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Ielts essay sample 36 - the threat of nuclear weapons maintains world peace, ielts writing task 2/ ielts essay:, the threat of nuclear weapons maintains world peace. nuclear power provides cheap and clean energy. the benefits of nuclear technology far outweigh the disadvantages..

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Article contents

Nuclear weapons and international conflict: theories and empirical evidence.

• Daniel S. Geller Daniel S. Geller Daniel S. Geller is Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Wayne State University. He conducts research and teaches in the areas of International Politics, Defense Policy, and Foreign Policy. From 2000 through 2010 Dr. Geller served as a consultant to the U.S. Department of State, Office of Technology and Assessments, and in 2009 he was a member of a Senior Advisory Group to the U.S. Strategic Command on the Nuclear Posture Review. Dr. Geller was a Co-Principal Investigator on an NSF grant involving the expansion of the militarized interstate dispute database. He has published extensively in books, journals and edited collections on the subject of interstate war. His most recent books are Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict (Cambridge University Press) co-authored with J. David Singer and The Construction and Cumulation of Knowledge in International Relations (Blackwell, Ltd.) co-edited with John A. Vasquez.
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.347
• Published online: 27 July 2017

The balance of conventional military capabilities is intrinsic to understanding patterns of war among nations. However, cumulative knowledge relating to the effects of nuclear weapons possession on conflict interaction is largely absent. Framework is provided for analyzing the results of quantitative empirical research on this question and to identify any extant strong and consistent patterns in the interactions of states that can be associated with the possession of nuclear weapons.

Since 1945, a vast, sophisticated, and contradictory literature has developed on the implications of nuclear weaponry for patterns of international conflict and war. This theoretical and empirical work has principally focused on the conflict effects of these weapons for the interaction of nuclear-armed states, although a growing number of studies have explored the impact of a state’s possession of nuclear weapons on the behavior of nonnuclear opponents. Given the destructive capacity of these weapons and their questionable value for battlefield use, most of this work has concentrated on the requirements for successful deterrence. In categorizing the studies, some scholars note that “classical deterrence theory” derives from the Realist paradigm of international politics and subdivide this theory into two complementary strands: structural (or neorealist) deterrence theory and decision-theoretic deterrence theory. In contrast, other analysts choose to classify work on nuclear deterrence into three schools of thought: nuclear irrelevance; risk manipulation, escalation, and limited war; and the nuclear revolution. The essence of these divisions involves a debate about what the possession of nuclear weapons does for a state that controls them. Does the possession of these weapons affect the behavior of nuclear and nonnuclear opponents in disputes over contested values? Do the weapons impart political influence and hold military utility, or are they useless as tools for deterrence, compellence, or war?

• nuclear weapons
• crisis escalation
• nuclear war
• international conflict
• empirical international relations theory

Introduction

The balance of conventional military capabilities is intrinsic to understanding patterns of war among nations (Geller, 2000a ). However, cumulative knowledge relating to the effects of nuclear weapons possession on conflict interaction is largely absent. This article seeks to provide a framework for analyzing the results of quantitative empirical research on this question and to identify any extant strong and consistent patterns in the interactions of states that can be associated with the possession of nuclear weapons.

Since 1945 , a vast, sophisticated, and contradictory literature has developed on the implications of nuclear weaponry for patterns of international conflict and war. 1 This theoretical and empirical work has principally focused on the conflict effects of these weapons for the interaction of nuclear-armed states, although a growing number of studies have explored the impact of a state’s possession of nuclear weapons on the behavior of nonnuclear opponents. Given the destructive capacity of these weapons and their questionable value for battlefield use, most of this work has concentrated on the requirements for successful deterrence. In categorizing the studies, Zagare and Kilgour ( 2000 ), for example, note that “classical deterrence theory” derives from the Realist paradigm of international politics, and they subdivide this theory into two complementary strands: structural (or neorealist) deterrence theory and decision-theoretic deterrence theory. In contrast, Jervis ( 1979 , 1984 , 1988 ), among others, chooses to classify work on nuclear deterrence into three schools of thought: nuclear irrelevance; risk manipulation, escalation, and limited war; and the nuclear revolution. The essence of these divisions involves a debate about what the possession of nuclear weapons does for a state that controls them. Does the possession of these weapons affect the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear opponents in disputes over contested values? Do the weapons impart political influence and hold military utility or are they useless as tools for deterrence, compellence, or war?

Nuclear strategy has principally concerned itself with the efficacy of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. One school of thought—nuclear revolution theory—characterized by the works of Brodie ( 1946 , 1959 , 1978 ), Waltz ( 1981 , 1990 , 1993 , 2003 ), and Jervis ( 1984 , 1988 , 1989a ), holds that the incredibly rapid and destructive effects of nuclear weapons creates a strong disincentive for nuclear-armed states to engage each other in disputes that might escalate to the level of war. The “nuclear revolution” means that nuclear weapons can deter aggression at all levels of violence and makes confrontations and crises between nuclear-armed states rare events. The maintenance of a nuclear second-strike capability is all that is required for a successful military deterrent force.

A second school of thought—risk manipulation, escalation, and limited war—emphasizes the problem of “risk” in confrontations between states in possession of nuclear weapons. The issue here is that, in disputes between nuclear-armed states, the use of nuclear weapons carries such enormous costs for both sides that any threat to use the weapons lacks inherent credibility. While allowing that a nuclear second-strike capability can deter a full-scale nuclear strike by an opponent, these analysts argue that states will manipulate the risk of dispute escalation and war for the purposes of deterrence and compellence (e.g., Gray, 1979 ; Kahn, 1962 , 1965 ; Schelling, 1960 , 1966 ). In this view, crises and brinkmanship tactics become surrogates for war in confrontations between nations in possession of nuclear weapons (Snyder & Diesing, 1977 ). Associated with this thesis is the concept of the “stability-instability paradox” (Snyder, 1965 ), whereby nuclear-armed states are secure in the deterrence of general nuclear war but are free to exploit military asymmetries (including strategic and tactical nuclear asymmetries as well as conventional military advantages) at lower levels of violence (e.g., Kissinger, 1957 ).

Yet another perspective holds nuclear weapons to be “irrelevant” as special instruments of either statecraft or war (Mueller 1988 , 1989 ). 2 In this argument, nuclear weapons are not substantially different in their deterrent effect from conventional military forces and, in John Mueller’s view, developed nations will not engage each other in either conventional or nuclear wars—having already witnessed the devastation that can be produced with both types of weaponry. A related argument holds that the possession of nuclear weapons provides little or no coercive advantage in confrontations with either nuclear-armed or nonnuclear states. A number of quantitative empirical studies of deterrence failures and successes (in both direct- and extended-deterrence cases) have produced results supportive of this thesis. Additionally, a notable formal mathematical study of deterrence by Zagare and Kilgour ( 2000 ) demonstrates that raising the costs of war above a certain threshold has no effect on deterrence stability. In this work, Zagare and Kilgour also maintain that, while nuclear weapons may increase the costs associated with a deterrent threat, they simultaneously decrease the credibility of the threat—and hence the stability of deterrence. These contrary effects serve to minimize the impact of nuclear weapons on effective deterrence. In short, nuclear and nonnuclear crises should exhibit the same patterns of escalation.

Over the past 35 years, large-scale quantitative empirical studies have attempted to generate evidence relating to these theories. Discussion of some of these works follows.

Nuclear Weapons and Patterns of International Conflict

The nuclear revolution.

The term “nuclear revolution” was coined by Robert Jervis ( 1989a , ch. 1), although the initial recognition of the alterations in patterns of international politics likely to be wrought by nuclear weapons should be credited to Bernard Brodie ( 1946 ). As Jervis has noted:

the changes nuclear weapons have produced in world politics constitute a true revolution in the relationships between force and foreign policy. The fact that neither [the United States nor the Soviet Union] can protect itself without the other’s cooperation drastically alters the way in which force can be used or threatened . . . The result is to render much of our prenuclear logic inadequate. As Bernard Brodie has stressed, the first question to ask about a war is what the political goal is that justifies the military cost. When the cost is likely to be very high, only the most valuable goals are worth pursuing by military means . . . What prospective . . . goals could possibly justify the risk of total destruction? (Jervis, 1989a , p. 13, 24)

Moreover, for Jervis ( 1989b ), that this destruction was essentially unavoidable under any plausible strategy constituted the essence of the nuclear revolution. Jervis ( 1989a , pp. 23–25) went on to enumerate changes in international politics directly attributable to the presence of nuclear weaponry, including the absence of war among the great powers, the declining frequency of great power crises, and the tenuous link between the conventional or nuclear balance among great powers and the political outcomes of their disputes. 3

Kenneth Waltz ( 1981 , 1990 , 1993 , 2003 , 2008 ) has been exceptionally prominent in developing and forwarding the thesis that nuclear weapons are a force for peace and that nuclear proliferation will lead to declining frequencies of war. Waltz argues that nuclear weapons are simply more effective in dissuading states from engaging in war than are conventional weapons:

In a conventional world, states going to war can at once believe that they may win and that, should they lose, the price of defeat will be bearable (Waltz, 1990 , p. 743). A little reasoning leads to the conclusions that to fight nuclear wars is all but impossible and that to launch an offensive that might prompt nuclear retaliation is obvious folly. To reach these conclusions, complicated calculations are not required, only a little common sense (Waltz in Sagan & Waltz, 1995 , p. 113). The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons make wars hard to start. These statements hold for small as for big nuclear powers. Because they do, the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared. (Waltz in Sagan & Waltz, 1995 , p. 45)

Given this logic, evidence consistent with an absence of war or the use of force short of war between nuclear-armed states and few (or a declining frequency of) crises between nuclear powers would be supportive of the nuclear revolution thesis.

Empirical Evidence

A number of quantitative empirical studies have produced evidence relevant to the nuclear revolution thesis. In an early study of the effects of nuclear weapons possession, Bueno de Mesquita and Riker ( 1982 ) present both a formal mathematical model and an empirical test of deterrence success. The model assumes the possibility of nuclear war (i.e., the use of nuclear weapons) when nuclear asymmetry exists (only one side possesses nuclear weapons), but assumes the absence of nuclear war among nuclear-armed states. The model indicates a rising probability of nuclear war resulting from nuclear proliferation to the midpoint of the international system, where half of the states possess nuclear weapons, at which point any further proliferation results in a declining probability of nuclear war. When all nations possess nuclear weapons, the probability of nuclear war is zero. The supporting empirical analysis uses early Correlates of War (COW) Project Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data, for the years 1945 through 1976 , for four classes of dyads: nuclear/nuclear, nuclear/nonnuclear with a nuclear ally, nuclear/nonnuclear, and nonnuclear/nonnuclear. The analysis examines the distribution of threats, interventions, and wars across the four dyad classes and indicates that the presence of a symmetric nuclear threat constrains conflict by reducing its likelihood of escalation to the level of war. The two classes of nuclear/nuclear and nuclear/nonnuclear with a nuclear ally have the highest probabilities of employing only threats and the lowest probabilities of engaging in interventions and wars. This evidence is consistent with the predictions of the nuclear revolution thesis. 4

Rauchhaus ( 2009 ) provides a multivariate analysis of factors associated with both militarized interstate disputes and wars for all dyads between 1885 and 2000 (MID database). The data set used in his study contains 611,310 dyad years, and tests were performed on time sections from 1885–1944 and 1945–2000 . He reports that in symmetric nuclear dyads (both states possess nuclear weapons) the odds of war drop precipitously. Rauchhaus concludes that Waltz and other nuclear revolution theorists find support for their thesis in the patterns uncovered by his study.

Asal and Beardsley ( 2007 ) examine the relationship between the severity of violence in international crises and the number of states involved in the crises that possess nuclear weapons. Using data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project for the years 1918 through 2000 , their results indicate that crises in which nuclear actors are involved are more likely to end without violence and that, as the number of nuclear-armed states engaged in crises increases, the probability of war decreases. This evidence is interpreted as supportive of the nuclear revolution thesis: the presence of nuclear weapon states in international crises has a violence-dampening effect due to the potential consequences of escalation and the use of nuclear force.

In a second study, Beardsley and Asal ( 2009a ) hypothesize that nuclear weapons act as shields against aggressive behavior directed toward their possessors. Specifically, it is postulated that nuclear states will be constrained in engaging in aggressive actions toward other nuclear-armed powers. Data is drawn from the ICB Project for the years 1945 through 2000 , using directed dyads as the unit of analysis. The results indicate that nuclear opponents of other nuclear-armed powers are limited in their use of violent force. However, Beardsley and Asal ( 2009a , p. 251) also note that the “restraining effect of nuclear weapons on violent aggression does not appear to affect the propensity for actors to engage each other in general crises, in contrast with the expectations of . . . the ‘nuclear revolution’ model. . .”

Additional results consistent with the nuclear revolution thesis are reported in a study by Sobek, Foster, and Robinson ( 2012 ). Using directed-dyad year with MID data for the period between 1945 and 2001 , the study examines the effects of efforts to develop nuclear weapons on the targeting of the proliferator in militarized disputes. Sobek et al. ( 2012 , p. 160) conclude that “. . .if a state . . . gains nuclear weapons, then the odds of being targeted in a militarized dispute falls.” States developing nuclear weapons are high-frequency targets in MIDs, but “. . .[t]argeting drops precipitously when [joint] acquisition is achieved” (Sobek et al., 2012 , p. 160).

However, Bell and Miller ( 2015 ) present evidence that is counter to the preceding studies. Using data collected by Rauchhaus ( 2009 ), they contend that nuclear dyads are neither more nor less likely to fight wars or engage in sub-war conflicts than are nonnuclear dyads. They argue that the evidence indicating a strong negative probability of war in symmetric nuclear dyads is due to the statistical model used by Rauchhaus, whereas the positive association for nuclear dyads and crisis frequency reported by Beardsley and Asal ( 2009a ) is due to selection effects (i.e., nuclear weapons possession is more a consequence rather than a cause of conflict).

The nuclear revolution thesis maintains that there should be a general absence of war or the use of force short of war among nuclear-armed states. In addition, there is the expectation of few (or a diminishing number of) crises in nuclear dyads, as the fear of escalation will exert a powerful constraint on aggressive behavior.

Bueno de Mesquita and Riker ( 1982 ) present compelling evidence that nuclear asymmetry or the absence of nuclear weapons on both sides of a conflict are more likely to be associated with war. In their data, between 1945 and 1976 , there were 17 cases of war between nonnuclear states, two cases of war in asymmetric nuclear dyads, and zero cases of war in either nuclear dyads or nuclear/nonnuclear dyads where the nonnuclear party had a nuclear-armed ally. Rauchhaus’s ( 2009 ) study also presents evidence that symmetric nuclear dyads are unlikely to engage in war. The article by Asal and Beardsley ( 2007 ) reports results consistent with those of Bueno de Mesquita and Riker ( 1982 ). Specifically, crises ending in war are not uncommon for confrontations engaging nonnuclear states and for confrontations in which only one state possesses nuclear weapons. However, as the number of nuclear participants increases beyond one, the probability of full-scale war diminishes. Only the results of Bell and Miller ( 2015 ) stand in contrast with the findings on symmetric nuclear dyads and the probability of war. Similarly, Beardsley and Asal ( 2009a ) show findings consistent with the nuclear revolution thesis: symmetric nuclear dyads engage in few crises where violence is the “preeminent” form of interaction. This conclusion is also supported by the findings reported by Sobek et al. ( 2012 ). However, Asal and Beardsley ( 2007 ) and Beardsley and Asal ( 2009a ) also note that there appears to be no constraining effect produced by nuclear weapons on the occurrence of crises that exhibit lower levels of hostility in symmetric nuclear dyads.

Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945 , there has been one war between nuclear-armed powers: the Kargil War of 1999 involving India and Pakistan (Geller, 2005 , p. 101). This conflict remained at the conventional level and surpassed the threshold of 1,000 battle deaths set by the Correlates of War Project for classification as a war (Singer & Small, 1972 ; Small & Singer, 1982 ). However, Paul ( 2005 , p. 13) argues that, despite the conventional military asymmetry between India and Pakistan (in India’s favor) that existed at the time of the Kargil War, the development of Pakistani nuclear weapons actually permitted Pakistan to launch a conventional invasion of the disputed territory of Kashmir. As Paul explains, only in a long war could India mobilize its material superiority, but as a result of the development of Pakistani nuclear weapons, a long war becomes “inconceivable” without incurring the risk of nuclear escalation. Hence, Pakistan’s leaders were emboldened to initiate a conventional war behind the shield of their nuclear deterrent despite their conventional military inferiority. This sole case of conventional war between nuclear-armed states—and its facilitation by the risk of unacceptable escalation provided by nuclear weapons—stands in stark contradiction to the predictions of nuclear revolution theory. 5

These collective results provide only partial support for the nuclear revolution thesis. As the theory suggests, war between nuclear-armed states should be nonexistent or a very rare event. This prediction, to date (with one notable exception), has been upheld. However, Beardsley and Asal ( 2009a ) report that symmetric nuclear dyads engage in an unexpectedly large number of crises—in contradiction to the predictions of nuclear revolution theory. This is an empirical question that will receive additional examination in the following section.

Risk Manipulation, Escalation, and Limited War

A second school of thought—risk manipulation, escalation, and limited war—finds its archetypal expression in the seminal work of Henry Kissinger ( 1957 ). According to this thesis (and counter to that of nuclear revolution theory), the possession of a nuclear second-strike capability may deter a nuclear attack by an opponent on one’s home territory, but not much else. Kissinger argued that the United States (and its NATO allies) required the ability to conduct successful combat operations at levels of violence below that of general nuclear war if the protection of Europe against Soviet aggression was a political goal. Some years later, Snyder ( 1965 ) discussed this as what was later termed the “stability-instability paradox.” The essence of the paradox was that stability at the level of general nuclear war permitted the exploitation of military asymmetries at lower levels of violence—including strategic (counterforce) and tactical nuclear wars as well as conventional forms of combat. The thesis that strategic nuclear weapons possessed little political or military utility other than deterring a nuclear attack on one’s home territory led to a number of works devoted to the analysis of tactics for coercive bargaining and limited war by Thomas Schelling ( 1960 , 1966 ), Herman Kahn ( 1960 , 1962 , 1965 ), and others. 6

As Snyder and Diesing ( 1977 , p. 450) maintain, the primary effect of the possession of nuclear weapons on the behavior of nuclear adversaries is the creation of new constraints on the ultimate range of their coercive tactics—a result of the extraordinary increase in the interval between the value of the interests at stake in a conflict and the potential costs of war. They note that before the advent of nuclear weapons, this interval was comparatively small and states could more readily accept the risk of war in a coercive bargaining crisis or engage in war in order to avoid the loss of a contested value. In contradistinction, given even small numbers of nuclear weapons in the stockpiles of states, it is far more difficult to conceive of an issue worth incurring the high risk of nuclear war, much less the cost of actually fighting one. 7

According to this thesis, a direct result of the constraints created by the presence of nuclear weapons has been the attempt by nuclear powers to control, in a more finely calibrated manner, the threat and application of force in disputes with other nuclear-armed states. These developments find theoretical and empirical expression in the concept of escalation , which is defined as the sequential expansion of the scope or intensity of conflict (Osgood & Tucker, 1967 , p. 127, 188). 8 In most standard formulations, escalation is conceived as a generally “controllable and reversible process,” 9 which a rational decision maker can employ in conflict situations as an instrument of state policy (Osgood & Tucker, 1967 , p. 188). Decision makers estimate the relative bargaining power of the rivals and engage in increasingly coercive tactics that are designed to undermine the opponent’s resolve. Controlled escalation occurs when each side is capable of inflicting major or unacceptable damage on the other but avoids this while attempting to influence the opponent with measured increases in the conflict level that incorporate the threat of possible continued expansion.

The measured application of force and the ability to control escalation in nuclear disputes are seen—by these strategic theorists—as indispensable for securing political values while minimizing risk and cost (Osgood & Tucker, 1967 , p. 137; Russett, 1988 , p. 284). A preeminent theorist in this school, Herman Kahn ( 1965 , p. 3), described escalation as “an increase in the level of conflict . . . [often assuming the form of] a competition in risk-taking or . . . resolve.” As this theory developed, conflict analysts elaborated the risks involved in the process and incorporated the manipulation of these risks as a possible tactic in one’s strategy. 10

Clearly, nuclear weapons have not altered the values at stake in interstate disputes (and the desire to avoid political loss), but rather have increased the rapid and immediate costs of war. As a result, in a severe conflict between nuclear powers, the decision maker’s dilemma is to construct a strategy to secure political interests through coercive actions that raise the possibility of war without pushing the risk to an intolerable level. Some analysts argue that the solution to this problem has entailed an increase in the “threshold of provocation,” providing greater area of coercive maneuver in the threat, display, and limited use of force (Osgood & Tucker, 1967 , pp. 144–145; Snyder & Diesing, 1977 , p. 451). Hostile interaction between nuclear powers under this higher provocation threshold can range from verbal threats and warnings, to military deployments and displays, to the use of force in limited wars. Hence, in disputes between nuclear powers, it is argued that military force should be viewed as requisite but “potentially catastrophic power” that must be carefully managed and controlled within the bounds of reciprocally recognized constraints (Osgood & Tucker 1967 , p. 137).

It is frequently stated that the principal exemplar of this new form of competition is the local crisis. Obviously, crises have an extensive history in international politics, but the argument is made that the nuclear age has produced an expansion of steps on the escalation ladder and has intensified the maneuvering of nuclear rivals for dominant position in conflicts below the level of all-out war. For example, Snyder and Diesing note that:

the expanded range of crisis tactics in the nuclear era can be linked to a new conception of crises as surrogates for war, rather than merely dangerous incidents that might lead to war. . . [S]ince war is no longer a plausible option between nuclear powers, they have turned to threats of force and the demonstrative use of force short of war as a means of getting their way. The winner of the encounter is the one who can appear the most resolved to take risks and stand up to risks. (Snyder & Diesing, 1977 , pp. 455–456)

Given this logic, conflicts between nuclear powers should reveal different escalatory patterns than conflicts between states where only one side possesses nuclear arms, or conflicts where neither side possesses nuclear arms. Specifically, disputes between nuclear powers should evidence a greater tendency to escalate—short of war—than nonnuclear disputes or disputes, in which only one side possesses a nuclear capability.

Kugler ( 1984 ) presents an empirical test of classical nuclear deterrence theory: the study examines whether nuclear weapons are salient in preventing the initiation or escalation of war to extreme levels. The analysis focuses on crisis interactions involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and China (PRC) with the case set drawn from Butterworth ( 1976 ) and CACI (Mahoney & Clayberg, 1978 , 1979 ). The cases used in the analysis constitute 14 extreme crises where nuclear nations were involved and where nuclear weapons “played a central role” (Kugler, 1984 , p. 477). The results indicate that crises of extreme intensity diminish as the threat of nuclear devastation becomes mutual. In other words, as the capacity of actors to destroy each other with nuclear weapons increases, there is a tendency to decrease the intensity of conflict, and to settle those crises that reach extreme proportions by compromise. This suggests that deterrence of war through the symmetric possession of nuclear weapons is operative in the conflict dynamics of great-power crises.

As Siverson and Miller ( 1993 , pp. 86–87) note, the earliest systematic statistical work on the effect of nuclear weapons possession in the escalation of conflict is by Geller ( 1990 ). This study employs the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data covering 393 MIDs between 1946 and 1976 and uses the MID five-level dispute hostility index in coding the dependent variable. The results indicate that dispute escalation probabilities are significantly affected by the distribution of nuclear capabilities. Comparing the escalatory behavior of nuclear dyads with the escalatory behavior of nonnuclear dyads in militarized disputes, it is reported that symmetric nuclear disputes indicate a far greater tendency to escalate—short of war—than do disputes for nonnuclear pairs: disputes in which both parties possess nuclear weapons have approximately a seven times greater probability (0.238) of escalating of escalating than do disputes in which neither party possesses nuclear arms (0.032). The conclusion indicates that the presence of nuclear weapons impacts the crisis behavior of states, with disputes between nuclear states more likely to escalate, short of war, than disputes between nonnuclear nations.

Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett ( 1993 ) analyze 97 cases of great power deterrence encounters from 1816 to 1984 as a means of testing the explanatory power of two competing theoretical approaches to dispute escalation. Dispute escalation is defined as the failure of the deterrent policies of the defender. Deterrence failure occurs when the confrontation ends in either the large-scale use of force or defender capitulation to the challenger’s demands. For the post- 1945 period, the findings indicate that, for nuclear dyads, the possession of a nuclear second-strike capability by the defender substantially reduces the likelihood of the confrontation ending either in war or in capitulation by the defender. However, the possession of nuclear weapons in great power dyads does not deter the challenger from initiating militarized disputes.

Asal and Beardsley ( 2007 ) examine the relationship between the severity of violence in crises and the number of states involved in the confrontations that possess nuclear weapons. Using data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, the study includes 434 international crises extending from 1918 through 2001 . The results indicate that symmetric nuclear dyads engage in an unexpectedly large number of crises—and that “crises involving nuclear actors are more likely to end without violence. . . [A]s the number of nuclear actors increases, the likelihood of war continues to fall” (Asal & Beardsley, 2007 , p. 140). The authors also note that their results indicate that there may be competing effects within nuclear dyads: specifically, that both sides will avoid war but engage in sub-war levels of escalatory behavior (Asal & Beardsley 2007 , p. 150, fn. 6).

Rauchhaus ( 2009 ) also attempts to test the effects of nuclear weapons possession on conflict behavior. The data are generated using the EUGene (v.3.203) statistical package for dyad years from 1885 through 2000 and for a subset period from 1946 through 2000 . 11 The findings indicate that, in militarized disputes, symmetric nuclear dyads have a lower probability of war than do dyads where only one nation possesses nuclear arms. Moreover, in dyads where there are nuclear weapons available on both sides (nuclear pairs), the findings indicate that disputes are associated with higher probabilities of crises and the use of force (below the level of war). The author suggests that the results support the implications of Snyder’s ( 1965 ) stability-instability paradox. The results are also supportive of the Snyder and Diesing ( 1977 ) contention that crises have become surrogates for war between nuclear-armed states where the manipulation of risk through coercive tactics is employed to secure political objectives.

A study by Kroenig ( 2013 ) provides similar results. Using an original data set of 52 nuclear crisis dyads drawn from the International Crisis Behavior Project for the years 1945 through 2001 , Kroenig codes the outcomes of nuclear crises against nuclear arsenal size and delivery vehicles, and the balance of political stakes in the crisis. He concludes “. . . that nuclear crises are competitions in risk taking, but that nuclear superiority—defined as an advantage in the size of a state’s nuclear arsenal relative to that of its opponent—increases the level of risk that a state is willing to run” (Kroenig, 2013 , p. 143), and hence its probability of winning the dispute without violence. These results support the contention that crises between nuclear-armed states tend to involve dangerous tactics of brinkmanship and tests of resolve.

Evidence consistent with the risk manipulation, escalation, and limited war thesis would include the presence of severe crises between nuclear powers that exhibit escalatory behavior short of unconstrained war but inclusive of the use of force. The limited conventional war of 1999 between India and Pakistan, initiated and carried out by Pakistan under the umbrella of its nuclear deterrent, is an extreme example of precisely this type of conflict interaction. It captures the logic of Snyder’s stability-instability paradox and incorporates, as well, descriptions by Schelling and by Kahn of the use of limited war (with the risk of greater violence to follow) as a means of persuading an adversary to relinquish a contested value.

Beardsley and Asal ( 2009a ) report that symmetric nuclear dyads engage in an unexpectedly large number of crises—a finding that is consistent with the Snyder and Diesing ( 1977 ) contention that crises have become surrogates for war among nuclear-armed states. Similarly, Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi ( 1992 ) note that, in great-power dyads, the possession of nuclear weapons by the defender does not deter dispute initiation by a nuclear-armed challenger, and that an outcome of either war or capitulation by the defender is unlikely. In findings not inconsistent with those of Huth et al., ( 1992 ), Kugler ( 1984 ) reports that (between 1946 and 1981 ), as the capacity of nuclear actors to destroy each other increases, there is a tendency to decrease the intensity of the conflict. Both Geller ( 1990 ) and Rauchhaus ( 2009 ), in large-scale quantitative empirical analyses of escalation patterns in nuclear, nonnuclear, and mixed (asymmetric) dyads, report that symmetric nuclear dyads are substantially more likely to escalate dispute hostility levels—short of war—than are nonnuclear pairs of states. In Geller’s study, the findings indicate that disputes in which both parties possessed nuclear weapons had approximately a seven times greater probability of escalation (0.238) than did disputes in which neither party possessed nuclear arms (0.032). Last, Kroenig ( 2013 ) demonstrates that confrontations between nuclear-armed states may be understood as competitions in risk taking and that an advantage in the size of one’s nuclear arsenal is associated with increased levels of risk acceptance and, hence, successful coercion.

These cumulative findings are strongly supportive of the risk manipulation, escalation, and limited war thesis on the effects of symmetric nuclear weapons possession. 12 Moreover, the case of the 1999 limited conventional war between India and Pakistan reflects both the logic of this school of thought as well as the patterns of escalation described in the large-scale quantitative studies of militarized disputes between nuclear-armed states.

Nuclear Irrelevance

The views of John Mueller are most commonly associated with the thesis of “nuclear irrelevance.” Mueller ( 1988 , 1989 ) makes the highly controversial argument that nuclear weapons neither defined the stability of the post-Second World War U.S.-Soviet relationship nor prevented a war between the superpowers; he also maintains that the weapons did not determine alliance patterns or induce caution in U.S.-Soviet crisis behavior. His contention is that the postwar world would have developed in the same manner even if nuclear weapons did not exist.

Mueller’s logic allows that a nuclear war would be catastrophic, but that nuclear weapons simply reinforced a military reality that had been made all too clear by World War II: even conventional war between great powers is too destructive to serve any conceivable political purpose. Moreover, the satisfaction with the status quo shared by the United States and the Soviet Union removed any desire for territorial conquest that might have led to conflict, as each superpower held dominance in its respective sphere of influence. Similarly, provocative crisis behavior was restrained by the fear of escalation—and although the presence of nuclear weapons may have embellished such caution, the mere possibility of fighting another conventional war such as World War II would have induced fear and restraint on the part of decision makers. In short, nuclear weapons may have enhanced Cold War stability, but their absence would not have produced a different world. Mueller closes his argument with the extrapolation that war among developed nations is obsolescent. It may simply be that, in the developed world, a conviction has grown that war among post-industrial states “would be intolerably costly, unwise, futile, and debased” (Mueller, 1988 , p. 78). In this sense, nuclear weapons lack deterrent value among developed states because—absent the incentive for war—there is nothing to deter.

In a related thesis, Vasquez ( 1991 ) holds that it is unlikely—given what is known about the complex conjunction of multiple factors in the steps to war—that any single factor, such as the availability of nuclear weapons, causes or prevents wars. He makes the nuanced argument, in discussing the long post-war peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, that:

There is little evidence to support the claim that nuclear deterrence has prevented nuclear war or that it could do so in the future, if severely tested . . . Nuclear war may have been prevented not because of deterrence, but because those factors pushing the United States and the USSR toward war have not been sufficiently great to override the risks and costs of total war (Vasquez, 1991 , p. 207, 214).

Of principal significance to Vasquez is the absence of a direct territorial dispute between the superpowers. Other factors that Vasquez believes contributed to the long peace include satisfaction with the status quo, the experience of the two world wars, the establishment of rules and norms of interaction between the superpowers, procedures for crisis management, and effective arms control regimes. 13

A second area of application for the nuclear irrelevancy thesis involves asymmetric dyads. Little has been written about the effects of nuclear weapons on the patterns of serious disputes where this technology is possessed by only one side. However, what has been written suggests that in these types of conflicts nuclear weaponry may lack both military and psychological salience. For example, Osgood and Tucker ( 1967 , p. 158) and Blainey ( 1973 , p. 201) argue that tactical nuclear weapons are largely devoid of military significance in either Third World conflicts or insurgencies, where suitable targets for the weapons are absent. An additional disincentive to the use of nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear opponent is that it might be expected to increase the pressures for nuclear proliferation and to incite international criticism and denunciation of the nuclear state (Huth, 1988a , p. 428). It also has been suggested that a sense of fairness or proportionality contributes a moral aspect to the practical military and political inhibitions on using nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear opponent and that the set of these concerns has undermined the efficacy of nuclear power as a deterrent in asymmetric conflicts (Huth & Russett, 1988 , p. 38; Russett, 1989 , p. 184).

Moreover, Waltz ( 1967 , p. 222) and Osgood and Tucker ( 1967 , pp. 162–163) caution against exaggerating the differences due to nuclear weapons between contemporary and historical major power-minor power conflicts. Long before the advent of nuclear weapons, minor powers frequently defied or withstood great power pressure as a result of circumstances of geography, alliance, or an intensity of interests that the major power could not match.

In a similar argument, Jervis ( 1984 , p. 132) examines the logic of escalation in a losing cause (presumably a tactic relating directly to disputes between nuclear and nonnuclear states) and suggests that a threat to fight a war that almost certainly would be lost may not be without credibility—indeed, there may be compelling reasons for actually engaging in such a conflict. Specifically, if the cost of winning the war is higher to the major power than is the value at stake in the dispute, then the confrontation embodies the game structure of “Chicken.” Hence, even if war is more damaging to the minor power than to the major power, the stronger may still prefer capitulation or a compromise solution to the confrontation rather than engaging in the fight. In sum, Jervis ( 1984 , p. 135) argues that: “the ability to tolerate and raise the level of risk is not closely tied to military superiority . . . The links between military power—both local and global—and states' behavior in crises are thus tenuous.”

The third area of application for the nuclear irrelevancy thesis involves policies of extended deterrence. The efficacy of nuclear weapons for the purposes of extended deterrence was an issue of immense importance throughout the Cold War. In fact, the positions on whether American strategic nuclear weapons were sufficient to deter a Soviet-Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe or whether substantial conventional and tactical nuclear weapons were necessary for successful deterrence constituted a continuing debate for decades. Nuclear revolution theory contended that the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal (with its ability to destroy the Soviet Union) was sufficient to induce caution and restraint on the part of the Soviet leadership. However, the strategists who formulated the stability-instability paradox argued that U.S. strategic nuclear weapons would deter a direct nuclear strike on the United States itself, but little else. According to this logic, for the successful extended deterrence of an attack on Europe, the United States and NATO required effective combat forces that could fight at the level of conventional war and even war with tactical nuclear weapons. Escalation dominance was required to sustain extended deterrence. Of course, extended deterrence policies existed long before the development of nuclear weapons and applied to any situation where a powerful defender attempted to deter an attack against an ally by threat of military response. The issue at hand is the effectiveness of a strategic nuclear threat in sustaining a successful extended deterrence policy. The nuclear irrelevancy position is that such weapons lack significance in extended deterrence situations.

In sum, the nuclear irrelevance thesis suggests that nuclear weapons have little salience in the interaction patterns of nuclear-armed dyads. Evidence consistent with this position would indicate that, for symmetric dyads, the possession of nuclear weapons or the nuclear balance does not affect crisis escalation, crisis outcomes, or dispute initiation patterns. In addition, if a set of practical, political, and ethical constraints has weakened the military advantage of possessing nuclear weapons in a serious dispute with a nonnuclear state, then the monopolization of a nuclear capability will not confer a bargaining edge to the nuclear-armed state in an asymmetric crisis. The nuclear irrelevance school would also gain support in findings indicating the absence of substantive effects resulting from possession of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence situations.

In evaluating the empirical evidence regarding the nuclear irrelevance thesis, it is useful analytically to separate the studies into distinct categories: (a) findings involving the effects of nuclear weapons in nuclear-armed dyads; (b) findings involving the interaction patterns of nuclear-armed states against nonnuclear opponents; and (c) findings bearing on extended deterrence situations.

(a) Nuclear dyads . The examination of evidence relating to nuclear revolution theory upheld the prediction that, as the theory suggests, war between nuclear-armed states should be nonexistent or a very rare event (e.g., Asal & Beardsley, 2007 ; Bueno de Mesquita & Riker, 1982 ; Rauchhaus, 2009 ). The success of this prediction (with the exception of the 1999 Kargil War) serves as the principal finding in support of the nuclear revolution thesis. However, this finding holds negative implications for the validity of the nuclear irrelevancy thesis. In other findings counter to the patterns hypothesized by the nuclear irrelevancy thesis, Geller ( 1990 ) reports results that indicate that the distribution of nuclear capabilities affects the patterns of escalation in militarized interstate disputes, and that symmetric nuclear dyads show substantially higher dispute escalation probabilities, short of war, than do nonnuclear dyads. Rauchhaus’s ( 2009 ) findings mirror Geller’s. Similarly, Beardsley and Asal ( 2009a ) note that the crisis behavior of symmetric nuclear dyads differs from that of asymmetric dyads. Only the work of Bell and Miller ( 2015 ) stands in opposition to this general pattern. Using data from Rauchhaus ( 2009 ), Bell and Miller ( 2015 , p. 83) contend that nuclear dyads do not exhibit conflict patterns distinct from nonnuclear dyads either in terms of war or sub-war militarized disputes.

However, other evidence relating to conflict behavior, crisis interaction patterns, or crisis outcomes that indicate that nuclear weapons were inconsequential in the disputes would support the contention that nuclear forces are irrelevant in symmetric dyads. For example, Blechman and Kaplan ( 1978 ) provide an empirical analysis of 215 incidents between 1946 and 1975 , in which the United States used its armed forces for political objectives. Their findings indicate that the strategic nuclear weapons balance between the United States and the Soviet Union did not influence the outcome of competitive incidents involving the two states (Blechman & Kaplan, 1978 , pp. 127–129). Instead, the authors maintain that the local balance of conventional military power was more important in determining the outcomes of the confrontations (Blechman & Kaplan, 1978 , p. 527).

Kugler ( 1984 ) presents an empirical test of nuclear deterrence theory by examining whether nuclear weapons are efficacious in preventing the initiation or escalation of crises to the level of war. The case set is 14 extreme crises between 1946 and 1981 involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Of the 14 crises, five involved nuclear-armed dyads (a nuclear power on each side). He concludes that: “nuclear nations do not have an obvious and direct advantage over other nuclear . . . nations in extreme crises. Rather, conventional [military] capabilities are the best predictor of outcome of extreme crises regardless of their severity” (Kugler, 1984 , p.501).

In contrast to the findings by Blechman and Kaplan ( 1978 ) and Kugler ( 1984 ), a study by Kroenig ( 2013 ) provides different results. Using a data set of 52 nuclear crisis dyads ( 1945–2001 ) drawn from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, Kroenig codes the outcomes of nuclear crises, nuclear arsenal size and delivery vehicles, and the balance of political stakes in the crisis. He concludes that nuclear superiority—defined as an advantage in the size of a state’s nuclear arsenal relative to that of its opponent—increases the level of risk that a state is willing to run and hence its probability of winning the dispute without violence (Kroenig, 2013 , p. 143).

Huth et al. ( 1992 ) examine militarized dispute-initiation patterns among great power rivalries between 1816 and 1975 as a means of testing a set of explanatory variables drawn from multiple levels of analysis. The principal focus of the study is to investigate the relationship between the structure of the international system and the initiation of great power disputes. However, the analysis does include a variable coded for the possession of nuclear weapons by the challenger’s rival. The findings indicate that the presence of defenders’ nuclear weapons does not deter challengers from initiating militarized disputes among great powers (Huth et al., 1992 , p. 478, 513).

Gartzke and Jo ( 2009 ) examine the effects of nuclear weapons possession on patterns of militarized dispute initiation using a sophisticated multivariate model and data drawn from the COW/MID database for directed dyads over the years 1946 through 2001 . Their findings indicate that nuclear weapons possession has little effect on dispute initiation behavior. The authors note that: “Instead, countries with security problems, greater interest in international affairs, or significant military capabilities are simultaneously more likely to fight and proliferate” (Gartzke & Jo, 2009 , p. 221). The relationship between nuclear weapons and MID initiation is rejected statistically: this finding applies to both symmetric (nuclear) and asymmetric (nuclear/nonnuclear) dyads.

(b) Asymmetric dyads . The nuclear irrelevancy school also maintains that the possession of nuclear weapons confers no bargaining advantage on the nuclear-armed power engaged in a confrontation with a nonnuclear state.

In a seminal study examining the effects of nuclear weapons on conflict interaction patterns, Organski and Kugler ( 1980 , pp. 163–164) identify 14 deterrence cases that occurred between 1945 and 1979 in which nuclear weapons could have been used. Seven of these cases involved a nuclear power in confrontation with a nonnuclear state (or a state with an ineffective nuclear force ). Their findings indicate that in only one case out of the seven did the nuclear-armed state win: “Nonnuclear powers defied, attacked, and defeated nuclear powers and got away with it” (Organski & Kugler, 1980 , p. 176). In the six cases that the nuclear power lost to a nonnuclear state, the winner was estimated to have conventional military superiority at the site of the confrontation (Organski & Kugler, 1980 , p. 177).

In a related study, Kugler ( 1984 ) isolates 14 cases of extreme crisis that occurred between 1946 and 1981 , in which nuclear weapons were available to at least one party in the dispute. Of these 14 cases, nine involved confrontations in which only one state had access to nuclear arms. In all nine cases, the outcomes of the crises favored the nonnuclear challenger. Once again, the balance of conventional military capabilities—not nuclear weaponry—provided the best predictor of crisis outcome (Kugler, 1984 , p. 501).

In an early large-scale study, Geller ( 1990 ) examines conflict escalation patterns in serious interstate disputes among nations with both symmetric and asymmetric types of weapons technology. This study employs the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data, inclusive of 393 MIDs between 1946 and 1976 , and uses the MID five-level dispute hostility index in coding the dependent variable. The findings indicate that, for asymmetric dyads (with only one state in possession of nuclear arms), the availability of nuclear force has no evident inhibitory effect on the escalation propensities of nonnuclear opponents. In fact, the findings show that in this class of confrontation, both nonnuclear dispute initiators and targets act more aggressively than do their nuclear-armed opponents. The summation suggests that in confrontations between nuclear and nonnuclear states, war is a distinct possibility, with aggressive escalation by the nonnuclear power probable. In such cases, it is concluded that the conventional military balance may be determinative of the outcome (Geller, 1990 , p. 307).

In two studies published in 1994 and 1995 , Paul employs the case study method to examine the dynamics of asymmetric war initiation by weaker powers. Paul ( 1994 ) analyzes six cases of war initiation by weaker states against stronger states: three of these cases (China/U.S. in 1950 ; Egypt/Israel in 1973 ; and Argentina/Great Britain in 1982 ) involve nonnuclear nations initiating wars against nuclear-armed opponents. Paul ( 1994 , p. 173) concludes that nuclear weapons appear to have limited utility in averting war in asymmetric dyads. He notes that, with either nuclear or conventional weapons, a significant military advantage may be insufficient to deter a weaker state that is highly motivated to change the status quo. In a more focused study, Paul ( 1995 ) discusses the possible reasons underlying the nonuse of nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed states against nonnuclear opponents. Here he analyzes two cases (Argentina/Great Britain in the Falklands War of 1982 and Egypt/Israel in the Middle East War of 1973 ) in which nonnuclear states initiated wars against nuclear opponents. Paul argues that in both cases nuclear retaliation by the targets was deemed highly improbable by the nonnuclear war initiators due to a combination of limited war goals and taboos (unwritten and uncodified prohibitionary norms) against the use of nuclear weapons.

Rauchhaus ( 2009 ) attempts to test the effects of nuclear weapons possession on conflict behavior for asymmetric as well as for symmetric dyads using data generated by the EUGene (v.3.203) statistical program for dyad years from 1885 through 2000 . The findings indicate that, for asymmetric (nuclear/nonnuclear) dyads (in comparison to symmetric dyads), there is a higher probability of war. Asymmetric dyads are also more likely to be involved in militarized disputes that reach the level of the use of force (Rauchhaus, 2009 , pp. 269–270). In short, the study produces results that hold in opposition to the view that conflict between nuclear and nonnuclear states will be limited. As Rauchhaus ( 2009 , p. 271) concludes: “nuclear asymmetry is generally associated with a higher chance of crises, uses of force, fatalities, and war.”

A study by Beardsley and Asal ( 2009b ) produces findings that stand in counterpoint to the main body of analyses on conflict in asymmetric dyads. This work examines the question of whether the possession of nuclear weapons affects the probability of prevailing in a crisis. The data are drawn from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project for directed dyads covering the years between 1945 and 2002 . The findings indicate that the possession of nuclear weapons provides bargaining leverage against nonnuclear opponents in crises: nuclear actors are more likely to prevail when facing a nonnuclear state (Beardsley & Asal, 2009b , p. 278, 289).

However, with regard to bargaining advantages that may be derived from the possession of nuclear weapons, Sechser and Fuhrmann ( 2013 ) argue (counter to Beardsley & Asal) that compellent threats based on nuclear force may lack credibility due to their indiscriminately destructive effects and the reputational costs that, presumably, would be associated with their use. Drawing on a new data set (Militarized Compellent Threats) containing 242 challenger-target dyads for the period 1918 to 2001 , they report findings indicating that “states possessing nuclear weapons are not more likely to make successful compellent threats [than nonnuclear states] . . . and that nuclear weapons carry little weight as tools of compellence” (Sechser & Fuhrmann, 2013 , p. 174).

An interesting corollary finding is presented by Narang ( 2013 ). Using data collected by Bennett and Stam ( 2004 ) to explore the conflict behavior of regional (non-superpower) nuclear actors from 1945 through 2001 , Narang finds little evidence supporting an existential deterrent effect for nuclear weapons against nonnuclear opponents. Rather, he concludes that the nuclear posture adopted by the nuclear-armed state is determinative of deterrence success, with an “asymmetric escalation” posture superior to either a “catalytic” or “assured destruction” posture in deterring conventional attacks with military force (Narang, 2013 , p. 280, 284–286).

(c) Extended deterrence . The logic of the nuclear irrelevancy thesis suggests that nuclear weapons should be of little salience in extended deterrence situations.

Huth defines deterrence as a policy that seeks to convince an adversary through threat of military retaliation that the costs of using military force outweigh any expected benefits. Extended deterrence is then defined by Huth ( 1988a , p. 424) as a confrontation between a defender and a potential attacker in which the defender threatens the use of military force against the potential attacker’s use of force against an ally (protégé) of the defender. There have been a large number of studies produced on the issue of the efficacy of extended nuclear deterrence—the majority of which report a body of consistent or complementary findings.

As noted in Harvey and James ( 1992 ), Bruce Russett’s ( 1963 ) analysis of 17 crises that occurred between 1935 and 1961 appears to be the first aggregate study of the factors associated with extended deterrence success and failure. Nine crisis cases involved defenders with a nuclear capability, and six of the nine cases resulted in successful extended deterrence. However, Russett draws no conclusions as to the independent effect of nuclear weapons on those outcomes. He does note that military equality on either the local (conventional) or strategic (nuclear) level appears to be a necessary condition for extended deterrence success.

Two studies published by Weede ( 1981 , 1983 ) also deal with the effectiveness of extended nuclear deterrence. Weede examines 299 dyads between 1962 and 1980 for evidence relating to patterns of extended deterrence success or failure. His findings are supportive of the position that nuclear weapons assist in producing extended deterrence success.

In a subsequent study, Huth and Russett ( 1984 ) increased the size of Russett’s ( 1963 ) sample set from 17 to 54 historical cases of extended deterrence from 1900 through 1980 . The findings indicate that the effect of nuclear weapons on extended deterrence success or failure is marginal. Of much greater import are the combined local conventional military capabilities of the defender and protégé; hence, conventional, rather than nuclear, combat power is associated with the probability of extended deterrence success.

In two related studies, Huth ( 1988a , 1988b ) examines 58 historical cases of extended deterrence and reports findings similar to those found in Huth and Russett ( 1984 ). Specifically, the possession of nuclear weapons by the defender did not have a statistically significant effect on deterrence outcomes when the target itself was a nonnuclear power. In addition, the ability of the defender to deny the potential attacker a quick and decisive conventional military victory on the battlefield was correlated with extended deterrence success.

Huth and Russett ( 1988 ) present an analysis of Huth’s ( 1988b ) 58 historical cases of extended deterrence success and failure. In this database, there were 16 cases of extended deterrence crises where defenders possessed nuclear weapons. The findings indicate that a defender’s nuclear capability was essentially irrelevant to extended deterrence outcomes; existing and locally superior conventional military forces were of much greater importance to deterrence success.

