self governance than discipline essay

8 Keys to Gritty Self-Governance

With determination and gentle humor, be passionate about deep self-care..

Posted February 8, 2019 | Reviewed by Davia Sills

"In this world, emotion has become suspect—the accepted style is smooth, antiseptic, and passionless." — Joe Biden

"Strong government doesn't mean simply military power or an efficient intelligence apparatus. Instead, it should mean effective, fair administration—in other words, 'good governance.'" — Raghuram Rajan

The governor is the part of a steam engine that makes sure that the right amount of fuel is being fed to fuel the fire. How does it work? Engines typically make a shaft rotate, and that shaft is attached to something it powers, such as the wheels of a train or the machines in an old-time factory. At the top of the shaft sits the governor.

It's a simple idea, elegant. Picture two small spheres opposite one another, spinning like a carnival ride with two riders. The faster they go, the higher they rise on their hinged rods because of centrifugal force.

The governor is attached to the fuel supply by another set of rods, or a wire, in such a way that they pull on a valve or switch. As they go higher, they close the valve, and there is less fuel, and they slow down. As they slow down, the valve opens, and they speed up. They stay within a fixed range because of this feedback mechanism, which can be tuned by changing how tightly they are connected to the valve.

The idea of self-governance also conjures up a sense of authority. Having authority over oneself, standing in good relation to oneself, taking one's counsel, and so on. Being self-possessed without being authoritarian. Having this balance requires a good state of affairs among many different aspects of oneself, including the emotions, body, intellect, self-regard, and relationship with others.

Thinking about self-governance, eight key ingredients come to mind for me, in an intuitive order:

1. Self-Awareness

This includes all aspects of how one attends to oneself. The way perception is directed, the extent to which one’s self-awareness is expansive and inclusive of all aspects of sensation and experience, and to some reflective function—the recursive ability of the mind—are all relevant concepts related to self-awareness. Self-awareness is of great importance because it is part of the foundation of consciousness.

Self-awareness necessarily includes an awareness of the boundaries between consciousness and unawareness, the self and the other, as well as attention to changes on the margins... noticing how experience springs into being internally. The inner act of creation draws attention to itself only sometimes. Self-governing individuals have a good grasp of how self-awareness works, how to use it, and the pitfalls and empowerment of it. Playfulness is critical for self-awareness to properly function, in my opinion, necessary but not sufficient.

In witnessing oneself, for example, in internal dialogue, we create another, and another, and another. A kind of hall of mirrors. For instance, hearing a self-critical voice, and then thinking about that and feeling attacked, and then seeing the attacker and the attacked, and realizing the third perspective is taking in the dialogue, and so on.

2. Planfulness

Is "planfulness" even a word? Regardless, as I see it, long-term thinking remains highly underrated. To humorously misquote, "There id was shall ego be." It’s hard to fully leverage the capacity of the human mind, especially together in groups, because that requires very clear communication and consensus in thinking through alternatives in detail.

We think of risk and reward. One one side of the path, the risk doesn’t pay off, and we tumble. On the other side of the path, the reward is less than anticipated. At the same time, there is another way when the risk pays off, and the risk and reward end up being on the same side. You don’t know until you are there.

Can we really recommend that every contingency in life be simulated in advance, every scenario played out? That we learn fully from every dream and fantasy ? There is a law of diminishing returns, and action is required. Getting better at planning leaves room for accuracy and spontaneity. People learn from experience, including how to direct attention and place intention, making better choices with mental resources.

3. Psychological-mindedness

I want to put self-reflective function here, as well as mentalization, the capacity to understand and symbolize the inner mental states of oneself and others. We vary in how much we can look at ourselves. That can be trained with practice but may have a personality -driven ceiling.

Some people seem born uber self-reflective, others not so much—and over-thinking to a neurotic extent isn't helpful, either. To each their own. In any case, our psychological capacity beyond self-reflection refers to a broad set of functions—the ability to have the idea that we all have minds, that we are all subjective centers of experience—that we all contain a whole entire world.

We live in these worlds of our own, and they interlace and overlap with one another in an imperfectly shared social reality. There’s a lot going on, in you and in me. Everyone has this internal process. And beyond that, a theory of mind , your own psychological and emotional model of what makes people tick.

Because we have to make guesses about motivation and assess the people around us. Living in a world with experiencing subjects is very different from living in one with soulless automata. It's weird to think that there are 7+ billion different worlds in our world, not counting sentient non-humans.

4. Self-Appraisal

I don’t know about you, but self-criticism and self-blame are a major drag . Even if there is accurate and putatively useful information contained in some of these lancinating thoughts, the packing of negative feelings directed at oneself is not good branding.

One of the issues is that candid self-appraisal isn’t easy. It does get better with practice, but the emotional work of frank self-appraisal comes more easily to some than others. Especially if your goal is to appraise with feeling, rather than with too much detachment. Numb self-appraisal can be helpful at times but is as distorted in its own way as an emotional appraisal. Self-appraisal is an art, as much as a science, and as such can be quite beautiful, one of the peaks of human inspiration.

5. Emotional Continence

Incontinence is when we can’t control the boundary between inside and outside. What is inside leaks or gushes out, and what is outside gets covered in emotions. What’s outside can also get inside, though that is less common.

When the outside gets covered in emotions, we tend to see ourselves in what is outside more easily and less accurately, i.e., projection. We may also feel robbed of ourselves, I find. Not to be too staunch, emotional continence also means having more executive control, knowing when, where, how, and why to let it go. Not to a perfectionistic extent, not to cheat us out of all vitality, but as a form of affect regulation based on early bodily experience.

Our brains use spatial metaphors for emotions and relationships, and we learn how to control the world early on via our own bodies. Our earliest experiences are physical and sensory; that is what shapes our mental apparatus, along with how others respond to our inchoate needs and feeble efforts to communicate.

We take people in, we push ideas away, we want to get rid of thoughts and other things. Feelings and raw experience are so powerful, and learning how to wield, embrace, that potential means being able to hold reasonably steady and re-orient when blown off-course.

6. Esteem Regulation

Being able to monitor and reinforce one’s sense of self in anticipation of and though challenges is really useful. It’s like having a power station and diverting electricity into the grid when you see that the current is heading into a lull, shifting power to the wheels that grip. Getting traction with reality requires having a sense of self to bite into it.

Being able to keep self-esteem up when facing challenges, including difficult information about oneself from other people as well as self-appraisal, means being resilient through whatever changes that new information may catalyze. Greeting oneself with hospitality is essential. It does not mean being brittle and unaffected by events around us, though that can be a useful substitute when flexible resilience is not readily available.

At the core of esteem regulation is cultivating a sense of self-efficacy and habit of self-compassion . We have to believe we can do what we need to do. For this, success can be important, of course, but where we direct our attention is also crucial. This is very tricky, because people who aren’t feeling good about themselves don’t feel much self-efficacy, and have trouble seeing how to even notice evidence of self-efficacy, and tend to discount what there may be. It takes faith in oneself and isn’t always a choice. A great way to bring up self-esteem and self-efficacy is to get others to provide support and encouragement in those areas .

7. Self-Relationship

This is an important concept, though a little bit strange to some. Self-compassion and love for oneself, at least the idea of those things, comes into play because there is a way where we are both self and other to oneself. When we attend, or tend, to ourselves, we can see this in a fanciful sense as if we were one person taking care of another person. Ultimately we are just one person, but we can step into a caregiving role in relation to ourselves.

Self-talk is a good illustration of this, where we are hearing a thought as if it were another person, or even talking out loud. That makes it easy because we can behave with ourselves as if we were another person. And when we hear our own thoughts about ourselves, we can also feel like we are on the receiving end.

If it is self-critical, we can have many responses—fighting back, feeling hurt, ignoring and trying to suppress, counter-arguing, listening, self-compassion, and so on. How we relate to ourselves basically determines what happens next. Incremental changes in self-relationship build up over time.

This is one of the reasons long-term planning is important, though it does mean shifting what we find rewarding in the short run as well, because it helps to enjoy each little decision, and be curious about each little slip. Generally, I think of it as something like being a really good friend to oneself, even falling in love with oneself (in a healthy, non-pathologically narcissistic way, of course).

8. Playfulness

Being able to have fun with oneself, while also maintaining a serious and respectful stance when appropriate, without losing self-possession—and especially not ridiculing oneself or laughing at one’s own expense—is a defining ingredient. It can be kind of hard to master, if even possible. Play means learning, plasticity, meta-plasticity, and curiosity, and it also means that aggression is generally pretended. Now, pretend aggression can cause real hurt, as we know from teasing, but play is only play when it is consensual.

Inherent in play is experimentation, testing reality and ourselves, seeing what happens, and making use of that info. Cultivating an experimental attitude both with creative spontaneity as well as rigorous scientific inquiry is important. Because we have to pay attention to what we learn from play, in order to learn from it, make sense of it, see patterns, and so on. Learning ought to be fun, I suppose.

Humor about oneself is likewise tricky, but it can be a powerful tool for compassion . Humor can be healing by providing a gentle perspective on oneself. The right kind of laughter , especially shared, but sometimes only shared with oneself, can be like a good cry in releasing the burdens of shame and guilt , precipitating bits of self-forgiveness . Humor and play are also, of course, entertaining. If you can be good company for yourself, being alone is less likely to turn to loneliness . Play is strong medicine, and as such, must be carefully dispensed.

There are many different ways to contemplate self-governance. I see it as a daily practice that pays dividends over time. Self-governance above all requires developing balance in many different capacities coupled with responsiveness to oneself and others. There doesn't seem to be a magic pill, but over time, incremental efforts, tiny little changes, snowball, and sometimes we realize things have changed for the better right under our noses.

Grant Hilary Brenner, M.D., a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, helps adults with mood and anxiety conditions, and works on many levels to help unleash their full capacities and live and love well.

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Essay on Self Discipline for Students and Children

500+ words essay on self discipline.

Self-discipline means self-control, which gives you inner strength and a way to control yourself, actions, and reactions. It is one of the most important and useful skills to achieve success and everyone should possess this quality. Self-discipline comes naturally to some people. And some people can achieve it with some effort. The effort made is worth it as it changes life for the better. It just means exercising self- control. A person who stays in control has the ability to take charge of his/her actions and reactions.

Tips to Achieve Self-discipline

• Set your goals: – The first step towards leading a disciplined life is to set goals. Goals give you a clear idea about what needs to be achieved. One must always set a timeline for your goals. This serves as a driving force and motivates you to work hard. It is a good idea to set both short term and long term goals and create a well thought out plan to achieve them.
• Do meditation:- Meditation is one of the best ways to channel our energy in the right direction. It helps maintain focus, acquaints us with our inner self and furthers better self- control. It is the stepping stone for a disciplined life. Meditating for half an hour every day can help in inculcating self-discipline.
• Set a Routine:- Those who set a routine and follow it daily lead a more disciplined life. It is suggested to list all the tasks that you require accomplishing in a given day. Write them in the order of their priority, set a timeline for each and act accordingly. This is a good way to lead an organized and disciplined life.
• Stay away from distractions :- In this technology-driven world, there are numerous things that can distract us and take charge of our lives. Our mobile phones, television, and chatting apps are some of the new age things that are a big hindrance in practicing self-discipline. No matter how determined we are to study, work or sleep on time, we tend to get distracted at the beep of our phone. Social media platforms, chatting apps and web series are extremely addictive and hamper work. In order to practice self-discipline, it is important to stay away from these distractions. Put your phone on silent or keep it at a distance when you sit to study or work. Similarly, just put your phone away at bedtime and instead pick a book to read.
• Reward yourself :- Reward yourself for every goal you achieve. This will motivate you to work harder to achieve more. This is a good way to trick your brain to inculcate self-discipline.
• Take proper sleep :- You can inculcate self-discipline only when you are well-rested. So, it is essential to sleep for eight hours each night. Maintaining a good sleep cycle is also essential. This means that you should try sleeping and waking up at the same time each day. A power nap during the afternoon can help further.
• Stay Positive : – Many people want to inculcate self-discipline but are unable to because they somehow believe that it is difficult to achieve. They feel that it is too much to ask for and that they shall not be able to practice it. This is the wrong approach. You can achieve anything in life if you stay positive and believe in yourself. So, you should stay positive. It is a pre-requisite for inculcating self-discipline.

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Self Discipline Benefits and Importance

Self-discipline helps you to overcome the bad habits by meditating regularly. It gives you the ability not to give up after failure and setbacks, develop self-control, provide the ability to resist distractions, helps you to motivate yourself until you accomplish your goals.

Achieving self-discipline may be difficult but in order to lead a healthy personal and professional life, it is very important. A self-disciplined person makes optimum use of the time. Hence, he can achieve more and do more work as compared to a person who is not self-disciplined. We should, therefore, make some efforts to achieve it.

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How Self-Discipline is Linked to Integrity

By   Dan Nielsen

February 18, 2021

Several weeks ago I published a pair of articles on self-control and self-discipline . In the second article I offered a very simple summary of the difference between the two traits:

“ Self-Control  is about controlling reactions and keeping urges in check, while  Self-Discipline  is about persevering and maintaining positive habits .”

I went on to explain how these two traits are very closely linked, as our self-control is significantly impacted by the quality and amount of  sleep ,  nutrition , and  exercise  we get, and in turn, those things are all very reliant on our personal habits—which is where self-discipline comes in. 

Today I’d like to dig a little deeper into self-discipline , and make a case for its link to integrity . 

