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• Published: 26 July 2021

Large-scale quantitative evidence of media impact on public opinion toward China

• Junming Huang   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-2532-4090 1 ,
• Gavin G. Cook 1 &
• Yu Xie 1 , 2  

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume  8 , Article number:  181 ( 2021 ) Cite this article

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• Cultural and media studies
• Politics and international relations

Do mass media influence people’s opinions of other countries? Using BERT, a deep neural network-based natural language processing model, this study analyzes a large corpus of 267,907 China-related articles published by The New York Times since 1970. The output from The New York Times is then compared to a longitudinal data set constructed from 101 cross-sectional surveys of the American public’s views on China, revealing that the reporting of The New York Times on China in one year explains 54% of the variance in American public opinion on China in the next. This result confirms hypothesized links between media and public opinion and helps shed light on how mass media can influence the public opinion of foreign countries.

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Introduction.

America and China are the world’s two largest economies, and they are currently locked in a tense rivalry. In a democratic system, public opinion shapes and constrains political action. How the American public views China thus affects relations between the two countries. Because few Americans have personally visited China, most Americans form their opinions of China and other foreign lands from media depictions. Our paper aims to explain how Americans form their attitudes on China with a case study of how The New York Times may shape public opinion. Our analysis is not causal, but it is informed by a causal understanding of how public opinion may flow from the media to the citizenry.

Scholars have adopted a number of wide-ranging and even contradictory approaches to explain the relationships between media and the American mind. One school of thought stresses that media exposure shapes public opinion (Baum and Potter, 2008 ; Iyengar and Kinder, 2010 ). Another set of approaches focuses on how the public might lead the media by analyzing how consumer demand shapes reporting. Newspapers may attract readers by biasing coverage of polarizing issues towards the ideological proclivities of their readership (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005 ), and with the advent of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, traditional media are now more responsive to audience demand than ever before (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2011 ). On the other side of this equation, news consumers generally tend to seek out news sources with which they agree (Iyengar et al., 2008 ), and politically active individuals do so more proactively than the average person (Zaller, 1992 ).

Two other approaches address factors outside the media–public binary. The first, stresses the role of elites in opinion formation. While some, famously including Noam Chomsky, argue that news media are unwitting at best and at worst complicit “shills” of the American political establishment, political elites may affect public opinion directly by communicating with the public (Baum and Potter, 2008 ). Foreign elites may also influence American opinion because American reporters sometimes circumvent domestic sources and ask trusted foreign experts and officials for opinions (Hayes and Guardino, 2011 ). The second stresses how the macro-level phenomenon of public sentiment is shaped by micro-level and meso-level processes. An adult’s opinions on various topics emerge from their personal values, many of which are set during and around adolescence from factors outside of the realm of individual control (Hatemi and McDermott, 2016 ). Social networks may also affect attitude formation (Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017 ).

In light of these contradictory interpretations, it is difficult to be sure whether the media shape the attitudes of consumers or, on the other hand, whether consumers shape media (Baum and Potter, 2008 ). Moreover, most of the theories summarized above are tested on relatively small slices of data. In order to offer an alternative, “big data”-based contribution to this ongoing debate, this study compares how the public views China and how the news media report on China with large-scale data. Our data set, which straddles 50 years of newspaper reporting and survey data, is uniquely large and includes more than a quarter-million articles from The New York Times.

Most extant survey data indicate that Americans do not seem to like China very much (Xie and Jin, 2021 ). Many Americans are reported to harbor doubts about China’s record on human rights (Aldrich et al., 2015 ; Cao and Xu, 2015 ) and are anxious about China’s burgeoning economic, military, and strategic power (Gries and Crowson, 2010 ; Yang and Liu, 2012 ). They also think that the Chinese political system fails to serve the needs of the Chinese people (Aldrich et al., 2015 ). Most Americans, however, recognize a difference between the Chinese state, the Chinese people, and Chinese culture, and they view the latter two more favorably (Gries and Crowson, 2010 ). In Fiske’s Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002 ), which expresses common stereotypes as a combination of “competence” and “warmth”, Asians belong to a set of “high-status, competitive out-groups” and rank high in competence but low in warmth (Lin et al., 2005 ).

The New York Times, which calls itself the “Newspaper of Record”, is the most influential newspaper in the USA and possibly even in the Anglophonic world. It boasts 7.5 million subscribers (Business Wire, 2021 ), and while the paper’s reach may be impressive, it is yet more significant that the readership of The New York Times represents an elite subset of the American public. Print subscribers to The New York Times have a median household income of $191,000, three times the median income of US households writ large (Rothbaum and Edwards, 2019 ). Despite the paper’s haughty and sometimes condescending reporting, it “has had and still has immense social, political, and economic influence on American and the world” (Schwarz, 2012 , p. 81). The New York Times may be a paper for America’s elite, and it may be biased to reflect the tastes of its elite audience, but the paper’s ideological slant does not affect our analyses as long as the its relevant biases are consistent over the time period covered by our analyses. Our analyses support the intuition of qualitative work on The Times (Schwarz, 2012 ) and show that these biases remain more or less constant for the decades in our sample. These analyses also illuminate some of the paper’s more notable biases, including the paper’s particular predilection for globalization.

The impact of social media on traditional media is not straightforward. While new media have certainly changed old media, neither has replaced the other. It is more accurate to say that old media have been integrated into new media and, in some ways, become a form of new media themselves. Twitter has accelerated the 2000s-era trends of information access that made it possible for news readers to find their own news and also enabled readers to interact with journalists (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2011 ), and the The New York Times seems to have made a significant commitment to the Twitter ecosystem. A quick glance at the follower count of The Times’ official Twitter account shows that it is one of the most influential accounts on the site, with almost 50 million followers. For comparison, both current president Joe Biden and vice president Kamala Harris have around 10 million followers. Most New York Times reporters additionally have “verified” accounts on the platform, which means that individual reporters may be incentivized to maintain public-facing profiles more now than in the past.

The media consumption patterns that made new media possible have changed the way The New York Times interacts with its audience and how it extracts revenue. The New York Times boasts a grand total of 7.5 million subscribers, but only 800,000 of them subscribe to the print edition. The Times’ digital subscription base has boomed since the election of Donald J. Trump, growing almost sixfold from a paltry 1.3 million in 2015 to a staggering 6.7 million in 2020 (Business Wire, 2021 ). The Times increasingly relies more on digital subscriptions and less on print subscriptions and ad sales for revenue (Lee, 2020 ). Ad revenue for most papers has been in sharp decline since the early 2000s (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2011 ), and this trend has only continued into the present. The New York Times now operates almost like a direct-to-consumer, subscription tech startup. New media have not replaced but have certainly changed old media. The full impact of these changes is beyond the scope of this paper, and we suggest it as an area for further research.

A small body of prior work has studied the The New York Times and how The New York Times reports on China. Blood and Phillips use autoregression methods on time series data to predict public opinion (Blood and Phillips, 1995 ). Wu et al. use a similar autoregression technique and find that public sentiment regarding the economy predicts economic performance and that people pay more attention to economic news during recessions (Wu et al., 2002 ). Peng finds that coverage of China in the paper has been consistently negative but increasingly frequent as China became an economic powerhouse (Peng, 2004 ). There is very little other scholarship that applies language processing methods to large corpora of articles from The New York Times or other leading papers. Atalay et al. is an exception that uses statistical techniques for parsing natural languages to analyze a corpus of newspaper articles from The New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and other leading papers in order to investigate the increasing use of information technologies in newspaper classifieds (Atalay et al., 2018 ).

We explore the impact of The New York Times on its readers by examining the general relationship between The Times and public opinion. Though some might contend that only elites read NYT, we have adopted this research strategy for two reasons. If the views of NYT only impacted the nation’s elite, the paper’s views would still propagate to the general public through the elites themselves because elites can affect public opinion outside of media channels (Baum and Potter, 2008 ). Additionally, it is a widely held belief that NYT serves as a general barometer of an agenda-setting agent for American culture (Schwarz, 2012 ). Because of these two reasons, we interpolate the relationship between NYT and public opinion from the relationship between NYT and its readers, and we extrapolate that the views of NYT are broadly representative of American media.