Huth ( 1990 ) produced another study based on the data set described in his 1988b book. In this study, he examines the effects of the possession of nuclear weapons by a defender only in extended deterrent crises not characterized by mutual assured destruction (i.e., where the potential attacker either does not possess nuclear weapons or does not possess a significant nuclear capability). He reports that, when the defender has an advantage in conventional forces, nuclear weapons do not play a significant role in the outcomes of extended deterrence confrontations (Huth, 1990 , p. 271).

In an unusual work, Carlson ( 1998 ) combines a formal mathematical model with an empirical test of escalation in extended deterrence crises. Using Huth’s ( 1988b ) data extending from 1885 to 1983 , the analysis examines the 58 cases of extended deterrence crises. Measures include the estimated cost-tolerance of both attackers and defenders. The findings indicate that low cost-tolerance challengers are less likely to escalate a crisis to higher levels of hostility when the defender possesses nuclear weapons.

Fuhrmann and Sechser ( 2014 ) report findings similar to those of Weede ( 1981 , 1983 ) and Carlson ( 1998 ), insofar as the independent extended deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is supported. Using Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data for the years 1950 through 2000 , and controlling for the effects of contiguity, polity-type of challenger, power ratio, and nuclear status of challenger, they conclude that “formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits. Having a nuclear-armed ally is strongly associated with a lower likelihood of being targeted in a violent militarized dispute . . .” (Fuhrmann & Sechser, 2014 , p. 920).

The empirical evidence regarding the nuclear irrelevance thesis has been divided analytically into three distinct categories: (a) findings involving the effect of nuclear weapons in nuclear dyads; (b) findings involving the interaction patterns of nuclear-armed states against nonnuclear opponents; and (c) findings relating to extended deterrence situations.

Regarding Category “a”—the effect of nuclear weapons on conflict patterns in nuclear dyads—the results are mixed. According to the logic of the nuclear irrelevancy thesis, nuclear-armed dyads should show identical conflict patterns to nonnuclear dyads. This prediction is supported by the findings of Bell and Miller ( 2015 ). However, Asal and Beardsley ( 2007 ), Bueno de Mesquita and Riker ( 1982 ), and Rauchhaus ( 2009 ) all note that empirical probabilities of war are far lower for nuclear dyads than for nonnuclear dyads. Moreover, Geller ( 1990 ) reports results indicating that the distribution of nuclear capabilities affects escalation patterns in militarized interstate disputes, and that symmetric nuclear dyads show substantially higher dispute escalation probabilities—short of war—than do nonnuclear dyads. Rauchhaus’s ( 2009 ) findings are identical to Geller’s. Similarly, Beardsley and Asal ( 2009a ) note that the crisis behavior of symmetric nuclear dyads differs from that of asymmetric dyads. In sum, contrary to the predictions of the nuclear irrelevancy school, these findings suggest that patterns of war and crisis escalation differ among symmetric nuclear dyads, asymmetric dyads, and nonnuclear dyads.

Nevertheless, there is a body of evidence for nuclear dyads that supports the nuclear irrelevancy thesis; these findings focus on the effects of the nuclear balance on crisis outcomes and the effect of nuclear weapons on patterns of dispute initiation. Both Blechman and Kaplan ( 1978 ; with 215 incidents from 1946 to 1975 ) and Kugler ( 1984 ; five extreme crises between 1946 and 1981 ), report that the balance of nuclear forces in nuclear dyads was less significant in influencing the outcome of confrontations than was the local balance of conventional military capabilities. Only Kroenig’s ( 2013 ) work indicates a crisis bargaining advantage accruing to a state with nuclear superiority in symmetric nuclear dyads. With regard to dispute initiation, Huth et al. ( 1992 ) report a lack of salience regarding the availability of nuclear weapons for great powers and the initiation patterns of their militarized disputes. Gartzke and Jo ( 2009 ) similarly note that nuclear weapons show no statistically significant relationship to the initiation of militarized interstate disputes in either symmetric or asymmetric dyads. In sum, the findings of this subset of studies are consistent with the thrust of the nuclear irrelevancy thesis regarding both the effects of the nuclear balance on crisis outcomes and the effects of the availability of nuclear weapons on dispute initiation patterns.

Category “b”—focusing on the interaction patterns of nuclear-armed states against nonnuclear opponents—provides a second set of cumulative findings. Organski and Kugler ( 1980 ), Kugler ( 1984 ), Geller ( 1990 ), and Rauchhaus ( 2009 ) all conclude that the possession of nuclear weapons provides little leverage in the conflict patterns or outcomes of disputes in asymmetric dyads. Organski and Kugler ( 1980 ) note that, in six cases out of seven, nonnuclear states achieved their objectives in confrontations with nuclear-armed states. Kugler ( 1984 ) reports that in nine crises between nuclear and nonnuclear states, the outcomes in every case favored the nonnuclear party. In both studies, conventional military capabilities at the site of the confrontation provided the best predictor of crisis outcome.

Geller’s ( 1990 ) analysis indicates that in 34 asymmetric disputes with a nuclear initiator, the nonnuclear target matched or escalated the initiator’s hostility level in 24 cases (71%); in 56 asymmetric disputes with a nonnuclear initiator, the nuclear target deescalated the crisis by failing to match or exceed the nonnuclear initiator’s hostility level in 35 cases (63%). Moreover, 35 of the total of 90 cases (39%) of asymmetric disputes reached the level in which force was used. These findings show that in this class of dyad, nonnuclear dispute initiators as well as targets act more aggressively than do their nuclear-armed opponents. The conclusion suggests that in confrontations between nuclear and nonnuclear states, the use of force, including war, is a distinct possibility, with aggressive escalation by the nonnuclear state probable. In such cases of asymmetric distribution of nuclear forces, the conventional military balance may well be the determinative factor in the outcome of the dispute.

The findings of Rauchhaus ( 2009 ) reinforce those discussed above: there is a higher probability of war in asymmetric dyads than in symmetric nuclear dyads, and asymmetric dyads are more likely than symmetric nuclear dyads to experience militarized disputes that engage the use of force. As Rauchhaus concludes, nuclear asymmetry is associated with higher probabilities of crises, limited use of force, and war, than are symmetric nuclear dyads.

A study by Narang ( 2013 ) offers corollary evidence that the deterrent effect of the possession of nuclear weapons (for regional nuclear powers engaged in disputes with nonnuclear states) depends heavily on the nuclear posture that is adopted. Specifically, in contrast to catalytic or assured destruction postures, only an asymmetric escalation posture has any effect in deterring conventional military assaults. Last, Sechser and Fuhrmann ( 2013 ) report findings indicating that, although nuclear weapons may provide deterrent value, they are irrelevant as instruments of compellence.

These results are generally consistent with the predictions of the nuclear irrelevance thesis regarding conflict patterns in asymmetric dyads: the possession of nuclear weapons confers little or no advantage to nuclear-armed states in disputes with nonnuclear opponents. Paul’s ( 1994 , 1995 ) case studies of instances of war initiation by nonnuclear states against nuclear-armed adversaries offer additional evidence in conformity with this pattern.

In sum, the findings of this subset of studies are supportive of the thrust of the nuclear irrelevance thesis regarding both the effects of the nuclear balance on crisis outcomes and the effects of nuclear weapons possession on dispute initiation patterns: the possession of nuclear weapons does not impede aggressive behavior by nonnuclear states.

Category “c”—extended deterrence crises—also provides a pattern of results. Studies by Huth and Russett ( 1984 , 1988 ), and Huth ( 1988a , 1988b , 1990 ) report the essential irrelevance of a defender’s possession of nuclear weapons to extended deterrence success. These studies indicate that existing and locally superior conventional military force is the factor most frequently associated with the majority of successful extended deterrence outcomes. Russett ( 1963 ) notes the ambiguous effects of a nuclear capability in situations of extended deterrence and concludes that military equality on either the conventional or nuclear level appears to be minimally requisite for extended deterrence success. However, Weede ( 1981 , 1983 ), Carlson ( 1998 ), and Fuhrmann and Sechser ( 2014 ) report evidence contrary to the general set of findings: specifically, that nuclear weapons assist in producing successful outcomes in extended deterrence situations.

In sum, the cumulative findings in all three areas are consistent with some of the predictions of the nuclear irrelevance school and inconsistent with others. For symmetric nuclear dyads, a substantial set of findings indicates that patterns of war and crisis escalation differ between symmetric nuclear dyads, asymmetric dyads, and nonnuclear dyads. Counter to the predictions of the nuclear irrelevancy thesis, nuclear weapons affect the nature of conflict interaction between nuclear-armed states. At the same time, there is a subset of findings consistent with the predictions of nuclear irrelevancy for nuclear dyads: the nuclear balance does not affect the outcome of crises (the balance of local conventional military forces is more important), nor does the symmetric possession of nuclear weapons distinguish initiation patterns of militarized disputes from initiation patterns in asymmetric or nonnuclear disputes. Also supportive of the irrelevancy thesis are findings indicating that, for asymmetric dyads, the possession of nuclear arms provides scant advantage in crises and confrontations with nonnuclear states. Escalation by the nonnuclear adversary and its use of force—including war—are outcomes with surprisingly high probabilities. Last, in extended deterrence situations, the cumulative findings tend toward the essential irrelevance of nuclear weapons possession and point instead toward the salience of the local balance of conventional military forces in determining crisis outcomes.

This article has reviewed the three principal schools of thought regarding the effects of nuclear weapons possession on patterns of international conflict: (a) nuclear revolution theory; (b) risk manipulation, escalation, and limited war; and (c) nuclear irrelevance. Quantitative empirical works that produced findings relevant to evaluating the predictions of these schools were then collated by category and their results compared to the predictions.

For nuclear revolution theory, the findings offer limited, but not insignificant, support. For example, as predicted, wars among nuclear-armed states have been rare events. To date, with the exception of India and Pakistan in 1999 , no other militarized dispute between nuclear powers has reached the level of war (based on Correlates of War Project coding rules). As Waltz and Jervis have predicted, wars occur among nuclear-armed states at a far lower proportional frequency than in asymmetric or nonnuclear dyads. However, the prediction of nuclear revolution theory—that there will be few crises among nuclear-armed powers—has not been supported by the quantitative empirical evidence. Similarly, the prediction that those crises that do develop among nuclear powers will be settled rapidly and without serious escalation has not found empirical support.

For the risk manipulation, escalation, and limited war school, the evidence has proved more uniformly favorable. The prediction by Snyder and Diesing ( 1977 ) that crises among nuclear-armed states will be used as surrogates for war—with associated tactics (including the limited use of force) designed to increase risk and intimidate through dangerous escalatory behaviors—has been largely supported. Comparisons of crisis escalation probabilities between symmetric nuclear dyads, asymmetric dyads, and nonnuclear dyads clearly show higher escalation probabilities for nuclear dyads than for the other two classes, with disputes for nuclear dyads approximately seven times more likely to escalate—short of war—than disputes for nonnuclear dyads. Moreover, the case of the 1999 war between India and Pakistan conforms to the logic of Snyder’s stability-instability paradox whereby limited war is fought between nuclear powers under the protective umbrellas of their nuclear deterrents.

The nuclear irrelevance school, like nuclear revolution theory, finds mixed support in the extant empirical evidence. The nuclear irrelevancy thesis can be categorized according to predictions involving (a) the effects of nuclear weapons in nuclear dyads, (b) the effects of nuclear weapons possession in asymmetric dyads, and (c) the effects of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence situations. Counter to the logic of this school, cumulative empirical evidence indicates that nuclear weapons do make a difference in certain types of conflict interaction. Patterns of war and crisis escalation differ between symmetric nuclear dyads, asymmetric dyads, and nonnuclear dyads, with nuclear dyads less likely to fight wars and more likely to exhibit crisis escalation patterns short of war than nonnuclear dyads.

Supportive of the contentions of the nuclear irrelevancy school are findings indicating that in asymmetric dyads, the possession of nuclear arms provides no discernable advantage in crises and confrontations. Escalation by the nonnuclear adversary and its use of force against its nuclear-armed opponent—including war—are distinct outcomes with surprisingly high probabilities. Lastly, in extended deterrence situations, the cumulative findings indicate the essential irrelevance of nuclear weapons possession and point instead toward the salience of the local balance of conventional military forces in determining outcomes.

Three conclusions may be drawn from the patterns discussed above.

Wars among nuclear-armed states are improbable. If confrontations do escalate to the level of violence, such violence will likely remain conventional. Hence, the spread of nuclear weapons increasingly supports the maintenance of the status quo.

Crises among nuclear powers have a higher probability of escalating—short of war—than do crises for asymmetric or nonnuclear dyads. It is apparent that symmetric nuclear dyads engage in dangerous tactics involving the manipulation of risk as a means of securing policy, objectives.

In asymmetric dyads the possession of nuclear weapons does not impede aggressive behavior by a nonnuclear adversary. Hence, the advantage in holding nuclear weaponry does not translate into bargaining leverage in confrontations between nuclear states and their nonnuclear adversaries.

It is evident that the effects of nuclear weapons possession on patterns of international conflict are complex. Moreover, the patterns themselves may be subject to change as a result of events. For example, the future use of nuclear weapons in a war between nuclear-armed states or the use of such weapons in a war against a nonnuclear state might lead to different expectations of outcomes and thereby alter the subsequent strategic calculations and policy choices of decision makers. Unmistakably, nuclear weapons have raised the prompt and potential long-term costs of war. Empirical analysis has indicated in what way these weapons have affected the patterns of international conflict in the past. How these weapons may ultimately affect the future conflict patterns of states remains to be determined.

Acknowledgment

I wish to thank John Vasquez, Jack Levy, and Peter Wallensteen for their expert commentaries on an earlier version of this article. This article is an expanded and revised version of Daniel S. Geller (2012), Nuclear Weapons and War, in J. A. Vasquez (Ed.), What Do We Know About War? (2d ed.). Used by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group. All rights reserved.

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1. See Gartzke and Kroenig ( 2016 ) for an excellent review of this literature. Related studies that examine the determinants of nuclear proliferation include Meyer ( 1984 ), Sagan ( 1996/1997 ), Geller ( 2003 ), Singh and Way ( 2004 ), Hymans ( 2006 , 2012 ), Solingen ( 2007 , 2012 ), Jo and Gartzke ( 2007 ), Gartzke and Kroenig ( 2009 ), Kroenig ( 2009 , 2010 ), Fuhrmann ( 2009 ), Horowitz ( 2010 ), Bleek ( 2010 ), Bleek and Lorber ( 2014 ), Brown and Kaplow ( 2014 ), Miller ( 2014 ), Way and Weeks ( 2014 ), and Reiter ( 2014 ).

2. As Mueller ( 1988 , pp. 55–56) notes: “nuclear weapons neither define a fundamental stability nor threaten severely to disturb it. . . [W]hile nuclear weapons may have substantially influenced political rhetoric, public discourse, and defense budgets and planning, it is not at all clear that they have had a significant impact on the history of world affairs since World War II.”

3. Others attributing to nuclear weapons causal significance for the “long peace” between the United States and the Soviet Union include The Harvard Nuclear Study Group ( 1983 ), Tucker ( 1985 ), Quester ( 1986 ), Bundy ( 1988 ), and Gaddis ( 1991 ). However, Levy ( 1989 , pp. 289–295), while noting the stability in the superpower relationship produced by nuclear weapons, cautions about pressures for preemptive war that may develop between nuclear-armed states.

4. Intriligator and Brito ( 1981 ) present a similar formal mathematical analysis of the effects of nuclear proliferation on the probability of nuclear war—but in this case without associated empirical data. The mathematical model demonstrates that the effects of nuclear proliferation on the probability of nuclear war depend on the number of existing nuclear weapon states, and that proliferation may reduce rather than increase the probability of nuclear war. Once two or more states achieve a secure second-strike capability, the addition of new nuclear states decreases the incentive to initiate a nuclear war. However, Intriligator and Brito note that, while the probability of a calculated nuclear attack may decrease as a result of proliferation, there may be an increase in the probability of accidental or irrational nuclear war as these weapons spread throughout the system.

5. For a different interpretation of the 1999 Kargil War—by Waltz—see Sagan and Waltz ( 2003 , pp. 109–124). Also see Basrur ( 2007–2008 ) and Diehl, Goertz, and Saeedi ( 2005 ) for analyses suggesting, like Waltz, that caution was imposed in the conduct of the Kargil War by nuclear weapons. For a sophisticated model of the effects of various levels of nuclear war between India and Pakistan, see Batcher ( 2004 ).

6. Major works, many using formal mathematical models, that explore the factors associated with deterrence, brinkmanship and the manipulation of risk, crisis stability, threat credibility, and the consequences of nuclear proliferation include those by Ellsberg (1959[ 1968 ], 1960 ), Brams and Kilgour ( 1985 ), Powell ( 1987 , 1988 ), Kugler ( 1987 ), Nalebuff ( 1988 ), Langlois ( 1991 ), Wagner ( 1991 ), Carlson ( 1995 ), Brito and Intriligator ( 1996 ), Zagare and Kilgour ( 2000 ), Danilovic ( 2002 ), Morgan ( 1977 , 2003 ), and Zagare ( 2007 ).

7. For example, see Bundy and Blight ( 1987–1988 , pp. 30–92). Glaser and Fetter ( 2016 ), in a sophisticated analysis of potential United States damage-limitation strategies and forces vis-à-vis China, conclude that such an effort would most likely fail and would undermine a stable deterrence relationship. Indeed, Mueller ( 1988 , 1989 ) presents an argument that, among developed countries, major war (nuclear or conventional) is no longer considered a realistic foreign policy option due to the massive destructive effects. But Mueller ( 1988 , p. 56) also contends that nuclear weapons have not fundamentally affected the crisis behavior of major powers. For a response to this argument, see Jervis ( 1988 ).

8. Escalation theory is a subset of the more general body of theory on strategic interaction in international politics (e.g., Singer, 1963 ).

9. Strategic theorists fully recognize, however, that escalation of conflict can occur irrespective of the desires of the participants due to factors of miscalculation or momentum. This possibility—and an appreciation of it—forms a key element in the work of some theorists in this school (e.g., Schelling, 1966 , ch. 3).

10. Other early works with sections on escalation that touch on the subject of risk are Kahn ( 1962 , ch. 6), Snyder ( 1961 , pp. 252–258), Schelling ( 1966 , pp. 99–116, 166–168), Schelling ( 1960 , appendix A), and Halperin ( 1963 , chs. 1–2, 4). The issue of “costly signals” with regard to the credibility of threats and commitments are elaborations on the themes of these early studies on escalation (e.g., Fearon, 1994a , 1994b , 1997 ; Schultz, 1998 ). For example, Fearon ( 1997 , p. 82) discusses the relative merits of the “tie-hands” and “sink-cost” signaling strategies. Fearon demonstrates (using formal methods) that costly signals are more successful if they involve a tie-hands strategy (create costs that would be paid ex post if they fail to uphold the commitment) rather than if a sink-cost strategy is pursued (which is only costly to the actor ex ante). The tie-hands strategy is connected to ex post domestic audience costs. The model also indicates that decision makers will not bluff with either type of costly signal; they will not incur or create costs and then fail to carry out the threat.

11. Rauchhaus notes that the analysis performed on the second data set covering only the years 1946 through 2000 (when nuclear weapons were available) did not produce different statistical or substantive results in comparisons between patterns of nuclear and nonnuclear disputes using the 1885–2000 database.

12. In an interesting study at the monadic level, Grieco ( 2012 ) conducts a comparative analysis of the conflict behavior of states before and after the acquisition of nuclear weapons. His principal finding is that states do not become more prone to the initiation of military crises after acquiring nuclear weapons.

13. In a more recent work, Vasquez (Senese & Vasquez, 2008 ) allows that nuclear weapons have raised the provocation threshold for total war: “What would have provoked a war between major states in the pre-nuclear era no longer does so” (Senese & Vasquez, 2008 , p. 62). Nevertheless, Vasquez ( 2009 ) continues to maintain that a proper evaluation of the effects of nuclear weapons on war is within the context of the “steps to war” model (e.g., Senese & Vasquez, 2008 ; Vasquez, 1993 ). For an alternative explanation of war based on a process of complex conjunctive causation see Geller and Singer ( 1998 ) and Geller ( 2000b , 2004 , 2005 ).

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The aggressive war that the Russian Federation is waging in Ukraine has rehashed fears about nuclear weapons 75 years since the first atomic bomb was used. 

The Ukraine war is the first conventional war fought since WWII in Europe under the shadow of nuclear threats. The Russian Federation has the largest nuclear arsenal globally, and its nuclear doctrine envisages the possibility of using nuclear weapons first against enemies preparing to invade the country with conventional capabilities. 

The global nuclear order had been in trouble for quite some time before the Ukraine war began. Since 2006, the North Korean regime has steadily advanced its nuclear capabilities to strike within the United States territory. China has been working on expanding its arsenal and dominating in critical technology fields, including space and artificial intelligence. And doubts linger on the military dimension of the Iran nuclear program. But the Russian threat over nuclear weapons in Ukraine underscores a much more severe and entrenched problem: how fragile the global nuclear balance is. 

For decades, the best way to manage potential nuclear escalations has been by seeking to design nuclear deterrence postures that were credible to discourage the adversary from undertaking a surprise attack but equally intentional and cautious so as not to trigger inadvertent escalations. 

The urgency of nuclear threats today raise an inevitable question: Is nuclear deterrence still appropriate in the 21st century?

Launching the Research Network on Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence

On May 10, the Belfer Center Project on Managing the Atom launched the Research Network on Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence (RNDn) to address two fundamental and interrelated questions: 

• Given the deteriorating geopolitical and security landscape, how do we make sure nuclear deterrence does not fail? And, 
• What alternatives can replace nuclear deterrence, and what conditions should exist to materialize them?

RNDn stands as the largest inter-institutional and inter-university consortium in the nuclear field. It consists of more than 10 universities and research centers and dozens of scholars and practitioners. 

The work is divided into four main working groups: 

• Preventing Nuclear Wars, co-chaired by Harvard University and India Centre for Air Power Studies. 
• Ethics, Law, and Nuclear Deterrence, co-chaired by Stanford University and the University of Oxford. 
• Arms Control and Emerging Technologies , co-chaired by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the University of Hamburg. 
• Beyond Nuclear Deterrence , co-chaired by Hassan Elbahtimy (King's College London, Centre for Science and Security Studies), Rebecca Davis Gibbons (University of Southern Maine, Department of Political Science), and Stephen Herzog (ETH Zurich, Center for Security Studies).

Two additional initiatives will support the academic work. A policy initiative will distribute and disseminate the main research findings across multiple policy audiences. A Brain Trust will ensure diversity of perspectives, connection with other disciplines, and rigorousness of scholarship.

The funding for the RNDn comes from the MacArthur Foundation. The decision of the Foundation before exiting the field has been to entrust MTA with its last and largest legacy gift to build a new nuclear research agenda without walls.

The research network will shape the future of nuclear studies for decades to come. It will also encourage international, inter-generational, and inter-disciplinary collaboration at an unprecedented scale. 

There is much at stake if nuclear deterrence fails. We are determined not to let it happen. 

Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence: What that means 

Amb. Bonnie Jenkins, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, former pre-doctoral fellow with the Center ’s Managing the Atom/International Security Program, speaks at an event recognizing Managing the Atom's 25th anniversary.

The nuclear deterrence theories that continue to dominate and inform strategic thinking today were wholly designed to manage the risks of a bipolar nuclear order consisting of two blocs of internally homogeneous and ideologically distinct states. These theories were also conceived in isolation from considerations of a broader nature, including the quest for human security, social justice, inclusion, and equality. 

Three-quarters of a century after the first nuclear detonations, nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear conflict continue to cast a long shadow on global affairs. But the current nuclear age is radically different than the era in which nuclear deterrence theories were originally developed. It consists of many more players bound together by complex economic and technological interdependencies. And it interplays with other global challenges—climate change, social justice issues, violent nationalism, global pandemics in particular—of unprecedented scale. 

Since the end of the Cold War, legitimate questions have been raised about how universally appropriate deterrence is as the answer to existential security risks in a world of multiple state and potentially non-state nuclear actors, extensive nuclear entanglement with non-nuclear technologies and military arrangements, terrorist groups with nuclear ambitions, and hybrid/gray zone attack that seeks to defeat or disable the adversary without necessarily going to war.