Let’s take a quick look at the dictionary definition of integrity. Dictionary.com defines integrity as “adherence to moral and ethical principles; soundness of moral character; honesty.” Likewise, Merriam-Webster.com defines integrity as “firm adherence to a code of especially moral or artistic values;incorruptibility.”

Now think about self-discipline . Great self-discipline requires firm adherence to whatever standard you have set for yourself. Look at it this way: if you have told yourself that you will put down your phone and go to bed by 9:30 PM every night, and then you don’t do it, you either lied [to yourself] or broke a promise [to yourself] or both. If you lied to someone else or made a promise to a friend and then broke it, you would—or at least should—recognize that as a breach of integrity. I believe the same could be said of breaking your word to yourself, i.e., lacking self-discipline. 

So I believe the inverse of that, having great self-discipline, is akin to being a person of integrity. After all, keeping your promises to yourself is often harder than following through on your commitments to other people, so if you are consistently able to do the first, it follows that you will very likely do the second as well!

I really like how author Frank Sonnenberg put it in an article he published to his blog last year. He explained, 

“While self-discipline is most often associated with willpower and perseverance, it also means that you have the courage, strength, wisdom, and moral character to do what’s right —even if it’s difficult.”

Read that again: “… it also means that you have the courage, strength, wisdom, and moral character to do what’s right—even if it’s difficult.” I don’t know about you, but that sounds a lot like integrity to me!

Sonnenberg when on to state that “Self-discipline is a sign of inner strength.” Isn’t that what integrity is? Inner strength? This inner strength is demonstrated by “your willingness to accept personal responsibility, your ability to make hard choices, and your determination to live your life with honor.”

Give that some thought. What do you think? Do you see a link between self-discipline and integrity? Does it make you think any differently about the state of your own self-discipline? I for one consider it to be some very interesting food for thought!

About the author

Dan Nielsen is the author of the books  Be An Inspirational Leader: Engage, Inspire, Empower , and  Presidential Leadership: Learning from United States Presidential Libraries & Museums . He regularly writes and speaks on leadership excellence and achieving greater success, and is available to deliver keynotes, lead workshops, or facilitate discussions for your group. LEARN MORE

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Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality

Michael E. Bratman, Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality , Oxford University Press, 2018, 272pp., $29.95 (pbk), ISBN 9780190867867.

Reviewed by Elijah Millgram, University of Utah

One might well suppose that a philosopher's collection of essays -- this is Michael Bratman' third -- would be simply a progress report, in this case on an evolving view of the role of planning in our lives. Of course it is that, and avowedly, but not simply : throughout his career, Bratman has made a point of intervening in debates that bear on his own position, and when he addresses the two related discussions that take center stage here, it exposes a reemerging and very important disagreement about the ground rules in philosophy of logic.

In Bratman's view, part of understanding what plans are and what they do for us is to see a handful of requirements as constitutive: once a plan has been adopted, it governs your further behavior, and you need a special reason to give it up; plans are typically initially quite sketchy, but come the appropriate time, they have to be filled in with workable subsidiary plans; if you have more than one plan at a time (or when you have several of those subsidiary plans), they have to be coexecutable; they have to make sense against the background of your beliefs about the world around you. These and like requirements Bratman understands as demands of practical rationality; if you shrug them off, you're exhibiting yourself to be incompetent when it comes to reasoning about what to do.

As our beginnings of a list indicate, the demands that planning makes on us are more elaborate than what I'll call the bare requirement of means-end consistency: that if you're committed to attaining an objective, if some particular means is clearly necessary for doing so, and if you both refuse to adopt it and to give up on the goal, it counts as a lapse. In the discussions that Bratman has taken it upon himself to engage, it appears as almost the solely invoked formal constraint on practical rationality, and we'll get back to that fact about it shortly. However, his more elaborate requirements on planning commit one to some version of the bare requirement.

Turning to the first of those two debates, in this volume Bratman is engaging an assortment of recent voices that acknowledge the bare requirement, but insist that it is not properly practical : the requirements of rationality do not stick directly to the adoption of goals, to decisions, actions and so on, but rather to the beliefs that are in one way or another bound up with them. (In some of these theoretical constructs, the intentions are held to be beliefs, and in these cases the requirement is thought to stick to the intentions entirely in virtue of consistency requirements that apply to beliefs generally.) The position has come to be called "cognitivism," though unfortunately, since the label has built into it the retrograde and question-begging posture that only what affirms a proposition to be true can genuinely be a thought . Because the intent is reductionist -- to reduce whatever requirements of practical rationality are being acknowledged to requirements of theoretical rationality -- here I'll just refer to it as the reductionist program (practical-to-theoretical, understood).

Over the twentieth century, reductionism more broadly had an abysmal track record: one after another after another such enterprise failed, and the highly professionalized philosophers pursuing this reductionist program cannot be unaware of the pending inductive conclusion. So their opting doggedly to proceed regardless makes the question of their motivations unavoidable, and it is at this juncture that the back-and-forth with Bratman recorded here is revealing and even invaluable. If you are reading this book cover-to-cover, you will be seeing only one side of the exchange, in rather the manner of the dialogue in Yehoshua's Mr Mani ; but, as in that novel, the drift of the conversation will be quite clear. [1] If you are new to Bratman's work, you might start off with chapter 5, "Agency, Time, and Sociality," which can serve as an introductory overview.

Let me pause to give you a bit of the flavor of the interchange. Long ago, Gilbert Harman observed that if you intend to do something, you think, to a first approximation, that you're actually going to do it: when someone tells you that his retirement is taken care of because he plans to win the lottery, that's a joke, one that turns on violating the conceptual feature of intention that Harman highlighted. But now, if you think you're going to do something, and the only way to do it is to do something else, which you know you won't -- well, in some very straightforward sense, what you believe is inconsistent, and that is where the allegedly practical irrationality of intending the ends but not the means bottoms out. Bratman's rejoinder is that, as someone famously put it, they know not what they do . . . at any rate sometimes, and nonetheless we don't forgive them. That is, when you in various ways misconstrue your intentions, your beliefs can be fully consistent even when your projected course of action is incoherent and, your obliviousness notwithstanding, we don't count it, or you, as rational. This is to respond to the reductionism on its own terms, by identifying an occasion on which a requirement of practical rationality fails to be cashed out into requirements of theoretical rationality.

There is a good deal more of this sort of back-and-forth, but let's go back to that bare requirement. Cases in which there is exactly one way to get something done, with no room for negotiation or fudging, are artificial and actually quite rare. A closely related issue is the defeasibility of means-end inference; in case this is your first encounter with the concept, when an inference is defeasible, even when it is all in order as far as what's already on the plate goes, you nevertheless need to be ready to back off and refrain from drawing the conclusion, should appropriate further facts or assessments turn up. Here's a toy illustration: we need to kill time until the demonstration is over and the public transit is running again; hanging out in this here pizza joint would be a way of killing time; let's hang out. That's fine, but defeasible: not if the pizza is really bad, and not if the health inspection suggests we're likely to get sick, and not if we'll have to talk to the other patrons, and not if the ambient music is really annoying . . . As that open-ended list suggests, the most striking logical feature of defeasible inference is that the well of potentially defeating conditions never runs dry; no matter how many of them you have surveyed, you can always think of more.

Thus when one is engaging in means-end reasoning, one's deliberative stance is normally something like the following: yes, this is a means to my end, but the instrumental inference is interrupted by one or another further consideration, and while I don't need to give up on the end (or for that matter on the implicit inference rule), I'm not going to draw the conclusion. Rather, I look at further options, maybe brainstorming a bit to find them, and also for other kinds of wiggle room.

Then why the widely shared preoccupation with the bare requirement? Evidently, it strikes participants in the debate as a useful simplification. In the first place, it seems to spare them the effort of taking on a philosophical treatment of defeasibility. ('Seems to': if the bare requirement characterizes a limit case, what remains after the indefinitely many defeaters and flexible option spaces have been finally -- and usually impossibly -- pared away, and if you generally only understand limits of this kind when you understand the series that leads to them, it is not a philosophically viable shortcut.) It does so in that the means-end inference has been shaped into what looks as much as possible like a step in a deduction (specifically, a modus ponens ): deductive inference is regarded as philosophically safe , a domain in which you can characterize inferential correctness formally, and so without looking beyond the stated steps themselves. And now, the question of what one would be seeking to avoid, by taking this kind of cut-and-dried inference as the exclusive focus of one's attention, brings us around to the underlying disagreement between Bratman and his reductionist opponents.

Bratman's own way of thinking about rationality is not safe in this way. At the outset of his intellectual trajectory, he understood plans or intentions as a device for managing limited cognitive resources: when you adopt a plan, your further deliberations are conducted within the framework of the plan (unless an appropriate exception handler gets triggered), and so you can shelve thinking about all the options it excludes. Timna plans to spend the next couple of hours studying for her exam, and so she doesn't need to consider movies, the gym, impromptu shifts at the restaurant where she used to work and so on. That is, the early backstory for Bratman's planning approach was bounded rationality , the idea that you determine what counts as the right way to deliberate by considering not merely a formal problem description, but the cognitive abilities and (especially) limitations of the agent, along with challenges posed by the range of environments in which it has to function. [2] Abiding by the norms built into planning is rational due in part to this constraint: human beings cannot afford to reconsider everything, all the time. For our purposes, the relevant observation is that he argues about what rationality requires (in part) on the basis of how a human mind works -- or rather, how a mind that is limited in roughly the ways that human minds are has to work.

Over time, that initial orientation was supplemented with a very different kind of reason for taking the requirements built into planning agency seriously. This round involves a number of moving parts, and I'll proceed in laps. First, I'll recap why Bratman came to think that the earlier bounded rationality account wouldn't do the job he wanted. Then I'll introduce the second of the two debates that I mentioned at the outset, as the organizing themes of this collection. That will put us in a position to see what Bratman's supplementary reason is, and that in turn will allow us to say what really separates Bratman from both groups of his opponents.

Rule-utilitarians used to tell us that we shouldn't lie, because a policy of not lying has overall good outcomes; but now, what if you know that lying on this occasion will give rise to a good outcome? If what you really care about is overall utility, shouldn't the policy be overridden? (Aren't you just a "rule-worshipper" if you stick with it?) Bounded-rationality justifications for planning, Bratman thinks, find themselves in the same bind. Plans preempt moment-to-moment reconsideration of your course of action; human cognitive limitations justify a policy of not continually reconsidering; but now, if reconsidering on this occasion will improve your choice, shouldn't you bail on the plan and reconsider? (And if you don't, aren't you just a plan-worshipper, and stubbornly pigheaded, to boot?) Bratman hopes to show that not reconsidering your course of action can still be practically rational; so in this series of essays he is scouting out a further basis for complying, in the moment, with the requirements of planning agency.

At this point, Bratman proposes in addition to engage that second group of interlocutors; these claim that instrumental rationality is a "myth". [3] Instead of trying to explain away the bare means-end consistency requirement, by reducing it to requirements of theoretical rationality, myth theorists deny that there is any requirement to explain. First of all, it's held that what matters is what's valuable , rather than what your ends are; so the relation of means to end is beside the point, and Joseph Raz coyly talks only about "facilitation". And second, the means-invoking reasons are held not to constitute a distinctive category; there's no special type of prescriptive force that they share. Bratman's taking 'myth'-minimalism as a foil tells us what construction to put on this next argument.

Planning, Bratman argues, figures centrally and structurally into the way that humans govern themselves. (In this book, we are only given summaries of the more elaborate treatment in his earlier Structures of Agency . [4] ) We care a great deal, he thinks, about being self-governed, both over time, and in the moment. So it is rational to take seriously and live up to the requirements involved in planning, instance by instance.

Just how do we care about self-governance -- that is, about one version of what other philosophers have discussed under the headings of, variously, autonomy, the full-fledged attribution of attitudes and actions to an agent, and, long ago, sophrosune ? As we will shortly see, Bratman is prone to conceive of our interest in being self-governing as a preference or desire or end we have adopted, but I am uncomfortable about making such an end into a pivot of the argument. For then the form of the argument we have just rehearsed would be a means-end argument: self-government is our end; planning is a means to that end; so it is rational to plan. But Bratman is speaking not only to reductionists but to myth theorists, according to whom something's being your end is beside the point. [5] So putting this construction on the argument would make it out to beg the question against his opponents. At various points Bratman's discussion attempts to parry that objection by reminding his readers of the constitutive role of planning in self-governing agency; a constitutive means to an end, however, is still a means to an end.

A myth theorist balks at appeals to ends; even if he allows that planning facilitates self-governance, the argument that addresses him will have to turn, rather, on the value of self-governance. Now, Bratman does indeed announce, here and there, that running your own life is valuable. But he doesn't argue for the claim, and even if most of his readers are likely to concede the assessment, if it is going to be doing the heavy lifting in his justification of planning, an argument is owed. If it's not there, it would be unfair to read Bratman's argument as requiring it.

There is a different way to take the move, however, and if I am seeing the state of play correctly, it is to be preferred. Questions about what is rational are questions about, for instance, what you should conclude -- that is, they are questions about (as Bratman, following Frankfurt, puts it) where you (ought to) stand. Bratman has it that there is only an answer to a question as to where you stand on a particular practical matter if you are means-end consistent regarding it. So means-end consistency is not a means to the desired end of self-government, but rather part of the preliminary and required stage-setting for questions of practical rationality. And since in his earlier work Bratman has argued that plans play a central role in supporting full-fledged attribution of attitudes to human agents -- for instance, it counts as your conclusion , as what you really think , only because you drew it in accordance with high-level policies you adopted, policies that determine what will count as a reason for what -- planning more generally is a precondition of there being a question to raise about what is rational at all.

