor in promoting environmental conservation and sustainability. In this essay, we will examine the connection between trust and environmental initiatives, including the role of trust in building partnerships, promoting environmental stewardship, and addressing global environmental challenges.

• Trust and Technology: Navigating the Ethical and Privacy Implications of Trust

In an era of rapid technological advancement, trust in technology has become a pressing issue. This essay will explore the ethical and privacy implications of trust in technology, including the impact of trust on data security, privacy protection, and ethical use of technology.

• Trust and Social Justice: The Role of Trust in Promoting Equity and Inclusion

Trust is essential for promoting social justice and addressing systemic inequalities. In this essay, we will discuss the connection between trust and social justice, including the impact of trust on inclusive policies, diversity initiatives, and advocacy for marginalized communities.

• Trust and International Relations: Building Trust in Diplomacy and Global Cooperation

Trust is a crucial component of international relations and diplomacy. This essay will examine the role of trust in global cooperation, including the impact of trust on diplomatic negotiations, conflict resolution, and international alliances.

• Trust and Artificial Intelligence: Navigating the Ethical and Trustworthiness of AI

As artificial intelligence becomes more prevalent in our daily lives, trust in AI systems has become a pressing concern. This essay will discuss the ethical and trustworthiness implications of AI, including the impact of trust on AI adoption, algorithmic bias, and ethical AI development.

• Trust and Faith: Exploring the Intersection of Trust and Religion

Trust plays a significant role in religious faith and spirituality. In this essay, we will examine the intersection of trust and religion, including the impact of trust on religious communities, spiritual beliefs, and the search for meaning and purpose.

Trust is a multifaceted and essential aspect of human interaction and society. These essay topics provide a rich and diverse exploration of the role of trust in various domains, from personal relationships and leadership to technology and global cooperation. By delving into these topics, we can gain a deeper understanding of the power and significance of trust in shaping our lives and the world around us.

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Analysis of the reasons of orgon’s trust in tartuffe in molière’s play, an objectivist approach to honesty over white lies, trust: definition, components and significance, trust vs. mistrust examples, the landlady roald dahl summary, relevant topics.

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Why Is Trust So Important?

We often take trust for granted, until it is broken, psychologist and author chris skellett explores the three dimensions of trust: in oneself, in relationships, and in the world, if your trust has been broken and you need to talk to someone, find a therapist here  .

Trust is like oxygen. It’s all around us. It is an absolute necessity for living a healthy life. When we live in a trusting world, we take it for granted and we hardly realise that it is there.

But take away trust and we are suddenly gasping for survival. A sudden accident or trauma, a partner’s infidelity, or a business deal turned sour…these kinds of experience all lead to a major re-think of how we see the world. Suddenly we find ourselves questioning everything.

Our complacent assumptions of a safe and predictable world are shattered. We become suspicious, fearful, and full of self-doubt. We feel betrayed. We can no longer trust our judgements about the world. What had once seemed so straightforward and simple now becomes complicated and confusing.

We start to assume mistrust , and this inevitably takes us into a confusing world of insecurity and second guessing. We look for hidden agendas, unexpected consequences, and dark motives. At its worst, we become paranoid. A world without trust is riddled with avoidance, negativity and fear.

We speak so often about trust, but few of us have any idea as to how it can be usefully managed and conceptualised. 

For example:

• Is it something that we should give freely, or is it something that must be earned?
• Is it something that lies within ourselves (“ I have great trust in him ”) or within others (“ He is completely trustworthy ”)?
• Are we being excessively naïve when we trust, or are we being overly cautious when we don’t trust?

It turns out that the more that we stop to think about trust, the less we seem to understand what it is.

I define trust as   an assumption of predictable and affirming outcomes . This suggests that when we trust, we are assuming that what we expect to happen will actually happen, and that events will generally work out favourably for us.

By defining trust as an assumption, it becomes something that we choose to do and is therefore something over which we can gain active control.

Assumptions of trust are generally forward looking. We see that essentially they are about managing future risk. They require us to make best guess estimates about the probability of a positive or a negative outcome.

Trust operates in a world of optimism, pessimism, and general uncertainty. It is a subjective world based on one’s personal belief about the future, and encompasses the powerful emotions of hope, fear and despair.

The three dimensions of trust

There are three domains of trust to consider:

In t rusting ourselves , we trust ourselves to make good decisions, to perform competently, and to manage ourselves well. We trust ourselves to keep good boundaries with the world around us, and the people that we meet.  We also trust ourselves to remember our past effectively, and to plan well for the future.  We are confident.

In trusting our relationships with others , we trust others to act in our best interests, to respect us, and to be honest. Trust is widely acknowledged as a necessary platform for any healthy relationship.

In trusting our world , we trust our world to be predictable and to be safe. We assume that the natural rhythms and patterns of events will unfold as we expect. We also trust that the way we view the world is essentially correct, and that what we believe to be true is actually the truth.

Clinical problems will usually arise when our trust in one or more of the domains has been compromised.

The core domain to nurture should always be to trust in oneself . It is the key to personal resilience. Because if we keep trust in ourselves following adversity, we can always dust ourselves down and rise again… 

Chris Skellett is the author of  The Power of the Second Question

Further reading

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Relationships Articles & More

How to rebuild trust, a recent study suggests that our beliefs about human nature strongly influence how trusting we are..

“Love all, but trust a few,” wrote Shakespeare. But how do we decide whether to trust someone after they’ve violated our trust?

According to a recent study, our ability to restore trust in someone depends not on that person’s qualities but on our personal beliefs about whether moral character can change over time.

In the study, published in Psychological Science , researchers randomly distributed one of two types of essays to participants. One essay advocated an “incremental” view of moral character, suggesting that character can change over time; another promoted an “entity” view of character, suggesting that character is fixed and not changeable.

The researchers found that these essays had a subtle but important effect on participants’ beliefs: Participants who’d read about the incremental view rated moral character as significantly more malleable than did participants who’d learned about the entity view.

To test how these beliefs actually affect people’s actions, the researchers then gave participants six dollars, which they could share with a partner. Whatever they shared was then tripled, and the partner could either keep all the money for themselves or give half of the tripled amount ($9) back to the participant.