Already by 2010, senior Europeans were calling nuclear deterrence into question. In an open letter published by The Guardian in April 2010, a group of senior European statesmen and women said, “Nuclear deterrence is a far less persuasive strategic response to a world of potential regional nuclear arms races and nuclear terrorism than it was to the cold war. The circumstances of today require a shift in thinking.”

In addition, and since 2011, a coalition of non-nuclear weapons states launched a powerful initiative to explore the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, claiming that any use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the globe will have catastrophic consequences on the food chain and water supply, agricultural and health infrastructures of all. The initiative later culminated in the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of nuclear weapons that entered into force last February 2021. It is essential to point out that none of the nuclear weapons states or their allies participated in any negotiating sessions. 

The divide has been growing between countries relying for their security on nuclear weapons and those who believe that security can only be guaranteed through a world free of nuclear weapons. 

Nuclear Deterrence: Not a matter of policy but of reality

Nuclear deterrence is not a condition that you meet or a status you reach. Instead, it is a relationship between two or more nuclear states and a tool employed by states to achieve specific goals. Accordingly, it is subject to changing strategic considerations and global circumstances. It is dynamic and ever-evolving. 

The concept of deterrence has deep historical roots and, thanks to the nuclear age, has been deeply developed and entrenched, especially in the existing nuclear-weapon states. Deterrence, in broad terms, is about influencing decision-making through the threat of force to discourage an opponent from taking an undesired action. This can be achieved through the threat of retaliation (deterrence by punishment) or by denying the opponent’s aims (deterrence by denial), or both.  

The concept of nuclear deterrence—equally theoretically parsimonious and morally perplexing—has been historically contested and highly disputed. States rely on nuclear deterrence when, to intimidate an enemy, they threaten the use of weapons of mass and indiscriminate destructive power—nuclear weapons—and potentially on a scale that could produce catastrophic global carnage.

Frank Gavin observed: "During the period of intense Soviet-U.S. rivalry, some questioned whether the benefits of nuclear deterrence were worth the terrifying risk that nuclear weapons could be launched, either intentionally or by accident. On balance, however, the recent memory of a catastrophic great power war, within an international system marked by a bitter ideological clash, deep mistrust, and intense security competition made the possibility that nuclear deterrence could provide stability and decrease if not eliminate the prospect of total war appealing [1] . 

Contestation to the concept of nuclear deterrence also led to the creation of powerful schools of thought regarding nuclear weapons. The first urged the United States to seek to maintain a qualitative technological edge and to prepare for nuclear warfighting. The second advocated for a more restrained nuclear posture and bilateral and multilateral agreements to constrain dangerous forms of nuclear competition. The third argued for complete nuclear disarmament given human fallibility, the catastrophic impacts of nuclear weapons, and the precarity of nuclear deterrence. 

Even though unsatisfactory and at least debatable, nuclear deterrence offered a way to navigate through dangerous nuclear war inclinations and uncompromising disarmament aspirations. And however frightening and risky, in fact, nuclear deterrence had, according to many policymakers and scholars, some positive effects in reducing the risk of war during the Cold War. In one of his seminal works, Scott Sagan remarks, “Relying on nuclear deterrence to maintain peace is like skating on thin ice. The fact that you have done it before does not mean you should expect to be able to do it safely forever.” [2] .

[1]  Frank Gavin, Beyond Deterrence: U.S. Nuclear Statecraft Since 1945, American Academy of Arts and Sciences Occasional Paper, February 2018, p. 1

[2]  Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety, Princeton University Press; 1st edition (January 9, 1995), p. xx

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the 21 st  Century: Belfer Center Launches Network on Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence.” Belfer Center Newsletter, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. (Spring 2022)

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Can nuclear deterrence preserve the Long Peace between major powers?

• May 5, 2022

Lawrence Freedman

For the past sixty years, the use of nuclear weapons has become unthinkable. But with every conflict there comes a point where the unthinkable becomes possible.

This essay was originally published in  War: Perspectives from the Engelsberg Seminar , Axess, in collaboration with the Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation in 2015.

The question of why there has been a Long Peace, a period now of 70 years since the last major war between major powers, has generated as much debate as the question of the origins of the  Great War of 1914 . On the one hand,  John Gaddis,  who first used the term, is clear that it had something to do with nuclear weapons. On the other hand,  Steven Pinker  asserts that this welcome development has little or nothing to do with the prospect of mass destruction but is the result instead of the triumph of the good of our ‘better angels’ in a Manichean struggle with the evil of our ‘inner demons’. The ‘better angels’ connote empathy, self-control and morality and have encouraged a progressive  civilising process.  The ‘inner demons’ lead to instrumental violence, domination, revenge, sadism and ideology. These two approaches can be distinguished as one offering a theory of coercive peace, which assumes that tendencies towards conflict have been suppressed through fear of the consequences of escalation and, the other, a theory of normative peace, which assumes that the major powers have adopted a more civilised approach to conflict and have come to reject violent means to the resolution of disputes.

These two positions are not necessarily exclusive. Few who stress the importance of nuclear deterrence would deny the importance of many other factors, including the nature of the issues in dispute, as well as normative factors. But those who believe in the normative peace do tend to have a problem with the idea that nuclear deterrence might have played a role. They are wary of arguments for maintaining alert nuclear arsenals, instead of proceeding to complete disarmament, and nervous that this is a dangerous basis for peace — for once it ceases to work, the effects could be disastrous. Thus Steven Pinker, in  The Better Angels of our Nature , seeking to defend his thesis of the decline of war, attempts to write them out of post-1945 history, as if they had no discernible effect on behaviour. ‘Thankfully’, he writes, responding to Gaddis’s view, ‘a closer look suggests that the threat of nuclear annihilation deserves little credit for the Long Peace.’ If it were shown that ‘the Long Peace was a nuclear peace’, Pinker remarks, this ‘would be a fool’s paradise’, because of the ease with which a miscommunication or accident could ‘setoff an apocalypse’. His look was not close enough, as the case against the coercive peace is inadequate. Moreover, when we consider the normative basis for the Long Peace, as applied to nuclear weapons (the ‘nuclear taboo’), it exposes the problems of relying on normative restraints. The problem with a coercive peace is not that it is a myth but that it cannot be expected to endure indefinitely.

The  Second World War’s  finale involved the first deployment of nuclear weapons in anger, with the destruction of the Japanese cities of  Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Since then, there have been crises in which there were fears that they might be used again and defence policies that have given a central role to nuclear threats. Although further nuclear use has been avoided, the same combination of technical safeguards and political common sense may not get us through the next seventy years without a disaster of some sort. Nonetheless, the record to date undermines the claim that the only alternative to complete disarmament is complete disaster. If that had been the case, we have no right still to be around. Instead, considerable caution has been introduced into statecraft as a result of the unambiguous awfulness of the weapons. Over time, countries have come to adapt to their existence and, as a result, a sort of nuclear order has been created, with a degree of underlying stability. This means, however, that avoidance of a terrible conflagration depends on a daily act of restraint. Even when governments feel a need to remind others of their  nuclear capabilities , we must rely on them keeping their arsenals under tight control and not getting close to ordering any strikes. The fact that a range of governments, totalitarian as well as democratic, vulnerable as well as confident, anxious as well as relatively secure, have managed this restraint over a number of decades is at least evidence that they understand the risks. They have been reluctant to allow a minor event to trigger a rush to war, or to accept that all inhibition can end, and prudence be forgotten as soon as fighting begins. If the  First World War  had dashed confidence in the old balance of power, which relied on individual states acting to keep the system in a form of stable equilibrium, the nuclear age helped revive it. In one of his last speeches as prime minister, Winston Churchill commented on the ‘sublime irony’ that a stage had been reached ‘where safety will be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation’. It was hardly comfortable to rely on a balance of terror to keep the peace but, overtime, as the condition of mutual assured destruction was recognised, it appeared to work.

A number of abolitionists have sought to deny that there has been a valuable deterrent effect.  Ward Wilson , for example, argues that with proof that nuclear deterrence does not work, the case for disarmament is sealed. Without a ‘stronger rationale for keeping these dangerous weapons’, he wrote in a 2008 essay, ‘The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence’, then ‘perhaps they should be banned’. He went so far as to insist that the atomic bombing of August 1945, played no role in Japan’s surrender, suggesting that the  real cause was the Soviet Union’s entry into the war against Japan . This is a dubious claim but can be addressed by reference to the historical evidence. With regard to later deterrent effects, the analysis is even harder because that requires working out conclusively why nothing happened. Ward’s method is to cite cases in which something happened to a nuclear power and to mark that as a failure of deterrence. Thus, he points to America’s two wars with Iraq (1991 and 2003) and NATO’s with  Serbia  over Kosovo in 1999; Britain and the Falklands; and Israel and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. This is poor methodology. In none of these cases was any attempt made to deter, to control events using nuclear threats. There was no reason to suppose that the weapons were in play. The parties to the conflict did not act as if they were. The only possible exception is the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Israel had made no attempt to use nuclear threats to deter Arab invasion because it was confident in its conventional forces, but as Arab attacks began to make progress, the nuclear issue did begin to come into view. In the event, the Egyptian and Syrian armies were pushed back without resort to explicit nuclear threats. At the end of the crisis, there were reminders of high nuclear stakes as the Israelis surrounded the Egyptian Third Army.

Pinker uses a similar method to Wilson. Thus, he finds it telling that Britain’s nuclear capability did not prevent Argentina invading the Falklands in 1982. The Argentinian junta ‘ordered this’, he says, ‘in full confidence that Britain would not retaliate by reducing Buenos Aires to a radioactive crater’. In fact, they launched the invasion confident that Britain would not do anything militarily at all. They had ruled out a British military response in their planning. For its part the British government had not made any attempt to deter the junta because the British government did not realise that the junta needed to be deterred. As news came in that an invasion was taking place, the British government discovered, somewhat to its surprise as well as Argentina’s, that it could send a credible task force to the South Atlantic. This approach, therefore, gets the issue the wrong way round. It is not whether wars take place despite the existence of nuclear weapons, but whether some wars did not happen, or were limited, because of their existence. It is not whether Syria and Egypt discounted the risk of a nuclear riposte to a limited war in October 1973, but whether they understood that this risk could grow if Israel began to face a truly existential threat and whether this affected their readiness to come to  amodus vivendi,  just as in  2002, India and Pakistan stepped back from a full-scale confrontation  as they became aware of where this might lead.

The risk of retaliation was the source of prudence and the basis of deterrence. Anything that might challenge the possibility of retaliation put deterrence at risk because it might render threats incredible. Hence the search for a ‘first strike capability’ that might be able to disarm the enemy in a surprise attack and force the defenceless enemy state to capitulate. Such a capability would link nuclear weapons with classical military theory and the search for a knockout blow. A battle would have been won and the defeated state would be at the mercy of the victor. Once, however, the attacked nation possessed sufficient forces to survive an attempted first strike with retaliatory weapons intact, it would have what was known as ‘second-strike capability’ and prudence would be in order. A first-strike capability offering one side a decisive advantage risked a dangerous edginess developing at times of crisis and even leading to a catastrophic war through miscalculation. If there was no premium in a first strike then both sides should be more cautious and concentrate on diplomacy in a crisis. The calculations of risk might shift very quickly, especially if both sides had sought a first-strike capability. On the other hand, if both sides were confident of their second-strike capabilities, there would be no premium attached to unleashing nuclear hostilities. In the event, technological developments supported the second strike. By the mid-1960s, it was apparent that, for the foreseeable future, each side could eliminate the other as a modern industrial state. The term chosen to describe this condition,  mutual assured destruction , conveyed exactly what it was supposed to convey — destruction would be assured and mutual. Contrary to what had been assumed, therefore, the system tended towards stability. This was not a deliberate policy choice but a condition which confirmed the risks involved in any attempt to achieve a decisive victory through a knockout blow.

There was a paradox. Deterrence required that military preparations be taken seriously, accepting that the prospect of war, even if tiny, was still finite. All this made the task of designing, constructing and sustaining armed forces extremely difficult. It was hard to think through the circumstances that would trigger a war in the first place. So potent were the nightmarish images of a third world war that there really was no good reason why any moderately sane leader would start one deliberately. That helps explain the coercive peace. But others have also argued for the normative nuclear peace, that political leaders have become inhibited from contemplating nuclear use because this would be an appalling thing to do as can be seen in references to a ‘nuclear taboo’ or, in  Nina Tannenwald’s  phrase, a ‘norm of non-use’. Nuclear weapons are seen to be so exceptional and pernicious that no moral person could contemplate their use.

In  The Nuclear Taboo , Nina Tannenwald argues that the taboo takes restraint beyond deterrence. There may be no fear of retaliation, but nuclear use still seems to be unthinkable. She places considerable weight on anti-nuclear movements as a source of the taboo. Yet to the extent that these movements prospered during the Cold War (they have been largely absent since), it was because they were playing on general unease about the implications of such huge power. The idea of a ‘taboo’ was first raised during the 1950s in connection with ‘tactical’ weapons and not the new thermonuclear city-busters and, then, as a worry rather than a relief. The American government was concerned that this would prevent it from taking advantage of its most effective weapons because of a fear of Soviet retaliation. As it became evident that it was meaningless to speak of a victory in any nuclear battle, the ‘nuclear taboo’ came to refer to a sort of institutionalised common sense, reflected in a desire to avoid any situation in which their use might be contemplated.

There are other reasons. Over time, the military purposes that might justify any resort to nuclear weapons have narrowed. During the early stages of the Cold War, they were the only means of destroying some targets. This is no longer the case, because of the accuracy and lethality of conventional munitions. Claims that alternative forms of mass destruction, such as biological or chemical weapons, could only be deterred by nuclear weapons do not withstand scrutiny, although the formal NATO position is that this is a possibility. If such weapons were used, there would be a variety of possible responses in a government’s repertoire short of inflicting some great punishment against civilians. So the routine expectation of the first decades of the nuclear age, that one way or another any future hostilities between nuclear-armed states would escalate to nuclear use, and that escalation would take over as one mega-explosion led to another, may no longer be valid.

At the end of the Second World War, after the  Holocaust , carpet-bombing and V-missiles, the atom bombs seemed to be a logical culmination of what had gone before and also brutally successful in bringing a total war to an end. The simplest, if depressing, assumption was that war had become progressively more murderous, with ever more sophisticated means being found to slaughter people on a large scale. There was no reason to suppose that future wars would not follow the trend. The trend in conventional war since 1945, however, at least in the West, has been to seek more ethical strategies that deliberately avoid civilians and refrain from the sort of raids against centres of population that both sides employed during the Second World War and in later campaigns, such as Korea.

In part, this is because of revulsion at the consequences of city-bombing; in part, it is because of a view that, even at its height, the strategic effects were limited as societies absorbed punishment in preference to surrendering; in part, because targeting has reached levels of precision unimaginable in the past. We have reached the point where the expectation is that only the intended target should be hit and any collateral damage is unacceptable. This could change. Perhaps under the strain of war, attitudes could switch, as they have switched before, into a position where the old arguments about getting at governments through their miserable populations will appear credible again. There may simply be a visceral desire for retribution.  We can see that Russia has made regular reference to its nuclear capability since the start of its intervention in Ukraine , presumably to persuade NATO to stay clear. At the same time, the fact that it has picked on Georgia and Ukraine, neither members of NATO, but only made menacing noises to countries such as  Estonia , a member of NATO, demonstrates that deterrence is far from irrelevant

A social or moral constraint is not the same as a physical constraint. The experience of war will test any taboo. Soldiers can be recruited into an army, have the rules of war explained to them, find the idea of harming innocents repugnant, yet as circumstances change and the conflict becomes more intense, they find themselves engaged in those very acts that would have horrified and shamed them not long before. This can also happen at the governmental level. The international system is one in which individual states are not subject to any higher authority and norms are not universally shared. At desperate moments of existential threat, in a country battling against overwhelming military odds, concerns about breaking taboos may suddenly become less pressing. A number of restraints were in place at the start of the Second World War, including proscriptions on the use of chemical weapons, attacks on merchant shipping and bombardments of civilian populations. Only the one on chemical use held. They all came under pressure as the war became more total. Thus the war did not open with air raids against cities, as many had feared, but soon cities in the way of invading German forces were attacked. It took almost a year before air raids against large centres of population began to become common. They initially reflected notions about how popular morale could be a legitimate target to undermine war production. They then came to reflect a lack of alternative options and a yearning for revenge. By the end of the war, with the allies having freedom of the skies, bombing was progressively unrestrained, concluding with the systematic fire-bombing of Japanese cities and then the use of the two  atom bombs.  Political leaders were authorising actions by the end of the war that would have appalled them at the start. The taboos did not last.

Thus, a point can come during the course of a conflict when the unthinkable becomes possible. In a war of growing brutalisation and intensity, the pressures would build so that the most devastating weapons available would be used, even nuclear weapons, regardless of the consequences. We do not need to doubt that the nuclear taboo has been internalised to worry that the effect might ease during the course of a war of increasing intensity and violence. This prospect might well influence crisis behaviour. Imagine a crisis in which the leaders of one nuclear state observed that the risks of a major war with another nuclear state leading to mutual destruction were negligible because the taboo was in place. This would seem alarmingly complacent. The danger, these leaders would quickly be warned, lies not in what has been said before, but what might happen should the crisis get out of control. Even if nuclear threats are becoming less credible, the possibility of a catastrophic miscalculation remains, especially in a social and political setting already transformed by brutalising violence. Because nuclear weapons are dangerous, prudence dictates considerable caution when moving towards any situation which could create pressures for their use. This is why nuclear weapons can have a deterrent effect well beyond their logical limits. There is therefore no reason to view the normative restraints surrounding nuclear weapons as an alternative to prudential deterrent effects. It is good to have a normative peace, but it needs the backstop of a coercive peace.

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Ending Nuclear Testing to Advance Global Peace and Security

About the author, robert floyd.

Robert Floyd is Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). 

26 August 2022

The spread of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use is creating well-founded anxiety in all parts of the world. In the face of current circumstances, it can be difficult to discern the hard-fought mechanisms and tools in place to address concerns about the truly global threat posed by these terrible weapons.

In 2009, the United Nations General Assembly brought attention to the investments made in global peace and security with its unanimous adoption of resolution 64/35 , by which it declared 29 August the International Day against Nuclear Tests . The resolution recognized that “every effort should be made to end nuclear tests in order to avert devastating and harmful effects on the lives and health of people and the environment,” and that “the end of nuclear tests is one of the key means of achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.”

More than 60 years after the devastating use of nuclear weapons on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the General Assembly had acknowledged the need for increased public awareness and education about the dangers of nuclear testing and the need to end such tests. 

Between 1945 and 1996, more than 2,000 nuclear tests were conducted at dozens of sites around the world. During that period, the average explosive yield of nuclear tests each year was equivalent to nearly 1,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs. The tests helped create weapons that are orders of magnitude more powerful than those used during the Second World War and have long-lasting health and environmental consequences. 

In 1996, while recognizing that a nuclear arms race was one that could not be won, States adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to ban nuclear tests by anyone, anywhere, for all time. In the 25 years since the Treaty was opened for signature, 186 States have signed it and 174 have ratified it; fewer than a dozen nuclear tests have been conducted, with only one country carrying out tests this millennium. This underscores the meaningful and measurable CTBT contribution to preventing the further spread and use of nuclear weapons.

Due to the success of the Treaty, it is often taken for granted that we live in an age where nuclear testing is recognized as a clear threat to international peace and security. This is understandable because for more than two decades, every nuclear test has been met with near universal condemnation, and nuclear test sites have been shut down or converted for other national security purposes.

The adoption of a total ban on nuclear testing was never a foregone conclusion. More than 40 years passed between the first call for a stand-still agreement on nuclear testing in 1954 and the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996. Putting in place a comprehensive, universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory prohibition on nuclear testing was a momentous achievement for humanity, and a victory for science and diplomacy in support of peace and security. We can all be inspired by the history of the Treaty and the efforts it took to make it a reality, from the extensive scientific research to the long hours of negotiations.

This Treaty has already accomplished a lot. The signatures and ratifications from countries committing themselves to a global ban on nuclear tests are an essential contribution to our collective efforts to strengthen the powerful international norm against nuclear testing and to achieve a world free of such tests.

The CTBT prohibition on nuclear testing is backed by a proven global verification regime. The lynchpin of this regime—the International Monitoring System (IMS), with over 300 monitoring facilities around the world—is nearly complete. A union of ingenuity, engineering and international cooperation, IMS has demonstrated its ability to meet the verification requirements of the Treaty on multiple occasions, including detection of all six nuclear tests conducted this century. The global cooperation required to design, implement and operate the verification regime offers a blueprint for how to develop effective multilateral verification measures.

The verification regime also provides value beyond the core mission of nuclear test monitoring. The range of applications of data collected by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) are broad and offer myriad benefits for the global community, from the contribution of real-time data to tsunami early warning systems to earthquake detection and climate change research.

The use of CTBTO data for civil and scientific applications also furthers our nuclear test monitoring mission. When scientists and researchers use the data to study whale migration patterns or asteroids entering the Earth’s atmosphere, their enhanced understanding of these processes helps CTBTO analysts distinguish naturally occurring events from nuclear explosions.

While the Treaty has already helped advance the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, we must remain vigilant. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use continue to pose unacceptable risks to humanity. There are nearly 13,000 nuclear weapons in the world today, and as United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres noted in his address to the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 1–26 August 2022) , humanity is “just one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation.”  

Effective arms control and disarmament measures are the best tools we have to address this risk, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime are integral to the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. As we continue to build on the Treaty’s success, my hope is that every 29 August we pass, we are that much closer to achieving a complete end to nuclear testing. We owe this to ourselves and especially to future generations.  

Click here to see Executive Secretary Floyd's video message on the occasion of the International Day Against Nuclear Tests - 29 August 2022.

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Humanitarian impacts and risks of use of nuclear weapons

10th review conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I. Introduction

1. On 2 March 2020, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) convened a full-day expert meeting on the humanitarian impacts and risks of the use of nuclear weapons. Based on existing and emerging expert research, the meeting aimed to take stock of the humanitarian and environmental consequences of the use and testing of nuclear weapons, as well as the drivers of nuclear risk.

2. In addition to scientific experts from inter alia Sciences Po, Columbia University, Rutgers University, the Federation of American Scientists, Chatham House, the Gender and Radiation Impact Project and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, representatives from approximately 45 states and a range of UN agencies and civil society organizations took part in the meeting. This paper provides a summary of the discussions and is published by the ICRC and the IFRC. It does not necessarily represent the views of the participants.

II. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons

3. The horrific devastation and suffering witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 by Japanese Red Cross and ICRC medical staff, as they attempted to help tens of thousands of dying and wounded people, have left an enduring mark on the entire International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and have driven its advocacy of the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons over the last 75 years. [1] A few weeks after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the ICRC and other organizations began documenting the effects of the nuclear explosions on human health, the environment and medical infrastructure. [2]

4. Evidence of the immediate and longer-term impacts of the use and testing of nuclear weapons has been the subject of scientific investigation ever since. In a major 1987 report, the World Health Organization (WHO) summarized existing research into the impacts on health and health services of nuclear detonations. The report noted inter alia that the blast wave, thermal wave, radiation and radioactive fallout generated by nuclear explosions have devastating short- and long-term effects on the human body, and that existing health services are not equipped to alleviate these effects in any significant way. [3] Since then, the body of evidence of the immediate and longer-term humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons use and testing, and of the preparedness and capacity of national and international organizations and health systems to provide assistance to the victims of such events, has been growing steadily. [4]

5. In 2013 and 2014, three international conferences were organized by the governments of Norway, Mexico and Austria to comprehensively assess existing knowledge of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. [5] The evidence presented at the three conferences demonstrated inter alia the following:

• A nuclear weapon detonation in or near a populated area would – as a result of the blast wave, intense heat, and radiation and radioactive fallout – cause massive death and destruction, trigger large-scale displacement [6] and cause long-term harm to human health and well-being, as well as long-term damage to the environment, infrastructure, socioeconomic development and social order. [7]
• Modern environmental modelling techniques demonstrates that even a “small-scale” use of some 100 nuclear weapons against urban targets would, in addition to spreading radiation around the world, lead to a cooling of the atmosphere, shorter growing seasons, food shortages and a global famine. [8]
• The effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, notably the radioactive fallout carried downwind, cannot be contained within national borders. [9]
• The scale of destruction and contamination after a nuclear detonation in or near a populated area could cause profound social and political disruption as it would take several decades to reconstruct infrastructure and regenerate economic activities, trade, communications, health-care facilities and schools. [10]
• No state or international body could address, in an appropriate manner, the immediate humanitarian emergency nor the long-term consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation in a populated area, nor provide appropriate assistance to those affected. Owing to the massive suffering and destruction caused by a nuclear detonation, it would probably not be possible to establish such capacities, even if attempted, although coordinated preparedness may, nevertheless, be useful in mitigating the effects of an event involving the explosion of an improvised nuclear device. [11]
• Notably, owing to the long-lasting effects of exposure to ionizing radiation, the use or testing of nuclear weapons has, in several parts of the world, left a legacy of serious health and environmental consequences [12] that disproportionally affect women and children. [13]

6. The immediate and longer-term humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons use and testing continue to be subject to scientific scrutiny, with emerging evidence and analysis inter alia of the sex- and age-differentiated impacts of ionizing radiation on human health, [14] the long-term impacts of nuclear weapons testing on the environment, [15] including on mortality and infant mortality rates, [16] the consequences of a nuclear war on the global climate, [17] food security, [18] ocean acidification, [19] as well as evidence and analysis of regional preparedness and response measures to nuclear testing. [20] While there are some aspects of these impacts that are not fully understood and require further study (see paragraph 17), these scientific studies reveal new and compelling evidence of long-term harm to human health and the environment from the use and testing of nuclear weapons.