Our paper aims to advance understanding of how Americans form their attitudes on China with a case study of how The New York Times may shape public opinion. We hypothesize that media coverage of foreign nations affects how Americans view the rest of the world. This reduced-form model deliberately simplifies the interactions between audience and media and sidesteps many active debates in political psychology and political communication. Analyzing a corpus of 267,907 articles on China from The New York Times, we quantify media sentiment with BERT, a state-of-the-art natural language processing model with deep neural networks, and segment sentiment into eight domain topics. We then use conventional statistical methods to link media sentiment to a longitudinal data set constructed from 101 cross-sectional surveys of the American public’s views on China. We find strong correlations between how The New York Times reports on China in one year and the views of the public on China in the next. The correlations agree with our hypothesis and imply a strong connection between media sentiment and public opinion.

We quantify media sentiment with a natural language model on a large-scale corpus of 267,907 articles on China from The New York Times published between 1970 and 2019. To explore sentiment from this corpus in greater detail, we map every article to a sentiment category (positive, negative, or neutral) in eight topics: ideology, government and administration, democracy, economic development, marketization, welfare and well-being, globalization, and culture.

We do this with a three-stage modeling procedure. First, two human coders annotate 873 randomly selected articles with a total of 18,598 paragraphs expressing either positive, negative, or neutral sentiment in each topic. We treat irrelevant articles as neutral sentiments. Secondly, we fine-tune a natural language processing model Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) (Devlin et al., 2018 ) with the human-coded labels. The model uses a deep neural network with 12 layers. It accepts paragraphs (i.e., word sequences of no more than 128 words) as input and outputs a probability for each category. We end up with two binary classifiers for each topic for a grand total of 16 classifiers: an assignment classifier that determines whether a paragraph expresses sentiment in a given topic domain and a sentiment classifier that then distinguishes positive and negative sentiments in a paragraph classified as belonging to a given topic domain. Thirdly, we run the 16 trained classifiers on each paragraph in our corpus and assign category probabilities to every paragraph. We then use the probabilities of all the paragraphs in an article to determine the article’s overall sentiment category (i.e., positive, negative, or neutral) in every topic.

As demonstrated in Table 1 , the two classifiers are accurate at both the paragraph and article levels. The assignment classifier and the sentiment classifier reach classification accuracy of 89–96% and 73–90%, respectively, on paragraphs. The combined outcome of the classifiers, namely article sentiment, is accurate to 62–91% across the eight topics. For comparison, a random guess would reach an accuracy of 50% on each task (see Supplementary Information for details).

American public opinion towards China is a composite measure drawn from national surveys that ask respondents for their opinions on China. We collect 101 cross-sectional surveys from 1974 to 2019 that asked relevant questions about attitudes toward China and incorporate a probabilistic model to harmonize different survey series with different scales (e.g., 4 levels, 10 levels) into a single time series, capitalizing on “seaming” years in which different survey series overlapped (Wang et al., 2021 ). For every year, there is a single real value representing American sentiment on China relative to the level in 1974. Put another way, we use sentiment in 1974 as a baseline measure to normalize the rest of the time series. A positive value shows a more favorable attitude than that in 1974, and a negative value represents a less favorable attitude than that in 1974. Because of this, the trends in sentiment changes year-over-year are of interest, but the absolute values of sentiment in a given year are not. As shown in Fig. 1 , public opinion towards China has varied greatly from 1974 to 2019. It steadily climbed from a low of −24% in 1976 to a high of 73% in 1987, and has fluctuated between 10% and 48% in the intervening 30 years.

This time series is aggregated from 101 cross-sectional surveys from 1974 to 2019 that asked relevant questions about attitudes toward China with the year of 1974 as baseline. Years with attitudes above zero show a more favorable attitude than that in 1974, with a peak of 73% in 1987. Years with attitudes below zero show a less favorable attitude than that in 1974, with the lowest level of −24% in 1976. The time series is shown with a 95% confidence interval.

We begin with a demonstration of how the reporting of The New York Times on China changes over time, and we follow this with an analysis of how coverage of China might influence public opinion toward China.

Trend of media sentiment

The New York Times has maintained a steady interest in China over the years and has published at least 3,000 articles on China in every year of our corpus. Figure 2 displays the yearly volume of China-related articles from The New York Times on each of the eight topics since 1970. Articles on China increased sharply after 2000 and eventually reached a peak around 2010, almost doubling their volume from the 1970s. As the number of articles on China increased, the amount of attention paid to each of the eight topics diverged. Articles on government, democracy, globalization, and culture were consistently common while articles on ideology were consistently rare. In contrast, articles on China’s economy, marketization, and welfare were rare before 1990 but became increasingly common after 2000. The timing of this uptick coincided neatly with worldwide recognition of China’s precipitous economic ascent and specifically the beginnings of China’s talks to join the World Trade Organization.

In each year we report in each topic the number of positive and negative articles while ignoring neutral/irrelevant articles. The media have consistently high attention on reporting China government & administration, democracy, globalization, and culture. There are emerging interests on China’s economics, marketization, and welfare and well-being since 1990s. Note that the sum of the stacks does not equal to the total volume of articles about China, because each article may express sentiment in none or multiple topics.

While the proportion of articles in each given topic change over time, the sentiment of articles in each topic is remarkably consistent. Ignoring neutral articles, Figure 3 illustrates the yearly fractions of positive and negative articles about each of the eight topics. We find four topics (economics, globalization, culture, and marketization) are almost always covered positively while reporting on the other four topics (ideology, government & administration, democracy, and welfare & well-being) is overwhelmingly negative.

The panel reports the trend of yearly media attitude toward China in ( A ) ideology, ( B ) government & administration, ( C ) democracy, ( D ) economic development, ( E ) marketization, ( F ) welfare & well-being, ( G ) globalization, and ( H ) culture. The media attitude is measured as the percentages of positive articles and negative articles, respectively. US–China relation milestones are marked as gray dots. The New York Times express diverging but consistent attitudes in the eight domains, with negative articles consistently common in ideology, government, democracy, and welfare, and positive sentiments common in economic, globalization, and culture. Standard errors are too small to be visible (below 1.55% in all topics all years).

The NYT views China’s globalization in a very positive light. Almost 100% of the articles mentioning this topic are positive for all of the years in our sample. This reveals that The New York Times welcomes China’s openness to the world and, more broadly, may be particularly partial to globalization in general.

Similarly, economics, marketization, and culture are covered most commonly in positive tones that have only grown more glowing over time. Positive articles on these topics began in the 1970s with China–US Ping–Pong diplomacy, and eventually comprise 1/4 to 1/2 of articles on these three topics, the remainder of which are mostly neutral articles. This agrees with the intuition that most Americans like Chinese culture. The New York Times has been deeply enamored with Chinese cultural products ranging from Chinese art to Chinese food since the very beginning of our sample. Following China’s economic reforms, the number of positive articles and the proportion of positive articles relative to negative articles increases for both economics and marketization.

In contrast, welfare and well-being are covered in an almost exclusively negative light. About 1/4 of the articles on this topic are negative, and almost no articles on this topic are positive. Topics regarding politics are covered very negatively. Negative articles on ideology, government and administration, and democracy outnumber positive articles on these topics for all of the years in our sample. Though small fluctuations that coincided with ebbs in US–China relations are observed for those three topics, coverage has only grown more negative over time. Government and administration is the only negatively covered topic that does feature some positive articles. This reflects the qualitative understanding that The New York Times thinks that the Chinese state is an unpleasant but capable actor.

Despite the remarkable diversity of sentiment toward China across the eight topics, sentiment within each of the topics is startlingly consistent over time. This consistency attests to the incredible stability of American stereotypes towards China. If there is any trend to be found here, it is that the main direction of sentiment in each topic, positive or negative, has grown more prevalent since the 1970s. This is to say that reporting on China has become more polarized, which is reflective of broader trends of media polarization (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2011 ; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005 ).

Media sentiment affects public opinion

To reveal the connection between media sentiment and public opinion, we run a linear regression model (Eq. ( 1 )) to fit public opinion with media sentiment from current and preceding years.

where μ t denotes public opinion in year t with possible values ranging from −1 to 1. F k j s is the fraction of positive ( s  = positive) or negative ( s  = negative) articles on topic k in year j . Coefficient β k j s quantifies the importance of F k j s in predicting μ t .