The experiment unfolded over seven rounds, in three stages. In the first three rounds, the partners (who were actually working with the researchers) returned no money to the participants, eroding their trust.

Before the fourth round, the partners sent an apologetic message to the participants (“Hey, sorry I gave you a bad deal. I can change and return $9 from here on out.”), and in rounds four through six, they tried to rebuild trust by making good on their promise to split the money evenly.

After those six rounds were completed, the researchers wanted to know: How much would the participants trust their partner in the final, seventh round?

They found that participants who’d been led to believe that people can change were more likely to give away their $6 than the participants who’d been told that character is fixed.

Based on their results, the authors infer that participants who absorbed the incremental view of human behavior trusted their partners more because they thought those partners were capable of acting more honestly in the future, regardless of what they’d done in the past.

The authors note that relatively few studies have explored why some people are very slow to forgive and others re-establish trust quickly. They conclude that, ultimately, if you’re trying to rebuild trust with someone, their mindset and general beliefs about moral character may be just as important as the actions you take to regain their trust.

So if that person is open to the idea that people can change, they write, they may be especially receptive to a promise that you’ll act differently in the future.

What’s more, this study suggests that it’s even possible to influence people’s thinking about human nature, making them more or less open to the idea that you won’t betray their trust again. In that sense, an apology can be more effective if it includes a message about how readily people can change.

About the Author

Anahid modrek.

Anahid Modrek is a Greater Good research assistant.

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Essay Samples on Trust

Understanding the impact of broken trust in human relationships.

We all have emotional needs, please consider basic survival needs such as water, air, food, and shelter. Meeting these physical needs means you can live, but you need more to make life meaningful. You can see or touch things like friendship, feelings, security, or appreciation,...

• Communication in Relationships
• Relationship

The Importance of Trust in Building Strong Workplace Relationships

Trust is built on consistency as we interact with different kinds of individuals and build relationships with them based on desire behaviors and attitudes. A lack of trust leads to the desire to control a situation oneself as you believe the only person you can...

• Organizational Culture

Reasons to Be Hardworking, Forgiving, Honest and Trustworthy

Being forgiving is a difficult trait to have especially if someone damaged one badly. The time when the person I trusted the most in the world, my best friend stole from my family and stabbed me in the back, it taught me that in order...

• Forgiveness

Maintaining Trust: Importance of Telling the Truth

Have you ever wondered if lying is right or wrong? Have you ever lied and been tricked into telling the truth? Most people have been tricked by pretty much everyone. Lying according to research is always wrong. Most people feel guilty about lying and almost...

• Communication

The Link Between Apologies and the Willingness of Low Status Groups to Seek Help

This work extends research on intergroup apology by examining the influence of an apology on the willingness of low status group members to seek assistance from the high status outgroup. In line with our hypothesis, we found that under unstable status relations, Israeli Arab participants...

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Organizational Trust And National Culture And Trust

Organizational trust is impacted by the reality that there has been eroding confidence levels in multiple stratas of society. In addition, this erosion in confidence has been evidenced by waning trust hinted at by Furedi (1997), who suggests that “human beings appear to have lost...

• Organization

Trust As The Missing Root Relating To Education, Institutions And Economic Development

The institution being studied was established on with the goals of training persons for competent service and the world of work. The core values of the institution were based on philosophies centred on trust. Years after its establishment, that selected tertiary institution is struggling with...

Trust In Relation To Gender & To Years Of Service, Trust And Category Of Worker

Xie and Peng, in their work emphazised how corporations can repair customer trust following negative publicity. They contend that, especially in handling crisis situations, when there are distinct trusting targets needing varying levels of handling of trust repair, competence-based, benevolence-based and integrity-based trust are compulsory....

Overview Of The Main Thrusts In Negotiation

Negotiation is a deliberate procedure including diverse performing actors with various interests or objectives, distinctive dispositions and procedures prompting a circumstance were individuals are attempting to change these distinctions with a specific end goal to achieve an understanding. The willing ness to discover an answer...

• Negotiation

The Road By Cormac McCarthey: The Theme Of Trust In The Book

When I started reading I was doing as I had no choice. Though after reading the first few pages I wanted to keep going out of curiosity. The boy and his papa had me wondering how the story ends in there horrible cannibalism world. Their...

The Theme of Trust in "The Legend" by Marie Lu

“Trust but verify,” this was a famous quote said by the 40th U.S President, Ronald Reagan. June, one of the main characters in the book, Legend, learns how to apply this lesson to herself. In the novel, June is a 15-year-old, patriotic girl who has...

• Literature Review

Best topics on Trust

1. Understanding the Impact of Broken Trust in Human Relationships

2. The Importance of Trust in Building Strong Workplace Relationships

3. Reasons to Be Hardworking, Forgiving, Honest and Trustworthy

4. Maintaining Trust: Importance of Telling the Truth

5. The Link Between Apologies and the Willingness of Low Status Groups to Seek Help

6. Organizational Trust And National Culture And Trust

7. Trust As The Missing Root Relating To Education, Institutions And Economic Development

8. Trust In Relation To Gender & To Years Of Service, Trust And Category Of Worker

9. Overview Of The Main Thrusts In Negotiation

10. The Road By Cormac McCarthey: The Theme Of Trust In The Book

11. The Theme of Trust in “The Legend” by Marie Lu

• Perseverance
• Personal Experience
• Personality
• Reconstruction

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Beyond Intractability

The Hyper-Polarization Challenge to the Conflict Resolution Field: A Joint BI/CRQ Discussion BI and the Conflict Resolution Quarterly invite you to participate in an online exploration of what those with conflict and peacebuilding expertise can do to help defend liberal democracies and encourage them live up to their ideals.

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By Roy J. Lewicki Edward C. Tomlinson

December 2003  

Trust- Overview

The phenomenon of trust has been extensively explored by a variety of disciplines across the social sciences, including economics, social psychology, and political science. The breadth of this literature offers rich insight, and this is noted in the common elements that appear in the definition of trust.