7. There is a particular need for continued and scaled-up efforts to research and understand the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons testing. Communities in former nuclear testing areas – including the Marshall Islands, [21] Kazakhstan, [22] Algeria [23] and the United States [24] – continue to be affected today by the impacts of ionizing radiation released from nuclear tests that occurred decades ago. Many communities report that they do not have sufficient information about their own history of exposure, the current risks of living in a radioactively contaminated area and the intergenerational risks associated with radiation exposure. [25] A lack of transparency and a failure to take the perspectives, lifestyles and needs of communities into account are barriers that need to be overcome in future research efforts.

8. Moreover, while it has been established that women and children are disproportionally affected by ionizing radiation, little is known about the effects of ionizing radiation on reproductive health. Possible questions for further research in this area include: Why is biological sex a factor in radiation harm? Why are the biological sex differences in radiation harm greatest in young children? Is the percentage of reproductive tissue and how it reacts to radiation a contributing factor? [26]

III. The risk of the use of nuclear weapons

9. Evidence of the foreseeable impacts of a nuclear detonation is an integral part of a nuclear weapons risk assessment. Although nuclear weapons have not been used in armed conflict since 1945, there has been a disturbingly high number of close calls in which nuclear weapons were nearly used inadvertently as a result of miscalculation or error. [27] During the three conferences on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons in 2013 and 2014, it was demonstrated that the risks of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, stem notably from:

• the vulnerability of nuclear weapon command-and-control networks to human error and cyberattacks
• the maintaining of nuclear arsenals on high levels of alert, with thousands of weapons ready to be launched within minutes
• the dangers of access to nuclear weapons and related materials by non-state actors.

10. The conferences furthermore observed that international and regional tensions between nuclear-armed states, coupled with existing military doctrines and security policies that give a prominent role to nuclear weapons, increase the risk of nuclear weapons being used, and concluded that, given the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation, the risk of nuclear weapons being used is unacceptable, even if the probability of such an event were considered low. [28]

11. Since the three conferences on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, the risk that nuclear weapons may be used has increased. While there are different ways to conceptualize nuclear risks and the sources of these risks, the increased probability of nuclear weapons being used is driven by the following interconnected developments:

• After decades of significant cuts in the global nuclear arsenal, the trend towards nuclear reductions is now being replaced by a process of modernization and development of new nuclear weapons with novel, “more usable” capabilities. [29]
• Nuclear weapons are acquiring a more important role in the military doctrines and security strategies of nuclear-armed states, marked, most notably, by a return to considerations of “nuclear warfighting” and an expansion of the circumstances in which the use of nuclear weapons may be considered. [30]
• Broader technological developments, new missile technologies, increased activities and reliance on infrastructure in space, as well as the integration of digital technologies in nuclear command, control and communications, increases complexity in decision-making processes, thereby heightening the risk of misinterpretations and misunderstandings that could trigger the use of nuclear weapons. [31]
• The erosion of the nuclear arms control legal framework – indicated, for example, by the abrogation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty – reduces transparency and predictability in policy and decision-making processes, making it more difficult to read the adversary’s intent. [32]
• Broader geopolitical developments, with increasingly tense relationships and the possibility of conflict across several contexts between nuclear-armed and nuclear-allied states, increases the risk of escalation. [33]

12. It is possible to conceptualize the increasing risk of nuclear weapons being used according to the following four risk-of-use scenarios:

a)       doctrinal use of nuclear weapons, i.e. the use of nuclear weapons as outlined and envisaged in declared policies, doctrines, strategies and concepts

b)      escalatory use, i.e. the use of nuclear weapons in an ongoing situation of tension or conflict

c)       unauthorized use, i.e. the non-sanctioned use of nuclear weapons by a non-state actor

d)      accidental use, i.e. the use of nuclear weapons through error, including technical malfunction and human error. [34]

13. When assessing the risks arising from technological developments, it is important to consider these technologies both individually and in combination. New technologies may interrelate and depend on each other, thus affecting decision-making systems in unpredictable ways. For example, increased reliance on digital technologies in decision-making processes may create new sources of error that may be difficult to detect, potentially leading to a misplaced overconfidence in the ability of these technologies to deliver accurate information. The introduction and use of new technologies may also lead a state to misinterpret or misunderstand the behaviour of another state, thereby increasing the likelihood of unnecessary escalation. [35]

14. It is important to note that offering an objective and meaningful quantification of these risks may not be possible and engaging in such quantification may create a sense of overconfidence. Objective probability estimates are based on experience and exclude new and unprecedented paths to nuclear catastrophe. Using the language of risk may therefore create a false sense of controllability and manageability by creating an illusion that all the possible paths to disaster have been anticipated and accounted for. The concepts of “luck” and “vulnerability” may better capture our inability to control and manage the possible use of nuclear weapons and therefore provide a more accurate understanding of the dangers posed by these weapons. [36]

IV. Conclusions

15. Research into the various immediate and long-term impacts of nuclear weapons use and testing is important in itself because it informs us of the unique characteristics of these weapons. Such research also provides a crucial basis for humanitarian preparedness and response, and is important in upholding the rights of the individuals and communities affected. The evidence of the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons is essential to assess the legality of their use under international humanitarian law (IHL) and it gives a fact-based entry point for discussions about nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, more broadly.

16. The evidence of harm caused by the use and testing of nuclear weapons takes on a renewed importance in a world in which the risk of nuclear weapons being used is increasing. From a humanitarian perspective, any measure to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being used is to be welcomed. Indeed, preventing the use of nuclear weapons is of the utmost urgency. At the same time, nuclear risk reduction cannot become a substitute for the implementation of states’ legally binding obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament, notably those under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. [37] The only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again is by prohibiting and eliminating them.

17. Although much is already known about the humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons, there is a need for more research in certain areas. In particular, we need to understand more about the long-term humanitarian and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing, as well as the sex- and age-differentiated and, potentially, intergenerational consequences of ionizing radiation.

[1] Linh Schroeder, “The ICRC and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Working Towards a Nuclear-Free World since 1945”, 2017: https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2018.1450623 , all web addresses accessed 8 July 2020; Jakob Kellenberger, “Bringing the era of nuclear weapons to an end”,statement by the President of the ICRC to the Geneva Diplomatic Corps, Geneva, 20 April 2010: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/statement/nuclear-weapons-statement-200410.htm .

[2] ICRC, “ICRC report on the effects of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima”, 2016: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/icrc-report-effects-atomic-bomb-hiroshima .

[3] WHO, Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services, 1987: https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/39199 .

[4] John Borrie and Tim Caughley, An Illusion of Safety: Challenges of Nuclear Weapon Detonations for United Nations Humanitarian Coordination and Response, UNIDIR, 2014, pp. 8–15 for a contextual overview of research into the humanitarian consequences and capacities to respond to nuclear detonations: https://unidir.org/publication/illusion-safety-challenges-nuclear-weapon-detonations-united-nations-humanitarian .

[5] Alexander Kmentt, “The Humanitarian Consequences and Risks of Nuclear Weapons: Taking stock of the main findings and substantive conclusions”, presentation to the ICRC and IFRC expert meeting in Geneva on 2 March 2020 with an overview of the evidence presented at the three conferences; ILPI, “Evidence of Catastrophe: A summary of the facts presented at the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons”, ILPI, 2015.

[6] Simon Bagshaw, Population Displacement: Displacement in the Aftermath of Nuclear Weapon Detonation Events, ILPI-UNIDIR, 2014: https://unidir.org/publication/population-displacement-displacement-aftermath-nuclear-weapon-detonation-events .

[7] Article 36, “Economic impact of a nuclear weapon detonation”, 2015: http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Economic-impact.pdf .

[8] Alan Robock et al., “Global Famine after a Regional Nuclear War: Overview of Recent Research”, 2014, presentation to the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons: https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/Presentations/HINW14_S1_Presentation_Michael_Mills.pdf .

[9] Matthew McKinzie et al., “Calculating the Effects of a Nuclear Explosion at a European Military Base”, 2014, presentation to the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons: https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/Presentations/HINW14_S1_Presentation_NRDC_ZAMG.pdf .

[10] Neil Buhne, “Social and economic impacts: Structural restoration of lives and livelihoods in and around affected areas”, 2013, presentation to the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Oslo: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/hum/hum_buhne.pdf .

[11] Dominique Loye and Robin Coupland, “Who will assist the victims of use of nuclear, radiological, biological or chemical weapons – and how?”, 2007: https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/who-will-assist-victims-use-nuclear-radiological-biological-or-chemical-weapons-and-how ; ICRC, “Humanitarian assistance in response to the use of nuclear weapons”, 2013: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/2013/4132-3-nuclear-weapons-humanitarian-assistance-2013.pdf ; John Borrie and Tim Caughley, An Illusion of Safety: Challenges of Nuclear Weapon Detonations for United Nations Humanitarian Coordination and Response, UNIDIR, 2014: https://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/an-illusion-of-safety-en-611.pdf .

[12] John Borrie, A Harmful Legacy: The Lingering Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Testing, ILPI-UNIDIR, 2014: https://unidir.org/publication/harmful-legacy-lingering-humanitarian-impacts-nuclear-weapons-testing ; Roman Vakulchuk and Kristian Gjerde, Semipalatinks nuclear testing: the humanitarian consequences, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2014: http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2014/ph241/powell2/docs/vakulchuk.pdf .

[13] Anne Guro Dimmen, Gendered Impacts: The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons from a Gender Perspective, ILPI-UNIDIR, 2014: https://unidir.org/publication/gendered-impacts-humanitarian-impacts-nuclear-weapons-gender-perspective .

[14] Mary Olson, “Disproportionate impact of radiation and radiation regulation”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 2019: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03080188.2019.1603864 , presented to the ICRC and IFRC expert meeting in Geneva on 2 March 2020. (In November 2022, Olson corrected an error in one of her visualizations of the degree of difference in cancer outcomes from the exposure of young girls and adult males, respectively: A Correction — Gender + Radiation Impact Project )

[15] Maveric K.I.L. Abella et al., “Background gamma radiation and soil activity measurements in the northern Marshall Islands”,

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS), 2019: https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/116/31/15425.full.pdf ; Emlyn W. Hughes et al., “Radiation maps of ocean sediment from the Castle Bravo crater”, PNAS, 2019: https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/116/31/15420.full.pdf ; Carlisle E. W. Topping et al., “In situ measurement of cesium-137 contamination in fruits from the northern Marshall Islands”, PNAS, 2019: https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/116/31/15414.full.pdf ; R. Giles Harrison et al., “Precipitation Modification by Ionization”, Physical Review Letters, 2020: https://journals.aps.org/prl/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevLett.124.198701 .

[16] Kathleen M. Tucker and Robert Alvarez, “Trinity: “The most significant hazard of the entire Manhattan Project””, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2019: https://thebulletin.org/2019/07/trinity-the-most-significant-hazard-of-the-entire-manhattan-project/ ; Keith Meyers, “Some Unintended Fallout from Defense Policy: Measuring the Effect of Atmospheric Nuclear Testing on American Mortality Patterns”, 2019: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59262540b3db2b0d0d6d7d2b/t/5c81809a419202f922f0cfa4/1551990940274/Fallo%20utMortDraft_3-5-2019.pdf .

[17] Alan Robock et al., “How an India-Pakistan nuclear war could start–and have global consequences”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2019: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/IndiaPakistanBullAtomSci.pdf .

[18] Jonas Jägermeyr et al., “A regional nuclear conflict would compromise global food security”, PNAS, 2020: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/JagermeyrPNAS.pdf .

[19] Nicole S. Lovenduski et al., “The Potential Impact of Nuclear Conflict on Ocean Acidification”, Geophysical Research Letters, 2020: https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2019GL086246 .

[20] Beyza Unal, Patricia Lewis and Sasan Aghlani, “The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Testing: Regional Responses and Mitigation Measures”, Chatham House, 2017: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/humanitarian-impacts-nuclear-testing-regional-responses-and-mitigation-measures .

[21] Susanne Rust, “How the U.S. betrayed the Marshall Islands, kindling the next nuclear disaster”, Los Angeles Times, 2019: https://www.latimes.com/projects/marshall-islands-nuclear-testing-sea-level-rise/ .

[22] Wudan Yan, “The nuclear sins of the Soviet Union live on in Kazakhstan”, Nature, 2019: https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01034-8 .

[23] Johnny Magaleno, “Algerians suffering from French atomic legacy, 55 years after nuke tests”, Al Jazeera, 2015: http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/3/1/algerians-suffering-from-french-atomic-legacy-55-years-after-nuclear-tests.html .

[24] Lilly Adams, “The human cost of nuclear weapons is not only a “feminine” concern”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2019: https://thebulletin.org/2019/11/the-human-cost-of-nuclear-weapons-is-not-only-a-feminine-concern .

[25] Masaki Koyanagi, presentation to the Second International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, 2014: https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nayarit-2014/statements/Hibakusha-Koyanagi.pdf , giving the perspective of a third-generation hibakusha. The Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF) is currently carrying out a research programme on the children of atomic-bomb survivors.

[26] Mary Olson, presentation to the ICRC and IFRC expert meeting in Geneva on 2 March 2020.

[27] Patricia Lewis et al., “Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy”, Chatham House, 2014: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/199200 .

[28] Alexander Kmentt, “The Humanitarian Consequences and Risks of Nuclear Weapons: Taking stock of the main findings and substantive conclusions”, presentation to the ICRC and IFRC expert meeting in Geneva on 2 March 2020. The point was also made in the statement, “Never again: Nagasaki must be the last atomic bombing”, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 2017: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/never-again-nagasaki-must-be-last-atomic-bombing .

[29] Matt Korda, “The Key Drivers of Nuclear Risk”, presentation to the ICRC and IFRC expert meeting in Geneva on 2 March 2020; Wilfred Wan, presentation to the ICRC and IFRC expert meeting in Geneva on 2 March 2020. For an overview of nuclear modernization programmes, see Benjamin Zala, “How the next nuclear arms race will be different from the last one”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2019: https://thebulletin.org/2019/01/how-the-next-nuclear-arms-race-will-be-different-from-the-last-one/ ; Nuclear Notebook: https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-risk/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-notebook/ for updated public information about nuclear weapons programmes.

[30] Ibid. For a discussion about the risk implications of changing doctrines, see Ankit Panda, “Multipolarity, Great Power Competition, and Nuclear Risk Reduction”, chapter three in Wilfred Wan (ed.), Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use, 2020: https://unidir.org/publication/nuclear-risk-reduction-closing-pathways-use .

[31] Ibid. Yasmin Afina, presentation to the ICRC and IFRC expert meeting in Geneva on 2 March 2020; For the risk implications of digital technology in nuclear command, see Beyza Unal and Patricia Lewis, “Cybersecurity of Nuclear Weapons Systems: Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences”, Chatham House, 2018: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/cybersecurity-nuclear-weapons-systems-threats-vulnerabilities-and-consequences . For the risk implications of technological developments, see John Borrie, “Nuclear risk and the technological domain: a three-step approach”, chapter four in Wilfred Wan (ed.), Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use, 2020: https://unidir.org/publication/nuclear-risk-reduction-closing-pathways-use .

[32] Ibid. For a discussion about the risk implications of the evaporation of arms control, see Ankit Panda, “Multipolarity, Great Power Competition, and Nuclear Risk Reduction”, chapter three in Wilfred Wan (ed.), Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use, 2020: https://unidir.org/publication/nuclear-risk-reduction-closing-pathways-use .

[34] Wilfred Wan, presentation to the ICRC and IFRC expert meeting in Geneva on 2 March 2020; Wilfred Wan (ed.), Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use, 2020, chapter one: https://unidir.org/publication/nuclear-risk-reduction-closing-pathways-use .

[35] Yasmin Afina, presentation to the ICRC and IFRC expert meeting in Geneva on 2 March 2020; Beyza Unal and Patricia Lewis, “Cybersecurity of Nuclear Weapons Systems: Threats, Vulnerabilities and Consequences”, Chatham House, 2018: https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/cybersecurity-nuclear-weapons-systems-threats-vulnerabilities-and-consequences ; James M. Acton, “Escalation Through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War”, International Security, 2018: https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/08/08/escalation-through-entanglement-how-vulnerability-of-command-and-control-systems-raises-risks-of-inadvertent-nuclear-war-pub-77028 .

[36] Benoît Pelopidas, “The unbearable lightness of luck: Three sources of overconfidence in the manageability of nuclear crises”, European Journal of International Security, 2017: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/unbearable-lightness-of-luck-three-sources-of-overconfidence-in-the-manageability-of-nuclear-crises/BDE95895C04E7E7988D15DB4F217D1E4 ; Benoît Pelopidas, “Power, luck, and scholarly responsibility at the end of the world(s),” International Theory, 2020: https://spire.sciencespo.fr/notice/2441/2gpssdhlp88r38vuhhl2h9et2v ; Papers presented to the ICRC and IFRC expert meeting in Geneva on 2 March 2020.

[37] UN, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Article VI: https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/ ; International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons”, ICJ, 8 July 1996, paras. 99–101: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/7497.pdf .

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The Role of Nuclear Weapons in International Politics: A Strategic Perspective

• Andrew L. Ross
• March 30, 2009
• National Security Program
• Program on Teaching Military History

The Dawn of the Nuclear Age

The Nuclear Age began with the World War II Manhattan Project (1942–46), which culminated in the Trinity test on July 16, 1945, of the “Gadget” and the August 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Project was led by Gen. Leslie Groves; physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer directed the scientific research. The Trinity test took place on a test range north of Alamogordo, New Mexico. Gadget was a somewhat less than 20-kiloton implosion-type fission device. Its yield was the equivalent of the bomb load of 2000 fully loaded WWII B-29s. Reacting to the test, Oppenheimer quoted the Bhagavad-Gita: “I am become Death, the Shatterer of Worlds.”

Less than a month later, “Little Boy” was dropped on Hiroshima, on August 6, 1945. A gun-type bomb, it had an explosive force of roughly 15 kilotons. It was relatively simple: one piece of uranium-235 was fired at another. When Little Boy was exploded in an airburst about 1900 feet over Hiroshima, some 80,000-140,000 people were killed instantly; another 100,000 were seriously injured. The burst’s temperature was estimated to reach more than 1 million degrees Celsius. The surrounding air was ignited, resulting in an 840-foot fireball; in less than a second, it expanded to over 900 feet. The blast wave from the explosion shattered windows ten miles away and was felt 37 miles away. Over two-thirds of the buildings in Hiroshima were demolished. Virtually everything within about 4.4 miles of ground zero of the explosion was incinerated by the hundreds of fires ignited by the thermal pulse. About thirty minutes later, a heavy “black rain” infused with dirt, dust, soot, and radioactive particles began falling in areas of the city. All this was the result of a relatively small device by today’s standards.

A few days later, on August 9, “Fat Man,” a roughly 21 kiloton bomb, was exploded over Nagasaki. According to Japanese estimates, almost 24,000 people were killed and another 23,000 wounded; the lower casualty rates despite the bomb’s being larger had to do with the terrain—Nagasaki was much hillier than Hiroshima. More than 40 percent of the city was destroyed. Fat Man was an implosion-type fission weapon, a more complex plutonium bomb. Unlike Little Boy, this type of bomb had been tested—the Little Boy type had not been. This was not just continuing wartime activities using a new device, it was also a test.

On August 15, after these two uses of the bomb (and the Soviet entry into the war against Japan), Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender.

The Nuclear Revolution in Military Affairs

The Nuclear Revolution is both a revolution in military affairs (RMA) and more than an “ordinary” RMA. From the start, nuclear weapons were regarded as so qualitatively different that everything that came before was rendered “conventional.” The most powerful bombs used in WWII until August 1945 contained 10 tons of TNT; the average yield of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs was the equivalent of 18,000 tons of TNT. The first U.S. thermonuclear test, in November 1952, had a yield of over 10 megatons, almost 580 times the power of the nuclear devices exploded in August 1945. Today, one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) warhead possesses the equivalent of the explosive power used in all of WWII.

A RMA has three components: technology, doctrine, and organization. The nuclear revolution was a technology-driven RMA. It was not the result of existing strategy. Certainly, the United States wanted to develop nuclear weapons before Germany did. But U.S. leaders didn’t have a specific use in mind—that came later. The Manhattan Project was viewed as a technological race with the Germans. That prefigured what was to come with the subsequent U.S.-Soviet technological competition. New doctrine and strategy was developed. The United States had to determine what role nuclear weapons were to play. Initially, the U.S. Army-Air Force (then the USAF after 1947) took the lead; relatively soon, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy went nuclear. New military organizations emerged—the Strategic Air Command, for instance. New service elites—strategic bomber pilots and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) operators in the USAF and nuclear submariners in the USN—appeared. New civilian structures were stood up, including the Atomic Energy Commission, which over time became the Department of Energy; subsequently, we saw the establishment of National Nuclear Security Administration.

There were further technological developments. Not only did we go from fission to fusion by 1952, but we also devised new delivery systems, truly intercontinental jet bombers developed relatively quickly during the 1950s, with the B-52 (which is still with us) making its appearance in the mid-1950s. In between going from bombers to ICBMs, the USAF worked on cruise missiles. The latter weren’t particularly successful in the 1950s but reappeared in the 1970s and 1980s. The Navy developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that were put on new platforms, nuclear-powered submarines.

The nuclear revolution is an RMA with a difference that made a difference. There were other RMAs in the 20th century, such as the German blitzkrieg that emerged during the interwar period. Like earlier RMAs, the blitzkrieg was developed during peacetime and was tested and employed during wartime. The nuclear revolution emerged during a conflict, and nuclear weapons have not been used in war since August 1945. Their impact has greater off than on the battlefield. They have not been used against a nuclear foe. Fortunately, the world has not experienced “nuclear combat” on a “nuclear battlefield,” much less a nuclear war. There have been many tests—and we think we know a lot about the effects of nuclear explosions as a result of all those tests—but there has never been anything that resembles nuclear combat, a nuclear battlefield, or a nuclear war.

The nuclear revolution had greater strategic than operational or tactical war-fighting implications. It has been about deterrence and how we think about deterrence rather than war-fighting. Deterrence became nuclear weapons’ central role. Some, such as Bernard Brodie in 1946, recognized that very early on. Over time, a very high level of strategic interdependence developed among the states that possessed nuclear weapons, at least among those that possessed large quantities of them—the U.S. and USSR were very sensitive to each other’s nuclear moves. Some argue that nuclear weapons are responsible for what historian John Lewis Gaddis called the “long peace” of the Cold War. We have not seen a major power war since August 1945. Gaddis and other analysts argue that this is a direct result of the nuclear revolution. So we have seen a revolution in  strategic , not merely military, affairs.