There is inertia to public opinion. A broadly held opinion is hard to change in the short term, and it may require a while for media sentiment to affect how the public views a given issue. For this reason, j is allowed to take [ t , t  − 1, t  − 2, ...] anywhere from zero to a couple of years ahead of t . In other words, we inspect lagged values of media sentiment as candidate predictors for public attitudes towards China.

We seek an optimal solution of media sentiment predictors to explain the largest fraction of variance ( r 2 ) of public opinion. To reduce the risk of overfitting, we first constrain the coefficients to be non-negative after reverse-coding negative sentiment variables, which means we assume that positive articles have either no impact or positive impact and that negative articles have either zero or negative impact on public opinion. Secondly, we require that the solution be sparse and contain no more than one non-zero coefficient in each topic:

where r 2 ( μ , β , F ) is the explained variance of μ fitted with ( β , F ). The l 0 -norm ∥ β k , ⋅ , ⋅ ∥ 0 gives the number of non-zero coefficients of topic k predictors.

The solution varies with the number of topics included in the fitting model. As shown in Table 2 , if we allow fitting with only one topic, we find that sentiment on Chinese culture has the most explanatory power, accounting for 31.2% of the variance in public opinion. We run a greedy strategy to add additional topics that yield the greatest increase in explanatory power, resulting in eight nested models (Table 2 ). The explanatory power of our models increases monotonically with the number of allowed topics but reaches a saturation point at which the marginal increase in variance explained per topics decreases after only two topics are introduced (see Table 2 ). To strike a balance between simplicity and explanatory power, we use the top two predictors, which are the positive sentiment of culture and the negative sentiment of democracy in the previous year, to build a linear predictor of public opinion that can be written as

where F culture, t −1,positive is the yearly fraction of positive articles on Chinese culture in year t  − 1 and F democracy, t −1,negative is the yearly fraction of negative articles on Chinese democracy in year t  − 1. This formula explains 53.9% of the variance of public opinion in the time series. For example, in 1993 53.9% of the articles on culture had a positive sentiment, and 46.9% of the articles on democracy had negative sentiment ( F c u l t u r e ,1993,positive  = 0.539, F democracy,1993,negative  = −0.469). Substituting those numbers into Eq. ( 2 ) predicts public opinion in the next year (1994) to be 0.208, very close to the actual level of public opinion (0.218) (Fig. 4 ).

The public opinion (solid), as a time series, is well fitted by the media sentiments on two selected topics, namely “Culture” and “Democracy”, in the previous year. The dashed line shows a linear prediction based on the fractions of positive articles on “Culture” and negative articles on “Democracy” in the previous year. The public opinion is shown with a 95% confidence interval, and the fitted line is shown with one standard error.

By analyzing a corpus of 267,907 articles from The New York Times with BERT, a state-of-the-art natural language processing model, we identify major shifts in media sentiment towards China across eight topic domains over 50 years and find that media sentiment leads public opinion. Our results show that the reporting of The New York Times on culture and democracy in one year explains 53.9% of the variation in public opinion on China in the next. The conclusion that we draw from our results is that media sentiment on China predicts public opinion on China. Our analysis is neither conclusive nor causal, but it is suggestive. Our results are best interpreted as a “reduced-form” description of the overall relationship between media sentiment and public opinion towards China.

While there are a number of potential factors that may complicate our conclusions, none would change the overall thrust of our results. We do not consider how the micro-level or meso-level intermediary processes through which opinion from elite media percolates to the masses below may affect our results. We also do not consider the potential ramifications of elites communing directly with the public, of major events in US–China relations causing short-term shifts in reporting, or of social media creating new channels for the diffusion of opinion. Finally, The New York Times might have a particular bias to how it covers China.

In addition to those specified above, a number of possible extensions of our work remain ripe targets for further research. Though a fully causal model of our text analysis pipeline may prove elusive (Egami et al., 2018 ), future work may use randomized vignettes to further our understanding of the causal effects of media exposure on attitudes towards China. Secondly, our modeling framework is deliberately simplified. The state affects news coverage before the news ever makes its way to the citizenry. It is plausible that multiple state-level actors may bypass the media and alter public opinion directly and to different ends. For example, the actions and opinions of individual high-profile US politicians may attenuate or exaggerate the impact of state-level tension on public sentiment toward China. There are presumably a whole host of intermediary processes through which opinion from elite media affects the sentiment of the masses. Thirdly, the relationship between the sentiment of The New York Times and public opinion may be very different for hot-button social issues of first-line importance in the American culture wars. In our corpus, The New York Times has covered globalization almost entirely positively, but the 2016 election of President Donald J. Trump suggests that many Americans do not share the zeal of The Times for international commerce. We also plan to extend our measure of media sentiment to include text from other newspapers. The Guardian, a similarly elite, Anglophonic, and left-leaning paper, will make for a useful comparison case. Finally, our analysis was launched in the midst of heightened tensions between the US and China and concluded right before the outbreak of a global pandemic. Many things have changed since COVID-19. Returning to our analysis with an additional year or two of data will almost certainly provide new results of additional interest.

Future work will address some of these additional paths, but none of these elements affects the basic conclusion of this work. We find that reporting on China in one year predicts public opinion in the next. This is true for more than fifty years in our sample, and while knowledge of, for example, the opinion diffusion process on social media may add detail to this relationship, the basic flow of opinion from media to the public will not change. Regarding the putative biases of The New York Times, its ideological slant does not affect our explanation of trends in public opinion of China as long as the paper’s relevant biases are relatively consistent over the time period covered by our analyses.

Data availability

All data analyzed during the current study are publicly available. The New York Times data were accessed using official online APIs ( https://developer.nytimes.com/ ). We used their query API to search for 267,907 articles that mention China, Chinese, Beijing, Peking, or Shanghai. We downloaded the full text and date of each article. The survey data were obtained from three large public archives/centers, namely Roper Center for Public Opinion Research (ROPER), NORC at the University of Chicago, and Pew Research Center (Pew Research Center, 2019 ; Smith et al., 2018 ). See Supplementary Information for a full list of surveys. The source codes and pretrained parameters of the natural language processing model BERT are publicly released by Google Inc. on its github repository ( https://github.com/google-research/bert ). The finetuned BERT models and the inferred sentiment of The New York Times articles in our corpus are publicly available at Princeton University DataSpace. Please check the project webpage ( http://www.attitudetowardchina.com/media-opinion ) or the DataSpace webpage ( https://doi.org/10.34770/x27d-0545 ) to download.

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Acknowledgements

The authors thank Chesley Chan (Princeton University), Wen Liu (Renmin University of China), Yichun Yang (Renmin University of China), and Emily Yin (Princeton University) for coding The New York Times articles with the topic-specific sentiment. The authors thank Chih-Jou Jay Chen (Academia Sinica), Cheng Cheng (Singapore Management University), Shawn Dorius (Iowa State University), Theodore P. Gerber (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Fengming Lu (Australian National University), Yongai Jin (Renmin University of China), Donghui Wang (Princeton University) for valuable discussions. The authors thank Xudong Guo (Tsinghua University) for helping fine-tune the BERT model and analyze the calculation results. The authors thank Tom Marling for proofreading the manuscript. The research was partially supported by the Paul and Marcia Wythes Center on Contemporary China at Princeton University and Guanghua School of Management at Peking University.

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Huang, J., Cook, G.G. & Xie, Y. Large-scale quantitative evidence of media impact on public opinion toward China. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 8 , 181 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00846-2

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2.3 Methods of Researching Media Effects

Learning objectives.

• Identify the prominent media research methods.
• Explain the uses of media research methods in a research project.

Media theories provide the framework for approaching questions about media effects ranging from as simple as how 10-year-old boys react to cereal advertisements to as broad as how Internet use affects literacy. Once researchers visualize a project and determine a theoretical framework, they must choose actual research methods. Contemporary research methods are greatly varied and can range from analyzing old newspapers to performing controlled experiments.

Content Analysis

Content analysis is a research technique that involves analyzing the content of various forms of media. Through content analysis, researchers hope to understand both the people who created the content and the people who consumed it. A typical content analysis project does not require elaborate experiments. Instead, it simply requires access to the appropriate media to analyze, making this type of research an easier and inexpensive alternative to other forms of research involving complex surveys or human subjects.