That is, what often enough appears on the face of it to be a means-end argument in Bratman's treatment we must in fact understand as transcendental. Now, Bratman himself balks at transcendental arguments here because, as a Kantian would say it, they invoke the necessary preconditions of the possibility of, in this case, agency, and Bratman wants to allow that you can be an agent without being a planning agent. No doubt there are such agents, but if you are a planning agent, then something may be a necessary precondition of the possibility of, say, full-fledged attitude attribution, for you . And so such arguments should not, in my own opinion, be neglected.

What is the status of the end of self-government, and how does it figure into Bratman's construction? It has a dual function, supporting both the rationality of the requirements on planning generally, and why it is that, on one particular occasion after another, you have reason actually to do what your plans prescribe. That is, it blocks the complaint of plan-worship by giving you a further reason, available at each moment, to do as your plan prescribes. Readers who know their way around the contemporary practical rationality literature will be reminded of the structural role of David Velleman's ever-present desire to know what one is doing, which is added onto whatever other considerations are available at any given time to tilt one's choices in the direction of intelligibility. [6] And readers who know their way around older literature will also be reminded of the prudential desire that Thomas Nagel, in The Possibility of Altruism , famously argued would fail to glue together one's temporal stages into an individual who is genuinely extended across time. [7]

How is that end itself to be accounted for? Bratman suggests that, when we look at planning agency as it appears in human beings, it supports an inference to the best explanation, namely, to the end of self-governance. But now, there are two ways to construe that inference. It might be thought of as practical reasoning to a new end, one that coheres with what a planning agent has on his stack already -- that is, as a step akin to Paul Thagard's 'inference to the most coherent plan'. Or it could be thought of as a theoretical inference, an abduction through which we arrive at a belief about what end planning agents have already. Let's consider both options.

A practical inference to the best explanation, one whose conclusion is adopting the end of self-government, is not likely to persuade interlocutors who already either think that there is no such thing as means-end rationality, because ends are neither here nor there, or are grudging reductionists about it. But over and above the tactical issue, there is a strategic consideration. If we have such an inferential tool in our repertoire, we should expect it to be used not just to derive this one end, but pervasively. And in that case, the picture of practical rationality we have to work with will turn out to be deeply, systematically different than the one that Bratman has been working with hitherto. Instead of means-end reasoning supplemented by the low-key adoption, in the first place on instrumental grounds, of plans, we will have ends and presumably plans regularly falling into place on coherentist grounds. It's hard to know what to say about the landscape of rationality that we can anticipate will emerge, but it would be a surprisingly large step to see Bratman take in so casual a manner.

In that case, let's try construing that inference to the best explanation as factual, informing us of an end that we already have, perhaps unawares. Here I hope my incredulity won't be taken amiss. Entire literary and cinematic genres (think of romance novels or thrillers) show us that a great many people yearn to be swept away by uncontrollable passions, or by urgent and unexpected circumstances. [8] A desire and the end one endorses are not the same thing, but with desires that are so dramatically expressed, it's hard to believe that self-government ends up as an end all that often. Again, people routinely put themselves in positions that degrade their ability to plan their lives, for instance by having children, or taking jobs that subject them to the arbitrary whims of their employers. (To be sure, I'm told that no one can really imagine how much children get in the way of planning until they actually have them.) And you will notice that over the past few decades, mobile telephones have accustomed people to rearranging their plans on the fly, almost on a minute-by-minute basis, which is to say that in Bratman's sense these are scarcely plans at all. (Yes, I know, they claim to be merely filling in the loosely specified plan rather than ditching it, but that's not how it looks to the lunch date they're standing up.) An inference to the best explanation suggests that self-governance is at most a low priority, and much lower than, say, convenience.

Bratman hopes to navigate between the horns of this dilemma by having it both ways: his "keystone claim" is that we indeed have the end, and it is locked into place, as the keystone of our planning agency, by that practical coherentist inference. I'm not myself sure, however, why that evades the liabilities on each of the horns of the dilemma, rather than incurring both of them simultaneously. He does at one point remark that he is limiting his discussion to those who do care about self-governance (p. 138). But that makes me worry that the scope of his treatment makes the treatment itself implausible. A great many people allow others to run their lives for them, and those who give them their marching orders quite properly expect instrumentally consistent planning and execution from their subordinates. [9] Surely what goes wrong when the battalion commander acting on orders fails to function as a planning agent is the same thing that has gone wrong when I, a putatively self-governing agent, fail to do so. Shouldn't the explanation of why each of us is irrational be the same explanation?

But now, remember where we are. Although I've been registering some pushback to Bratman's second round of explanations for the rationality of planning agency, what I want to bring to your attention is the common ground between both those rounds. Like bounded-rationality arguments, an argument turning on the functional role of a specially designated end in the planning agent has to do with how the agent (or his mind) is built , and on how he works . That is, both of these forms of argument are psychologistic , and let me pause to reintroduce that term.

Psychologistic logicians used to see the purview of logic as investigating and laying down the prescriptive laws of thought, and they took it to be obvious that, just as you would not write a repair manual for your car, or for that matter teach someone how to drive, without knowing how a car works, so you would not lay down the rules that are to govern reasoning without knowing a good deal about how the mind that is going to do the reasoning works. The reader should be warned that the psychologism wars of the nineteenth century were won by the antipsychologistic logicians, and that we have all been raised on polemical mischaracterizations of their opponents. (For instance, that they confused prescriptions with empirical generalizations; but John Stuart Mill, one of the most prominent logicians of his day, was quite clear that the laws of thought were to be understood as analogous to the laws of the state: as telling you how to think, not how people mostly do think.) Indeed, most of us have encountered the very notion, if at all, only as embedded within the phrase, "the psychologistic fallacy". [10]

At the outset, I suggested that the essays in this collection of Bratman's work were of special interest in that they brought to light a disagreement about the ground rules in philosophy of logic. Not that Bratman himself is pressing this point; on the contrary, his approach is the one recommended to judges, who are to prudently decide their cases on the narrowest possible grounds. But if we are after the Big Picture, what we see here is another stage in the reemergence of psychologistic philosophy of logic. And once we are looking at it that way, we can place the two camps of his interlocutors. The near-exclusive focus of some of them on the bare requirement of means-end consistency betrays the spirit of antipsychologism, and suggests their underlying philosophical motivations: practical reasoning is directed toward deciding what to do, and when it seems hard to understand how to do it right without thinking about how an agent works, it is natural to try to reduce practical rationality to theoretical rationality, for which antipsychologistic accounts are presumed to be available. And myth theory, with its insistence on accounting for rational choice in terms of what is valuable rather than an agent's ends, likewise appears to be an attempt to avoid invoking the workings of the mind of a person who is deciding what to do; it also bears the stamp of antipsychologism. Here I don't want to attempt to adjudicate the merits of the two approaches. Suffice it that this collection of Bratman's essays deserves the attention not only of specialists in planning agency but those of us who are attentively following the reappearance of psychologistic approaches to philosophy of logic.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I'm grateful to Teresa Burke, David Enoch, Svantje Guinebert, and Aubrey Spivey for comments on a draft, to the Hebrew University for a Lady Davis Fellowship, and to the University of Utah for support through a Sterling M. McMurrin Esteemed Faculty Award.

[1] A. B. Yehoshua, Mar Mani (Bnei Brak: HaKibbutz HaMeuhad, 2013).

[2] Markers of that initial concern are sprinkled throughout the present volume, as when Bratman reminds us that "reconsideration . . . takes time and uses other mental resources," that we aim "not to use deliberative resources inefficiently," and so on; (133); Herbert Simon, the acknowledged patron saint of bounded rationality, is given occasional nods in the footnotes (e.g., at 115n10).

[3] To keep the discussion manageable, I'll tie the conversation to just one such piece: Joseph Raz, "The Myth of Instrumental Rationality," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1(1), April 2005.

[4] Michael Bratman, Structures of Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[5] Almost entirely: there are qualifications I won't review here.

[6] See, e.g., J. David Velleman, How We Get Along (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[7] Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[8] Bratman does acknowledge, in a footnote (p. 138n16), that sometimes people want to lose control. In my own view, he is not giving that desire nearly enough weight in his discussion.

[9] For a discussion of such individuals and what has gone wrong with their lives, see Svantje Guinebert, Hörigkeit als Selbstboykott (Paderborn: Mentis, 2018).

[10] For a sociologically oriented account of the psychologism debate, see Martin Kusch, Psychologism (New York: Routledge, 1995); for the cultural context, see Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 295-298.

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• v.82(2); May, 2015

Integrity and virtue: The forming of good character

Moral character is formed by one's actions. The habits, actions, and emotional responses of the person of good character all are united and directed toward the moral and the good. Because human beings are body/soul unities, actions of the body are actions of the self, that is, human beings are self-possessing, self-governing, and self-determining. In order to be of good character, one must know the good, act in morally good ways, and be disposed and inclined toward the good through the development of virtues. Character and action are intertwined so intimately that one's professional duties, or even what is perceived by others as one's duties, cannot override one's conscience without negatively affecting (and changing) one's character. For the physician to be of good character, it is vital that he or she follow his or her conscience in all things: in private life and also in his or her profession, i.e., in the treatment of patients.

Lay summary: Character cannot be separated from the person. To be of good character means that one’s habits, actions, and emotional responses all are united and directed toward the moral and the good. In this, public actions cannot be separated from private actions. Both sets of actions affect one’s character. For example, a physician believes use of contraceptives to be immoral yet prescribes them in the office because he or she feels a duty to provide what the patient asks for, or a pharmacist who believes abortion to be immoral fills prescriptions for the abortifacient RU-486. These public acts affect one’s character even if one’s private belief is the opposite of the action. They leave traces on one’s character. Not only do actions reflect the goodness or badness of one’s character, one’s actions also change one’s character. The more one does an immoral action or recommends an immoral action for others, the more it becomes part of one’s character to be the type of person who condones that immoral action. In order to be of good character one must not only know and desire the good, one must also pursue it in both private and public actions. Virtue is an aid in this; it is the act of good character. Growing in the virtues, especially prudence (knowing what to seek and what to avoid) forms good character. What is at stake is the integrity of the person. The physician who believes that use of contraception is immoral must also act in ways that display that belief and avoid actions that promote contraception use by his or her patients.

There is much controversy in bioethics today, especially in areas such as abortion, contraception, reproductive technologies, and end-of-life issues; and there is much confusion over the role of physician. 1 One side says that physicians should be involved in physician-assisted suicide, abortion, contraception, etc.; it is their duty to provide the services the patient wants; and, even, they endanger the patient's health by refusing. Another side says that physicians should never be forced to go against their consciences; they should never have to do things that they think are wrong (and even evil). 2 Can one's professional duties override one's conscience? 3 Is such a conflict even possible? There are many variations of these positions, and some even seek a middle ground between them. The issue is becoming more and more urgent as many US states consider rejecting existing laws that allow conscientious objection or enacting laws specifically to allow it.

What seems even more insidious, and more crucial, is the claim of some physicians that they can involve themselves with these things in their public life and still be against them privately. They insist that they can compartmentalize their life in such a way that the two do not affect one another. It could be that they do not consider contraceptives to be abortifacient, and so, there is no moral problem with prescribing them, or that they should not push their Catholic beliefs on non-Catholic patients or other reasons. “If women who come into my practice ask for contraception, as is the culture in our society today, I prescribe it. That's what I do. I'm trained to be an ob-gyn,” said Lester Ruppersberger, D.O., who later stopped prescribing contraceptives ( Schierhorn 2013 ; see also Brinker 2010 and Grisez 1997 ). Mary Davenport, M.D., explains what happened when she first joined the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AAPLOG):

I asked if one could prescribe IUDs, oral contraceptives, and post-coital contraception and be a member of the organization. I was told that organization existed to fight surgical and medical abortion of established pregnancies, and that the IUDs and hormonal [contraception] didn't violate that principal … . This didn't make sense to me, but I figured if the distinguished physicians who started this organization at the time of Roe v. Wade could live with that contradiction, I could too. I later found out that many AAPLOG doctors actually do not believe that oral contraceptives act as abortifacients, which was a complete surprise to me! (Davenport 1998 , 23)

This paper will examine the relationship between one's actions and one's character. When one is pressured or convinced or even willing to perform an action that one considers to be bad or wrong, does it corrupt one's (good) character or can one maintain a separation of character from action? Does one's character regulate one's actions or generate a specific or required set of actions? These seem to be key issues in discussions of conscience, conscientious objection, and character.

Paul Ricoeur describes character as something, which cannot be separated from the person ( Ricoeur 1992 , 122). It has “a permanence which we say belongs to us” ( Ricoeur 1992 , 118). Ricoeur defines “character” as “the set of distinctive marks which permit the re-identification of a human individual as being the same.” 4 We cannot separate character from the person and say here is the person and there is his or her character. A person can be distinguished from his or her actions, what was done is different from who did it. But the same distinction cannot be made between character and action. But Ricoeur's discussion of character seems to include much more than moral character as can be seen from the following statement:

By means of this stability, borrowed from acquired habits and identifications—in other words, from dispositions—character assures at once numerical identity, qualitative identity, uninterrupted continuity across change, and, finally, permanence in time which defines sameness. ( Ricoeur 1992 , 122)

“Personality” might be a more comprehensive term for such a broad definition than “character” ( Audi 1991 , 307). This broader category can then include nature or traits, about which one could turn to biology for explanations ( Ricoeur 1992 , 120 note 5); and position or capacity or reputation, which is the expertise of sociology or the like; and many other aspects of the person.