Another difference is that this RMA was led by civilians rather than the military. From the Manhattan Project on, civilians—Americans, Canadians, British, former Germans—led this RMA. More important, those who were responsible for the systematic exploration and development of U.S. nuclear policy and strategy over the years have been primarily civilians, people like Bernard Brodie, a historian/political scientist at RAND and then UCLA; the mathematician Albert Wohlstetter, also at RAND; the Nobel Prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling, who was at Harvard and then the University of Maryland; and RAND’s Herman Kahn, who wrote  Thinking About the Unthinkable  (1962). These and other civilians were the pioneers— Fred Kaplan called them the “Wizards of Armageddon”—in developing nuclear thought. In the past, new strategy and doctrine were developed by the military.

The Central Role of Deterrence

In 1946, Bernard Brodie, one of the Wizards of Armageddon, observed “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other purpose.” Brodie here put deterrence front and center. Also in 1946, General H. A. P. Arnold provided a hint of how to think about deterrence: “[O]ur first line of defense is the ability to retaliate even after receiving the hardest blow the military can deliver.” This is about striking second, about being able to absorb a nuclear blow, having forces that would survive, and being able to retaliate and punish the enemy.

The objective of deterrence is to prevent aggression and war, not necessarily to be able to fight a war. In the past, we’ve often thought that the ability to deter depended on the ability to fight: to be able to defend yourself and to be able to go on the offense. Whether that logic applies to nuclear deterrence has been a matter of no little contention.

The United States has attempted to deter threats against itself and against its allies and friends. Deterrence of threats against the U.S. homeland has been referred to as core, central, or fundamental deterrence. The deterrence of threats against allies and friends is known as extended deterrence. When we’ve talked about countries like South Korea or Japan being under the U.S. nuclear umbrella or about preventing Soviet aggression against our NATO allies, we were talking about extended deterrence.

Deterrence entails persuading potential aggressors that the costs and risks of aggression are sure to exceed its benefits. This requires the requisite capabilities and the willingness to use them. Extended deterrence is regarded as more difficult than core or central deterrence: would the United States really risk the destruction of New York or San Francisco to save Bonn or Paris? It is generally thought that the target of deterrence has to be a rational actor. A very limited definition of rationality is at play here. It doesn’t mean than an adversary has to think like us; it simply has to recognize that the costs and risks of aggression will exceed the benefits. If you do A, we’ll do B, which could well be the destruction of your society as you know it.

It’s usually clear when deterrence has failed. If the Soviets had invaded Western Europe during the Cold War, deterrence would have failed. Some argue that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was a deterrence failure. It’s very difficult, however, to know for certain when deterrence is working. Does the fact that the USSR never invaded Western Europe mean that U.S. extended deterrence worked? That something we wanted to prevent, or deter, didn’t happen doesn’t necessarily mean that what we did worked. Conclusively demonstrating why something did not occur is always problematical.

During the Cold War, two ways were developed of persuading a potential adversary that the costs and risks of aggression would be greater than the benefits. The first approach emphasized the threat of punishment; aggression would be met with the infliction of unacceptable costs; an aggressor would pay an unacceptably high price. The second approach emphasized the denial of objectives: aggression would fail; an aggressor would be stopped and defeated. Although these two approaches were developed in the context of the dyadic, U.S.-Soviet Cold War relationship, they continue to frame the post-Cold War nuclear policy and strategy debate.

What kind of nuclear capabilities are required to punish an aggressor, to impose unacceptable costs on an aggressor? Punishment is thought to require not only offensive strike capabilities, but also retaliatory, second- (rather than first-) strike capabilities. The emphasis on second-strike capabilities requires survivable forces. Survivability is enhanced by dispersing forces, rather than concentrating them, by deploying them underground in concrete, steel-reinforced silos; or by putting them out at sea in submarines that cannot be easily tracked and targeted. Redundancy, in the form of the triad of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, also enhances force survivability. Punishment embraces the defense of military systems, whether passive (dispersal, hardening) or active (point defense). It requires as well the ability to destroy urban/industrial or “countervalue” targets, a targeting capability that does not require an especially high degree of accuracy.

The threat of punishment does not require civil defense capabilities or national ballistic missile defense capabilities that would serve to erode an opponent’s ability to punish you (population centers were to remain vulnerable—Reagan’s SDI was seen as providing an offensive rather than a defensive capability). Punishment requires relatively low cost, finite, or absolute, capabilities. It provides an answer to “how much is enough?” Punishment came to be known as “Assured Destruction” or, when both sides subscribe to it, “Mutual Assured Destruction”—MAD. Advocates of this approach viewed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 as the enshrinement of punishment, assured destruction, and MAD. In their view, by embracing the ABM Treaty, both the U.S. and the USSR agreed not to take their population centers out of hostage.

What kind of nuclear capabilities are required to deny an aggressor the accomplishment of objectives? Denial requires all the capabilities needed for punishment and more. It emphasizes the need for a full range of offensive and defensive capabilities. Denial requires offensive strike capabilities, not just to retaliate but to strike first. Some argue that extended deterrence necessitates a first-strike capability. Like punishment, denial requires survivability and redundancy. Needed too are robust, survivable C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities. Unlike punishment, denial places a premium on the ability to destroy not just countervalue but military, “counterforce,” targets, especially the other side’s nuclear capabilities, such as its ICBMs and command and control centers. Counterforce targeting is much more demanding than countervalue targeting; hardened, underground target and mobile targets must be put at risk. A much higher degree of accuracy, therefore, is required. Denial demands passive and active defensive capabilities to protect not only military capabilities but population centers. It requires civil defense (air raid shelters) and national anti-ballistic missile defense capabilities as well as point defense, hardening, concealment, dispersal, and mobility.

Denial, clearly, requires a full suite of nuclear war-fighting capabilities. It emphasizes relative rather than absolute capabilities—superiority matters. Since one can never have too much superiority, denial is essentially open ended. Thus a denial posture is a great deal more expensive than a punishment posture. Kennedy and McNamara came into office convinced that the Eisenhower approach, which emphasized massive retaliation, provided too few options—it appeared to be all or nothing. They initially embraced a move to a denial, or “Flexible Response,” posture. Once McNamara realized how open ended this was, he moved to an assured destruction posture. With their emphasis on the need for not just a deterrent but a nuclear war-fighting capability, the proponents of Flexible Response became known as NUTs—nuclear utility theorists.

The positions of the two schools can be compared as follows:

We see differences in objectives here. For Assured Destruction, it’s all about the ability to deter and retaliate, to punish, to harm. Flexible Response is about the ability to deter, fight, and win a nuclear war. This is much more demanding. Flexible Response has a fallback; Assured Destruction does not. Does having a fallback make it more likely that deterrence will fail? Assured destruction answers “Yes”—and that this is an experiment we should not want to run. Does a nuclear war-fighting capability enhance or erode deterrence? According to Assured Destruction, it erodes deterrence; according to Flexible Response, it enhances deterrence.

Have we been MAD or NUTS? Both, actually. We’ve gone back and forth. At times we’ve been a combination of the two, even though the two are in tension with one another. In the 1950s, the declaratory policy of massive retaliation amounted, essentially, to an early version of Assured Destruction. Many argue that it was credible in the 1950s because the U.S. had nuclear superiority, and Assured Destruction wasn’t mutual. As noted, Kennedy and McNamara initially shifted away from Assured Destruction to Flexible Response, saw how demanding and expensive it was, and moved back to Assured Destruction. It became MAD in the late 1960s-early 1970s. Nixon and Kissinger placed a declaratory emphasis on “essential equivalence,” i.e., MAD. That’s when the ABM Treaty was negotiated and signed. After James Schlesinger came in as secretary of defense, we moved away from Assured Destruction to Flexible Response and emphasized the development of limited nuclear options, especially counterforce options. Under Carter and Reagan we moved further away from Assured Destruction to Flexible Response.

Over the years, we’ve been MAD and NUTs. What should we be now? What specifically are we trying to deter with nuclear weapons?

• State use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction?
• State use of conventional weapons? Do we still need to use nuclear weapons to deter other states’ use of conventional weapons?
• Non-state actor use of nuclear or other WMD? (Can terrorists be deterred the way states are deterred?)
• State support for non-state actor use of nuclear or other WMD?
• Non-state actor use of “conventional” weapons?
• State support for non-state actor use of “conventional” weapons?

Today most advocates of Assured Destruction, or a minimalist approach, argue that the only role for nuclear weapons is the deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons. The proponents of a Flexible Response, or a maximalist approach, continue to see a broader role for nuclear weapons.

Non-deterrent Roles

Nuclear weapons have had a truncated war-fighting role. They were only used in August 1945; most of us think that’s a good thing. A tradition of nonuse, which some think is sufficiently strong as to constitute a nuclear taboo, has developed over the years.

For some, nuclear weapons clearly are a status symbol, an indicator or attribute of major power status. The U.S. development of nuclear weapons was replicated by the USSR (1949), Britain (1952), France (1960), China (1964), Israel (1966/67), India (1974, 1998) and Pakistan (1998), and the DPRK (2006). Now we’re concerned about Iran going nuclear. Is it a coincidence that the first five nuclear powers were the five permanent members of the UN Security Council? Of course they’re also the only nuclear weapons states recognized by the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968.

In addition to their role as status symbols, nuclear weapons have served as an equalizer. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were relied upon by the United States and its NATO allies to counter, or offset, the conventional advantage of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This was what, for instance, the Eisenhower administration’s New Look was all about.

Today, the tables have been turned. It’s the U.S. that possesses an enormous conventional advantage; Russia, which in conventional military terms is a mere rump state of the former Soviet Union, relies on its nuclear capabilities to the extent that it’s concerned about the need to counter U.S. and NATO conventional capabilities. Others, state and non-state alike, seek a nuclear counter to U.S. conventional superiority. There are a number of reasons states seek to go nuclear. But to the extent that is U.S. military capabilities that spur them to do so, it is not U.S. nuclear capabilities but U.S. conventional capabilities, particularly the manner in which they have been used since 9/11, that is most prominently at play.

Nuclear weapons have thus served as a substitute for conventional forces. In the past, the U.S. and NATO quite explicitly substituted nuclear for conventional weapons. Today, Russia is doing that; like the United States and NATO in the past, Russia more recently hasn’t been able to afford, or hasn’t wanted to pay for, the conventional capabilities required to match those of an erstwhile adversary. Again as in the past, nuclear weapons continue to play a role in dampening defense spending.

Finally, nuclear weapons arguably have played a role in discouraging both horizontal and vertical proliferation. Extended deterrence has provided an excuse for European states such as Germany and Asian states such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan for not going nuclear. It has been suggested as well that the sheer size of the U.S. (and Soviet or Russian) nuclear arsenals have dissuaded others from attempting to increase their nuclear capabilities or even joining the nuclear club since competing seriously with the likes of the United States is hopeless. For some (although not this author), this dissuasion effect is cause for not reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal below the Moscow Treaty range of 1,700-2,200 warheads.

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• Teaching the Nuclear Age

Is Peace possible in a world with nuclear weapons?

• 9. August 2023

The movie “Oppenheimer” is still being screened in most cinemas around the world, captivating audiences with the gripping tale of the man responsible for creating the most devastating weapon in history. However, it becomes increasingly evident that the world urgently must divert attention to the most pressing question: how can we achieve a world free from nuclear weapons? If filmmaker Nolan caught the attention of millions of people, there are a lot fewer people who know about existing legal mechanisms to prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

Following this, I want to share my reflections on attending a meeting at the United Nations (UN) on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation happening at this very moment while we commemorate 78 years since the first and so far only use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. For me personally, the existence of nuclear weapons is far from being something abstract because I was born 100 kms from the former Soviet nuclear test site. I know from my personal but also professional experience, the scale of the devastating impact of nuclear weapons use and testing on human health and environment.

Disarmament should be the end goal.

During the Cold War era, nuclear war was closer than ever with the Soviet Union and the US tangled up in a nuclear arms race, most specifically during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. To stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and prevent more states from possessing them, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT or Non-Proliferation Treaty) was adopted in 1968, entering into force in 1970.

There are three pillars of Non-Proliferation Treaty:

• The non-proliferation pillar (Article I, II) which aims to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
• The disarmament pillar (Article VI) which encourages states to reduce their nuclear arsenal and eventually achieve total disarmament.
• The peaceful use of nuclear energy pillar (Article IV) which establishes the right of state parties to NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

NPT is the treaty which divides nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear weapons states. NPT ‘allows’ the 5 UN Security Council Permanent Member States (P5) states – the  United States, the Soviet Union and now Russia, France, China, and the United Kingdom – to legally possess nuclear weapons. Four states, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, expressing opposition to this double standard, developed their own nuclear weapons over the past 50 years, and ultimately have neither signed nor ratified the NPT. 

For a long time, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the only international tool legally controlling nuclear weapons and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Since 1970, every five years, States gather at the NPT Review Conference (RevCon) to assess the Treaty’s progress. In the three years preceding each RevCon , they also hold annual meetings at the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom). These two-week-long PrepComs aim to promote the implementation of the Treaty and make recommendations for the upcoming RevCon.

This year, from July 31st to August 11th, state delegations, civil society organisations (including CFFP, represented by me), and disarmament activists gathered in Vienna to initiate the NPT PrepCom leading to the 2026 Review Conference.

More than 50 years have passed since the adoption of the NPT, and as I witnessed during the first week at the PrepCom, nuclear-armed states are neither interested in nor are they working towards banning and finally eliminating nuclear weapons once and for all. 

Disarmament is not being implemented, and this has been already criticised by many non-nuclear weapons states and civil society. Considering the continuous nuclear threats f rom Russia  since the beginning of its full-scale invasion in Ukraine in February 2022, achieving the disarmament pillar of the NPT appears distant.

Nuclear weapons don't make peace.

Nuclear weapons are sold to us as something that is supposed to ‘maintain peace’ and keep us safe. This argument has been reinforced by “nuclear deterrence theory” and the concept of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD).

Unfortunately, this argument is used to merely justify the possession of nukes.

To me, the notion that the most destructive weapons can somehow “maintain peace” is the weakest argument I would never be able to comprehend.

As experts fairly point out , the argument used by nuclear arms advocates that nuclear deterrence is a key instrument in preventing possible conflict and war or worsening the existing conflicts proves to be far from reality when looking back at the full picture of historical events. Keeping the peace and avoiding the Third World War is more complex than relying only on nuclear weapons as deterrents and ‘agents of peace’. I agree with Ward Wilson’s argument in his book Five Myths about Nuclear Weapons :

“The history of nuclear deterrence has been distorted; certain episodes that might indicate failures of nuclear deterrence have been allowed to fade quietly into the background, while other episodes have been claimed as successes and given a prominence they may not deserve”.

During the week I spent at PrepCom, I did not see any commitments from nuclear-armed states to achieve disarmament. Over a little enjoyable coffee at the UN building, I asked a colleague a question: if not NOW, then when?!

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is oftentimes characterised as “the cornerstone of global security” and the main tool to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Here, in my feminist brain, I cannot avoid the question: “Security for Who? And from Whom?” . While 5 out of 9 nuclear-armed states party to NPT justify their possession of nuclear weapons for the sake of security, I do not feel a tiny bit close to feeling safe in a world with almost 13.000 nukes much more powerful than those dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

A sombre reality in fact: this justification looms as a formidable barrier on the path to a truly safer world. Relying on nuclear deterrence to maintain peace is something nuclear-armed states need to stop doing because clearly nuclear weapons do not stop conflict and war . Also, we never know when the existence of nuclear weapons lead to the full-scale (accidental) use of them dooming us to a nuclear annihilation with devastating humanitarian and ecological consequences

Our only choice is to eliminate nuclear weapons which are already banned under international law, namely under the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Ban Treaty or TPNW) – different from the Non-Proliferation Treaty which I’ve been mentioning until now. The Nuclear Ban Treaty follows and compliments Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on disarmament. But unlike the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Nuclear Ban Treaty provides better and more effective measures to achieve nuclear disarmament by prohibiting nuclear weapons . Unsurprisingly, nuclear-armed states or allied states have not signed or ratified the Nuclear Ban Treaty; By doing so, they continue to legitimise the possession of nuclear weapons instead of prohibiting them.

During the first week at PrepCom, I attended plenary sessions with states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and side events organised either by civil society or state delegations or in cooperation with both. Those times I sat in a big plenary room, I could not help but notice the double standard when it comes not only to the possession of nukes but also to nuclear sharing. The US keeps some of its nuclear warheads in NATO states such as Italy, Belgium, Turkey, Netherlands, and Germany. These 5 NATO states are non-nuclear weapons states under Non-Proliferation Treaty but nevertheless have US nukes on their territories. All the while, during PrepCom, nuclear-armed states and their allies continuously criticised the deployment of Russia’s nuclear weapons to Belarus , a non-nuclear weapons state and a State Party to the NPT. Whilst this must be avoided at all costs as such deployment would increasingly threaten the security of countless people, hearing this felt somewhat hypocritical since the US has stationed nukes beyond its territory as well. Both civil society and non-nuclear weapons states criticise nuclear sharing since it is not in compliance with neither the Non-Proliferation Treaty nor  Nuclear Ban Treaty, and do not make us closer to a nuclear weapons-free world.  

NATO non-nuclear weapons states, such as Italy, Belgium, Turkey, Netherlands, and Germany (which, like the Netherlands, is committed to Feminist Foreign Policy), need to refrain from legitimising nuclear weapons and hosting them on their territories.  

The power of civil society to push for nuclear disarmament.

I left for Vienna without expecting much from the conference because it is based on a Western-oriented, cis-hetero and gender-exclusive treaty. The whole time I was at the UN building, there were many moments when I could roll my eyes, and sigh in disappointment, but there were also many moments of much-needed hope despite destabilising times we are facing now.

There were moments of interaction with delegates from countries which are against nuclear weapons, where understanding and respect prevailed over any justification for nuclear weapons. One unforgettable moment was the exchange of replies at the plenary between Russia and Ukraine. It was my first big UN conference since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression and I felt goosebumps by witnessing the strength of a delegate from Ukraine responding to statements of the delegate from Russia. I applauded the Ukraine delegate’s resilience since it is clear that ‘debating’ during an ongoing war with the aggressor country which threatens to use nuclear weapons is everything but an easy task.

I wholeheartedly applaud the unwavering dedication of civil society organisations, like-minded states, and individuals who do not give up on this crucial fight.

I draw my inspiration and motivation from civil society. Witnessing much-needed solidarity during PrepCom is something that gives me an enormous amount of strength and inspiration to keep going. As a relatively new expert to this field and an Asian woman affected by the nuclear testing, I oftentimes feel excluded from the field which glorifies male dominance. But seeing so many like-minded people at the forefront of the common battle against nukes is refreshing and quite hopeful. 

On the first day of NPT PrepCom, I spoke about the nexus between nuclear justice and climate justice from a feminist perspective at an event organised by ICAN Germany, Kazakhstan and Marshallese Educational Initiative . In my speech, I made sure to highlight that there is no nuclear justice without climate and gender justice. It is very disheartening to see how nuclear justice remains oftentimes side-lined at the NPT . However, communities affected by nuclear testing made sure to be heard at the side events and country statements emphasising the role of the Nuclear Ban Treaty (TPNW) in victims’ assistance and environmental remediation. 

Germany, a nuclear-sharing state, for example, in its F eminist Foreign Policy guidelines , committed to ‘supporting efforts to recognise and compensate the victims of nuclear tests’ while not being a party to the Nuclear Ban Treaty (TPNW). I am convinced that these commitments must be implemented by nuclear-armed and allied states to achieve nuclear justice for people disproportionately affected by nuclear testing programs.

We must not forget that the existence of nuclear weapons reproduces power inequalities. As a feminist, I am hoping to see the world free from nuclear weapons, not a world with weapons that strongly reinforce patriarchy and unjust global order.

Attending NPT PrepCom has cemented both hopes for peace and the despair of the current reality we live in, with almost 13,000 nuclear warheads scattered in different places around the world we are meant to love and cherish.

Let’s not forget the price which has already been paid.

On my way to Vienna early in the morning on the 31st of July, a quote from Setsuko Thurlow, a survivor of the Hiroshima bombing, raced through my sleep-deprived mind.  When Setsuko was seeking a way out from the school destroyed by the US atomic bomb in 1945, a man trying to help her said :

“Don’t give up! Keep pushing! I am trying to free you. See the light coming through that opening? Crawl towards it as quickly as you can.”

The struggle for a world free from nuclear weapons feels like crawling towards a light that, at times, seems unreachable. This light has been dimmed by the mere creation of the atomic bomb, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and hundreds of nuclear tests.

As a third-generation survivor of the Soviet Nuclear testing in my hometown in Kazakhstan, I cannot help but wonder how we all define peace in a world with nuclear weapons. Sitting in a room with hundreds of diplomats speaking about nuclear weapons made me reflect on how we, as human beings, are responsible for maintaining peace in this world.

In these reflections, there is no place for nuclear weapons. I stand firm on this.

This article was written by:

Aigerim Seitenova is Project Manager for our Peace and Security Programme.

Towards a future with more just and inclusive food systems? Power shifting and centring indigenous knowledge systems hold the key

The urgent need for a moroccan feminist foreign policy , afghan women are at the forefront of resistance, as they have always been..

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Annie Jacobsen: 'What if we had a nuclear war?’

The author and Pulitzer prize finalist, who has written the latest pick for the New Scientist Book Club, Nuclear War: A scenario, on the "shocking truths" about a nuclear attack

By Annie Jacobsen

12 April 2024

The Titan nuclear missile in the silo in Arizona, US

Michael Dunning/Getty Images

Not long after the last world war, the historian William L. Shirer had this to say about the next world war. It “will be launched by suicidal little madmen pressing an electronic button. Such a war will not last long and none will ever follow it. There will be no conquers and no conquests, but only the charred bones of the dead on an uninhabited planet.”

As an investigative journalist, I write about war, weapons, national security and government secrets. I’ve previously written six books about US military and intelligence programmes – at the CIA, The Pentagon, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency– all designed to prevent, or deter, nuclear world war III . In the course of my work, countless people in the upper echelons of US government have told me, proudly, that they’ve dedicated their lives to making sure the US never has a nuclear war. But what if it did?

“Every capability in the [Department of Defense] is underpinned by the fact that strategic deterrence will hold,” US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which is responsible for nuclear deterrence, insists publicly. Until the autumn of 2022, this promise was pinned on STRATCOM’s public Twitter feed. But to a private audience at Sandia National Laboratories later that same year, STRATCOM’s Thomas Bussiere admitted the existential danger inherent to deterrence. “Everything unravels itself if those things are not true.”

If deterrence fails – what exactly would that unravelling look like? To write Nuclear War: A scenario , I put this question to scores of former nuclear command and control authorities. To the military and civilian experts who’ve built the weapon systems, been privy to the response plans and been responsible for advising the US president on nuclear counterstrike decisions should they have to be made. What I learned terrified me. Here are just a few of the shocking truths about nuclear war.

The US maintains a nuclear launch policy called Launch on Warning. This means that if a military satellite indicates the nation is under nuclear attack and a second early-warning radar confirms that information, the president launches nuclear missiles in response. Former secretary of defense William Perry told me: “Once we are warned of a nuclear attack, we prepare to launch. This is policy. We do not wait.”

The US president has sole authority to launch nuclear weapons. He asks permission of no one. Not the secretary of defense, not the chairman of the joint chief of staff, not the US Congress. “The authority is inherent in his role as commander in chief,” the Congressional Research Service confirms. The president “does not need the concurrence of either his [or her] military advisors or the US Congress to order the launch of nuclear weapons”.

When the president learns he must respond to a nuclear attack, he has just 6 minutes to do so. Six minutes is an irrational amount of time to “decide whether to release Armageddon”, President Ronald Reagan lamented in his memoirs. “Six minutes to decide how to respond to a blip on a radar scope… How could anyone apply reason at a time like that?” And yet, the president must respond. This is because it takes roughly just 30 minutes for an intercontinental ballistic missile to get from a launch pad in Russia, North Korea or China to any city in the US, and vice versa. Nuclear-armed submarines can cut that launch-to-target time to 10 minutes, or less.

Today, there are nine nuclear powers, with a combined total of more than 12,500 nuclear weapons ready to be used. The US and Russia each have some 1700 nuclear weapons deployed – weapons that can be launched in seconds or minutes after their respective president gives the command. This is what Shirer meant when he said: “Such a war will not last long and none will ever follow it.”

Nuclear war is the only scenario other than an asteroid strike that could end civilisation in a matter of hours. The soot from burning cities and forests will blot out the sun and cause nuclear winter. Agriculture will fail. Some 5 billion people will die. In the words of former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, “the survivors will envy the dead”.