Content analysis studies require researchers to define what types of media to study. For example, researchers studying violence in the media would need to decide which types of media to analyze, such as television, and the types of formats to examine, such as children’s cartoons. The researchers would then need to define the terms used in the study; media violence can be classified according to the characters involved in the violence (strangers, family members, or racial groups), the type of violence (self-inflicted, slapstick, or against others), or the context of the violence (revenge, random, or duty-related). These are just a few of the ways that media violence could be studied with content-analysis techniques (Berger, 1998).

Archival Research

Any study that analyzes older media must employ archival research, which is a type of research that focuses on reviewing historical documents such as old newspapers and past publications. Old local newspapers are often available on microfilm at local libraries or at the newspaper offices. University libraries generally provide access to archives of national publications such as The New York Times or Time ; publications can also increasingly be found in online databases or on websites.

Older radio programs are available for free or by paid download through a number of online sources. Many television programs and films have also been made available for free download, or for rent or sale through online distributors. Performing an online search for a particular title will reveal the options available.

Resources such as the Internet Archive ( www.archive.org ) work to archive a number of media sources. One important role of the Internet Archive is website archiving. Internet archives are invaluable for a study of online media because they store websites that have been deleted or changed. These archives have made it possible for Internet content analyses that would have otherwise been impossible.

Surveys are ubiquitous in modern life. Questionaires record data on anything from political preferences to personal hygiene habits. Media surveys generally take one of the following two forms.

A descriptive survey aims to find the current state of things, such as public opinion or consumer preferences. In media, descriptive surveys establish television and radio ratings by finding the number of people who watch or listen to particular programs. An analytical survey, however, does more than simply document a current situation. Instead, it attempts to find out why a particular situation exists. Researchers pose questions or hypotheses about media, and then conduct analytical surveys to answer these questions. Analytical surveys can determine the relationship between different forms of media consumption and the lifestyles and habits of media consumers.

Surveys can employ either open-ended or closed-ended questions. Open-ended questions require the participant to generate answers in their own words, while closed-ended questions force the participant to select an answer from a list. Although open-ended questions allow for a greater variety of answers, the results of closed-ended questions are easier to tabulate. Although surveys are useful in media studies, effective use requires keeping their limitations in mind.

Social Role Analysis

As part of child rearing, parents teach their children about social roles. When parents prepare children to attend school for example, they explain the basics of school rules and what is expected of a student to help the youngsters understand the role of students. Like the role of a character in a play, this role carries specific expectations that differentiate school from home. Adults often play a number of different roles as they navigate between their responsibilities as parents, employees, friends, and citizens. Any individual may play a number of roles depending on his or her specific life choices.

Social role analysis of the media involves examining various individuals in the media and analyzing the type of role that each plays. Role analysis research can consider the roles of men, women, children, members of a racial minority, or members of any other social group in specific types of media. For example, if the role children play in cartoons is consistently different from the role they play in sitcoms, then certain conclusions might be drawn about both of these formats. Analyzing roles used in media allows researchers to gain a better understanding of the messages that the mass media sends (Berger, 1998).

Depth Interviews

The depth interview is an anthropological research tool that is also useful in media studies. Depth interviews take surveys one step further by allowing researchers to directly ask a study participant specific questions to gain a fuller understanding of the participant’s perceptions and experiences. Depth interviews have been used in research projects that follow newspaper reporters to find out their reasons for reporting certain stories and in projects that attempt to understand the motivations for reading romance novels. Depth interviews can provide a deeper understanding of the media consumption habits of particular groups of people (Priest, 2010).

Rhetorical Analysis

Rhetorical analysis involves examining the styles used in media and attempting to understand the kinds of messages those styles convey. Media styles include form, presentation, composition, use of metaphors, and reasoning structure. Rhetorical analysis reveals the messages not apparent in a strict reading of content. Studies involving rhetorical analysis have focused on media such as advertising to better understand the roles of style and rhetorical devices in media messages (Gunter, 2000).

Focus Groups

Like depth interviews, focus groups allow researchers to better understand public responses to media. Unlike a depth interview, however, a focus group allows the participants to establish a group dynamic that more closely resembles that of normal media consumption. In media studies, researchers can employ focus groups to judge the reactions of a group to specific media styles and to content. This can be a valuable means of understanding the reasons for consuming specific types of media.

Focus groups are effective ways to obtain a group opinion on media.

Wikimedia Commons – CC BY-SA 3.0.

Experiments

Media research studies also sometimes use controlled experiments that expose a test group to an experience involving media and measure the effects of that experience. Researchers then compare these measurements to those of a control group that had key elements of the experience removed. For example, researchers may show one group of children a program with three incidents of cartoon violence and another control group of similar children the same program without the violent incidents. Researchers then ask the children from both groups the same sets of questions, and the results are compared.

Participant Observation

In participant observation , researchers try to become part of the group they are studying. Although this technique is typically associated with anthropological studies in which a researcher lives with members of a particular culture to gain a deeper understanding of their values and lives, it is also used in media research.

Media consumption often takes place in groups. Families or friends gather to watch favorite programs, children may watch Saturday morning cartoons with a group of their peers, and adults may host viewing parties for televised sporting events or awards shows. These groups reveal insights into the role of media in the lives of the public. A researcher might join a group that watches football together and stay with the group for an entire season. By becoming a part of the group, the researcher becomes part of the experiment and can reveal important influences of media on culture (Priest).

Researchers have studied online role-playing games, such as World of Warcraft , in this manner. These games reveal an interesting aspect of group dynamics: Although participants are not in physical proximity, they function as a group within the game. Researchers are able to study these games by playing them. In the book Digital Culture, Play, and Identity: A World of Warcraft Reader , a group of researchers discussed the results of their participant observation studies. The studies reveal the surprising depth of culture and unwritten rules that exist in the World of Warcraft universe and give important interpretations of why players pursue the game with such dedication (Corneliussen & Rettberg, 2008).

Key Takeaways

• Media research methods are the practical procedures for carrying out a research project. These methods include content analysis, surveys, focus groups, experiments, and participant observation.
• Research methods generally involve either test subjects or analysis of media. Methods involving test subjects include surveys, depth interviews, focus groups, and experiments. Analysis of media can include content, style, format, social roles, and archival analysis.

Media research methods offer a variety of procedures for performing a media study. Each of these methods varies in cost; thus, a project with a lower budget would be prohibited from using some of the more costly methods. Consider a project on teen violence and video game use. Then answer the following short-response questions. Each response should be a minimum of one paragraph.

• Which methods would a research organization with a low budget favor for this project? Why?
• How might the results of the project differ from those of one with a higher budget?

Berger, Arthur Asa. Media Research Techniques (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998), 23–24.

Corneliussen, Hilde and Jill Walker Rettberg, “Introduction: ‘Orc ProfessorLFG,’ or Researching in Azeroth,” in Digital Culture, Play, and Identity: A World of Warcraft Reader , ed. Hilde Corneliussen and Jill Walker Rettberg (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008), 6–7.

Gunter, Barrie. Media Research Methods: Measuring Audiences, Reactions and Impact (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000), 89.

Priest, Susanna Hornig Doing Media Research: An Introduction (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2010), 16–22.

Priest, Susanna Hornig Doing Media Research , 96–98.

Understanding Media and Culture Copyright © 2016 by University of Minnesota is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Mass Media Research Paper

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Mass media—modes of communications intended to reach large numbers of people—have played an important role in world history, rousing populations in various times and places to resist governmental or other oppression, and calling those in power to account.

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Communications media that are geared to reaching the masses—mass media—has been a force in social, political, and cultural change throughout history. It is not surprising that in many countries rulers have refused to permit a free press, and journalists have even been killed for speaking out. In some countries the media are nothing more than the official voice of those in power, whereas in others, the media have served as the voice of resistance or even revolution.