The rational side, including “moral excellence and firmness,” can more easily be found under the term “moral character.” 5 From this moral aspect come evaluation, judgment, decision, choice resulting in right or wrong, and moral or immoral action. 6 It is this last aspect—moral character—which is most involved in a physician's moral decisions. Character then involves goodness and wickedness, that is, ethics. In this case, one must turn to philosophy (and anthropology), and especially the study of ethics, for assistance and understanding.

A more detailed definition of character, or, more specifically, being of good character, can be found in the three facets of dispositions, desires, and tendencies:

having steady and permanent dispositions to do what is right and to refrain from doing what is wrong; having morally desirable wishes, desires, purposes, and goals; and having the tendency to respond emotionally toward things in the morally appropriate way. 7

The habits, actions, and emotional responses of the person of good character all are united and directed toward the moral and the good.

Aristotle's famous four categories of character (the virtuous, the continent, the incontinent, and the vice-filled 8 ) in the Nicomachean Ethics reflect aspects of this deeper definition. 9 In the vice-filled person, reason and appetite are united; and reason is a slave to passions and appetites. The vice-filled person chooses what his or her appetites command. In the incontinent person, reason and appetite are not united; and appetite wins out more often than reason. There is correct knowledge of the right thing to do and desire to do it, to be a virtuous person, but one fails more than one wins; and appetite overrides reason. In the continent person, reason and appetite are not united; but reason wins out more often than appetite. The desire is there; and the right thing gets done more frequently than not. In the virtuous person, reason and appetite are united; and appetite is controlled by reason so the right thing gets done (most of the time). In addition, these categories admit of degrees; one person may be more continent or less incontinent. Also, persons are not static; they (usually) move within a category or between categories during the course of their lifetime. Most persons fall into the categories of continent and incontinent; they know the good and are more or less able to do it.

The physician who writes a prescription for contraceptives knowing that it is wrong may fall into the category of the incontinent. 10 For example, he may be under pressure from his colleagues or society and be acting out of fear or timidity. Or he may think he is acting for a greater good—an obligation to his patient to provide what is requested. This second case does not seem to quite fit into Aristotle's categories as the physician seems to be choosing the good (fulfilling the requests of his patients) and overriding his emotions (toward contraception). Reason seems to be in control of appetites and passions. The problem here is not that appetite is controlling reason, but that reason is faulty. The knowledge of the good is not lacking in one respect—the evil of contraception is recognized—but is lacking in another, the knowledge of the relationship between character and action is insufficient resulting in bad choices. Here then is another facet of character: one must have right reason or, more specifically, a rightly formed reason—that is, not just knowledge of the good but correct knowledge of the good, in this case, correct knowledge of the human person, a sufficient anthropology, if you will. 11 The physician also needs correct knowledge of the ends of medicine (more on this later). This is why truth is so important for character (and human action, and moral decision making).

One's character is based upon the truth (as one knows it). That the truth about something (and about everything) makes a difference can be seen in terms such as “dirty money.” It makes a difference to a person of good character where money they have received as a gift comes from. Donations are usually accepted at face value, but when the truth about the source of the money is revealed, another determination is made about its acceptability. A donation of hard-earned money from honest work is seen as acceptable; while a donation from stolen funds or money made from illegal drug trade or other illegal activities would be refused. “Dirty” money is seen as tainting the character even of one who simply receives it as a gift.

It is a trait of human beings, not non-human animals, that they need right reason in order to become fully human beings. It is a trait of human beings, not spirits, that they are in the process of change, of becoming what they are. Edith Stein makes this clear.

The human soul must gradually gain possession of its essence or nature, and its life is the way that leads to that goal. This is why in the case of the human soul formation is possible and necessary. But so that this formation may be free , … the human soul must have self-knowledge and be capable of taking a stand with respect to its own self. It must find itself in a dual sense: It must learn to know itself, and it must come to be what it is destined to be. 12

Therefore, the more one knows the truth about reality, the world, the human being, the better able one is to form a good character. A consequence of this is that the one who thinks he knows the good is harder to correct than the one who is incontinent yet has right reasoning, “because reasoning does not teach the principles” ( Aquinas 1993 , bk. 7, lec. 8, n. 1432). The incontinent person knows he is doing something wrong, and wants to and tries to change. The person who thinks he is doing something right when he is not is hard to convince, because he thinks he is right. In other words, he thinks he has the truth. 13

In both cases described above, the physician may think he or she can perform a bad act yet stay of good character. As a physician, he or she writes prescriptions for contraception, but in his or her private life, he or she thinks use of contraception is immoral. This belief—ultimately about the separation of character and action—is the reasoning for continuing the behavior (writing prescriptions for contraception). If this belief is true, then these physicians are upholding good character (at least in this area). If it is false, then they are changing their character. However, any truth found may not lead the physicians in this example to change: the one may still be unable to overcome passions, and the other may then become obstinate ( Aquinas 1993 , bk. 7)—but on the other hand, truth is an essential component of good character and a better understanding may lead to better reasoning and improved moral character.

Can character be compartmentalized either so that it is unaffected by certain actions or that one has more than one character (say a character in one's role as physician and a different character in one's private life)? Fundamental to answering these questions is the relationship of character to the person, the amount of control over character development a person has, and the effects of one's actions on character.

A United States flag is a sign. It conveys more meaning than a rectangle of the colors red, white, and blue, and stars and stripes. It stands for honor and courage, blood shed in battles, freedom, the unity of fifty states, and more. A traffic light indicates more than three circles of red, amber, and green lights. It controls actions of cars and pedestrians, makes busy intersections safe, and allows people moving in opposing and conflicting directions to progress safely.

In the same manner, the character of a human being means more than “this is a human being”; it also indicates what manner of human being this is (good or evil, virtuous or vice-filled, saint or beast, etc.). Being of good character is not a description of the uniqueness of Joe in the same way that physical indicators, such as fingerprints or DNA, are, but Joe does have a unique character in that it is a unique mixture of strengths, weaknesses, virtues, vices, knowledge, and experience.

While a sign, such as a flag or a traffic light, expresses its meaning through its physical presence, a human being expresses character through actions. I cannot determine Joe's character through watching him stand in one spot (unless that spot is atop a pole in the desert like the desert Fathers) or through his physical description. To find out about his character, I must observe Joe's actions. Does he kick the cat or pet it? Does he give a coin to the beggar or turn his face away? It is not even any one action that resolves the issue, but the accumulation of all my observations and interactions with the person, which reveals his or her character. But even then, I cannot know Joe's character fully. One action can cause one to re-evaluate the whole of a person's character, just as a single pebble can cause ripples across much of a small pond. A multitude of good actions can confirm the good character of a person, but one bad action leads the observer to question that good character. 14 Maybe the person is of less good character than one thought, or maybe in this particular area, the person has a weakness 15 (The same can be said of someone who is vice-filled but does something truly charitable; maybe they are less bad then at first seems.) Even further, because human beings change over time, character cannot really be fully known until after changes stop (at death). And one can hardly know one's own character without some external input ( Crosby 1996 , 152–57). This does not mean that character is completely unknowable. Character does express itself through actions. Others help us by reflecting back to us what our actions are telling them about our character. If we know Joe well enough, we can generally predict his actions. This is why one bad action from an otherwise good character mostly seems to come as a shock to those who are familiar with the person.

It also seems that we are better able to know another's character when the other person is closer to the virtuous or vice-filled ends of the spectrum. The more one's moral character tends toward one end of the spectrum (good or bad), the less unique it becomes but the more rare. Good character is an ideal outside of oneself that all strive for. In Christianity, the ideal is Christ; we are to constantly strive to be Christ-like, having the character of Christ. 16 The human being's “salvation, his perfect realization, will be accomplished when he is fully conformed to the risen, glorified Christ … . Revelation has as its end this perfect assimilation to Christ” ( Caffara 1987 , 170). At the extremes of moral character, uniqueness is found more in personality, rather than in character. All the saints have similar characters, and all the beastly humans have similar characters. The virtue of prudence (or fortitude or temperance or justice, etc.) is the same in all who possess it though it may express itself differently depending on circumstances and personalities. We recognize Joe as different from Jane or Peter, but we recognize patience as being the same virtue in Joe and in Jane and in Peter.

Another facet of character is that it is able to be changed. Sometimes a child who was a “little angel” (or “little devil”) when young is the opposite as an adult. One reason criminals are imprisoned is to give them a chance to reform. One of the big issues in the education of children recently, especially in the US in light of school shootings such as Columbine, is character formation. 17 Even traits acquired whether through DNA or environment seem to be redirectable or even reversible. Shyness can sometimes be (more or less) overcome through training and practice in social or group settings. Aggressiveness can be directed toward useful or good purposes rather than bad or criminal ones. Anecdotal evidence for the changeability of character abounds. It is generally observable that character is subject to change over time, whether the change is small or a complete reversal.

Aristotle, in a more philosophical examination of character and the human being, found three things in the soul: passions (appetite and emotions), faculties (the capability to experience passions), and states of character (being well- or ill-disposed to each passion, the best state being moderation between extremes, for example, feeling anger moderately rather than too weakly or too violently) (Aristotle n.d., bk. 2, chap. 5). Aquinas took these up interpreting them as passion ( passio ), power ( potentia ), and habit ( habitus ). He then analyzed in which of these three character resides. Character is not a passion because passions come and go but character is indelible. Character is not a habit because a bad habit cannot be good nor a good habit bad, but character can be good or bad, in other words, it is indifferent to goodness and badness. Therefore, character must be a power, a potentia . 18 Here then is the root of the mutability of character, namely, a power is an ability or potential for change of some sort. There is movement from potential to actual, from power to action.

Ricoeur sees this power of character as a disposition acquired over time ( Ricoeur 1992 , 120–21). This disposition is both immutable and mutable, stable and changeable. The source of these two seemingly incompatible traits is habit, that is, one is continually forming habits (mutability) and making use of already realized habits (a type of immutability). This last is what Ricoeur refers to as “sedimentation”: that “which confers on character [a] sort of permanence in time” ( Ricoeur 1992 , 121). Therefore, through the acquiring and the breaking of habits, character is formed and formable. 19

Once a physician starts writing prescriptions for contraception when a patient asks and no longer thinks about it overmuch but just does it, then this becomes a habit and consequently becomes part of his or her character. This does not mean that only habits form character. Rather, character is something incomplete in a sense. It develops over time. Dispositions, inclinations, and desires, which stabilize over time, are also part of the formation of character.

The other side of the relation between moral character and action is the effect of action on character. Three aspects of action relevant to this are repetition of action and its effect on the person, the type of action, and intention and responsibility.

Habits, skills, and habitus

Actions can be repetitive or automatic in (at least) three different ways: by habit, by education, and by habitus . When an action is constantly repeated, over time it can become a habit. Every time I see the straggly haired man in the orange beanie and three sweaters, I give him a dollar; the orange caught my eye at some time in the past, and ever since then, I respond with a dollar. Or I habitually put my keys on the bookshelf by the front door. The action gradually becomes unconscious or automatic, and the will is less involved in the initiation of the action. Consequently, a habit takes away some freedom ( Aquinas 1993 , bk. 7, lec. 6, n. 1403). I am no longer as free to do something different. I can change my habit, but it usually requires continual, conscious effort and much struggle (until a new habit is established). I put the keys on the bookshelf again when I really wanted to put them on the new hook by the door, so I take them off the shelf and put them on the hook. Eventually, I will remember to put them on the hook instead of the bookshelf, and that will then become a new habit. The physician who automatically writes a prescription for contraception for patients who ask and no longer thinks it through has acquired a habit. The physician who automatically says no to such a request also has acquired a habit.

Another type of automatic action is a skill. Actions become skills through repetition and experience. The rugged-terrain hiker automatically reaches a hand out to steady the inexperienced hiker who is losing his or her balance on the steep path. The potter's hands automatically smooth out the small bumps in the clay pot he or she is making. The baker automatically stops kneading the bread dough when it reaches a certain elasticity. These actions are done without consciously thinking through all the steps and reasoning and judgments. These actions are skills.

Physical education thus means much more than merely bodily hygiene, physical exercise, or physical habituation. It means directing the will to a planful, conscientious, and free forming of the body. And such a free forming is possible because of the fact that the soul is the form of the body, so that the soul's attitude expresses itself naturally in the body. ( Stein 2002 , 428–29, original emphasis)

One trains one's body through experience and repetition in how to act and react in a certain environment or under certain circumstances. This functions as a kind of physical memory, a memory in the body. These are skills.