For example, Rousseau and her colleagues offer the following definition: "Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another."[1] Similarly, Lewicki and his colleagues describe trust as "an individual's belief in, and willingness to act on the basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another."[2]

The need for trust arises from our interdependence with others. We often depend on other people to help us obtain, or at least not to frustrate, the outcomes we value (and they on us). As our interests with others are intertwined, we also must recognize that there is an element of risk involved insofar as we often encounter situations in which we cannot compel the cooperation we seek. Therefore, trust can be very valuable in social interactions.

Trust has been identified as a key element of successful conflict resolution (including negotiation and mediation ). This is not surprising insofar as trust is associated with enhanced cooperation , information sharing, and problem solving.

Origins and Development of Trust

Armed with a definition of trust and a description of the benefits it brings, we now turn to examine its origins and development. Theory on the origins of interpersonal trust has proceeded broadly along three fronts: (1) explaining differences in the individual propensity to trust, (2) understanding dimensions of trustworthy behavior, and (3) suggesting levels of trust development.

Individual propensity to trust

Personality theorists have developed one of the oldest theoretical perspectives on trust, and argued that some people are more likely to trust than others. Viewed as a fairly stable trait over time, trust is regarded as a generalized expectancy that other people can be relied on. This expectancy is a function of the degree to which trust has been honored in that individual's history of prior social interactions, and may have its most pronounced effect in novel or ambiguous situations. While this expectancy shapes perceptions of the character of people in general, more recent work has identified the characteristics of trustees that allow for the formation of trust and its growth to higher levels.

Dimensions of trustworthy behavior

Our trust in another individual can be grounded in our evaluation of his/her ability, integrity, and benevolence. That is, the more we observe these characteristics in another person, our level of trust in that person is likely to grow.

Ability refers to an assessment of the other's knowledge, skill, or competency. This dimension recognizes that trust requires some sense that the other is able to perform in a manner that meets our expectations.

Integrity is the degree to which the trustee adheres to principles that are acceptable to the trustor. This dimension leads to trust based on consistency of past actions, credibility of communication, commitment to standards of fairness, and the congruence of the other's word and deed.

Benevolence is our assessment that the trusted individual is concerned enough about our welfare to either advance our interests, or at least not impede them. The other's perceived intentions or motives of the trustee are most central. Honest and open communication, delegating decisions, and sharing control indicate evidence of one's benevolence.

Although these three dimensions are likely to be linked to each other, they each contribute separately to influence the level of trust in another within a relationship. However, ability and integrity are likely to be most influential early in a relationship, as information on one's benevolence needs more time to emerge. The effect of benevolence will increase as the relationship between the parties grows closer. The next section describes trust development in relationships in more detail.

Levels of trust development

Early theories of trust described it as a unidimensional phenomenon that simply increased or decreased in magnitude and strength within a relationship. However, more recent approaches to trust suggests that trust builds along a continuum of hierarchical and sequential stages, such that as trust grows to 'higher' levels, it becomes stronger and more resilient and changes in character. This is the primary perspective we adopt in the remainder of these essays.

At early stages of a relationship, trust is at a calculus-based level. In other words, an individual will carefully calculate how the other party is likely to behave in a given situation depending on the rewards for being trustworthy and the deterrents against untrustworthy behavior. In this manner, rewards and punishments form the basis of control that a trustor has in ensuring the trustee's behavioral consistency. Individuals deciding to trust the other mentally contemplate the benefits of staying in the relationship with the trustee versus the benefits of 'cheating' on the relationship, and the costs of staying in the relationship versus the costs of breaking the relationship. Trust will only be extended to the other to the extent that this cost-benefit calculation indicates that the continued trust will yield a net positive benefit. Over time, calculus-based trust (CBT) can be built as individuals manage their reputation and assure the stability of their behavior by behaving consistently, meeting agreed-to deadlines, and fulfilling promises. CBT is a largely cognitively-driven trust phenomenon, grounded in judgments of the trustees predictability and reliability.

However, as the parties come to a deeper understanding of each other through repeated interactions, they may become aware of shared values and goals. This allows trust to grow to a higher and qualitatively different level. When trust evolves to the highest level, it is said to function as identification-based trust (IBT). At this stage trust has been built to the point that the parties have internalized each other's desires and intentions. They understand what the other party really cares about so completely that each party is able to act as an agent for the other. Trust at this advanced stage is also enhanced by a strong emotional bond between the parties, based on a sense of shared goals and values. So, in contrast to CBT, IBT is a more emotionally-driven phenomenon, grounded in perceptions of interpersonal care and concern, and mutual need satisfaction.

Violated Expectations

Trust violations occur when the trustor's (i.e., the victim's) confident positive expectations of the trustee (i.e., the offender) are disconfirmed. These violations result in lower subsequent trust, and may reduce the extent to which victims of these violations cooperate with the offender. Research within organizations has shown that trust violations stifle mutual support and information sharing, and even exert negative effects on organizational citizenship behaviors, job performance, turnover, and profits.

The experience of a trust violation is likely to result in the trustor making (1) a cognitive appraisal of the situation and (2) experiencing a distressed emotional state. The cognitive appraisal refers to the victim's assignment of culpability to the offender and the evaluation of the costs associated with the violation. The emotional reaction is likely to be composed of some mixture of anger , disappointment, and/or frustration at oneself for trusting and at the offender for exploiting that trust.

We proceed to consider how violations damage interpersonal trust.

In some cases, a single trust violation may seriously damage or irreparably destroy trust. In other cases, one trust violation may not be that damaging when considered in isolation. Rather, a pattern of violations may be needed to create serious damage to the relationship. In other words, not all trust violations are created equally. So, to analyze the effect of trust violations on a relationship, we need a way to describe how much harm (cognitive and/or emotional) a given violation has created. We will broadly refer to this extent of harm as the Offense Severity, and note that as it increases, it is likely to be met with more active and extreme responses by the trustor (victim), and signal greater harm to interpersonal trust.

For example, minor offenses may be met with simply a reduced level of trust. That is, one may have simply lower trust in another in a given context. The victim will be motivated to avoid transactions with the trustee (offender) in the future, and to withhold further support and cooperation. In situations where the relationship cannot be terminated (e.g., the parties have to continue to interact or work together), the relationship continues as a hollow "shell," a facade of superficial cooperation and/or specific transactions that are tightly controlled. These are relatively passive approaches to low trust management strategies -- i.e., "Okay, you got me. I'm simply not going to trust you any more, even though we have to deal with each other."