The First Print Mass Media

Perhaps the first newspaper was the Acta Diurna (Daily Transactions) in ancient Rome. Julius Caesar decided to make the proceedings of the government available to the citizenry, and starting in 59 BCE, they were posted in public places. Later versions were called the Acta Urbana (Transactions of the City) or the Acta Senatus (Transactions of the Senate). These news sheets were hand-copied by scribes, probably on papyrus, and they were undoubtedly subject to government oversight and control. Good news about the Roman Empire was much more likely to appear in writing than bad news. In addition to the daily doings of those in power, the Acta contained birthday and wedding announcements and information about new buildings being dedicated. Later emperors expanded the role of the Acta, using them to disseminate favorable stories about themselves or unfavorable stories about particular rivals. The Acta seem to have been very popular and to have reached a wide audience; those who could not read stood waiting until someone (a professional town crier or literate passerby) would read the news aloud. The orator and historian Tacitus (c. 56–c. 120 CE) wrote in his Annals that people from all walks of life eagerly read the various Acta, and political leaders found them an invaluable resource.

Another ancient empire that made use of something resembling a newspaper was Tang-dynasty China (618–907 CE), where the Di bao (Court Gazette) contained news gathered by various members of the governing elite. Originally intended for members of the imperial court, it was later expanded to include the intellectuals, but unlike the Acta, it was not posted anywhere that the general public could read it. By the time of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), newspapers received wider dissemination, but the elites still wanted information restricted to a select few and wanted control over what the general public read. It was not until the 1800s that the newspaper industry in China began to flourish.

Early European Mass Media

Although the Chinese inventor Bi Sheng had developed a method of printing using movable wood blocks around 1041, Europe did not make use of moveable type until Johannes Gutenberg developed his printing press around 1438.

Prior to the mid-1800s, European publications that reported on news events were called by various names. One of the oldest forms of publication to survive is the coranto; the first coranto was published in Amsterdam in December 1620 and was more of a pamphlet than what we would today call a newspaper. Most of the corantos were published in Dutch. They focused on business news and on political news that might affect business. Amsterdam was a very cosmopolitan city, with merchants who traveled throughout the known world. They wanted to know what was going on in other countries where they might engage in commerce. As a result, corantos became very popular; at one period in the mid-1600s there were as many as eight weeklies or biweeklies, bringing news from Africa, Asia, Italy, Germany, and elsewhere.

In Italy there was the gazette, a weekly news sheet that seems to have originated in Venice in the mid- 1500s (although some historians question the date, as they also question whether the sheet really took its name from the coin gazeta with which one paid for it). Gazettes, like corantos, contained business and political news and were read both by the general public and by the many merchants who came to Italy. In Germany there were weeklies as early as 1615, and a daily newspaper, the Leipziger Zeitung (Leipzig Newspaper), began in 1660. These newspapers covered politics, culture, and science, and provided important information during the Thirty Years’ War. But the German press was frequently subjected to restrictions by the government.

In Paris, as early as 1488, there were occasionnels— government leaflets about four pages in length. Mostly published in Lyon and Paris, they were mainly brief summations of what the government was doing. From about 1529 there were also the canards, publications of a more sensational and sometimes polemical nature. French exiles living in Amsterdam published broadsides that criticized the intolerance of King Louis XIV; these publications were called lardons (“jibes”), and the exiles, mostly Huguenots, had them smuggled into France during the late 1690s. Early in 1777, Paris gained its first daily newspaper, the Journal de Paris (Newspaper of Paris), but the government maintained strict control over what could be printed. An underground press existed for dissenting voices. There were also some women who participated in journalism, publishing a monthly newspaper called the Journal des Dames (The Ladies’ Newspaper),which first appeared in 1759. Its editors believed in “the female public’s right—and obligation—to be informed about controversial matters” (Landes 1988, 58–59) Unfortunately, as with other newspapers of that time, it frequently encountered government censorship, as well as resistance to its call for greater female participation in public life. It ceased publication in 1778.

In Spain under King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, all printers had to be licensed. The first Spanish newspaper was probably the Correos de Francia, Flandres y Alemania (News of France, Flanders and Germany), founded by Andres de Almansa y Mendoza in 1621. In Spain’s colony in Mexico, the Gaceta de Mexico y Noticias de Nueva Espana (Mexico Gazette and the News of New Spain), regarded by some as Mexico’s first newspaper, appeared in January 1722, published by Juan Ignacio Maria de Castorena y Ursua, who later became Bishop of Yucatan.

In England the earliest surviving newspaper, from September 1621, is the Weekely Newes from Italy, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Bohemia, France and the Low Countreys. It followed the format of the Dutch corantos and at first carried mostly business news, although gradually it expanded to include natural disasters, wars, and so forth. In 1641 reports from Parliament were issued for the first time. The first daily was the Daily Courant, founded by Samuel Buckley in March 1702. Magazines such as the Tatler also began to proliferate around this time; they offered opinions about current events. As demand for newspapers and news publications continued to increase, so did government restrictions, sometimes indirectly, through excessive taxes on printers, and sometimes directly, with dissenting presses being shut down entirely. After a brief period of relative freedom during the 1640s, when journalists could even criticize the king and hundreds of pamphlets and news sheets were seen in London, press censorship was reimposed by Oliver Cromwell in 1655. The same sort of control occurred in the British colonies. The first newspaper in North America, Publick Occurences, was published in September 1690 and was immediately shut down. The next colonial American newspaper, the Boston News-Letter, appeared in 1704 and had to submit itself to the British censors in order to continue publishing. It survived for the next seventy-two years by avoiding controversy and not criticizing the monarchy. Several newspapers that began in colonial times are still publishing today: the New Hampshire Gazette was founded in Portsmouth in 1756, and the Hartford [Connecticut] Courant began in 1764. European immigrants to North America from other countries also established newspapers. The first to appear, a German-language paper, was Philadelphische Zeitung (Philadelphian Newspaper), which was begun in 1732.

Print Media in the British Empire

Throughout the British Empire, English was the preferred language for journalism, since entrepreneurs from Great Britain founded most of the newspapers. This excluded everyone who could only read in the vernacular, but it did help any local journalists who were fluent in English to get hired. In Calcutta, India, James Augustus Hickey started the Bengal Gazette in January 1780. To help cover the expenses of publishing, he began taking advertisements, but the newspaper still lasted only two years, due in large part to Hickey’s controversial reporting about the governor-general. Even in a faraway place, the British government took a dim view of criticism by the press. Although the Bengal Gazette is regarded by some as the first Indian newspaper, other sources note that in 1777 a member of the Parsi community named Rustomji Kashaspathi founded a newspaper called the Bombay Courier. A few newspapers in local languages did begin to emerge in the 1800s, but the most influential newspapers were English-language papers. Among the best-known was the Bombay Times and Journal of Commerce, founded in 1838; today it is known as the Times of India, a name it began using in 1851.

In Canada the first newspaper appeared in March 1752; the Halifax (Nova Scotia) Gazette began as a two-page tabloid, with news from England, Europe, and other British colonies. Its founder was the printer John Bushell. Although it was published in Canada, it did not cover local births, deaths, or marriages until about 1769; most of what it printed at first was material aimed at government officials, merchants, and the military. More local in its focus was the Toronto Globe (today the Globe and Mail), founded by Scottish emigre George Brown in 1844. The Globe sent correspondents all over eastern Canada to cover the news. And in Montreal, the Gazette began in 1778 as a French-language newspaper, switched to a bilingual format, and finally became all English in 1822.

In Australia one of the first newspapers was the Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser, founded in 1803. Three British men who had worked there, Alfred Stephens, Frederick Stokes, and William McGarvie, went on to found the Sydney Herald (today the Sydney Morning Herald) in 1831. The Herald, originally a weekly and only four pages long, expanded and became a daily in 1840.

Cape Town, South Africa, had a newspaper as early as 1800; the founders of the Cape Town Gazette were Alexander Walker and John Robertson, and it published articles in both English and Afrikaans. There was no black newspaper in South Africa until 1884, when Imvo Zabantsundu (Xhosa: Native Opinion) appeared for the first time. Founded by black journalist John Tengo Jabavu, it published in the Xhosa language and English, and was unique in addressing current events and politics from a black perspective and in giving black poets and essayists a way to get their ideas into print.