A third way actions become automatic is through what Aquinas calls habitus , that is, inclination or disposition. I may give a dollar to the man in the orange beanie every time I see him, and that is a habit. But if every time I see someone begging, I give them a dollar; and I regularly give my restaurant leftovers to a homeless person; and I see a person without a coat shivering in the middle of winter and give them my coat, and on and on, example after example, that is a habitus , an inclination, a will-ingness, to respond charitably to anyone in need as the situation arises. The will has been trained to recognize the situation when it arises and to be willing to act in a charitable way. Rather than a habit as a type of muscle memory (always putting my keys on the bookshelf), the repeated actions of a specific kind (e.g., charitable) in different situations become a disposition to act in a specific way in all situations, in this case, in a charitable way. With habitus , one becomes a charitable person rather than a person with a habit. The source of this last type of action is character. In order for the physician to write a prescription for contraception (or not) out of a habitus rather than a habit, he or she needs to act out of the detailed definition of character discussed at the beginning of this paper: desires, inclinations, tendencies, knowledge, and virtue.

While this example is about charity, there is nothing about habitus that requires it to be good. One may also will to be miserly and act in a miserly way and therefore develop a bad disposition or habitus of miserliness. The morality of the action also determines the morality of the habitus . But not all acts can be cataloged as moral or immoral. There are different types or categories of actions.

Moral action

Because human beings are body/soul unities, actions of the body are actions of the self. “As an instrument of my acts, my body is an integral part of the unity of my personality” ( Stein 2002 , 367). Even the biological functions of the body are (or can be) part of the self. When my stomach growls, I do not say “my body is hungry” but “I am hungry.” I do not say “my body has a fever,” but “I have a fever.”

Digestion of food is certainly an action, as is jumping when startled or yawning when tired. Aquinas calls these acts of a human being ( actus humanus ) and distinguishes them from human acts ( actus humanis ). Human acts are rational acts, “those springing from man's will following the order of reason” ( Aquinas 1993 , bk 1, lec. 1, n. 3) those “of which man is master … through his reason and will.” 20 Consequently, they are moral acts. Human acts are more closely associated with character than are acts of human beings, because the former actions come from the whole person. They are a commitment of the whole person 21 ; the body did what the will willed. In other words, the person threw the whole of themselves, as a psycho-somatic unity, into the action. The person could have chosen to do something different, but chose this particular action.

In contrast, an act of a human is not a matter of choice. A person cannot choose to stop the physical act of their stomach growling. A growling stomach is not a choice. One can choose to eat something and thereby stop the growling but cannot choose to stop the growling directly by willing it. Even laughing at funny things is a moral act, in contrast to laughing because one is being tickled, which is an act of a human being. In the former, there is choice. One can choose to laugh or not. Laughing that is ridicule is a bad moral act. Laughing at oneself can be good (e.g., humbling). In fact, training oneself to not laugh at racist jokes or sexual innuendos is considered by many to be a moral responsibility. 22 Writing a prescription, likewise, is a human, and therefore moral, act; it is a matter of choice. One can write it or not write it as one wills and chooses. In Karol Wojtyla's thought, this sort of “action draws together all of the elements in the experience of the person.” 23 And so, “action reveals the person.” 24

Responsibility and intention

Two important aspects of the revelatory nature of action are responsibility and intention. To ask who did a specific action is to ask who is responsible, and to say that “Joe did it” is to assign responsibility to Joe for his actions. In other words, human beings own their actions and the consequences of them. This even applies to actions that are accidental rather than willed and chosen. If I unintentionally bump into someone while walking on a crowded sidewalk, the person I bumped into does not stop to ask if I did it on purpose but instead automatically expects an apology, and I automatically (hopefully) give it.

This intimacy between an action and the person who performs it is also recognized when a “why” is added to the “who did it.” And while an external observer can see who did an action, the why is more intimate and internal to the agent. In non-human animals, the why is instinct and nature, in human acts of human beings, it is a combination of will, freedom, and choice. The will is the rational power of human beings to act. It is the ability to choose what is good (or what one thinks is good) directed by reason. 25 In the will, then, is found intention. Voluntary actions have their source in intention while involuntary actions, such as being startled, do not. 26 There are forward-looking motives or intentions, such as “to heal”; backward-looking motives or reasons, such as fear of ridicule or loss of job or loss of reputation; and motives-in-general, such as love of God or wanting to do the right thing. The incontinent physician mentioned above is writing the prescription out of a backward-looking motive, fear. The continent (or continent-like) physician is writing the prescription out of a forward-looking motive, health of the patient. Both are acting for a good end (keeping job or reputation, and health of patient). But both are acting out of a limited freedom. The former's freedom is limited by fear, the latter's by ignorance or obstinacy. Most importantly, the actions of both are coming from what is internal and inseparable from them, the will ( John Paul II 1993 , n. 67).

Responsibility and intention are rooted in the will, which is the source of the self-possession and self-governance of human beings. Self-possession is different from possession of an object. One can own or hold an object, such as a rock, and therefore have possession of it. But one owns and holds oneself internally in a way one cannot with a rock. We are conscious of the rock as something that is external, but we are conscious of ourselves from the inside. We are both the object of our consciousness and the subject. 27 As such, we have possession of ourselves in a more intimate way than we have possession of a rock.

Human beings are what they possess; they possess what they themselves are. Even under duress, a person is self-possessing. One can be stopped from doing something through external sources such as obstacles put in one's way or even physical restraint, but no one can be forced to do something. The interesting thing here is that a physician may feel forced to write prescriptions for contraception through fear of ostracism or losing his job, but at the point at which he actually writes the prescription, he is no longer forced but actually willing the writing of the prescription. One can be prevented from doing something by external forces, but carrying through with an action has an element of the voluntary, of willing to do it and therefore cannot be forced. 28

Another way the will can be hindered is by lack of knowledge. 29 One may attempt to drive across a flooded bridge thinking the water is low enough to get through but then get stuck, because it was really two feet above the bridge. But if one knows that the water is that high, one would not drive across it or will to drive across it, because one knows the car will stall in the middle. In other words, while the will cannot be forced to will something, it can be hindered from doing what is willed ( Aquinas 1948 , I-II, q. 6, a. 4).

A corollary of self-possession is self-governance. Self-governance includes self-control but is farther and wider reaching into the interior of the self ( Wojtyla 1979 , 107). It is not mere control, but rule, which includes control and more. The human being is self-governing in that he can carry out a human action or not carry it out as he wills. He can choose to write a prescription or chose not to write it. Because of self-possession and self-governance, human beings both intend their actions and have responsibility for their actions.

Integration

Along with self-possession and self-governance, comes self-determination. To say that one's actions have no effect on one's character is a form of Cartesian dualism in which the mind controls the body as it would a machine. In this case, the body has no effect on the mind or the person; and one's character is only what one makes of it. The person is self-directed and formed in an internal process isolated from external events and influences. 30

Paul Ricoeur seems to lend support to this view when he says that one can separate an action from an agent, but cannot separate character from agent. For character, what I am and who I am are the same: “Character is truly the ‘what’ of the ‘who’” ( Ricoeur 1992 , 122). The what is internal to the who. Whereas, for action, they are separable; we can isolate the what, writing a prescription, from the who, the physician. The what is external to the who. One can “distinguish between what someone does and the one who does something” ( Ricoeur 1992 , 122). Certainly, it is true that the who can be distinguished from the what, but they cannot really be separated from each other. A particular person did this specific action.

If one changes perspective, from an external examination of the action performed and the person performing, to an internal examination of the person performing this action, then one can see that while there is distinction there is not separation. The person is the source and cause of his or her own actions.

All voluntary action upon the body, however, and all formative influence which the I—through the instrumentality of the body—exerts upon the external world rest upon the fact that human freedom is not restricted to the purely spiritual realm and that the realm of the spirit is not a separate, isolated sphere. The foundation upon which the spiritual life and free acts arise and to which they remain attached is the matter which is placed at the disposal of the human being's intellect and free will to be illuminated, formed, and used. In this way the bodily sentient life of the human being becomes a personally formed life and a constituent part of the human person. ( Ricoeur 1992 , 372–73)

Ricoeur's separation of an agent from an act is a separation only externally and on the surface. Internally the agent, possessing will, self-governing, and self-possessing, is the direct cause of his or her action and therefore inseparable from it. Therefore, whichever choice is made (to write a prescription or not), the action is an expression of one's character and also reinforces or changes one's character, i.e., human beings are self-determining.

When a person recognizes a habit in himself as bad (e.g., smoking or biting one's nails), he or she usually seeks to change it. We recognize when someone is acting out of character. Our character allows others to predict, in a way, the types of actions we will do. We do not expect Mother Teresa of Calcutta to throw a sick person into the gutter, such an action would be out of character for her, rather we expect her to pick up a person out of the gutter. Being of good character means that some actions are excluded, but also that some are included and expected. We expect to perceive the virtues being expressed in the actions of one of good character. At the same time, one of good character tries to increase the virtues in oneself. Actions are expressive of character precisely because human beings are self-possessing, self-governing, and self-determining.

Acts which are “deliberate and chosen are essentially self-determining—that is, internal to and constitutive of an individual's character.” 31 A simple way in which this happens is when a bad (or good) action becomes a habit. That habit then becomes part of one's character. As previously noted, Ricoeur called this sedimentation, a permanence acquired over time that therefore is seen as expressive of one's character ( Ricoeur 1992 , 121).

Another way in which action becomes character is through inclinations or virtues. Recall the difference noted above between the habit of giving a dollar to a beggar in an orange beanie and the habitus of acting charitably in any situation in which one finds someone in need. Virtues are acquired only after hard work, attention to one's actions, and much repetition:

More than a crackerjack lecture on temperance is going to be required if you are to become temperate. You must change your heart. Only by dint of repeated acts, performed with difficulty and against the grain, will temperance become your good such that acting in accord with it in changing circumstances is merely a matter of your acting in character. ( McInerny 2004 , 109)

Even a single act forms character in that it expresses one's will and one's acceptance of the action. 32 Since the human being is continually maturing and changing, actions leave “traces” on the human being. 33

It is neither the intellect that knows nor the will that decides, but it is the human being as acting person who recognizes, initiates, and determines. To act with efficacy is to integrate the rich complexity of the embodied human agent in a way that transforms him or her … .

Action, then, redounds upon the whole person, so that self-determination is also self-formation and self-development. 34

Moral actions especially have a significant effect on the person, because they are determinative of good or bad character.

Because action draws upon the whole person as agent, it affects the whole person; and because ethical action engages the good of the person through personalistic values, it cannot leave the person indifferent to his or her action. It transforms the person, for better or for worse. 35

Self-determination is key to becoming of good moral character. Paul Taylor sees four ways in which we can train ourselves to be morally good: (1) simply doing good and avoiding evil; (2) deliberately placing ourselves in situations of moral significance (e.g., volunteering at a soup kitchen); (3) imagining ourselves in such situations and acting rightly; and (4) “reflective thinking about moral matters” ( Taylor 1964 , 22).

If a physician sees use of contraception as morally bad, then acting out of his good moral character or if he wants to develop good character, he will not facilitate the use of contraception by writing prescriptions for it. It is intrinsic to the definition of a prescription that the physician is recommending and expecting that it will be filled and the medication taken by the patient, and this for the good of the health of the patient. It cannot be separated from this context.

If a physician acts against his judgment that contraception is morally bad and still writes a prescription for it, his character is affected. By his action, he actually wills that contraception be used, he wills what he considers an evil. If it becomes a habit then he may no longer even be thinking of the evil but just doing it automatically. Through repetition, it may become an inclination or habitus such that he starts recommending it (in appropriate situations) even to patients who do not ask for it. Through his actions, he also risks being associated with the category of physicians who write prescriptions for contraception thinking it morally good. For, acts are not only self-determinative of an individual but also self-determinative of a group or community ( Finnis 1998 , 41). He may not recognize himself in that group but others will, simply due to the fact that one of the group's traits is that they write prescriptions for contraception ( Ricoeur 1992 , 121–22). According to Aquinas, this is hypocrisy, that is, “simulat[ing] a character which is not his own” ( Aquinas 1948 , II-II, q. 111, a. 3). This in fact indicates a fifth way of training one's character that we can add to Taylor's four above: associating with a group or community which embodies the character traits one wishes to acquire. 36 In such association one can seek to imitate the group's traits and character.

So far, we have seen that one's actions reflect one's character, and they also form one's character. Consequently, the morality of one's actions also reflects and forms one's character. Good moral actions come from a good character and form a good character. Bad moral actions come from and form a bad character.

Being of Good Character

One of the most essential—if not the most essential—requirements of good moral action is knowledge of the good. Knowledge of the good frees us to act well, that is, to act in accordance with the good that we have come to know. “Moral behavior is a response to reality and therefore requires a knowledge of reality” ( Ratzinger 1984 , 10). This knowledge is not made up by the person, nor is it found exclusively in Revelation or the Scriptures ( Caffara 1987 , 162). Knowledge of the good is found in study of the world around us and in study of human beings (anthropology, biology, medicine, etc., and including philosophy and theology), in other words, in reality and in truth. 37

Everyone chooses the good (or what they believe to be the good), even someone acting immorally or breaking the law has some good in mind. 38 The thief steals a jacket, because he thinks looking cool is a good or steals money, because he thinks being able to buy things is a good. The physician who writes a prescription for contraception is choosing the good of keeping a job or a reputation or (what he or she thinks is) the good of the patient's health. But to know only an apparent good is to be hampered in choosing the good. Full(er) knowledge of the good frees us to choose the true good rather than an apparent good and therefore frees us to act in a truly moral way. 39 More concretely, choosing the good is “do[ing] those things which truly constitute our fulfillment and perfection.” 40 The good is not only goods outside the person or goods for the person, it is also the very human being per se. 41 These goods are knowable to us and perfective of us:

Intelligible human goods such as bodily life itself, health, knowledge of the truth, etc., are “goods of the person” in the sense that they are goods intrinsically perfecting the person: they are “noble goods” ( bona honesta ), not mere “useful goods” ( bona utilia ), that is, merely instrumental goods extrinsic to the person. ( Melina 2001 , 43 note 13)

For the physician, choosing the good also includes choosing the good for him or her as physician, that is, pursuing the ends medicine—the health of the patient and all that that entails. 42 The act of choosing the good is the process of self-determination with its roots in self-possession and self-governance (see Wojtyla 1979 , 106, 107). In this way, we are responsible for our own character. 43

Some theologians, for example, McCormick (1968 , 7–18), have contended that if one chooses God then even mortal sin cannot cut one off from God unless one consciously chooses to turn away from God; this is known as the “fundamental option” theory.