As Offense Severity grows, however, the victim is more likely to experience stronger negative cognitive and emotional reactions, including a sense of moral outrage. Serious offenses harm trust severely, often to the point of complete destruction. These serious offenses may also stimulate the rapid growth of distrust . Accordingly, the victim is more likely to engage in more severe reactions to the trust violation, including exacting retribution , escalating the conflict, and/or terminating the relationship .

Offense Severity exists along a continuum from low to high. Offenses can be severe in several ways:

• Magnitude of the offense. The magnitude of the offense is an indication of the seriousness of consequences incurred by the victim. To illustrate, when a dry cleaner loses an old shirt you were planning to replace soon anyway, this may be viewed as a trivial violation of your trust in the dry cleaner. However, it will be much more than a mere nuisance if that dry cleaner damaged a brand new, expensive suit!
• Number of prior violations. When there is a clear pattern of prior trust violations, even if they are each relatively minor when viewed in isolation, the overall pattern may be deemed a serious breach. As the proverbial "straw that broke the camel's back," it is the pattern of trust violations that provides evidence that the offender is not worthy of future trust. However, when there are few past violations, any given trust violation may be viewed as the exception rather than the rule.
• Specific dimension of trust that was violated. Violations of integrity and benevolence are likely to be experienced as more severe and damaging than violations that implicate one's ability. Examples may include intentional deception, purposefully reneging on a promise or obligation, and rude, disrespectful treatment.

At this point, we also wish to point out that trust violations that may be very disruptive to Calculus-Based Trust (CBT) relationships may be viewed as trivial nuisances or not violations at all in Identification-Based Trust (IBT) relationships. Because the relationship itself is the basis for IBT, and because such a major emotional investment goes into creating and sustaining it, the parties are relatively more motivated to maintain them. IBT relationships can become rather resilient to trust violations as long as the violations do not challenge the underlying basis of the relationship. However, when the basis of an IBT relationship becomes called into question by a trust violation (e.g., marital infidelity), this has the potential to devastate the entire relationship .

Rebuilding Trust

Despite the assertions of some scholars that broken trust cannot be repaired, we draw on recent research indicating a more optimistic view. However, we caution that rebuilding trust is not as straightforward as building trust in the first place. After trust has been damaged, there are two key considerations for the victim: (1) dealing with the stress the violation imposed on the relationship, and (2) determining if future violations will occur. After a trust violation and the cognitive and affective fallout that ensues, the first critical question is, is the victim willing to reconcile ? If the victim believes that the violator will not make efforts at righting the wrongs and minimizing future violations, the victim has no incentive to attempt reconciliation and restore trust.

Let us first clarify the distinction between reconciliation and forgiveness . Reconciliation occurs when both parties exert effort to rebuild a damaged relationship, and strive to settle the issues that led to the disruption of that relationship. Reconciliation is a behavioral manifestation of forgiveness, defined as a deliberate decision by the victim to surrender feelings of resentment and grant amnesty to the offender. However, it is possible to forgive someone (release him or her from responsibility for damage he/she has inflicted) without exhibiting a willingness to reconcile the relationship or trust him or her again in the future. An example may be when a battered woman forgives her abuser (as a means of coping and psychological healing ), but does not allow the relationship to continue. Thus, following a trust violation, the trust cannot be rebuilt if the victim is not willing to reconcile. On the other hand, if the victim is willing to reconcile, rebuilding trust in the relationship becomes possible (although not guaranteed). We will now describe this repair process as it relates to CBT and IBT.

Rebuilding CBT

In CBT relationships, expectations of the other party are grounded in a cognitive appraisal of the costs and benefits involved in a given transaction, with minimal emphasis on the emotional investment in the relationship (i.e., emotional concerns are not irrelevant, but just not as central as cognitive concerns). Violations in a CBT relationship involve a focus on the exchange itself and the loss of the specific benefits the victim was relying on from the exchange. In short, in order to repair CBT, parties tend to focus on the impact (i.e., the direct consequences) of the trust violation as the primary issue to address in any repair effort.

Accordingly, it is essential for the offender to take the initiative in stimulating reconciliation, and this is most likely when the offender actually desires to rebuild trust and is skilled at perspective taking (the ability to visualize the world as it appears to someone else). It may be that there were incongruent or unclear expectations between the parties that can be quickly clarified. Alternatively, there may be some explanation or justification that places the unexpected behavior in context such that the event is no longer perceived by the victim as a violation. For example, pushing someone to the ground so a car won't hit him or her would reframe an otherwise hostile act as an act of trustworthiness. Finally, apologies and promises signal remorse and assurance for the future, respectively. These are important forms of communication that help to restore balance in the relationship and convince the victim that it will be safe to trust again in the future.

This repair may involve acts of restitution that compensate the victim for the specific consequences of a violation. Restitution also carries important symbolism in that the offender is actually trying to redeem his/her trustworthiness with concrete actions. In CBT relationships, actions may speak louder than words, so it is imperative for the offender to honor trust in subsequent interactions with tangible offerings designed to restore ' fairness ' in the relationship.

Notice that while communication and action are both central elements to reconciliation and trust recovery, the repair process for CBT is dominantly a material, transactional effort. To illustrate, simply giving someone a hug after this type of violation is not likely to help, and may in fact make things worse. Tangible reparation has to occur.

Rebuilding IBT

In contrast, in IBT relationships, trust of the other party is grounded in the shared interests and values of the parties and their collective emotional investment in the relationship. Thus, violations may lead the victim to conclude that the parties are not as 'together' as they once may have appeared. Compared to the exchange of tangible resources in a CBT relationship, IBT relationships are more heavily grounded in intangible resources such as perceptions of mutual attraction, support and caring for each other . Therefore, in contrast to the focus on impact in CBT violations, violations of IBT lead the victim to question the intent (i.e., motives and desires) of the other party that prompted the perceived betrayal. As mentioned earlier, IBT relationships are often resilient to transactional discrepancies that would be sufficient to seriously damage a CBT relationship, as long as the identification with the other party is not called into question. Since an IBT violation threatens the very basis of identification with the other, the victim's reaction to the violation involves the feeling that he/she may no longer really 'know' the offender after all. Feelings of abandonment, estrangement, and alienation may not be uncommon.