Historical Censorship of Print Media

The excuse often given for government censorship of the press has been that journalism is unreliable, and in its formative years, there may have been some truth to this claim, since some of the news sheets were filled with unfounded rumors, and some writers used sensationalism to attract an audience. But the real problem for the ruling classes was that the press began taking sides in political issues. Many readers saw the newspapers as a way to learn perspectives that differed from the official version given by those in power. Then, as now, the powers-that-be sponsored “official” publications. The rulers often hoped theirs would be the only version, but in England, to give one good example, other publications developed, some of which questioned the government. There were ongoing tensions between the rulers and the publishers: rulers didn’t mind getting some positive publicity from a newspaper, such as when in 1622, King James I of Britain explained in print why he had decided to dissolve parliament. But monarchs often tried to shut down newspapers that they perceived as too critical. In France, printers and publishers were sometimes arrested and flogged for publications deemed seditious or defamatory. In at least one case, in England in 1584, a Catholic printer, William Carter, was sentenced to death because it was believed that an allegorical story he had written in one of his widely disseminated books was really an attack on the queen’s Protestant faith.

Despite the best efforts of various European monarchs to muzzle the press, journalists continued to make their opinions known, and as the years passed, reporters and columnists showed they could shape public opinion. In England the influence of the press grew so much that by the early 1800s, British journalists were being referred to as the “fourth estate,” in reference to the three classes (or estates) of society: the nobility, the clergy, and the common people. It was suggested that in addition to the original three, there should be added a fourth, the journalists, who were in some ways the most influential of all, since their telling of a story could bring praise or disapproval from thousands of people.

Mass Media, Freedom of the Press, and Sensationalism

The idea of freedom of the press was advocated by scholars and poets from at least as early as the poet John Milton’s famous Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of England, in 1644, but it wasn’t until the mid-to-late 1700s that any countries created laws to formally protect journalists. Scandinavia led the way in 1766, with Sweden being the first country to abolish censorship and introduce a law guaranteeing freedom of the press, followed by Denmark and Norway in 1770. Freedom of the press became part of the newly independent United States’ Bill of Rights—the first ten amendments to its constitution—which was ratified in 1791.

Earlier centuries had seen the occasional publication of unfounded rumors or sensationalist stories, but in the nineteenth century, as newspapers proliferated, so did some of those excesses. Perhaps the most disturbing was “yellow journalism.” Named after a character in a U.S. comic strip, the “Yellow Kid,” in its milder forms it was just a preoccupation with scandal, rumor, and sensationalism. The Canadian journalist James Creelman was well known in the late 1800s for his dramatic and hyperbolic writing. As a correspondent for several New York newspapers, he reported from dangerous places, while interviewing some of the most controversial newsmakers of his day in a “you are there” style. The style of writing was very exaggerated and filled with words that made it seem as if the writer was in mortal danger just for writing the story. Creelman was what his age would have considered shocking—when he wrote about atrocities during the Sino-Japanese war, for example, his narratives were so graphic that people could not believe such horrible things were true. He was among that era’s best known correspondents, and saw himself as a truth-teller. In England, William T. Stead, the publisher of London’s Pall Mall Gazette, reacted against what he saw as the blandness of the British press by creating a strategy to appeal to the working-class person rather than the educated elite. He began using screaming headlines and more illustrations, as well as actively crusading against a variety of social problems that affected the poor; for example, in the mid-1880s, the Gazette did a series on child prostitution, at that time called “white slavery,” showing how easy it was for poor children to be exploited. At that time standards were quite different, and even writing about prostitutes was considered in questionable taste. The pages of the Gazette enabled Stead to advocate for a number of causes, including women’s suffrage and his era’s antiwar movement. Yellow journalism was eventually seen as negative by the public when journalists began to compete with each other at being more sensational and more graphic—again, within the limitations of the era, in which “bad language” was not permitted no matter what.

Sensational reporting sold newspapers, but yellow journalism could also have serious consequences. In an era before the concept of objective reporting had been enshrined in the journalist’s vocabulary, many newspapers were unashamedly partisan. This could be a mixed blessing. In Hungary, for example, there was revolution in the air in 1848, as many Hungarians wanted independence from Austria. It was the press that led the charge, thanks in large part to Lajos Kossuth, a lawyer whose views were considered radical by those in power. A fiery orator and writer, Kossuth used his position as editor-in-chief of the underground Pesti Hirlap (Newspaper from Pest) to promote nationalism and lead the drive for independence. While encouraging nationalism had a positive result in this case, there were other occasions when stirring up nationalistic fervor did more harm than good. The Spanish-American war in 1898 was largely attributed to newspaper owner William Randolph Hearst, who encouraged his reporters to inflame the U.S. public to support a war that most modern historians agree need never have been fought.

Telegraphy and Wire Services as Mass Media

The mid-to-late 1800s saw further expansion of journalism throughout the world. Technology was partly responsible: Steam driven locomotives now carried people to other cities more quickly, which was good news for reporters trying to cover an assignment. Better news was the invention of the telegraph, which made communicating from distant points infinitely faster. In both Europe and North America, new companies were founded to serve as resources for gathering news. The first news agency was founded in 1832 by Charles-Louis Havas; named Agence Havas, it originally translated the newspapers from foreign countries but by 1835 expanded to cover events around the globe. The government continually monitored it, but Agence Havas became a reliable resource for French-language newspapers. It survives to this day under the name of Agence France Presse. In May 1848 the Associated Press (AP) opened in New York. Founded by David Hale and James Gordon Bennett, it offered its U.S.-affiliated newspapers access to news dispatches from all over North America. In 1858 AP was able to receive dispatches from Europe for the first time, via transoceanic cable.

As use of the telegraph expanded, it became possible for the newspapers to receive and disseminate news on the same day, even from distant colonial outposts. This contributed to the impact journalism had on a society that increasingly sought more information about world events. In Europe, in October 1851, a German immigrant working in London, Paul Julius von Reuter, began sending stock market quotations between London and Paris via cable. Prior to telegraphy, he had used the so-called pigeon post, sending the information via carrier pigeons. His new company, Reuters, quickly expanded, offering newsgathering services similar to those of the Associated Press. Members of the British press were among his first customers, but soon Reuters had affiliates throughout Europe. In 1865, Reuters was the first European news service to have the story that President Lincoln had been assassinated. Other European countries also established their own news-gathering organizations, often because of demands from businesses for global information that might affect them. Outside of Europe, the new technology was slow to arrive, so newspapers such as Australia’s Sydney Herald still relied on news from ships until transoceanic cables were successfully laid and telegraph connections were established in major Australian cities, between 1858 and the mid-1870s.

A lack of modern telegraphy was also a problem in China. The Qing government appeared not to see the need for telegraph cable until it fought a war with Russia in the 1870s. Lack of speedy communication hampered treaty negotiations and led to several unfavorable treaties. The public was outraged, and this provided the impetus to begin expansion: from 1884 to 1899, 27,500 kilometers of cable was laid. The encroachment of other countries on China’s sovereignty and territory led to a feeling of nationalism that manifested itself in the establishment of many newspapers and magazines from the 1860s through the 1880s. In the rest of the world, certain Latin American countries laid down telegraph lines in the 1850s, as did the Ottoman Empire, and lines were laid down in European colonies as well.

Radio and Television as Mass Media

The 1900s brought yet another dramatic change in journalism, as a result of another technological advance. The inventors Guglielmo Marconi and Nikola Tesla were both experimenting with wireless communication, or what would later be called radio. It is generally agreed upon that the first broadcast was an experiment done by a Canadian engineer, Reginald Fessenden, in Massachusetts, but the exact date is not certain and is in fact the subject of much debate: some sources say it was on Christmas Eve 1906, whereas others place it earlier.

Some of the earliest commercial radio stations worldwide were operated by corporations, with the hope of selling merchandise or radio equipment. In North America, one of the first stations was XWA (later CFCF) in Montreal, owned by the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company; it went on the air in December 1919. Another early station, KDKA in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, was owned by Westinghouse, which manufactured electronic equipment, while another, 8MK (later WWJ) in Detroit, Michigan, was owned by a newspaper, the Detroit News. At least one early North American station—WIAE in Vinton, Iowa—was owned in 1922 by a woman, Marie Zimmerman. Mexico got its first station in December 1923, when CYL took to the air, owned jointly by two businessmen, Raul and Luis Azcarraga, and the Mexico City newspaper El Universal (The Universal). Puerto Rico’s first commercial station, WKAQ, went on the air from San Juan in 1922, started by Joaquin Agusty, who was well known for his work with amateur radio. And one of the first radio stations in Cuba was PWX, owned by the Cuban Telephone Company in Havana; American radio fans reported hearing its powerful signal in 1922.