[This theory] maintains that for a mortal sin to be committed an action must be accompanied by an option against God, or one's ultimate Good. Failing this, even actions which are knowingly and willingly committed in grave matter, such as taking life, adultery, … , may not be mortal sins in the sense of cutting the person off from the life of God and communion with Him … . External behavior according to this, is only a partial indicator of interior orientation and attitudes. ( Bristow 2009 , 195–96)

On the contrary, our responsibility is more than for a (single) fundamental option for the good or for God, and it is more than having a good intention or choosing actions with good consequences ( John Paul II 1993 , nn. 67, 74, 77, 78). The object of the action must be good, one cannot choose evil means even for a good end, and still say one is choosing the good. 44 “Freedom is not only the choice for one or another particular action; it is also, within that choice, a decision about oneself and a setting of one's own life for or against the Good, for or against the Truth” ( John Paul II 1993 , n. 65). The true “fundamental option” is not a single choice for the good (or for God) made at one point in one's life. It is a decision made for or against the good in each and every moral act. Therefore, even at this most basic level, to say that one is against contraception and then to write prescriptions for contraception is in fact to be for contraception because one chooses it by the act of writing the prescription. This is to choose contraception as in some way a good.

Good character and virtue

In order to be of good character, then, once one knows the good, one must also desire it. In the simple case, the physician who knows that the use of contraception specifically to avoid pregnancy is not good—whether for the patient's health or from a Christian moral perspective—yet still prescribes it, does not desire the good. This seems a rather strong statement, but when one knows that (1) contraception is only an apparent good, not a true good; and (2) one knows that evil means may not be used even for good consequences or from a good intention, then (3) to still act on the apparent good is to be obstinate, to desire the apparent good not the true good. “The original or originating practical situation calls out not only for reason but also for affectivity and desire; thus it is that the grasp of the Good depends on the dispositions of the subject.” 45 The will must actually desire and incline itself to the good.

Choosing for or against the good, for or against the evil, is something that the will is constantly struggling with. It is easy to fall into evil; it is hard to continuously do good moral acts, this requires constant work. It is difficult to ascertain knowledge and establish truth. Human beings'

struggle to arrive at a deeper and deeper knowledge of the demands of God's divine and eternal law can be impeded because of their own biases and passions and because of the prejudices and misconceptions common to the cultures in which they live. The heart of the problem is human sinfulness, which afflicts the whole human race and each individual personally. ( May 2003 , 88)

Our reason can be overcome by (unreasonable) passions or mislead by false or incomplete knowledge ( Aquinas 1993 , bk. 7, lec. 3, n. 1348). Our conscience guides us to judging right or wrong action but that needs training and informing also. Conscience needs to know the good and to be listened to in order for us to act according to it. To listen and to act both require dispositions, desires, and tendencies ordered to the good.

Morality is therefore that ordering of desire and of will required for a good life: this ordering is not an external regulation of acts because they are in harmony with law or because they produce better results in the world; it is rather that interior harmony that reason introduces into our passions and choices precisely so that man might be himself. It is a harmony, an order that is not only a subjectivistic psychological expression but the reflection of the truth about the Good that fulfills man's desire. ( Melina 2001 , 45)

As we saw above, Aquinas calls this habitus , that is, inclination or disposition. When speaking of moral or good character, this then is an inclination or disposition to the good, in other words, virtue. While habits diminish freedom, virtue and virtues diminish potency ( Melina 2001 , 54). Potency is diminished by being put into act. Character is a potency, and when it is put into act, it becomes good character or bad character. Virtue is the act of good character, and virtues are the “principles of good action.” 46 Virtues are formative of the moral life, are developed through education, and are linked to time and the incompleteness (that is, potency) of the human being ( Melina 2001 , 56). One could say that virtue is habit, skill, and habitus . Virtues “forge” character. 47 They perfect the will and freedom ( Caffara 1987 , 166). Consequently, they perfect the human being. “The realization of the human person is not principally in morally good actions, but in the acquisition of the moral virtues.” 48 The virtues then are not just dispositions but an actualization of the human being, a changing from wanting to be of good character to actually being of good character ( Von Hildebrand and Von Hildebrand 1966 , 87). The human being “acquires right evaluation regarding the principle of things to be done, that is, the end, by the habitus of virtue either natural or learned by custom.” 49 This even leads one of virtuous character to act with regret when the right choice in a situation is not ideal ( Anscombe 1963 , 89–90). While all human beings have a natural inclination to the good and therefore to virtue, 50 the virtues need to be trained and developed so that they become a “second nature,” an actuality rather than a potency, a habitus of good character ( Melina 2001 , 51–53).

The most important of the virtues is prudence: good character and moral action depend on it. 51 Prudence is right judgment in moral matters.

This is not some prim conformity to convention or rule, but excellence and strength ( virtus ) of character involving a disposition and readiness to act with intelligent love in pursuit of real goods—the basic human goods towards which the primary practical principles direct—and successful resistance to the ultimately unreasonable lure of bad options. ( Finnis 1998 , 84, original emphasis)

As Aquinas says, quoting Augustine, “Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid.” 52 It is the virtue “which perfects the reason [and] surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power” ( Aquinas 1948 , I-II, q. 66, a. 1). The more prudence one has, the more one judges correctly the right action to take. At the same time, prudence depends on the other virtues: one may determine through prudence that fortitude is required in a particular situation, but if one does not have fortitude then one cannot carry out what prudence concludes is the right course of action. 53 It is prudence that ties all the other virtues together; by judging the right thing to do, it steers all the virtues to right action and the good. 54

In the case of the physician who sees contraception as immoral, it may seem prudent for him to write prescriptions for contraception, because, for instance, he has to support his family and so cannot afford to lose his position or patients. 55 But the effect on his character, changing him into someone he does not want to be—that is, a physician who wills the writing of prescriptions for contraception and therefore wills the evil of contraception—may be unwelcome and unwanted. Therefore, it may be more prudent for him to look for a different place in which to practice in which he does not feel compelled to write prescriptions for contraception.

Hypocrisy or Integrity

What is at stake then is the integrity of the human being. As Pope John Paul II said: “To separate the fundamental option from concrete kinds of behavior means to contradict the substantial integrity or personal unity of the moral agent in his body and in his soul.” 56 In the case under discussion, to separate one's view that use of contraception is immoral from one's action of writing prescriptions for it is a contradiction of the unity of the physician as moral agent. In fact, such a separation is not really possible, because character and action interact with each other. One could say that they spontaneously tend toward assimilation and amalgamation. This is the meaning and the consequence of self-possession, self-governance, and self-determination.

It is in ourselves that the drama of our liberty is played out, and it is played through what we do. The human person is more than his or her liberty; but it is in action that the whole person is gathered into the task of responsible freedom. If we are to possess ourselves and to govern ourselves through our liberty, then we are faced with the task of integration—not only of coordinating the various strands of our consciousness, but of integrating into our actions our whole human being, body and soul, physis and psyche . 57

To be of good moral character, a person must have knowledge of the good, act in morally good ways, and be disposed and inclined toward the good through the virtues. The physician who believes that use of contraception is immoral must also act in ways that display that belief and avoid actions that promote contraception use by his patients.

Louise A. Mitchell, PhD (Cand.), MA, MTS, is associate editor of The Linacre Quarterly and a graduate student studying bioethics at the John Paul II Institute for Marriage and the Family in Melbourne, VIC, Australia. Her email address is moc.liamtoh@99llehctimal .

1 I will limit this paper to physicians, but similar questions arise for hospitals and for pharmacists and other healthcare personnel.

2 Similarly, should pharmacists be allowed to refuse to fill contraception prescriptions in the name of conscientious objection or should they be forced to fill them? Should employers be forced to provide contraception in their prescription drug insurance plans? See, for example, Curlin et al. (2007) and Stein (2006a , 2006b) .

3 Some call this “value neutrality”; for a discussion of this, see Pellegrino (2000) .

4 Ricoeur (1992 , 119). This, he says, is “the overlapping of ipse by idem ” ( Ricoeur 1992 , 121).

5 See Merriam-Webster Dictionary , s.v. “character,” http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/character .

6 Ricoeur (1992 , 122): “the aspects of evaluative preference … define the moral aspect of character.”

7 Taylor (1964 , 21). See also Melina (2001 , 46): “[According to St. Augustine] for happiness, subjective satisfaction (to have everything one wants is not enough; it is also necessary that there be rectitude of the will (not to want anything evil) … . ‘To desire happiness is nothing other than to desire the satisfaction of the will,’ but then he affirms that only the true Good can fully satisfy the will.”

8 Rather than “vicious,” which is how W.D. Ross translates Aristotle's word, I will use “vice-filled.” Aristotle uses φαύλος (low in rank, mean, and common) vs. ε̉πιεικης (reasonable, fair, kind, gentle, and good); with related terms κα˘κός (bad, evil, and wicked) vs. α̉γα˘θός (good); and αι̉σχρόν (shameful, disgraceful, base, and infamous) vs. καλόν (well and rightly). See Aristotle (n.d.), for example, bk. 3, n. 5 (1113b10).

9 See especially bk. 7 in the Nicomachean Ethics ; and Thomas Aquinas's discussion of bk. 7 in Aquinas (1993) . There are also two more categories: the godlike and the brutish, but, Aristotle says, such persons as these are rare. See Aristotle (n.d. , bk. 7, chap. 1, 1145a15–30).

10 Other examples are assisting in euthanasia, writing prescriptions for euthanasia drugs, referring for abortions, etc. I will use the contraception example throughout. Also, contraception can be prescribed to treat medical conditions such as endometriosis. In this example, I will be discussing it purely as contraception, leaving aside medicinal uses.

11 Aquinas (1975 , bk. 3, chap. 106, n. 7); Ratzinger (1984 , 10): “Moral behavior is a response to reality and therefore requires a knowledge of reality.”

12 Stein (2002 , 429–30). See also Wojtyla (1979 , 158–59).

13 See Aquinas (1993 , bk. 3, lec. 8, n. 474), on ends; also Audi (1991 , 313), on changing beliefs.

14 This also is Pope John Paul's point about the fundamental option: one bad act can change one's orientation to the good. Each action must orient one towards the good. See John Paul II (1993 , n. 70).

15 Keep in mind that character does not go from good to neutral to bad, but all along the scale the good and the bad overlap. On the side of good character, the person is mostly good and maybe a little bad, and on the bad side, the person is mostly bad and maybe a little good.

16 See, for example, Gal 2:20 and Eph 4:15. See also John Paul II (1993 , n. 73) and Clarke (1993 , 96): “No one can reach mature development as a person without the experience of opening oneself, giving oneself to another in self-forgetting love of some kind.” For more on this self-transcendence, see Clarke (1993) , esp. “Personal Being as Self-Transcending,” 94–108: the loss of oneself in becoming united with God, a movement from self-centeredness to God-centeredness, is a “finding of one's true self at a deeper level” ( Clarke 1993 , 99). It would be interesting to see how Stein's thoughts, in Stein (2002 , esp. 510–27), on the unity of human beings in Christ relate to this.

17 See, for example, CNN (2000) and Wright and the Associated Press (2006) .

18 Aquinas (1948 , III, q. 63, a. 2, s.c.; q. 72, a. 5, obj. 2).

19 Though this is limited more or less by one's DNA, environment, and other factors as discussed above. Some interesting comments on the formability of character have been made, which cannot be explored in detail in this paper but are worth mentioning. Aquinas says, in Aquinas (1948 , I-II, q. 96, a. 4), that “a law that inflicts unjust hurt on its subjects” (ad 3) that is “wicked laws,” “often bring loss of character” (obj. 3). Leo XIII (1878 , nn. 14–15) said that character is “reformed” through teaching, “pursuit of virtue,” and obedience; and weakened by “seeking after self-interest alone”; also Leo XIII (1893 , n. 15), “discover[ing] the true relation between time and eternity … form[s] strong and noble characters.” And Vatican Council II (1975) said, in Gaudium et spes , n. 61, that understanding of others “refines man's character.”

20 Aquinas (1948 , I-II, q. 1, a. 1, c.) and John Paul II (1993 , n. 71). See also, Wojtyla (1979 , 207–19).

21 Von Hildebrand and Von Hildebrand (1966 , 88). Even what seem to be purely mental acts, such as believing in God, manifest themselves bodily (e.g., worship, prayer, almsgiving, and admitting one's faith to others). When the mental act does not manifest itself physically, one is labeled either deluded about oneself or a hypocrite. More on this later.

22 Even something seemly mundane such as choosing which color dress to buy is still a moral act: I am choosing a purple dress because my sister hates purple (choosing the evil or uncharitable) vs. because purple looks good on me or it is my favorite color (choosing the good).