For the offender to re-establish perceptions of his/her benevolent intent, the offender should quickly and voluntarily offer a thorough and sincere apology which conveys remorse for harm inflicted, an explanation of the details surrounding the betrayal, and a promise of future cooperation. Further, it is critical for the parties to substantively reaffirm their commitment to each other and to the ideals and values upon which the relationship is built. The offender should explicitly recommit to the relationship, and discuss strategies to avoid similar problems in the future.

As before, both communication and action are essential to the trust rebuilding process, but IBT repair involves an emotional, relational focus. For example, simply paying some form of material compensation may not be sufficient to re-assert shared values and rebuild the common sense of identity that was the foundation of the trust.

Practical Implications for Building Trust

What individuals can do.

It should be noted that trust building is a bilateral process that requires mutual commitment and effort, especially when attempting to de-escalate conflict . Nonetheless, there are several ways individuals can act on their own to initiate or encourage the trust building process. This is accomplished by either taking steps to minimize the risk that the other party will act in untrustworthy ways (also see the essay on distrust ), or by policing one's own actions to ensure they are perceived as evidence of trustworthiness.

At the CBT level, individuals can take several steps to strengthen another's trust in them, particularly when these steps are performed repeatedly and within several different contexts of the relationship.

• Perform competently. One should perform one's duties and obligations competently. Individuals should continuously strive to demonstrate proficiency in carrying out their obligations. In some cases, this may entail updating skills and abilities as technology advances. As others contemplate how much to trust you, they will assess your qualifications and ability to perform.
• Establish consistency and predictability. We can enhance the degree to which others will regard us as trustworthy when we behave in consistent and predictable ways. Every effort should be made to ensure that our words are congruent with our subsequent actions and that we honor pledged commitments. Our integrity is reinforced to the extent that we Do What We Say We Will Do (DWWSWWD).
• Communicate accurately, openly and transparently. In addition, one should act openly--that is, be clear about the intentions and motives for one's actions. This helps the other party calculate our trustworthiness accurately, because we are willing to act transparently and to be monitored for compliance.
• Share and delegate control. Trust often needs to be given for it to be returned. There is symbolic value in soliciting input and sharing decision control with others . Likewise, when such control is hoarded and others feel that they are not trusted (such as with monitoring and surveillance systems), they may be more likely to act out against this with behaviors that reinforce a distrustful image.
• Show concern for others. The trust others have in you will grow when you show sensitivity to their needs , desires, and interests. Acting in a way that respects and protects other people, and refraining from engaging in self-interested pursuits to the detriment of others will also contribute greatly to the trust others place in you. When you violate someone's trust, they deem that you are acting in your own self-interest. Accordingly, their attention will be diverted to their own self-interest and self-protection rather than on conflict resolution.

At the IBT level, prescriptions for trust building entail a number of additional steps.

• Establish a common name and identity. Nurturing a common identity creates a sense of unity that can further strengthen trust. Engage in talk and actions that build a sense of 'we' rather than 'me'. A common name and shared identity reduces divisiveness and encourages individuals to work together.
• Capitalize on co-location. As conflicting parties co-locate, their more frequent interaction can help them get to know one another better, strengthen their perceived common identity, and reduce distrust by exposing false stereotypes and prejudices . When used in conjunction with the recommendation above, co-location may demonstrate to the parties that they have more commonalities than differences.
• Create joint products and goals. Working toward the collective achievement of superordinate goals fosters a feeling of "one-ness" that can bring the parties together in a way that strengthens a salient, shared identity. Parties create and build products, services and activities that define their commonality and uniqueness.
• Promote shared values and emotional attraction. Individuals should model a concern for other people by getting to know them, engaging in active listening , showing a focus on their interests, recognizing the contributions of others, and demonstrating confidence in other's abilities.

What the Media Can Do

The media can play an important role in the trust building process by using news reporting as a way to increase the value of established, functional trust while simultaneously encouraging the parties not to violate that trust. Journalism aimed at wide audiences encourages parties to place more value on their reputations, as good reputations carry additional benefits, while bad reputations carry heightened costs. The media can also create and report stories, which build trust by featuring common identities, values, and concerns across diverse populations. In some cases, the media can also act as a third party that can facilitate greater openness and transparency. The parties can potentially use this forum to provide evidence of the compliance and trustworthiness of conflicting parties. For example, the media frequently uses consumer advocate reporting to investigate disputes between consumers and service providers. Finally, the media can promote accurate information of the parties in order to dispel inaccurate and negative stereotypes that forestall any trust-building efforts.

What the Educational System Can Do

Educators can assist by using classroom experiences such as dialog groups, problem-solving workshops , simulations and role-plays to practice trust-building at various stages of relationships. Subsequent debriefing sessions can also highlight how students manage their emotional reactions in the trust building process (i.e., making the conversion from suspicion and fear to benevolence and hope). These experiences have the benefit of allowing students to develop their trust building skills in a safe environment that is somewhat detached from more emotionally-charged and less controlled environments where trust may be hard to establish and easy to break.

Practical Implications for Rebuilding Trust

As we have noted earlier, effective trust repair is often necessary to resolve conflicts. Although this process is difficult, there are steps the offender can take to enhance the likelihood of stimulating the victim's willingness to reconcile, and further the trust rebuilding process. However, we stress that rebuilding trust is a process, not an event. As such, it is likely to consume a lot of time and resources. Containing conflict in the short term may be confined to managing distrust . Nonetheless, we offer several recommendations for rebuilding trust in both CBT and IBT relationships.