I wrote Nuclear War: A scenario to demonstrate – in appalling, minute-by-minute detail – just how horrifying a nuclear war would be. “Humanity is one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation,” UN secretary-general António Guterres warned the world in 2022. “This is madness. We must reverse course.”

Nuclear War: A Scenario   by Annie Jacobsen, published by Torva (£20.00), is available now. It is the latest pick for the New Scientist Book Club: sign up  here  to read along with our members

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The U.S. Has Received a Rare Invitation From China. There Is Only One Right Answer.

By W.J. Hennigan

Mr. Hennigan writes about national security issues for Times Opinion.

In the middle of the last century, as the United States and Russia rapidly amassed thousands of nuclear weapons, China stayed out of the arms race, focusing its energy on growing its economy and broadening its regional influence.

Beijing did build hundreds of nuclear weapons during those years, but the nation’s leaders insisted their modest arsenal was merely for self-defense. Since China’s first nuclear weapons test, in 1964, the country has pledged loudly to never go first in a nuclear conflict — no matter what. That stance, coupled with a stated strategy of “minimum” deterrence, didn’t demand the level of American fear, loathing and attention that the Russian threat did.

Now there is increasing unease in Washington about China’s nuclear ambitions. The Pentagon says Beijing is on track to double the number of its nuclear warheads by the decade’s end, to 1,000 from 500 — a development that senior U.S. officials have publicly called “unprecedented” and “breathtaking.” China has drastically expanded its nuclear testing facility and continued work on three new missile fields in the country’s north, where more than 300 intercontinental ballistic missile silos have recently been constructed.

China’s transformation from a small nuclear power into an exponentially larger one is a historic shift, upending the delicate two-peer balance of the world’s nuclear weapons for the entirety of the atomic age. The Russian and American arsenals — their growth, reduction and containment — have defined this era; maintaining an uneasy peace between the two countries hinged on open communication channels, agreement on nuclear norms and diplomacy.

Little of that nuclear scaffolding exists with China. In Washington, how exactly to interpret Beijing’s sharp nuclear buildup is still a matter of debate. At best, American officials say, their Chinese counterparts are trying to catch up with the United States and Russia, which still each have roughly a 10-to-1 nuclear advantage over China with their stockpiles. At worst, they say, this is Beijing’s boldfaced attempt to deter the United States from defending Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, the most likely flashpoint for an armed conflict between the competing superpowers.

In truth, no one knows what China is planning. President Xi Jinping’s government, as with much of its domestic policy, releases vanishingly little information about its nuclear intentions, strategies or goals, and it has been equally unwilling to engage on arms control.

That is, until now.

In February, in a rare offer for nuclear diplomacy, China openly invited the United States and other nuclear powers to negotiate a treaty in which all sides would pledge never to use nuclear weapons first against one another. “The policy is highly stable, consistent and predictable,” said Sun Xiaobo, director general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s department of arms control, in Geneva on Feb. 26. “It is, in itself, an important contribution to the international disarmament process.”

The invitation came as a surprise. While Beijing has long claimed moral superiority over other nuclear powers on this issue — China and India are the only nuclear-armed nations to declare a no-first-use policy — opening the possibility for talks in such a public way is something China hasn’t done in years.

It may seem like a no-brainer to take China up on the offer — wouldn’t it be better if everyone agreed not to be the first to use their nuclear weapons? — but it has been met with public silence from Washington. For American policymakers, committing to no-first-use is deeply divisive. The United States, the only nation to ever use nuclear weapons in conflict, when it dropped two atomic bombs on Japan in 1945, has never ruled out being first to use them again, nor has it detailed the circumstances under which it would consider doing so. This approach of calculated ambiguity is intended to prevent adversaries from taking military action against the United States — and the more than 30 allies it is bound by treaties to defend — out of fear for what could come their way in response.

It’s also a personal issue for President Biden. He supported a no-first-use policy as vice president amid deliberations inside the Obama administration, and as a presidential candidate on the campaign trail he said the “sole purpose” of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be aimed at deterring or retaliating against an adversary’s nuclear attack. But when it came time for his own administration to adopt a declaratory nuclear policy, he decided not to break with America’s longstanding nuclear dogma and retained the first-use option.

Mr. Biden’s about-face was a sign of the times, a result of both internal deliberations and consultations with allies in Europe and Asia. According to current and former administration officials, these nations’ leaders feared a U.S. policy reversal would undermine confidence in America’s commitment to come to their defense and would potentially embolden China, Russia and North Korea.

The uneasiness surrounding a potential change to America’s first-use policy almost certainly played a role in China’s unusually public invitation to negotiate. China may simply be trying to stoke anxieties among American allies and partners — and particularly Taiwan, South Korea and Japan — by floating a public offer outside of private diplomatic channels.

It’s not the first time it has gone down this road. During the Cold War, China made offers for a mutual no-first-use pledge at the United Nations in 1971 and 1982, and presented a draft treaty in 1994 to the other nuclear weapons states. Four years later, China tried to persuade President Bill Clinton to change American nuclear policy when he visited Beijing, but Mr. Clinton decided against it, choosing instead to share a pledge to stop targeting each other with their nuclear weapons.

Such overtures have all but halted under the leadership of Mr. Xi, who has pursued a far more aggressive foreign policy. He has overseen a sweeping modernization of China’s military, including developing and fielding new nuclear-capable missiles, submarines and bombers. Meanwhile, the stockpile of warheads steadily climbs.

The White House believes that China’s recent offer is a distraction from its broader unwillingness to engage diplomatically on the nuclear portfolio, including its own aggressive buildup. The Biden administration is wrestling with how it can deter both China and Russia without touching off a destabilizing three-way arms race. Jake Sullivan, Mr. Biden’s national security adviser, publicly invited the two nations last summer to hold nuclear arms control deliberations without preconditions. Russia dismissed the offer outright, while China agreed to preliminary talks. At a follow-on meeting in November, the United States proposed possible measures to manage nuclear risks, such as an agreement to notify one another when their militaries test-launch ballistic missiles.

“The P.R.C. has yet to respond or show interest in engaging substantively on these proposals,” a National Security Council spokeswoman, using the abbreviation for the country’s formal name, the People’s Republic of China, said in a written response to questions about Beijing’s recent offer. “This P.R.C. behavior calls into question the aims behinds the P.R.C.’s call for discussions of a no-first-use treaty.”

Some argue the Biden administration should take Beijing’s offer at face value. “China genuinely believes that any serious nuclear arms control discussion needs to start with no-first-use,” said Tong Zhao, a nuclear expert focused on China at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “From Beijing’s view, that’s the most effective way to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.”

Even if it is a strategic gambit, engaging with China and other nuclear nations on first-use talks could be a crucial step in establishing critical guardrails for the new nuclear era. It would be a major breakthrough for Washington to get China to the table for arms control talks. It could also help jolt the stalled relations between the United States and Russia, which together control nearly 90 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads.

“U.S. administrations have not responded with great alacrity or interest to Chinese outreach on the question of no-first-use,” said Steve Andreasen, who served as Mr. Clinton’s director for defense policy and arms control on the National Security Council. “But as we look forward into … the increasing U.S. national interest in engaging China in all things nuclear, we’re going to have to cross the Rubicon on this issue.”

It’s true that it’s not an easy time for trust-building exercises; the current level of mistrust between Chinese and American military intentions is deep. Speaking to Congress in March, Gen. Anthony Cotton, commander of all U.S. nuclear forces, suggested that China’s rapid nuclear expansion indicated its no-first-use policy was no longer credible. The Pentagon wrote in an October report that, despite China’s rhetoric, Beijing might consider using nuclear weapons first anyway during a crisis if it came down to the survival of Mr. Xi’s regime, such as defeat in a war with Taiwan. It also remains unclear how exactly China would respond if its nuclear forces were hit during a conflict. Would that trigger Beijing’s nuclear use? “Unknown,” the Pentagon said in the report.

Talking through these points of contention may help Beijing and Washington understand and appreciate the factors that go into formulating the finer points of each other’s nuclear policy. The very process of dialogue and diplomacy can help the Chinese hear American concerns, and vice versa. Given the widening gulf of fear and suspicion between the two nations around Taiwan, there is no better moment for them to sit down and discuss what constitutes a credible no-first-use commitment.

It may be that an unequivocal no-first-use pledge ends up being impossible. The talks may not result in a deal anyone can agree upon, and even if a deal were to be reached, it would be impossible to verify, meaning it would be more symbolic than substantive. But that doesn’t mean Washington shouldn’t take up Beijing’s invitation. In the increasingly endangered world of nuclear diplomacy, discussions on one treaty can still set the table for another. New START, the only remaining major arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, was built on the foundation of the original START I, which was signed two decades earlier.

Under Mr. Xi, China appears to have left its policy of minimum deterrence behind. If the Biden administration is serious about arms control, it’s time to look for common ground with Beijing to build new agreements for a safer future.

This Times Opinion series is funded through philanthropic grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York , the Outrider Foundation and the Prospect Hill Foundation . Funders have no control over the selection or focus of articles or the editing process and do not review articles before publication. The Times retains full editorial control.

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Did Nuclear Weapons Bring the World to the Edge of War or Did They Help Ensure Peace? Essay

Nuclear weapons are among the weapons of mass destruction, which were first detonated in1945 during the Second World War. Primarily, the United States of America is the only nation that has used nuclear weapons in wars, having detonated two atomic bombs in two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on 6 th and 9 th August 1945 respectively.

The destruction of these two acts was immense and the effects of the same can still be felt to date. In the recent past, the possession and production of nuclear weapons has brought much tension in the world. From the time of these two bombings, nuclear weapons are closely monitored and supervised. This paper will discuss whether nuclear weapons brought the world to edge of war, as well as their role in ensuring peace.

The nations that have acknowledged that they possess nuclear weapons are United States of America, China, North Korea, France, Russia, United Kingdom, Pakistan, and India. Israel is suspected to possess this ammunition but has not acknowledged or denied the claim. However, the numbers of nations yearning to have nuclear power for either military or economic are many.

Due to this, nations that already possess these weapons use this as a bargaining point, however, there are restrictions on who can produce or buy these weapons. Moreover, governments believe that nuclear weapons advance their national security, provide insurance against future risks and uncertainties (Paone, 2009).

Other reasons why a country may want to acquire nuclear powers are if one of its aggressors owns these weapons, to advance its international standings, running of economy through nuclear energy.

International relations are soaring since the invention of nuclear weapons. It is clear that with increase of nuclear, there is high risk of a nuclear war (Karp and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1992); indeed, nuclear weapons have brought the world to the verge of war.

The ability of a nation to destroy another population and environment with these weapons launched from far has increased the risk of military conflict. In addition, the risk of nuclear terrorism is real, in the wake of increased terror attacks in the world. Although up until now terrorists have not used nuclear weapons in their attacks, there is a fear that, terrorist could access and use these weapons.

In the event that terror groups cannot access nuclear weapons, they can choose to attack nuclear power plants, leading to catastrophic situations. Nuclear weapons are beyond reach by small terror groups; however, in the era where some states are exporting terror, these states can facilitate terror organization to obtain nuclear weapons.

Even with restrictions and regulation on states intending to acquire nuclear weapon, some states have been able to obtain weapons of mass destruction illegally. With technological advancement, terrorists would not face any hitches in manufacture of nuclear weapons. In addition, some irresponsible states could possibly sell nuclear weapons to terror groups in the black market. The other risk is unstable and poorly governed nations acquiring nuclear weapons and using them irresponsibly against its people or other nations.

Nuclear weapons have not ensured peace since there is fear and uncertainty of what could happen next. It is likely that one nation will use their weapons offensively. In addition, there is also the risk of accidents in the nuclear plants; nations in the nuclear club are able to interfere with lesser nations affairs because of their military strength, a case in example being the invasion of Iraq by United States.

Lesser countries are made to feel like subjects to the larger nations because of their military powers. This has led superpower nations to meddle with smaller nations’ affairs, as they are defenseless.

One of the major reasons why Iraq was invaded and occupied by the foreign forces was suspicion that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction; thus, the more superior nations joined and set to destroy and disarm him. It was largely believed that Saddam had large amounts of chemical and biological weapons; however, it is still not clear whether Saddam possessed or intended to reopen nuclear plants.

This conflict has caused other wars and terrorism acts, given that some nations cannot trust others handling nuclear warheads. A report indicates that Mr. Hussein had ambitions of building a science hub and weapons of mass destruction but his capacity had gone down since 1991 (Holdstock and Barnaby, 2003).

Due to this invasion, some people became radicalized and continued to wage wars against other people and nations. One case study is the bombing of the twin tower in the United States of America. These acts of terror can directly be traced and linked to nuclear weapons; indeed, “the acts of terror have come in to being neither by accidents nor by deliberate international arrangement; it has resulted from a combination of both political tension and technological advancement of weaponry” (Edwards, 1986, p. 14)

India and Pakistan conflicts could escalate to nuclear war. These two neighboring states have had conflicts since decolonization, as they both claim a disputed territory among other issues. India acquired nuclear warheads and hence Pakistan with the aid China. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by both countries continues to raise fear that their conflict could escalate to nuclear conflict. Indeed, since India and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons, the level of conflict has considerately risen.

There is animosity among nations in the nuclear club and the rest, whereby the nations in the nuclear club use their authority to cartel the hopes of other nations of acquiring nuclear energy. The hostility has grown to a level that these nations can wedge or sponsor terror attacks to nuclear states. In addition, religious states as Islamic could use force in their crusades in attempt to convert people into their religion.

The errant nations who defile orders and continue to produce their own weapons are dealt with militarily as was the case with Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein. Other nations like North Korea and Iran receive a lot of condemnation and the United States of America has been requesting these nations to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons in their territories (Holdstock and Barnaby, 2003).

The nuclear club wants to reserve all the rights to them; however, members of the club can go an extra mile to protect their ‘privileges’ even if it means warfare. Moreover, the reasons that they give why some nations should not have weapons of mass destruction are instability and poor governance.

There have been treaties signed by nations with nuclear arsenals to either reduce, or stop the production. However, there are nations who are not complying, hence leading to tensions among members of the nuclear club. The result of this is the likelihood of eruption of war due to some disgruntled nations (Holdstock and Barnaby, 2003, p. 54).

Another conflict being fueled by nuclear weapons is Israel and Middle East conflict. Israel does not confirm or denies its possession of nuclear weapons; it has been difficult to settle its conflict with nations in the Middle East. Since Israel owns weapons of mass destruction and hence more superior to its enemies, it has always been provoking and defying fire agreements. In the past, Israel has used un-proportional fire in short war encounters.

Moreover, Israel may in the future use its chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction. Protesting against this, Iran has been condemning and requesting the UN to warn Israel against its proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, Israel’s nuclear arsenals have just led to an increase of conflicts with its enemies, who are also likely to seek for nuclear weapons for offensive purposes (Karsh, 2000).

In the quest for knowing what nations in the nuclear club are developing, nations have resulted in spying, leaving the world on the edge of a war. For instance, the US is suspected to have spies in Iran, Iraq and china, while the Russians are also engaged in this vice. In an effort of deterring nations from obtaining nuclear weapons, nations are arresting scientists believed or linked to aiding in the proliferation of nuclear arsenals; for instance, in a recent case, the US abducted a nuclear scientist from Iran causing tension between the two nations.

According to Anon (1982), “the existence of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence has been the most important mechanism in keeping the world in peace for the last 40 years.” Peace is described as absence of war; and in this case, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the world has not gone into a large war except local conflicts after 1945 especially in Africa and Asia though none of these has escalated to the use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons have led to sustainable peace in the world since 1945. There is control and monitoring of nations with these weapons hence avoiding a state of war. Nuclear weapons have also deterred aggressor nation from provoking others in fear of attack.

There is a notion that nuclear weapons prevent armed conflicts due to undesired risks that pose to both parties. On the other hand, the existence of nuclear deterrence has promoted peace in the world. Nuclear deterrence is the refraining of an enemy from using nuclear weapons since he could be destroyed as a consequence.

For instance, if two nations choose to engage in nuclear conflict the consequences could be mutual destruction. Governments and leaders are less likely to engage or provoke nations with nuclear weapons, while nations who have strong friends in the nuclear club are respected. Thus, peace has prevailed in the world due to fear. Nevertheless, the bottom line of peace is that nations in the nuclear club could support and defend their weaker allies if need be.

Before the invention of nuclear arsenals, warfare was used by governments as a means of achieving political mileage but not any longer. The nation in the nuclear club relationship is based on mistrust; there are always speculations that other nations are advancing technologically more than the other is, reducing the tendency of aggravation of each other.

Having witnessed the massive destruction that nuclear weapons caused during the 1945 bombing, fewer nations are willing to engage in wars that could lead to nuclear war. After the use of these weapons, a body was formed that controls the affairs of the world, with the United Nations being a peace organization. It was formed during the Second World War, came into being officially in October 1945, with the main duties being to maintain international peace, security, and to develop friendly relations among nations

Since many sovereign nations are signatories to the UN, they are limited or governed and deterred from engaging in wars. The UN has promoted the peace to some level as it creates a platform for dialogue for countries with disputes.

In extreme cases, the UN also intervenes in areas where there is conflict through it peacekeeping programmes to stop the conflict from escalating. Since the UN is a neutral party, it has helped in solving and stopping many wars as well as advocating for non-proliferation of nuclear warheads. Moreover, the UN has its special forces that work alongside other military to maintain peace.

In conclusion, nuclear weapons have helped to ensure peace in the world given that the world has not suffered a major war since the first use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence is one of the ways nuclear weapons have aided to guarantee peace.

Many leaders and governments are not quick to engage in warfare; indeed, the possession of these weapons by government provides national security of their nations and those of their allies. The understanding of the destruction caused by nuclear weapons has promoted peace. These weapons usually cause immense destruction and can affect the mutual parties. However, it is still not clear whether the balance of terror can continue to sustain the peace prevailing presently.

Due to the events leading to first use of nuclear weapon, a peace organization was formed, the UN, a body that has been instrumental in ensuring peace in the world. In addition, the body has played a major role in deterring the use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, this body has some limitation, since it is funded by the super powers, who are also permanent members of the Security Council, hence the UN sometimes cannot have a great influence over them. A case in mind is the invasion of Iraq.

On the other hand, weapons of mass destruction have brought the world to the edge of war. The nations with these weapons boast of superior military strength, and due to this, they can meddle and provoke other smaller nations. In the attempt of controlling of perforation of weapons of mass destruction, smaller nations have been invaded.

There is always spying of other nations to check what they are doing. Acts of terror in the world are largely linked to nuclear weapons and the way members of the nuclear weapon club treat their nations. Even in the nuclear club, there is mistrust among members, as they are trying to outdo one another with development of new weapons.

However, due to the catastrophic consequence of chemical and biological weapons, the world should consider unilateral nuclear weapons disarments programmes. Moreover, the reduction of amount of weapons in the world could certainly reduce risks and tensions in the world.

Reference List

Anon.1982. The Economist , Volume 284, Issues 7244-7256. London: Charles Reynell Publisher.

Edwards, J. C., 1986. Nuclear weapons, the balance of terror, the quest for peace. Surrey: Sunny press.

Holdstock, D and Barnaby, F., 2003. The British nuclear weapons programme, 1952-2002 . London: Routledge.

Karp, R. C. and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 1992. Security without nuclear weapons? Different perspectives on non-nuclear security . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Karsh, E., 2000. Israel: From war to peace? London: Routledge.

Paone, R. M., 2001. Evolving New World order/disorder: China-Russia-United States-NATO . Oxford: University Press of America.

Segell, G., 2005. Axis of evil and rogue states: the Bush administration . London: Glenn Segell publishers.

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IvyPanda. (2024, March 1). Did Nuclear Weapons Bring the World to the Edge of War or Did They Help Ensure Peace? https://ivypanda.com/essays/did-nuclear-weapons-bring-the-world-to-the-edge-of-war-or-did-they-help-ensure-peace/

"Did Nuclear Weapons Bring the World to the Edge of War or Did They Help Ensure Peace?" IvyPanda , 1 Mar. 2024, ivypanda.com/essays/did-nuclear-weapons-bring-the-world-to-the-edge-of-war-or-did-they-help-ensure-peace/.

IvyPanda . (2024) 'Did Nuclear Weapons Bring the World to the Edge of War or Did They Help Ensure Peace'. 1 March.

IvyPanda . 2024. "Did Nuclear Weapons Bring the World to the Edge of War or Did They Help Ensure Peace?" March 1, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/did-nuclear-weapons-bring-the-world-to-the-edge-of-war-or-did-they-help-ensure-peace/.

1. IvyPanda . "Did Nuclear Weapons Bring the World to the Edge of War or Did They Help Ensure Peace?" March 1, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/did-nuclear-weapons-bring-the-world-to-the-edge-of-war-or-did-they-help-ensure-peace/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Did Nuclear Weapons Bring the World to the Edge of War or Did They Help Ensure Peace?" March 1, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/did-nuclear-weapons-bring-the-world-to-the-edge-of-war-or-did-they-help-ensure-peace/.

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Essay 414 – The threat of nuclear weapons maintains world peace

Gt writing task 2 / essay sample # 414.

You should spend about 40 minutes on this task.

Write about the following topic:

The threat of nuclear weapons maintains world peace. Nuclear power also provides cheap and clean energy. Thus, the benefits of nuclear technology far outweigh the disadvantages.

Do you agree or disagree?

Give reasons for your answer and include any relevant examples from your own knowledge or experience.

Write at least 250 words.

Model Answer:

The issue of nuclear technology, including nuclear weapons and nuclear power, has long been a subject of intense debate. Some opine that the threat of nuclear weapons is necessary to maintain global peace, and also emphasise the cheap and clean energy provided by nuclear power. In this essay, I will disagree with this opinion, and present the perspective asserting that the disadvantages of nuclear technology outweigh the benefits.

One of the primary concerns regarding nuclear technology is the potential for catastrophic accidents and the long-lasting environmental consequences they can entail. The 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the Soviet Union and the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan serve as grim reminders of the devastating effects of nuclear incidents. These accidents not only caused immediate loss of life and widespread health issues but also resulted in the contamination of vast areas, rendering them uninhabitable for generations. The inherent risks associated with nuclear power pose a significant threat to human safety and the environment, making it imperative to reconsider the widespread adoption of this technology.

Moreover, the disposal of nuclear waste presents a significant challenge that must be addressed. Radioactive waste generated by nuclear power plants remains hazardous for thousands of years, requiring safe and secure storage facilities. However, no foolproof long-term solution for the disposal of nuclear waste has been developed yet. The potential environmental and health hazards associated with nuclear waste demand careful consideration and call into question the sustainability of relying on nuclear power as a long-term energy solution.

Finally, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a grave concern. The possession and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by various nations have led to heightened global tensions and increased the risk of nuclear conflict. The destructive power of these weapons poses an existential threat to humanity and undermines the very notion of global peace.

Therefore, while nuclear technology may offer certain benefits, such as cheap energy and deterrence, the potential risks and drawbacks associated with it far outweigh these advantages. The environmental hazards, challenges in waste disposal, and the risk of nuclear proliferation pose significant concerns that cannot be ignored.

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The Threat of Nuclear Weapons Maintains World Peace but Nuclear Power Provides Cheap and Clean Energy- IELTS Writing Task 2

Updated On Jan 14, 2022

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The threat of nuclear weapons maintains world peace. Nuclear power provides cheap and clean energy. The benefits of nuclear technology far out-weight the disadvantages. Do you agree or disagree?

Opinion essay

Introduction

Sentences 1&2 – Paraphrase the topic with the use of synonyms. Create a base understanding for the reader, something to expand on in the essay.

Sentence 3 – State that the essay will understand how nuclear weapons maintain world peace, and how nuclear power provides clean energy.

Body Paragraphs

Paragraph 1 – Understanding the uses of nuclear weapons – how it helps deter wars and conflicts.

Paragraph 2 – Elaborate on how nuclear power helps power our homes and offices, and how it will fill the surging demand of energy as the world adopts to electronic vehicles and such kinds.

Paragraph 3 – Mention that nuclear disasters pose a grave threat to the world as whole, and how dangerous they can be. Use an example here to put things in perspective. But also point out that humans are careful around such dangerous technology, and also well prepared in the event of a disaster.

Restate your views.