23 Schmitz (1993 , 66). Schmitz continues: “The basis and source of action is … the whole person … . The whole person is caught up in and fully engaged through his or her own action.” See also Von Hildebrand and Von Hildebrand (1966 , 87–92).

24 Wojtyla (1979 , 11), quoted in Schmitz (1993 , 66).

25 See Aquinas (1948 , I-II, q. 1, a. 1, c.; q. 8, a. 1) and Wojtyla (1979 , 124–39, 161).

26 For this discussion of intention, see Anscombe (1981 , 75–82) and Anscombe (1963 , nn. [19–20], 21–28b, 45–49).

27 See Wrathall (2005 , 111–12); also, the body is “a third term in between mind and matter” (113).

28 Aristotle (n.d. , bk. 3, ch. 1) and Aquinas (1993 , bk. 3, lec. 1).

29 Aristotle (n.d. , bk. 3, ch. 1), Aquinas (1993 , bk. 3, lec. 3), and John Paul II (1993 , n. 52).

30 Maurice Merleau-Ponty says that to even consider the relationship of soul to body is to engage in dualism. See Wrathall (2005 , 111–12).

31 Finnis (1998 , 41). Schmitz (1993 , 83): “Through our human acts ( actus humanus ) we effect ourselves and other persons and things; and in this efficacy lies the root of our responsibility.”

32 Finnis (1998 , 41 note 68): “Even though a single choice (Aquinas thinks) cannot form a habitual disposition in the strict sense (which is formed by reiteration of acts: I-II q. 51, a. 3), still a choice lasts in, and shapes, one's will(ingness) until one repudiates or repents of it (see e.g., Ver . q. 24, a. 12, c.).”

33 Stein (2002 , 429): “[Human beings'] free modes of action are not co-extensive with the soul's total being but are rather an exertion of influence on something that is engaged in a process of evolution, and these free modes of action leave certain traces in the soul by virtue of which the soul attains to its final structural formation and firm contour.”

34 Schmitz (1993 , 85–86). See also, John Paul II (1993 , n. 52).

35 Schmitz (1993 , 89). Wojtyla (1979 , 99): “The becoming of man in his moral aspect that is strictly connected with the person is the decisive factor in determining the concrete realistic character of goodness and badness, of the moral values themselves as concretized in human acting. Without in any way constituting the content of consciousness itself they belong integrally to the personal, human becoming. Man not only concretizes them in action and experiences them but because of them he himself, as a being, actually becomes good or bad. Moral conduct partakes of the reality of human actions as expressing a specific type and line of becoming of the man-subject, the type of becoming that is most intrinsically related to his nature, that is, his humanness, and to the fact of his being a person.” See also, John Paul II (1993 , nn. 39, 71).

36 Audi (1991 , 311–12). See also Aquinas (1948 , III, q. 63, obj. 1 and 2, and c).

37 Wojtyla (1979 , 162): “Without truthfulness (or while out of touch with it) the conscience or, more broadly speaking, the whole specific system of the moral function and order cannot be properly grasped and correctly interpreted.”

38 Aquinas (1948 , I, q. 63, a. 1, ad 4; I-II, q. 10, a. 1; q. 74, a. 1, ad 1; q. 75, a. 1, ad 3).

39 John Paul II (1993 , n. 72): “ The morality of acts is defined by the relationship of man's freedom with the authentic good … . Acting is morally good when the choices of freedom are in conformity with man's true good . The rational ordering of the human act to the good in its truth and the voluntary pursuit of that good, known by reason, constitute morality. Hence human activity cannot be judged as morally good merely because it is a means for attaining one or another of its goals, or simply because the subject's intention is good. Activity is morally good when it attests to and expresses … the conformity of a concrete action with the human good as it is acknowledged in its truth by reason. If the object of the concrete action is not in harmony with the true good of the person, the choice of that action makes our will and ourselves morally evil.” See also Vatican Council II (1975, n. 17).

40 McInerny (2004 , 100): “The moral task is to acquire a character which enables us to maneuver through the contingencies of life in such a way that we act well and thus achieve what is perfective of us. The desire for the good is a given, that is what is meant by calling it natural. However, reflection not only reveals the notion of ultimate end, but makes clear that we must do those things which truly constitute our fulfillment and perfection. The criteria for the true good must be sought in our nature as rational agents.”

41 Melina (2001 , 43): “When one speaks of the ‘moral good’ one understands, first of all, the moral good that is the very person who chooses, that is, it is the ‘good of the person’—what makes the person good—insofar as he becomes good by means of his choices. This is only possible because his will has the unique characteristic of being ‘sealed’ by the way in which the subject freely realizes himself with respect to different intelligible human goods … the moral goodness of the person is determined not only by the subjective intentionality of ‘willing the good’ but also by the adequate relationship that the will establishes regarding these concrete good objects of choices, on the basis of a rational knowledge that has a connotation specifically practical.”

42 See John Paul II (1995 , n. 4), Ashley and O'Rourke (1997 , 47–48) (Ashley and O'Rourke word it a little too strongly, physicians can make some ethical judgments autonomously just based on the ends of medicine), Hauser (2005) , Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993 , 38), and Melina (1998 , 392): “the act of recognizing the value of life is laden with consequences for the subject who performs it. Not only does it immediately reveal definite moral obligations that he is bound to observe, but it also dramatically mirrors the very human identity of the person who makes a judgment about life's value … . To recognize the personal dignity of a nascent human embryo or fetus, or of a terminally ill person, means at the same time to perceive definite moral obligations towards him.”

43 Taylor (1964 , 21–23) and Audi (1991 , 304 note 1) (and other places): “See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics , bk. 1, in which Aristotle says that moral virtue is formed by habit … , and that we are praised and blamed for virtues and vices … . Compare his remarks, in bk. 3, that our character is determined by our choosing good or evil … , and that the virtues ‘are in our power and voluntary.’”

44 John Paul II (1993 , n. 78). See also Caffara (1987 , 162): “To say, then, that an act is good by its nature is to say that it has in itself the capacity to realize the human person as such, so that a properly ordered will can choose to perform it without destroying the will's rectitude. The act is in itself able to mediate, to concretize, a true self-determination of the person.”

45 Melina (2001 , 44). See also Wojtyla (1979 , 124–39).

46 Melina (2001 , 51), see also 51–53.

47 Catechism of the Catholic Church (1994 , n. 1810) and Leo XIII (1891 , n. 50).

48 Caffara (1987 , 167). See also Finnis (1998 , 84–85) and Melina (2001 , 44): “by means of a connaturality of the subject with the true Good, they [the virtues] make it possible for what really is good in itself and in accordance with the truth also to appear good to the virtuous person. By means of a virtuous connaturality, that which is good ‘in itself’ ( bonum simpliciter ) is perceived also as good ‘for me’ ( bonum conveniens ).”

49 Aquinas (1993 , bk. 7, lec. 8, n. 1431), see also n. 1432.

50 Finnis (1998 , 84–85 note 114): “[All human] virtues pre-exist in one's natural orientation towards the good of virtue [ naturali ordinatione ad bonum virtutis ], which exists in one's reason in so far as one is aware of this kind of good, and in one's will in so far as one is naturally interested in that good, and also exists somehow in one's lower powers in so far as they are naturally subject to one's reason.”

51 Caffara (1987 , 168) and Finnis (1998 , 119).

52 Aquinas (1948 , II-II, q. 47, a. 1, s.c.). See also, Ratzinger (1984 , 10): “It was not without reason that the ancients placed prudence as the first cardinal virtue: They understood it to mean the willingness and the capacity to perceive reality and respond to it in an objective manner.”

53 Melina (2001 , 53–54). See also Aquinas (1948 , I-II, q. 65, a. 4, ad 1).

54 Aquinas (1948 , I-II, q. 73, a. 1): “the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together in the right reason of things to be done, namely, prudence.”

55 John Paul II (1993 , n. 67): “Judgments about morality cannot be made without taking into consideration whether or not the deliberate choice of a specific kind of behavior is in conformity with the dignity and integral vocation of the human person. Every choice always implies a reference by the deliberate will to the goods and evils indicated by the natural law as goods to be pursued and evils to be avoided. In the case of the positive moral precepts, prudence always has the task of verifying that they apply in a specific situation, for example, in view of other duties which may be more important or urgent. But the negative moral precepts, those prohibiting certain concrete actions or kinds of behavior as intrinsically evil, do not allow for any legitimate exception. They do not leave room, in any morally acceptable way, for the “creativity” of any contrary determination whatsoever. Once the moral species of an action prohibited by a universal rule is concretely recognized, the only morally good act is that of obeying the moral law and of refraining from the action which it forbids.” I am leaving aside here, as beyond the scope of this paper, a discussion of whether or not writing a prescription for contraception (as opposed to using contraception) is intrinsically evil and allows for no legitimate exception.

56 John Paul II (1993 , n. 67). See also Stein (2002 , 367).

57 Schmitz (1993 , 77); see also 79, 85–86, 118.

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Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy

Individual autonomy is an idea that is generally understood to refer to the capacity to be one’s own person, to live one’s life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s own and not the product of manipulative or distorting external forces, to be in this way independent. It is a central value in the Kantian tradition of moral philosophy but it is also given fundamental status in John Stuart Mill’s version of utilitarian liberalism (Kant 1785/1983, Mill 1859/1975, ch. III). Examination of the concept of autonomy also figures centrally in debates over education policy, biomedical ethics, various legal freedoms and rights (such as freedom of speech and the right to privacy), as well as moral and political theory more broadly. In the realm of moral theory, seeing autonomy as a central value can be contrasted with alternative frameworks such an ethic of care, utilitarianism of some kinds, and an ethic of virtue. Autonomy has traditionally been thought to connote independence and hence to reflect assumptions of individualism in both moral thinking and designations of political status. For this reason, certain philosophical movements, such as certain strains of feminism, have resisted seeing autonomy as a value (Jaggar 1983, chap. 3). However, in recent decades, theorists have increasingly tried to structure the concept so as to sever its ties to this brand of individualism.

In all such discussions the concept of autonomy is the focus of much controversy and debate, disputes which focus attention on the fundamentals of moral and political philosophy and the Enlightenment conception of the person more generally.

1.1 Basic Distinctions

1.2 conceptual variations, 2.1 autonomy as an object of value, 2.2 autonomy and paternalism, 3.1 autonomy and the foundations of liberalism, 3.2 identity and conceptions of the self, 3.3 relational autonomy.

• 3.4 Autonomy, Liberalism and Perfectionism

3.5 Autonomy and Political Liberalism

3.6 autonomy, justice and democracy, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the concept of autonomy.

In the western tradition, the view that individual autonomy is a basic moral and political value is very much a modern development. Putting moral weight on an individual’s ability to govern herself, independent of her place in a metaphysical order or her role in social structures and political institutions is very much the product of the modernist humanism of which much contemporary moral and political philosophy is an offshoot. (For historical discussions of autonomy, see Schneewind 1988, Swain 2016 and Rosich 2019). As such, it bears the weight of the controversies that this legacy has attracted. The idea that moral principles and obligations, as well as the legitimacy of political authority, should be grounded in the self-governing individual, considered apart from various contingencies of place, culture, and social relations, invites skeptics from several quarters. Autonomy, then, is very much at the vortex of the complex (re)consideration of modernity.

Put most simply, to be autonomous is to govern oneself, to be directed by considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one’s authentic self. Autonomy in this sense seems an irrefutable value, especially since its opposite — being guided by forces external to the self and which one cannot authentically embrace — seems to mark the height of oppression. But specifying more precisely the conditions of autonomy inevitably sparks controversy and invites skepticism about the claim that autonomy is an unqualified value for all people.

Autonomy plays various roles in theoretical accounts of persons, conceptions of moral obligation and responsibility, the justification of social policies and in numerous aspects of political theory. It forms the core of the Kantian conception of practical reason (see, e.g, Korsgaard 1996, Hill 1989) and, relatedly, connects to questions of moral responsibility (see Wolff 1970, 12–19). It is also seen as the aspect of persons that prevents or ought to prevent paternalistic interventions in their lives (Dworkin 1988, 121–29). It plays a role in education theory and policy, on some views specifying the core goal of liberal education generally (Gutmann 1987, Cuypers and Haji 2008; for discussion, see Brighouse 2000, 65–111). Also, despite many feminists’ reservations concerning the ideal of autonomy, it is sometimes seen as a valuable conceptual element in some feminist ideals, such as the identification and elimination of social conditions that victimize women and other (potentially) vulnerable people (Friedman 1997, Meyers 1987, Christman 1995. Veltman and Piper 2014)).

Several distinctions must be made to zero in on the kind of autonomy that is of greatest interest to moral and political theory. “Moral autonomy” refers to the capacity to impose the (putatively objective) moral law on oneself, and, following Kant, it is claimed as a fundamental organizing principle of all morality (Hill 1989). On the other hand, what can be called “personal autonomy” is meant as a trait that individuals can exhibit relative to any aspects of their lives, not limited to questions of moral obligation (Dworkin 1988, 34–47).