For rebuilding CBT, the following steps are suggested:

• Take immediate action after the violation. Offenders should act quickly to engage in restorative efforts . This communicates sensitivity to the victim and the relationship, and avoids the double-burden the victim has to incur by both suffering the consequences of the violation and having to confront the offender with the consequences of his behavior.
• Provide an apology , and give a thorough account of what happened. Take responsibility for your actions if you are culpable, and express remorse for the harm that the victim endured because of the violation. Your remorse indicates to the victim that you have also suffered as a result of your actions, and the victim may be less likely to pursue vengeance and escalate the conflict. Also, be sure to carefully explain the circumstances that led to the violation, so the victim can understand the events that led you to your decisions. This will help them see the rationale behind your actions and give them a better sense of the values and parameters that are likely to shape your actions in the future.
• Be sincere. The victim is closely scrutinizing your motives and intentions, so it is imperative to sincerely strive to repair the harm from the violation. Take action unilaterally and volitionally, and make every effort to show through your words and actions that you genuinely desire to earn the victim's trust again.
• Be cognizant of the day-to-day history of the relationship. If the overall history of the relationship is good, and there are few if any past trust violations, the prospects for trust repair are more promising than in relationships characterized by many trust violations or few trust-confirming events. Make it a priority to honor trust on a daily basis in order to provide a conducive environment for trust repair should the need arise.
• Provide restitution/penance . Substantiate your verbal claims with concrete actions that demonstrate a good-faith effort to compensate the victim for the harmful effects of the violation. In CBT relationships, what the victim wants more than your kind words is some tangible aspect of the transaction that he/she was counting on.
• Restate and renegotiate expectations for the future, and be trustworthy in future interactions. You are likely to be on "probation" for a period, as the victim tests the waters to see if you actually resume trustworthy behavior. Be sure to take this into account, and take proactive steps to manage the expectations of the victim by specifically articulating what standards should be expected. Then commit to following these standards in the future.

In IBT relationships, the following steps should also be followed:

• Reaffirm commitment to the relationship. Reassert shared goals and interests, as well as the value placed on the relational bond between the parties. Re-establish the affective connection in the relationship by expressing your emotional attachment to the other party, and strive to demonstrate that the relationship is a top priority. You can re-gain credibility as you make clear sacrifices that establish the primacy of the relationship over your own self-interest.

A number of other helpful suggestions may be found in the essay on distrust .

Finally, we also wish to highlight possible obstacles to the trust rebuilding process. One of the most common is that some people are not clearly 'attuned' to other people's reactions, and hence do not understand when their behavior has violated someone else's trust. Thus, some individuals may have limited perspective-taking skills that make them less able to understand the consequences of trust violations they enact. Moreover, these same people may not know how to take the appropriate corrective action in order to begin to rebuild the other's trust. There is also an important psychological role for taking responsibility for one's actions, communicating remorse, and going to special lengths to compensate victims for harm inflicted by the offender. These types of restorative actions may threaten one's ego or self-esteem, and the expected benefits derived from such actions may not be deemed to be worth the expected costs for some individuals.

Another aspect to consider is the legal implications of our guidance. While apologies convey remorse and responsibility that aids in the trust rebuilding process, they also admit culpability that can be legally problematic. If trust rebuilding is the priority, the offender will have critical decisions to make regarding whether and how to apologize. Once again, there may be instances where the costs associated with trust rebuilding are unfortunately outweighed (for better or worse) by other considerations, such as minimizing legal liability.

While the media cannot directly rebuild trust between the parties, they can facilitate dialog and provide documentation of trust-rebuilding efforts. Reparative efforts by offenders may carry additional weight when conducted voluntarily and in a public forum. Knowing the risks to one's reputation by publicizing a complete account may provide additional credence and demonstrate sincerity. Media outlets may best provide this type of public forum.

As with trust-building initiatives, the educational system can help parties rebuild trust by promoting workshops and dialog groups that bring the parties together. Safe and structured programs can allow the victims to articulate their interests and expectations, and how these interests and expectations were violated, as well as provide the offender with an environment that can facilitate their efforts at reconciliation and trust repair.

[1] Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., and Camerer, C. (1998). "Not so Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust," in Academy of Management Review, 23, 393-404.

[2] Lewicki, R. J., McAllister, D. J., & Bies, R. J. (1998). Trust and distrust: New relationships and realities. Academy of Management Review, 23, 438-458.

Use the following to cite this article: Lewicki, Roy J. and Edward C. Tomlinson. "Trust and Trust Building." Beyond Intractability . Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: December 2003 < http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/trust-building >.

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Essay on Trust And Honesty

Students are often asked to write an essay on Trust And Honesty in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Trust And Honesty

What is trust.

Trust is when you believe someone will do what they say. It’s like when you think your friend will keep a secret. Trust is important because it makes you feel safe and happy with others.

What is Honesty?

Honesty means telling the truth. It’s when you don’t hide things or lie to make yourself look better. Being honest helps everyone understand each other better.

Why They Matter

Trust and honesty are key in friendships and family. They help us rely on each other. Without them, we feel unsure and alone. So, being honest builds trust, and together, they make strong relationships.

250 Words Essay on Trust And Honesty

Trust and honesty: cornerstones of strong relationships.

Trust and honesty are like two sides of a coin. They are inseparable and essential for building strong and lasting relationships. Without trust, there is no foundation for a relationship to grow and thrive. Without honesty, there is no integrity or authenticity.

The Importance of Trust

Trust is the belief that someone will act in your best interest, even when it’s difficult or inconvenient for them. It’s the confidence that they will be reliable, dependable, and loyal. Trust is earned over time through consistent actions and words that demonstrate trustworthiness.

The Importance of Honesty

Honesty is being truthful and sincere in your words and actions. It means being open and transparent, even when it’s easier to lie or hide the truth. Honesty creates a foundation of integrity and authenticity, allowing people to feel safe and respected in a relationship.

The Connection Between Trust and Honesty

Trust and honesty are deeply interconnected. Trust is built on honesty, and honesty reinforces trust. When someone is honest with you, it shows that they respect you and value your relationship. It builds trust because you know that they are being genuine and authentic.

The Benefits of Trust and Honesty

Trust and honesty create a strong foundation for relationships. They allow people to feel safe, respected, and valued. They also foster open communication, cooperation, and support. Relationships built on trust and honesty are more likely to be long-lasting and fulfilling.

Trust and honesty are essential for building strong and lasting relationships. Without trust, there is no foundation for a relationship to grow and thrive. Without honesty, there is no integrity or authenticity. By being trustworthy and honest, we create relationships that are built on a solid foundation of respect, communication, and support.