News was broadcast at a few stations in 1921 and 1922, and live sporting events were also broadcast during that time. But the staple of American programming was music. At first, because many of the owners were from the upper class, they felt their duty was to educate and to offer “good” music (opera and classical, as opposed to jazz, which they felt was vulgar), but gradually the public demand for dance and popular music won out at most stations. Radio was unique because it was the first mass medium to bring people an event as it was happening, and it also provided the poor and people of color access to places from which they were often excluded. With radio, people could hear the greatest vocalists, learn from famous professors, or just enjoy the hit songs in the privacy of the home. Radio helped to create a common culture, as certain songs or certain performers became popular across the country.

Early radio broke down borders in other ways too. Signals carried great distances, and listeners competed to see who could receive stations from the farthest away. In 1921 Eunice Randall, the first women announcer in Massachusetts, told a newspaper that she had received fan mail from people who heard her in London. Radio magazines such as Radio News began printing lists of stations from foreign countries, so that listeners could write down the ones they heard. And it was not just in North America that radio changed people’s lives. Radio News reported in September 1925 how broadcasting was affecting the peasants in an impoverished Russian village. A radio and loudspeakers had been set up in a public listening room so that people could gather and hear the news of the world; crowds eagerly awaited these broadcasts so they could find out what was happening outside the confines of their village. Meanwhile, the government had just begun permitting private ownership of radio sets in Moscow, and already over 50,000 receivers were in use. By the mid-1920s, many European cities were hosting radio expositions at which the public could meet radio broadcasters and see the newest radio receiving equipment.

By late 1926 the United States’ first national network was on the air—the National Broadcasting Company, or NBC. It was able to offer its affiliates excellent programs with famous performers because the network was entirely supported by advertisers, who often chose the talent and decided what got on the air—a prerogative that resulted in women being relegated to stereotypic roles and minorities seldom being hired at all. By the end of the 1920s, few of the small entrepreneurs who had put the first stations on the air were able to afford to operate a radio station.

In many countries it was the government that operated the stations, which were supported by a receiver fee that listeners had to pay in order to own a radio receiving set. Great Britain was one such country. The British Broadcasting Company was founded in 1922, and the first station, 2LO, went on the air in November of that year. Right from the beginning, government interests tried to limit how much news could be broadcast, fearing that radio could influence the public’s political views; newspapers also lobbied the government to restrict radio from doing news at all, since print journalists saw radio as competition.

As in Britain, in France, Denmark, and Germany the government quickly established control of broadcasting in the early 1920s. In at least one place, radio broadcasting was entirely controlled by the Catholic Church: Vatican City’s first station was built in late 1930; the station would enable the pope spread his message worldwide.

In Argentina, a commercial station, Radio Argentina, was licensed in November 1923, and a high powered station, LPZ in Buenos Aires, was on the air in 1924. Argentina was also an excellent market for American-made radio receivers. In Peru, as early as July 1921, a government-run shortwave station in Lima was put on the air at the request of President Augusto Leguia; it mainly broadcast weather reports and other information useful to the military and the police. The first commercial station in Peru was probably OAX in Lima, which went on the air in June 1925, broadcasting entertainment and educational programming. Many stations in Latin America were run by private companies, and although they were sometimes subjected to government censorship, in general, they were free to broadcast.

Radio broadcasting came slowly to Asia. In fact, there were fewer than thirty stations in all of Asia in 1927, whereas in North America, there were hundreds. In China, American and British businessmen seem to have set up the earliest radio stations; one of the first was in Shanghai in 1922. But the government did not allow radio broadcasting to become widespread; by 1931 there were only eighteen stations operating in the entire country. A national radio service, operated by the Communist party, did not begin until 1940. In Hong Kong, then a British colony, the government was equally cautious: amateur radio fans proposed a station as early as 1923, but it wasn’t approved till 1928. Hong Kong only had that one station till the mid 1930s. In contrast, radio was welcomed in Japan, where the amateurs had been demanding it since the early 1920s. Tokyo’s JOAK was the first commercial station, going on the air in March 1925 and quickly followed by stations in Osaka and Nagoya. Nippon Hoso Kyokai (the Japan Broadcasting Association, or NHK) was established as the official national broadcasting company of Japan in 1926. Modeling itself after the BBC, it took control of the three stations on the air and continued to expand throughout the country.

During the 1930s, NHK was also involved with experiments in early television, as was the Soviet Union, which conducted experiments with television as early as 1931. There were TV broadcasts in the Netherlands in 1935, and Great Britain inaugurated its national service in November 1936: the first British television broadcast featured a song called “Magic Rays of Light,” which certainly expressed the amazement people who witnessed it must have felt. Even prior to the establishment of electronic television, Great Britain was home to very primitive mechanical stations that broadcast sporadically in the late 1920s. A Scottish-born inventor, John Logie Baird, is regarded as the father of mechanical television in Great Britain, and he received considerable publicity despite the poor quality of the picture his system produced. In the United States, the inventor Charles Francis Jenkins was the father of mechanical television, and he too supervised some stations in the late 1920s. But it was the development of a far superior technology, electronic television (credited in the United States sometimes to an independent West-Coast inventor named Philo Farnsworth and sometimes to a corporate inventor who worked for RCA, Vladimir Zworykin), that eventually led to the United States’ successful television industry.

Colonialism played a major role in the history of international broadcasting. Colonial governments set up radio stations (and later TV stations) and controlled their content, as they had with newspapers. Even stations that were set up as noncommercial were operated by and often benefited corporate interests. The British Marconi Company, which wanted to sell receiving sets, attempted to open stations in Bombay (Mumbai) and Calcutta, India, as early as 1922. An amateur organization in India, the Radio Club of Bombay, did some programming beginning in 1923, but the first commercial stations did not begin till 1927. When it became evident that World War II was on the horizon, interest grew in expanding the radio broadcasts to give the public more news and entertainment during difficult times. But a national service (All India Radio) did not flourish till India achieved independence in 1947. And in Central America, the United Fruit Company had great influence on what was broadcast, making sure news reports were favorable and nobody challenged the company’s control over the banana industry. Even under colonial administration, nationalism could lead to conflicts about what should or should not be broadcast. In the British mandate of Palestine (present-day Israel), the British set up the Palestine Broadcasting Service in March 1936. Although BBC announcers trained the staff and programming was offered in Hebrew, Arabic, and English, neither Jews nor Arabs were happy with what was on the air. The same problem occurred in a number of other ethnically divided countries, where ethnic tensions played out in a struggle for control of the country’s radio stations.

The Mass Media Divide: Comparing Rich and Poor Nations

One organization that has been monitoring trends in international media is UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), which held its first international conference on communication policies in 1974 in Costa Rica. At that conference, a declaration was issued, urging that in crafting their communications policies, nations should take into account national realities but also the promotion of free expression of thought and respect for individual and social rights. In subsequent conferences, declarations were made about the necessity of protecting the rights of journalists and giving all people—not just the rich and the powerful—access to information. An international commission, with members from fifteen countries, convened in 1977 and began issuing reports on the state of the media. Their first report, Many Voices, One World, was issued in 1980 and was the first in-depth study of the media in both rich and poor countries. It identified disparities in access to media: in Africa, for example, 1976 statistics showed that only 3 percent of the population owned a radio, which was troubling because “[r]adio is of vital importance to developing countries because of [the] low penetration of newspapers into rural areas and . . . because of illiteracy on a mass scale” (MacBride 1980, 122–127). The commission also identified the countries that had kept pace with advances in communication technology—Japan, for example, composed only 5 percent of Asia’s population yet it had “66 percent of the press circulation, 46 percent of the radio receivers, 63 percent of the television sets and 89 percent of the telephones” (MacBride 1980, 122–127), according to 1979 research. The study found that while India had 835 different newspapers, eight African countries had no daily newspaper at all, while others had only a weekly or a biweekly that was not distributed outside of main centers of population. Even in developed countries that had radio or newspapers or television, most of the coverage was about what was going on in the biggest cities. And although media consolidation was not the issue in 1980 that it is today, there was already evidence that a handful of elites controlled the communication in many countries. As the commission noted, issuing a declaration about press freedom or equal access did not mean that those goals would be reached or that governments would cooperate.