Sample Essay

With the world evolving newer technology to eradicate dependency on exhaustible resources like petrol, coal and diesel, nuclear energy is being developed quite vigorously. It can be correctly said that this advancement was done in order to facilitate weapons of mass destruction. But nuclear energy emerged as an unlikely solution to another looming problem. I agree with this notion, and this essay will further elaborate on how vital nuclear energy is.

Since the time when a nuclear weapon annihilated Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II, nuclear technology has duly blossomed into a peaceful solution, in two senses. First, nuclear weapons are now seen as an “offensive defense,” which means that it acts as a war deterrent, as the cascading effects of an atomic blowout remain devastating.

On top of this, nuclear energy is already powering our homes, factories, and, soon, our lives. Nuclear power plants are being installed throughout the world as this technology is coming out as a complete winner. Additionally, as the world switches towards an all-electric age, humans are destined to be power-hungry, energy-wise. In such a scenario, nuclear energy gives us a dependable solution to this impending question.

It is true that this technology has inimical consequences – both in terms of weaponry and technology. For instance, the Chernobyl disaster sent shockwaves and radioactive particles that harmed almost the entire Europe. But, humans are more intelligent and sharper than ever. Moreover, we possess even more readiness to deal swiftly with a disaster, should it occur.

Hence, nuclear energy has dooming consequences, but the positives are propitiously advantageous.

Meaning – put an end to. Example – Polio vaccines have completely eradicated the deadly disease.

• Exhaustible 

Meaning – use up (resources or reserves) completely. Example – The world is running out of exhaustible resources.

• Annihilated 

Meaning – destroy utterly; obliterate. Example – The tsunami annihilated the entire coastline.

• Deterrent  

Meaning – a thing that discourages or is intended to discourage someone from doing something. Example – Installation of security cameras acts as a major crime deterrent.

Meaning – arrange (a number of devices or objects) in a series or sequence. Example – One after another, the dominoes fell in a cascading effect.

• Impending  

Meaning – (of an event regarded as threatening or significant) about to happen. Example – Bruno Mars’ tour of India is an impending event.

Meaning – tending to obstruct or harm. Example – His decisions have inimical effects on the company.

• Readiness  

Meaning – the state of being fully prepared for something. Example – Our healthcare structure is showing signs of readiness should the pandemic strengthen again.

Meaning – quickly Example – The firefighters arrived at the scene swiftly.

• Propitiously 

Meaning – giving or indicating a good chance of success; favourable. Example – Avi has a propitiously successful chance of getting into an Ivy league college.

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The threat of nuclear weapons maintains world peace nuclear provides and Clean Energy the benefits of nuclear Technology for outweigh the disadvantages.

IELTS essay The threat of nuclear weapons maintains world peace nuclear provides and Clean Energy the benefits of nuclear Technology for outweigh the disadvantages.

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Opinion: Can a ‘Net-Zero’ World Lead to True Sustainability?

The cold war shows that environmental sustainability, like peace, cannot be achieved solely by focusing on technology..

Left: Top: At the Uyuni Salt Flats in Bolivia, a backhoe moves the raw material for the production of lithium carbonate, which is key to produce batteries and electric cars. But such resource extraction to power a decarbonized future could devastate communities worldwide. Visual: Gaston Brito Miserocchi/Getty Images

T hroughout history, human societies have relied on technological progress to solve their challenges. In technology’s early days, this worked well. It is hard to dispute, for example, the invention of the wheel helping to alleviate hunger through more efficient agriculture. But as both societal challenges and technology became more complex, the line between “problem” and “solution” has blurred.

The Cold War is perhaps the most salient contemporary example. Leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain came to view nuclear weapons as a way to achieve peaceful coexistence in a world of incompatible ideologies. The doctrine of mutual assured destruction , made possible by the most powerful weapons ever made, was to guarantee peace. And while proponents would argue that it worked — the Cold War never erupted into World War III — nuclear weapons did not make nationalist sentiments, historical grievances, or expansionist tendencies go away, of which the war in Ukraine is a painful reminder. Technology can, at best, kick conflicts down the road. Peace cannot be engineered.

Environmental sustainability cannot be engineered, either. Like peace, it is a social and political challenge. Key tenets of Western civilization’s economic and political systems rest on the commodification of nature. A dead tree has economic value; a living tree typically doesn’t. Nature conservation is only considered a good idea insofar as it benefits economic growth . The notion of nature having an intrinsic value might exist in philosophy classrooms but not in mainstream legal, political, and economic systems. Achieving sustainability requires confronting these uncomfortable truths about Western civilization.

What if, just as a mutually destructive world couldn’t secure real peace, a net-zero world can’t guarantee real sustainability?

During the Cold War, building more (and more powerful) weapons than the enemy became synonymous with peace-building. Today, decarbonization, the effort to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide across the economy, has become virtually synonymous with environmental sustainability, as reflected in the Biden administration’s environmental legislation , the European Union’s net-zero plan , or Australia’s Long-Term Emissions Reduction Plan . According to the United Nations, the goal is a net-zero world where all emissions released are counterbalanced by emissions that are eliminated. Based on these policies, this destination is clear and all that matters is how quickly we can get there. But what if the destination is wrong? What if, just as a mutually destructive world couldn’t secure real peace, a net-zero world can’t guarantee real sustainability?

Scholars are increasingly pointing to ways that an overwhelming focus on emissions reduction — what has become known as carbon tunnel vision — can get in the way of holistically addressing the many sources of environmental decay. Zeroing in on one specific issue has the effect of leaving other challenges, such as biodiversity loss , particulate air pollution , or groundwater depletion , in the shadows. Although these issues are exacerbated by climate change, they are caused by a much wider range of underlying mechanisms, from changes in land use to global international trade to the removal of vast amounts of natural resources (known as extractivism). Flattening the environmental polycrisis into a supposedly singular crisis of greenhouse emissions obscures the many ways in which Western civilization degrades the environment — ways that often don’t lend themselves so readily to engineering solutions or economic profit to be made from the transition to “green” technologies and which demand a more fundamental reckoning with our civilization’s lopsided relationship with nature.

The current conversation around net zero centers around engineering questions like how to quickly replace fossil fuels with less polluting alternatives or how to build cost-effective carbon capture solutions. As important as addressing such questions might be in achieving progress in specific areas of climate adaptation and mitigation, they do not target the underlying political dimensions of environmental decay. When such technical questions come to dominate the public conversation about the environment, this can obscure, among other things, environmental justice concerns related to decarbonization. In his searing expose of the latter, “ Cobalt Red: How the Blood of the Congo Powers Our Lives ,” Siddharth Kara pointed to the landscapes denuded and lives ruined by the world’s hunger for cobalt, one of the metals needed for batteries in electric vehicles and in other decarbonization efforts. Evidence of such devastation elsewhere in the world is piling up.

In her essay “ Let Them Drown ,” Naomi Klein points out that the extraction of fossil fuels on which the current economy is built depends on “sacrificial people and places” whose ruination is justified by the march of progress. Decarbonization has not transformed this underlying logic. It too depends on ruthless extraction, objectification of nature, and decimation of communities unlucky enough to be sitting on minerals currently in demand. Can such an ideology truly deliver an environmentally sustainable world?

Decarbonization and “clean tech” cannot rebalance Western civilization’s relationship with the natural world.

History offers some clues. In February 1946, U.S. Navy Commodore Ben H. Wyatt met with the inhabitants of Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands in the Central Pacific. He asked them whether they would be willing to resettle temporarily so that the U.S. could proceed with its nuclear bomb tests “for the good of mankind and to end all world wars,” as Jack Niedenthal wrote in his account of the meeting. The Bikinians conceded and left their ancestral lands, never to return permanently .

Their sacrifice did not end all wars. Just as nuclear weapons could not tackle the psycho-socio-political reasons countries go to war with each other, decarbonization and “clean tech” cannot rebalance Western civilization’s relationship with the natural world, even as both come at a heavy price for marginalized communities. While technological change and decarbonization are likely to form part of the solution, it matters whether they are being pursued as ends in themselves or as elements of a more holistic approach to environmental sustainability — such as degrowth , which seeks to rebalance the economy away from environmentally destructive production and excess consumption, or doughnut economics , which is a model for development that meets people’s essential needs without exceeding the Earth’s ecological limits. If we are truly serious about sustainability, we need to place these approaches at the center of our collective imaginations of liveable futures and the policies we create to reach them.

Peter Sutoris is an environmental anthropologist and assistant professor in climate and development at the University of Leeds’ Sustainability Research Institute . He is the author of the books “Visions of Development” and “Educating for the Anthropocene,” and coauthor of the forthcoming “Development Reimagined” (Hurst, 2025).

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Why Did U.S. Planes Defend Israel But Not Ukraine?

O n April 13, the Islamic Republic of Iran launched missiles and drones at Israel. Also on April 13, as well as on April 12, 14, and 15, the Russian Federation launched missiles and drones at Ukraine—including some designed in Iran.

Few of the weapons launched by Iran hit their mark. Instead, American and European airplanes, alongside Israeli and even Jordanian airplanes, knocked the drones and missiles out of the sky.

By contrast, some of the attacks launched by Russia did destroy their targets. Ukraine, acting alone, and—thanks to the Republican leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives—running short on defensive ammunition, was unable to knock all of the drones and missiles out of the sky. On April 12 Russian strikes badly damaged an energy facility in Dnipropetrovsk. On April 13, a 61-year-old woman and 68-year-old man were killed by a Russian strike in Kharkiv. On April 14, an aerial bomb hit an apartment building in Ocheretyne, killing one and injuring two. On April 15, a Russian guided missile hit a school and killed at least two more people in the Kharkiv region.  

[ Eliot A. Cohen: The ‘Israel model’ won’t work for Ukraine ]

Why the difference in reaction? Why did American and European jets scramble to help Israel, but not Ukraine? Why doesn’t Ukraine have enough matériel to defend itself? One difference is the balance of nuclear power. Russia has nuclear weapons, and its propagandists periodically threaten to use them. That has made the U.S. and Europe reluctant to enter the skies over Ukraine. Israel also has nuclear weapons, but that affects the calculus in a different way: It means that the U.S., Europe, and even some Arab states are eager to make sure that Israel is never provoked enough to use them, or indeed to use any serious conventional weapons, against Iran.

A second difference between the two conflicts is that the Republican Party remains staunchly resistant to propaganda coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Leading Republicans do not sympathize with the mullahs, do not repeat their talking points, and do not seek to appease them when they make outrageous claims about other countries. That enables the Biden administration to rush to the aid of Israel, because no serious opposition will follow.

By contrast, a part of the Republican Party, including its presidential candidate, does sympathize with the Russian dictatorship, does repeat its talking points, and does seek to appease Russia when it invades and occupies other countries. The absence of bipartisan solidarity around Ukraine means that the Republican congressional leadership has prevented the Biden administration from sending even defensive weapons and ammunition to Ukraine. The Biden administration appears to feel constrained and unable to provide Ukraine with the spontaneous assistance that it just provided to Israel.

Open sympathy for the war aims of the Russian state is rarely stated out loud. Instead, some leading Republicans have begun, in the past few months, to argue that Ukraine should “shift to a defensive war,” to give up any hope of retaining its occupied territory, or else stop fighting altogether. Senator J. D. Vance of Ohio, in a New York Times essay written in what can only be described as extraordinary bad faith, made exactly this argument just last week. So too, for example, did Republican Representative Eli Crane of Arizona, who has said that military aid for Ukraine “should be totally off the table and replaced with a push for peace talks.”

[ Eliot A. Cohen: The war is not going well for Ukraine ]

But Ukraine is already fighting a defensive war. The materiel that the Republicans are refusing to send includes—let me repeat it again—defensive munitions. There is no evidence whatsoever that cutting off any further aid to Ukraine would end the fighting or bring peace talks. On the contrary, all of the evidence indicates that blocking aid would allow Russia to advance faster, take more territory, and eventually murder far more Ukrainians, as Vance and Crane surely know. Without wanting to put it that boldly, they seem already to see themselves in some kind of alliance with Russia, and therefore they want Ukraine to be defeated. They do not see themselves in alliance with Iran, despite the fact that Iran and Russia would regard one another as partners.

For the rest of the world, there are some lessons here. Plenty of countries, perhaps including Ukraine and Iran, will draw the first and most obvious conclusion: Nuclear weapons make you much safer. Not only can you deter attacks with a nuclear shield, and not only can you attack other countries with comparative impunity, but you can also, under certain circumstances, expect others to join in your defense.

Perhaps others will draw the other obvious conclusion: A part of the Republican Party—one large enough to matter—can be co-opted, lobbied, or purchased outright. Not only can you get it to repeat your propaganda; you can get it to act directly in your interests. This probably doesn’t cost even a fraction of the price of tanks and artillery, and it can be far more effective.

No doubt many will make use of both of these lessons in the future.

The threat of nuclear weapons maintains world peace. Nuclear power provides a cheap and clear replacement for existing energies. The benefits far outweigh the disadvantages. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

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Some people say that music is a good way of bringing people of different cultures and ages together. to what extent do you agree or disagree with this opinion, it is important for people to take risks both in their professional lives and thier personal lives. advantages of this trend outweigh the disadvantages., fossil fuel is the main source of energy. in some countries, the use of alternative sources of energy is encouraged. to what extent do you think it is a positive or negative development, some people think that hard work helps in achieving financial success while others think it is not the only thing that contributes to financial success. discuss both views and give your opinion.

Ukraine-Russia war: Latest updates

Follow our Ukraine war live page for all the latest developments and analysis of the conflict. Listen to a Daily podcast episode on the notion of the UK putting troops on the ground in Ukraine as you scroll.

Tuesday 16 April 2024 13:05, UK

• The big picture: What's happening with the war as we enter a new week?
• Your questions answered: Is it too late to save Ukraine?

While we haven't been able to bring you live updates today, we have been keeping an eye on what's been happening in the Ukraine conflict. 

Here's a quick round-up of the key updates so far: 

• Volodymyr Zelenskyy said a lack of air defence missiles prevented Ukraine from thwarting a Russian missile attack last week that destroyed the biggest power plant in the region around the capital Kyiv; 
• Ukraine's air defence systems destroyed all nine drones launched in a Russian attack, the air force said;
• The IAEA warned that attacks on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant put the world at risk;
• The Kremlin reacted to French President Emmanuel Macron's call for a truce in international conflicts during the Paris Olympics and said Ukraine might use it as an opportunity to regroup and rearm;
• German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said he had asked Chinese President Xi Jinping to exert influence over Russia to end the war in Ukraine.

Good morning, and welcome to our overview of the war between Russia and Ukraine as it rolls into another week.

The big news of the weekend came from the Middle East as Iran launched a significant missile and drone attack on Israel. Volodymyr Zelenskyy condemned the attack and said Ukraine knows "very well the horror of similar attacks by Russia".

Meanwhile, a Kremlin-installed official in the southern Zaporizhzhia region said 16 people were killed in an attack on the occupied town of Tokmak, which Russia has blamed on Ukraine. Two  people were also killed in a separate shelling in the Russian-occupied Kherson region.

While our live coverage remains paused, we've zoomed out to give you the bigger picture of the war today.

The frontline

Concerns appear to be increasing that Ukraine's defences may be at risk of collapse in the face of a new Russian assault. 

Sources in numerous media outlets over the past couple of weeks have raised this fear as Ukraine is facing shortages of both manpower and ammunition, and appears outmanned and outgunned on the battlefield.

Western officials told Bloomberg the country is now at its most fragile moment since the war began. 

Ukraine's military chief said on Saturday that the battlefield situation in the east had "significantly worsened in recent days" and that Moscow had ramped up its assaults since Vladimir Putin extended his rule in the Russian presidential election.

Reports also suggest Ukraine's second-largest city, Kharkiv, could be among the targets for a renewed Russian assault. 

Kharkiv has faced intense bombardment from Russia in recent months, coming under fire from S-300 ballistic missiles and glide bombs, and was the target of repeated attacks last week. 

The city is not the most likely target of a fresh assault, media reports say, but Russian news outlets have raised the prospect. 

'Massive strikes' on energy infrastructure 

Overnight into Thursday saw a huge assault on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, with 40 missiles and 40 drones reportedly sent into the country by Russia. 

A thermal power plant just outside Kyiv was completely destroyed and went up in flames, while 200,000 residents in Kharkiv were left without power. 

Vladimir Putin later said he had been "obliged" to attack Ukraine's energy infrastructure after Kyiv conducted attacks on Russian oil refineries.

Attacks at Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant

Russia accused Ukraine of attacking the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in a series of drone strikes over three days. 

The attacks at the Russian-occupied plant began on 7 April, with the roof of reactor 6 damaged. 

Ukraine has repeatedly denied involvement and said it would never target a nuclear facility, suggesting Russia was behind the attacks.

The UN's nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, has warned the "reckless" attacks "significantly increase the risk of a major nuclear accident". 

It has not said who it believes is behind the attacks. 

Civilian casualties increase sharply

The UN recorded a dramatic increase in civilian casualties in Ukraine in the last month. 

At least 57 children were killed or injured in March - double the number in February - as Russian forces stepped up their attacks. 

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission said it had verified at least 604 civilians killed or injured in Ukraine in March, a 20% increase from the previous month. 

"The March increase in civilian casualties was mainly due to attacks by the Russian armed forces using missiles and loitering munitions across Ukraine and increased aerial bombardments near the frontline," the Rights Office said.

It followed warnings from Volodymyr Zelenskyy that Ukraine country could run out of air defence missiles if Russia keeps up its intense bombing campaign. 

On Saturday, Uk

At least 10 people, including children, have been killed by shelling in a Russian-occupied town in Ukraine's southern Zaporizhzhia region, a local Kremlin-installed official said.

International diplomacy

In a rare meeting between a head of state and a minister, Chinese President Xi Jinping met Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov for talks on Monday. 

The pair met in the Chinese capital, where they pledged to strengthen communication. 

It was also a big week of diplomatic talks for the UK foreign secretary, who headed to Washington to appeal to Congress over the stalled multi-billion-dollar aid package for Ukraine. 

Lord Cameron made what was seen by some as an unusual trip to visit Donald Trump in Mar-a-Lago - likely because Republicans blocking the aid bill in the House of Representatives are aligned with Mr Trump. 

The foreign secretary was tight-lipped about what was discussed afterwards, saying the pair had "discussed a range of important geopolitical subjects". 

While live coverage of the war remains paused, here's a quick round-up of the key updates: 

• Two people were killed by Ukrainian strikes on the Russian-held parts of Kherson, the Moscow-installed regional governor said;
• Russia's defence ministry said its air defence systems destroyed 10 Ukraine-launched drones over the Krasnodar region in southern Russia and five drones over the Black Sea overnight; 
• Ukraine similarly claimed to have downed 10 Russian drones;
• The death toll in Zaporizhzhia from yesterday's attack, which Russia blames on Ukraine, rose to 16;
• President Zelenskyy condemned last night's attack by Iran on Israel.

A Ukrainian rocket also struck a machine-building plant in Russian-occupied Luhansk in eastern Ukraine, injuring three civilians, according to Moscow-based official Vladimir Rogov.

Meanwhile, Russia has claimed to have taken a village in Ukraine's Donetsk region. 

Russia's defence ministry said the capturing of Pervomaiske had improved its tactical position on the frontline. 

Ukraine's army chief has also warned the situation on the eastern front had deteriorated in recent days, with Moscow's forces intensifying its armoured assaults. 

Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi said battles were still raging for control of a village west of the devastated Bakhmut - an area that has seen some of the bloodiest fighting throughout the war.

We'll be back tomorrow morning with more updates on the war in Ukraine.

Two Biden administration officials have revealed the extent of China's involvement in Russia's war on Ukraine.

The officials spoke to Reuters news agency and said China has massively increased its sales to Russia of machine tools, microelectronics and other technology to Moscow.

These items are important because Russia is using them to make tanks, aircraft, missiles and other weapons for the war.

They also said:

• About 90% of Russia's microelectronics came from China
• Nearly 70% of Russia's approximately $900m in machine tool imports in the last quarter of last year came from China
• Chinese and Russian entities have been working together to make drones in Russia
• China is helping Russia improve its satellite and other space-based capabilities for use in the war. This could increase the threat Russia poses across Europe

US President Joe Biden has previously raised concerns with Chinese President Xi Jinping about Beijing's indirect involvement in the war.

US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen returned this week from a visit to Beijing and said she had warned China that the Biden administration was prepared to sanction Chinese banks, companies and Beijing's leadership if they helped Russia's military in the war.

She has already been given the go-ahead from Mr Biden to sanction financial institutions that help Russia's military-industrial complex.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken is due to travel to China for talks next month.

Russia, increasingly isolated economically and diplomatically, has become more reliant on China in recent months.

One official said Chinese materials are helping Moscow undertake its "most ambitious defence expansion since the Soviet era and on a faster timeline than we believed possible early on in this conflict".

"Our view is that one of the most game-changing moves available to us at this time to support Ukraine is to persuade the PRC (China) to stop helping Russia reconstitute its military industrial base. Russia would struggle to sustain its war effort without PRC input," the official said. 

Chinese Embassy spokesperson Liu Pengyu told Reuters that Beijing has not provided weapons to any party and that it is "not a producer of or party involved in the Ukraine crisis".

"We urge the US side to refrain from disparaging and scapegoating the normal relationship between China and Russia."

If Russia defeats Ukraine it will be a "turning point in history", former UK prime minister Boris Johnson says.

Writing in the Daily Mail, he criticised Western countries for not providing Ukraine with the weapons it needs to defeat Russia.

"Every week in which we fail to do the obvious — and give the Ukrainians the weapons they need — is a week in which Putin gets closer to his disgusting ambition, to torture a European country to death.

"Every day the pressure on the Ukrainians is growing — and yet the solution is within our grasp."

Mr Johnson, who visited Ukraine a number of times during his premiership, said: "A defeat for Ukraine would usher in a new era of fear in the whole Euro-Atlantic area, as Putin continues his drive to rebuild the Soviet empire: from the Baltics to Georgia to Moldova to Central Asia to the Arctic.

"It will be a terrifying moment for the people of Taiwan and the clearest possible signal to China that the West has lost the willpower to protect democracy.

"It will be a turning point in history, the moment when the West finally loses its post-war hegemony, the moment when borders everywhere are suddenly up for grabs and aggression is seen to pay — and all because of a failure to stand up for Ukraine."

Mr Johnson warned the world is "on a knife-edge, with a real risk that Western democracies are about to be humiliated, and autocracies emboldened around the world — because of our lassitude, our pathetic refusal to do what is necessary".

He said Ukraine is so short of shells that its troops sometimes have to wait under Russian bombardment because they can't fire back.

The shortage of air defences means Kharkiv, the second-largest city, is "in danger of being turned into another Mariupol", he added.

Ukrainians were able to intercept 90% of incoming strikes, he said, but now "we are starving them, for reasons I do not understand, of the protective shields they need".

Mr Johnson called on the US Congress to approve a $60bn military aid package earmarked for Ukraine and on the Germans to supply Taurus missiles.

The West - including Britain - needs to "snap out of our sleep-walk", he said, adding: "The simplest and most cost-effective way to defend freedom is to invest now in the defence of Ukraine."

Rescue workers in Ukraine have saved five puppies from under the debris of a destroyed building.

The non-residential building was on fire in the north-eastern city of Sumy, close to the border with Russia.

A video from the State Emergency Service of Ukraine showed the firefighters cuddling the squealing puppies and rinsing them off with water.

In a post of the emergency service's Telegram channel, officials said the "little ones" were not injured.

"This rescue story reminds us of the importance of human compassion and the willingness to help everyone, regardless of the circumstances," they added.

Ex-armed forces minister James Heappey has told Sky's defence and security editor Deborah Haynes the UK should consider sending its forces to Ukraine to train troops.  

On the Sky News Daily, host Tom Cheshire talks to her and Sky's military analyst Professor Michael Clarke about the interview with Mr Heappey, who stepped down from his role last month.  

They assess the bleak situation in Ukraine and why the conflict is at a critical stage. They also discuss how prepared the UK would be if it faced a war in the near future.

A former Ukrainian secret service employee has been injured in Moscow after a device under his car exploded.

Vasily Prozorov suffered leg injuries that are not considered life threatening after the device detonated as he tried to start his car, Radio Free Europe cited Russian media as saying.

According to RFE, Mr Prozorov worked for Ukraine's SBU until 2018.

The following year, he told media in Moscow that he had collaborated with Russia "for ideological reasons" from April 2014 until he left the SBU.

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