500 Words Essay on Trust And Honesty

What are trust and honesty.

Trust and honesty are two of the most important qualities in our lives. Trust is when you believe in someone and feel confident that they will not let you down. Honesty is when you always tell the truth and do not hide anything. These two qualities are like two sides of the same coin. Without honesty, trust cannot exist, and without trust, relationships cannot grow strong.

Why Is Honesty Important?

Honesty is important because it helps build a strong foundation in any relationship, whether with friends, family, or teachers. When you are honest, people know they can rely on what you say and do. This makes them feel secure and comfortable around you. Being honest also makes you feel good about yourself, knowing you are being true to others and to your own values.

The Role of Trust

Trust plays a huge role in our lives. It is what allows us to feel safe and supported by those around us. When we trust someone, we can share our thoughts, feelings, and fears with them, knowing they will not judge us or tell others. Trust must be earned and once it is broken, it is very hard to rebuild. This is why it is so important to always be honest, as honesty helps to build and maintain trust.

Trust and Honesty in Friendship

In friendships, trust and honesty are key. Good friends are honest with each other, even when it might be hard. They tell the truth to help, not hurt. Friends who trust each other feel comfortable sharing their secrets, knowing they will be kept safe. This kind of friendship is strong and can last a long time.

How to Be Honest and Build Trust

Being honest and building trust is not always easy, but it is worth it. Here are some tips: – Always tell the truth, even when it is hard. – If you make a mistake, admit it and say sorry. – Listen to others and respect their feelings. – Keep promises. If you say you will do something, do it. – Be patient. Trust takes time to build.

The Impact of Breaking Trust

Breaking someone’s trust can have a big impact. The person might feel hurt, sad, or angry. It can take a long time for them to trust again. This is why it is so important to think before we act and to always try to be honest and reliable.

Trust and honesty are very important in all parts of our lives. They help us build strong, healthy relationships with others. Being honest and trustworthy makes people feel safe and respected. Remember, trust is like a beautiful vase, once broken it can be fixed but the cracks will always show. Let’s all try to be honest and build trust with everyone around us.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

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How to write effective essays on trust learn with us.

September 4, 2020

The entire human civilization is based on trust. We trust our loved ones, we trust our teachers, we trust our community and so on.

A trust essay highlights the importance of this powerful value. It tells you what is trust and how the absence of trust affects people individually and even the community at large. Here are some steps that you can follow to write a great essay on trust:

Trust Essay – Define The Concept

The first step when you start writing essays on trust is to define the word trust. Essentially, it is the faith that you have in another person. But trust is also a two way street. It is not just about you trusting someone but also about being that person that someone else can put their trust in.

Start by writing a short paragraph on trust with statements like “In the most basic form, trust is the confidence that you have in someone else.” You can then work in the subject of what makes a person trust another person.

Trust Essay Sample

Leadership and Trust Leadership refers to the power and ability of an individual to lead others. Leadership is often spoken about in terms of nobility, charisma, and the ability to inspire and mobilize others, each of which are positive qualities that exemplify leaders and vice versa. What goes ignored is that leaders can have those characteristics and look to use them for bad or evil. Leaders are not only at the heads of corporate organizations, community groups and churches; they are also the heads of manipulative and mind-altering cults and command their power and ability to influence the behavior of others. Leadership styles vary from person to person, as well as the motives for harnessing that leadership. From business executives to cult leaders, leadership manifests in ways that serve the greater good, however, that “greater good” depends on the motives, desires and personality of the leader.   One iconic leader was Nelson Mandela, the face of the nonviolent uprising against the South African government and its racist policies and function. He was more than a leader, but a visionary capable of transformational leadership in a movement against the government that contributed to the lost lives and livelihoods of many, including himself. Mandela’s call to action for the South African people was reinforced and believed by his inimitable leadership. Mandela saw that the way that the government was running the nation through apartheid was, at the least, unsustainable and at the most, detrimental to society. Imprisoned for more than a quarter century On Robben Island along with several other activists, Mandela stood by his convictions and worked strategically to oppose and transform South Africa from the inside, finding that “the political prison of apartheid” (Schoemaker & Krupp, 2014) would have been far worse than serving out his prison sentence. He stood up to prisoners and guards, positioning himself as a man of nobility and dignity even though it came at the expense of his freedom and the realities of harsh prison life. As a leader, he researched other leaders and where they went wrong and where they went right. Observing the teachings of other nations and leaders, he hoped to inspire change by getting the South African government to deviate from a dangerous path that caused the decline of the country of Zimbabwe following a tumultuous and brutal period of dictatorship by Robert Mugabe. Mandela’s nobility shone through in wanting to nonviolently resist oppressors, instead surprising “with restraints and generosity.” Mandela called for peace when people wanted retribution and revenge, even if it was rightfully so. After being elected the first black president of South Africa, Mandela continued to inspire with his charisma and language, using inclusive pronouns like “we” and “our” to bridge gaps instead of widen them, calling on the people to act as a united front to bring about a new world. Nelson Mandela was a strategic leader who was able to harness his emotion and motivate people strongly enough to have continual support. On the contrary, leaders out to do what most perceive as harm have this drive as well—the key difference is in their motives and what they set out to achieve.   For those who do not fall under the most understood category of leader, like cult leaders, how the world looks upon them is quite different. Cult leaders are those who often portray themselves as the next messiah, but to others not under their spell of charisma and manipulation, look like manipulators, deceivers and sociopaths. However, the charisma that allowed people like Charles Manson to manipulate and convince his “family” to commit heinous murders unlike the Hollywood scene had seen is not only within him. Back in the 1960s, Charles Manson recruited a group of devote followers he called “The Family,” who shared his love for hallucinogenic drugs and an unconventional lifestyle led off the grid. The key to Manson’s power and control was his ability to position himself and the members of his family as a superior elite that had to do whatever it took to protect themselves and the world. There was danger in his charisma, which allowed his notoriously warped and outrageous ideals to result in the brutal murders of actress Sharon Tate, who was eight months pregnant at the time, Leno and Rosemary LaBianca, Steven Parent and Abigail Folger, heiress to the Folger Coffee fortune. Manson and his followers had a strong sense of moral values that, in their minds, made them better than the untouchable Hollywood elite. He used his own painful, shattered past to draw in people who had been stripped of their identity—if they ever had one—and fulfilled their needs, creating a dangerous connection between their self-esteem and worth and his provisions. Manson sought out people like him who had no sense of stability or identity; he was born without a name to a young, fleeting mother raised in a strictly religious household whose baby’s father abandoned her and their son. While he never directly carried out any of the murders. In prison, Manson studied religion as a tool of control and as he fluctuated between imprisonment and freedom, he harnessed the art of manipulation through advice for other criminals and books like How to Win Friends and Influence People (Romano, 2017). Manson, now deceased, has gone down in history as a symbol of the rebellious hippie counterculture that culminated in gleeful carnage, spurred by a strong distaste for the wealthy, racism and prejudice, and shared lifelong social rejection. As a leader, he is in no way comparable to Nelson Mandela or those like him, but his reign is a painful reminder of cult leadership and pseudo-transformational leadership that captivates and motivates people just as much as nobility does.   Leadership has to be understood in a context that allows both good and evil to prosper. History demonstrates that there are those who are looking for positive change like Nelson Mandela, as well as those who want the ultimate revenge and unending, unquestionable power like Charles Manson. To understand both is to understand where and how leadership can go right and wrong, although the concept itself is broad and complex in definition and application.