Since that first UNESCO report, more countries now have technology, and a growing number have Internet newspapers. Perhaps the first in Africa was the Mail and Guardian Online, started in South Africa in 1994. Saudi Arabia began an English-language service, ArabNews Online, around 1998; it was an offshoot of the English-language daily newspaper, Arab News, which had been established in 1975. What the average Saudi has access to remains limited. The ability to communicate in English was desirable primarily for the elite, who were taught the language in private schools so they could engage in commerce with the West. The average person mainly went to religious schools, but the educated elite then and now were taught English. The fact that the on-line Arab News publishes in English provides it with the ability to reach out to educated Saudi expatriates as well as to American and British diplomats. The ruling class and the clerics in Saudi Arabia at first opposed modernizations such as radio, which by all accounts did not start till the 1930s—the clerics only accepted radio when King Abd al Aziz tied its use to the religious purpose of airing scriptural lessons and teaching illiterate people more about their religion. For those who have access to it, the Internet can provide a means of resisting tyranny. Women human rights activists in Afghanistan founded RAWA (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan) and made use of online communication and a website to mobilize supporters worldwide during the repressive Taliban regime of the 1990s. Even in countries in which the average citizen lacks access to the Internet, exiles are often able to use it to spread the word of what is happening in their country. It has become harder for repressive regimes to control information or prevent it from being disseminated, but it can still be done: in Burma (Myanmar), the autocratic government has been successful in keeping dissenting voices from being heard, and in Iran, when protesters questioned the legitimacy of the elections in 2009, the government banned Western TV and radio reporters, and shut down most internet sites, while limiting access to social networking sites.

Mass Media and Violence

Being a journalist can be a dangerous occupation. The International Press Institute in Vienna stated that in 2003, sixty-four journalists were killed; nineteen of them died in Iraq and nine in Columbia. Also in 2003, the Committee to Protect Journalists named Iraq, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Turkmenistan, and Bangladesh as the most unsafe places for journalists. According to the CPJ, while Iraq was a war zone and any reporting from a war zone can be dangerous, the other countries had repressive governments that lock up and in some cases torture journalists whose opinions they do not like. By 2008, conditions for journalists remained unchanged—once again, sixty-four journalists were killed, with Iraq and Pakistan having the most deaths. In some countries, journalists have just disappeared, usually after reporting on a story the government disliked, or uncovering the activities of organized crime. That was the case in Mexico is 2007 when investigative reporter Rodolfo Rincon Taracena vanished after reporting on local drug trafficking. Reporters covering drug-related crime in Latin America were also frequently in danger: in Peru in 2006, forty journalists were attacked, and in Columbia, three were killed and many others had to go into hiding. In Haiti, where news is still spread by teledjol (word of mouth) and illiteracy is rampant, radio remains the most important mass medium: according to some reports, about 92 percent of Haitians own a radio and the country has over three hundred stations. For that reason, the government has sometimes tried to suppress the country’s radio stations: Jean Dominique, director of a popular language station, denounced the government and accused it of rigging the elections; he was gunned down in April 2000. There are reports that Haitian radio stations have gradually gained more freedom since then, although journalists have admitted to practicing self-censorship. In some countries, the media have also been used by those in power to incite the population to violence. One especially egregious example of this occurred during the Rwandan genocide of 1994, when a government radio station, RTML, encouraged Hutus to murder members of the Tutsi minority. Radio broadcasts referred to Tutsis as “vermin” and “cockroaches” and repeatedly demonized them. Transcripts show that some announcers even pointed out where Tutsis were living and encouraged Hutus to kill them.

The Future of Mass Media

In the Muslim world, the arrival of the cable news television station Al-Jazeera (Arabic for The Peninsula) in 1996 has been dramatic. Critics have called the Quatar-based station sensationalistic and biased and have accused it of stirring up anti-Jewish and anti-American sentiments in the Arab world. But many Muslims counter that it is the first network to report from a pro-Arab point of view. Unlike CNN or Fox, American cable networks with a decidedly American and Western viewpoint, Al-Jazeera has called American forces in Iraq “occupiers” and referred to those who were fighting against the Americans not as “militants” but rather as “resistance fighters” or “martyrs.” Al-Jazeera has grown in size and influence in the years since its founding; since 2003, it has competition from Dubai-based Al-Arabiya, which also offers news from a pro-Arab point of view, but is perceived by Western observers to be more moderate in its coverage. It will be interesting to see the direction these stations take in the years to come. Cable television has become a growing presence in a growing number of Arab countries in the first decade of the twenty-first century. And while many Arab stations, both radio and TV, are religious in nature, there are also stations that broadcast a wider variety of programming, including popular movies. One example is ART (the Arab Radio and Television Network), which was founded in Saudi Arabia back in 1993.

While globalization has affected how business is done worldwide, it has also affected the mass media. In the United States, deregulation of broadcast media began in the 1980s under President Ronald Reagan, culminating with the 1996 Telecommunications Act, signed by President Bill Clinton. The Telecom Act lifted restrictions on how many stations could be owned by one company. Rather than encouraging competition as proponents claimed it would, the end result was consolidation of power into the hands of a few giant media conglomerates, several of which (Clear Channel Communications, which at one point owned over a thousand radio stations and a major concert promotion company; and News Corporation, owner of cable channel Fox News as well as numerous newspapers and magazines) had ties to conservative politics and the Republican party. In the buildup to the invasion of Iraq, critics accused these conglomerates of stifling dissenting views and only broadcasting coverage in favor of going to war.

Similar media consolidation occurred in Canada, where in the period from 1985 to 2000, consolidation occurred in dramatic fashion. By 2000, 68 percent of all television stations were controlled by five giant companies, and one conglomerate, the Hollinger Corporation, soon owned or had a financial interest in 80 percent of Canada’s daily newspapers. Eventually, financial problems caused Hollinger to sell off many of those newspapers, but they were bought up by another conglomerate, CanWest.

Media consolidation is also a fact of life in parts of Europe. In England, there has been increasing pressure on the government to relax media ownership laws. One major proponent of removing the limitations is Rupert Murdoch; in addition to owning the American conglomerate News Corporation, he also owns several British newspapers (including the Times of London and a tabloid, the Sun) and a satellite programming service called BSkyB (British Sky Broadcasting), as well as media properties in Australia. Murdoch has been accused by his critics of censoring news stories that are contrary to his political views. Meanwhile, in Italy, the controversial prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, also had ties to media ownership; companies owned by his family dominate Italian television, and he has attempted to pass legislation that would permit his conglomerate to expand its ownership of newspapers. He has also used his influence to make sure the state-run broadcaster RAI is controlled by a board of directors that is favorable to him. Critics have accused him of using his wealth to manipulate media coverage, in order to avoid having his questionable financial dealings scrutinized.

In other countries too, a similar trend towards consolidation can be seen. Where media were at one time comprised of government-run monopolies, the new concern is that commercial media conglomerates are stifling opposing voices in the same way that the state-run media once did.

There are some hopeful media signs in countries where repression used to be a part of life. After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, an era of comparative freedom of the press began in Russia. While the press was reined in somewhat by the government of President Vladimir Putin, who was in office (2000– 2008), it is still far more free than it was in the era of Soviet rule. But being a journalist in Russia can still be dangerous: the Committee to Protect Journalists notes that when journalists are murdered there, the killers are seldom if ever brought to justice. The news is more positive for journalists in Haiti. Radio stations that were shut down by the government have quietly reopened since the ouster of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004. And in Rwanda a new radio service promotes not hatred but friendship and entertainment. Similar to pop music radio stations in the United States, Rwanda Radio in Kigali has opportunities for listeners to call in, a morning talk show, modern pop music, and even a children’s trivia contest in which the winners get to talk on the air. Young and articulate announcers offer listeners helpful information about health, and they also teach tolerance. Where radio had once been part of the problem, it is now trying to be part of the healing process.

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