The Role Of Trust In Relationships

Essays about trust are almost impossible to write without some reference to relationships. The bottom line is that every relationship that you have from neighbours, friends, relatives to your spouse is based on trust.

In fact, you can write an entire essay on trust in a relationship. Why it is important and how breaking someone’s trust is the hardest thing to recover from.

When we trust someone, we also expect that they reciprocate the same, while maintaining our trust and not hide anything from us. This love, faith, and trust can be a subject of discussion in your essay with respect to couples and relationships. You can also break down your trust essays into several layers such as the absence of trust leading to suspicion. And suspicion leading to the breach of trust by snooping or prying into the private mails and texts of the other person.

Betrayal and trust are vital turning points in any relationship. You can use other examples of breach of trust like cheating on a partner to show the effect that it has on love and faith between partners. It is also a great topic to use to define trust itself.

How Trust Affects The Community At Large

We vote for someone because we trust that they are good enough to run the country. A group of people in a corporate follow their team leader’s instruction because they trust that the latter is leading them to success. When parents leave their kids with a baby sitter, it is all about trust.

The point is that without trust, there would be no community. This is a great subject for your trust definition essay. It also gives you a new perspective and approach that is different from the relationship angle. There are enough instances of breach of trust within a community to include in your essays on trust. This will help you explore the definition of trust better.

The community angle gives you a lot more content for trust essay writing. You can talk about recent world events or even take references from history to show how trust plays a massive role in the community. There and endless examples of betrayal in history that have uprooted thriving kingdoms.

It is easier to write a definition essay on trust using these concepts because you can highlight both the angles. First, why trust is important in a society and why being a trustworthy individual is equally important.

Essays On Trust – Dealing With Them The Right Way

While writing an essay about trust, try to give relatable examples from real-life that establish trust between two people. This is the easiest way to bring out the definition of trust in its true essence.

If you need any writing assistance for your college essay, get in touch with us today. You can also go through a trust essay example to help you understand how to approach this subject with more depth and variety.

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Home / Essay Samples / Life / Experience / Trust

Trust Essay Examples

The power of actions: speaking louder than words.

Actions have a remarkable ability to convey messages and make a lasting impact. While words can be persuasive, actions hold a unique power that goes beyond mere rhetoric. This essay explores how actions can speak louder than words, transcending language barriers and leaving a lasting...

Trust Vs Mistrust: Example to Discuss the Topic

“Trust is the glue of life. It is the most essential ingredients in effective communication. It is the foundational principle that holds all relationships” mentions Stephen Covey. Trust is the hub in the wheel of relationship with God and creation. I often define trust as...

Deficiency of Trust in Strategic Partnership

Trust is actually one of the most crucial element for the favourable result of the strategic partnership. A partnership which is based on mutual respect and understanding is extremely important and one of the key value for the strategic partnership. contends This belief is believed...

The Five Dimensions of Trust and Its Role in My Approach to Work

Integrity, honesty, truthful, sincere. For me in a job I am sometimes truthful, depending on what the situation is. If it is going to get someone else in trouble then I am honest enough to let that person see their fault and hopefully they will...

Gaining Trust for New Comers

“Heigh-ho, heigh-ho, it's home from work we go”. Most of you probably would not recognize it, but that phrase was actually recorded in 1937 and sung by the seven dwarfs from Walt Disney’s first feature film; Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs. While singing the...

Analysis of the Article Leadership and Trust by M. C. Bligh

In this study of Research it was found that consulting team members when making decisions, communicating a collective vision, and sharing common values with the leader predicted 67% of employees’ ratings of trust in their leaders. Trust is a key process in ethical, servant, and...

Leadership, Trust and Communication: Building Trust in Companies Through Effective Leadership Communication

According to the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study employees who feel committed to their organization carry out more tasks then required by them. 79% of employees who share the values of their organization use their initiative to do more than just their required task, 91%...

The Effectiveness of Competence, Consistency, Loyalty, and Openness in Developing Trusting Relationships if There is No Integrity

A person needs to be thought of as a reliable person, competent in their job, knowing what works and what don’t and how to fix it when needed. Whether it is in a personal or work relationship the person needs to be fair with all,...

Exploring the Theme of Broken Trust in Toni Morrison’s Sula

Trust is both an emotional and logical act. On the emotional level, you expose your vulnerabilities to people, hoping that they will not benefit from your openness. Logically, it is when you evaluate the chance of gain and loss and conclude that the person in...

The Reasons of Ambidexterity

Handedness is a very complicating, multifactorial trait. How handedness is determined, advantages to specific hands, and ambidexterity are topics of research. Handedness is found to be indirectly related to genetics in that certain genes influence the brain. The brain hemispheres contribute to the bias toward...

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