Personal (or individual) autonomy should also be distinguished from freedom , although again, there are many renderings of these concepts, and certainly some conceptions of positive freedom will be equivalent to what is often meant by autonomy (Berlin 1969, 131–34). Generally, one can distinguish autonomy from freedom in that the latter concerns the ability to act, without external or internal constraints and also (on some conceptions) with sufficient resources and power to make one’s desires effective (Berlin 1969, Crocker 1980, MacCallum 1967). Autonomy concerns the independence and authenticity of the desires (values, emotions, etc.) that move one to act in the first place. Some distinguish autonomy from freedom by insisting that freedom concerns particular acts while autonomy is a more global notion, referring to states of a person (Dworkin 1988, 13–15, 19–20). But autonomy can be used to refer both to the global condition (autonomous personhood) and as a more local notion (autonomous relative to a particular trait, motive, value, or social condition). Addicted smokers for example are autonomous persons in a general sense but (for some) helplessly unable to control their behavior regarding this one activity (Christman 1989, 13–14; cf. Meyers 1987, 66–67).

In addition, we must keep separate the idea of basic autonomy, the minimal status of being responsible, independent and able to speak for oneself, from ideal autonomy, an achievement that serves as a goal to which we might aspire and according to which a person is maximally authentic and free of manipulative, self-distorting influences. Any plausible conceptualization of basic autonomy must, among other things, imply that most adults who are not suffering from debilitating pathologies or are under oppressive and constricting conditions count as autonomous. Autonomy as an ideal, on the other hand, may well be enjoyed by very few if any individuals, for it functions as a goal to be attained.

The reason to construe basic autonomy broadly enough to include most adults is that autonomy connects with other status designators which apply (or, it is claimed, should apply) in this sweeping manner. Autonomy is connected, for example, to moral and legal responsibility, on some views (e.g., Ripstein 1999); autonomous agency is seen as necessary (and for some sufficient) for the condition of equal political standing; moreover, being autonomous stands as a barrier to unchecked paternalism, both in the personal, informal spheres and in legal arenas (Feinberg 1986). Lacking autonomy, as young children do, is a condition which allows or invites sympathy, care, paternalism and possibly pity. Therefore, a guiding consideration in evaluating particular conceptions of autonomy (though hardly a hard and fast test) will be whether it connects properly to these ancillary judgments (for discussion of “formal conditions” of a concept of autonomy, see Dworkin 1988, 7–10).

The variety of contexts in which the concept of autonomy functions has suggested to many that there are simply a number of different conceptions, and that the word simply refers to different elements in each of those contexts (Arpaly 2004). Others have claimed that while there may be a single over-arching concept of autonomy, we should think in terms of separable dimensions of it rather than an all or nothing idea (Mackenzei 2014 and Killmister 2017). Feinberg has claimed that there are at least four different meanings of “autonomy” in moral and political philosophy: the capacity to govern oneself, the actual condition of self-government, a personal ideal, and a set of rights expressive of one’s sovereignty over oneself (Feinberg 1989). One might argue that central to all of these uses is a conception of the person able to act, reflect, and choose on the basis of factors that are somehow her own (authentic in some sense). Nevertheless, it is clear that formulating a “theory” of the concept will involve more than merely uncovering the obscure details of the idea’s essence, for autonomy, like many concepts central to contentious moral or political debate is itself essentially contested. So a theory of autonomy is simply a conceptual model aimed at capturing the general sense of “self-rule” or “self-government” (ideas which obviously admit of their own vagaries) and which can be used to support principles or policies the theory attempts to justify.

The idea of self-rule contains two components: the independence of one’s deliberation and choice from manipulation by others, and the capacity to rule oneself (see Dworkin 1989, 61f and Arneson 1991). However, the ability to rule oneself will lie at the core of the concept, since a full account of that capability will surely entail the freedom from external manipulation characteristic of independence. Indeed, it could be claimed that independence per se has no fixed meaning or necessary connection with self-government unless we know what kinds of independence is required for self-rule (cf., however Raz 1986, 373–78).

Focusing, then, on the requirements of self rule, it can be claimed that to govern oneself one must be in a position to act competently based on desires (values, conditions, etc.) that are in some sense one’s own. This picks out the two families of conditions often proffered in conceptions of autonomy: competency conditions and authenticity conditions. Competency includes various capacities for rational thought, self-control, and freedom from debilitating pathologies, systematic self-deception, and so on. (Different accounts include different conditions: see, for example, Berofsky 1995, R. Young 1991, Haworth 1986, Meyers 1989.)

Authenticity conditions often include the capacity to reflect upon and endorse (or identify with) one’s desires, values, and so on. The most influential models of authenticity in this vein claim that autonomy requires second-order identification with first order desires. For Frankfurt, for instance, such second-order desires must actually have the structure of a volition: wanting that the first order desires issue in action, that they comprise one’s will. Moreover, such identification, on his view, must be “wholehearted” for the resulting action to count as free (autonomous). [ 1 ]

This overall approach to autonomy has been very influential, and several writers have developed variations of it and defended it against objections. The most prominent objections concern, on the one hand, the fatal ambiguities of the concept of “identification” and, on the other, the threat of an infinite regress of conditions. The first problem surrounds the different ways that one can be said to “identify” with a desire, each of which render the view conceptually suspect. Either one identifies with an aspect of oneself in the sense of simply acknowledging it (without judgment) or one identifies with a desire in an aspirational, approving sense of that term. In the first case, however, identification would clearly not be a consistent mark of autonomy, for one could easily identify as part of oneself any manner of addictive, constricting, or imposed aspects of one’s make-up. But approving of a trait is also problematic as a requirement of autonomy, for there are many perfectly authentic aspects of myself (ones for which I can and should be held fully responsible for example) which I do not fully approve of. I’m not perfect, but does that mean that I am thereby not autonomous? (Cf. Watson 1989, Berofsky 1995, 99–102). [ 2 ]

This model stresses internal self-reflection and procedural independence. However, the view includes no stipulations about the content of the desires, values, and so on, in virtue of which one is considered autonomous, specifically there is no requirement that one act from desires independently of others. Were there to be such a requirement, it would involve what is called “substantive independence”. Some writers have insisted that the autonomous person must enjoy substantive independence as well as procedural independence (e.g., Stoljar 2000, Benson 1987, 2005, Oshana 2006). The motivation for such a position is the idea a person under constrained life situations should not be considered autonomous no matter how “voluntary” (or autonomous) was the choice that put her in that position (cf. Meyers 2000). This claim, however, threatens to rob the attribution of autonomy of any claim to value neutrality it may otherwise carry, for if, conceptually, one is not autonomous when one (freely, rationally, without manipulation) chooses to enter conditions of severely limited choice, then the concept is reserved to only those lifestyles and value pursuits that are seen as acceptable from a particular political or theoretical point of view. I will return to this line of thought in a moment. In rejoinder, it has been claimed that such procedural neutrality could not capture the value autonomy has for people, and moreover, a “weakly substantive” view can be compatible with a political form of liberalism as long as the values inherent in the concept could be accepted by reasonable persons in an overlapping consensus (see Freyenhagen 2017).

One variation on the internal self-reflection model focuses on the importance of the personal history of the agent as an element of her autonomy (Christman 1991, Mele 1993; cf. Fisher & Ravizza 1998; cf. also Raz 1986, 371). On these views, the question of whether a person is autonomous at a time depends on the processes by which she came to be the way she is. It is not clear that such a focus will be able to avoid the problems raised about internal reflection models (see Mele 1991, Mackenzie & Stoljar 2000b, 16–17), but such a move attempts to embrace a conception of the self of self-government which is not only social but diachronically structured (see, e.g., Cuypers 2001).

For those who are wary of the postulate of reflective self endorsement, an alternative approach is to equate autonomy with simply a set of competences, such as the capacity to choose deliberatively, rationally, and, as Berofsky claims, “objectively” (see Berofsky 1995, Meyers 1989). This locates autonomy in the general capacity to respond to reasons, and not, for example, in acts of internal self-identification. However, even in these accounts, the capacity to think critically and reflectively is necessary for autonomy as one of the competences in question, even though the reflective thought required need not refer to external values or ideals (Berofsky 1995, ch. 5).

Further difficulties have been raised with the requirement of second order self-appraisal for autonomy. For it is unclear that such higher level judgments have any greater claim to authenticity than their first order cousins. Clearly if a person is manipulated or oppressed (and hence non-autonomous), it could well be that the reflective judgments she makes about herself are just as tainted by that oppression as are her ground-level decisions (Thalberg 1989, Friedman 1986, Meyers 1989, 25–41, Noggle 2005), and often our second order reflective voices are merely rationalizations and acts of self-deception rather than true and settled aspects of our character (for general discussion see the essays in Veltman and Piper 2014). This has led to the charge that models of autonomy which demand second-order endorsement merely introduce an infinite regress: for second-level judgments must be tested for their authenticity in the same way as first order desires are, but if that is so, then ever higher levels of endorsement would be called for. Various responses to this problem have been made, for the most part involving the addition of conditions concerning the manner in which such reflection must be made, for example that it must be free of certain distorting factors itself, it must reflect an adequate causal history, and the like (Christman 1991, Mele 1995).

Other aspects of the inner reflection model should be noted. As just mentioned, this view of autonomy is often stated as requiring critical self reflection (see, e.g., Haworth 1986). This has been understood as involving a rational appraisal of one’s desires, testing them for internal consistency, their relation to reliable beliefs, and the like. But an overly narrow concentration on rational assessment exposes such conceptions to charges of hyper intellectualism, painting a picture of the autonomous person as a cold, detached calculator (see Meyers 2004, 111–37). Connections to values, desires, and personal traits are often grounded in emotional and affective responses, ones connected with care, commitment, and relations to others (see Friedman 1998, MacKenzie & Stoljar 2000b, Meyers 1989, de Calleja, Mirja Perez 2019). For parallel reasons, some theorists have noted that concentration on only desires as the focal point of autonomy is overly narrow, as people can (fail to) exhibit self-government relative to a wide range of personal characteristics, such as values, physical traits, relations to others, and so on (see Double 1992, 66).

2. Autonomy in Moral Philosophy

Autonomy is central in certain moral frameworks, both as a model of the moral person — the feature of the person by virtue of which she is morally obligated — and as the aspect of persons which grounds others’ obligations to her or him. For Kant, the self-imposition of universal moral law is the ground of both moral obligation generally and the respect others owe to us (and we owe ourselves). In short, practical reason — our ability to use reasons to choose our own actions — presupposes that we understand ourselves as free. Freedom means lacking barriers to our action that are in any way external to our will, though it also requires that we utilize a law to guide our decisions, a law that can come to us only by an act of our own will (for further discussion see Hill 1989; for doubts about this reading, see Kleingeld and Willaschek 2019). This self-imposition of the moral law is autonomy. And since this law must have no content provided by sense or desire, or any other contingent aspect of our situation, it must be universal. Hence we have the (first formulation of the) Categorical Imperative, that by virtue of our being autonomous we must act only on those maxims that we can consistently will as a universal law.

The story continues, however: for the claim is that this capacity (to impose upon ourselves the moral law) is the ultimate source of all moral value — for to value anything (instrumentally or intrinsically) implies the ability to make value judgments generally, the most fundamental of which is the determination of what is morally valuable. Some theorists who are not (self-described) Kantians have made this inference central to their views of autonomy. Paul Benson, for example, has argued that being autonomous implies a measure of self-worth in that we must be in a position to trust our decision-making capacities to put ourselves in a position of responsibility (Benson 1994; cf. also Grovier 1993, Lehrer 1997, and Westlund 2014). But the Kantian position is that such self-regard is not a contingent psychological fact about us, but an unavoidable implication of the exercise of practical reason (cf. Taylor 2005).

So we owe to ourselves moral respect in virtue of our autonomy. But insofar as this capacity depends in no way on anything particular or contingent about ourselves, we owe similar respect to all other persons in virtue of their capacity. Hence (via the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative), we are obliged to act out of fundamental respect for other persons in virtue of their autonomy. In this way, autonomy serves as both a model of practical reason in the determination of moral obligation and as the feature of other persons deserving moral respect from us. (For further discussion, see Immanual Kant and moral philosophy .)

Recent discussions of Kantian autonomy have downplayed the transcendental nature of practical reason in this account (see, for example, Herman 1993 and Hill 1991). For example, Christine Korsgaard follows Kant in seeing our capacity for self-reflection as both the object of respect and the seat of normativity generally. On her view, we are all guided by what she calls a “practical identity”, a point of view which orients reflection on values and manifests an aspect of our self concept. But unlike Kant, Korsgaard argues that we have different practical identities that are the source of our normative commitments, and not all of them are of fundamental moral worth. But the most general of such identities — that which makes us members of a kingdom of ends — is our moral identity, which yields universal duties and obligations independent of contingent factors. Autonomy is the source of all obligations, whether moral or non-moral, since it is the capacity to impose upon ourselves, by virtue of our practical identities, obligations to act (Korsgaard 1996).

Traditional critiques of autonomy-based moral views, and Kant’s in particular, have been mounted along various lines. I mention two here, as they connect with issues concerning autonomy in social and political theory. The first concerns the way in which autonomy-based moral theory grounds obligation in our cognitive abilities rather than in our emotions and affective connections (see, e.g., Williams 1985, Stocker 1976). The claim is that Kantian morality leaves too little room for the kinds of emotional reactions that are constitutive of moral response in many situations: the obligations of parents for example concern not only what they do but the passions and care they bring forth in doing it. To view obligation as arising from autonomy but understanding autonomy in a purely cognitive manner makes such an account vulnerable to this kind of charge.

The difficulty this criticism points to resides in the ambiguities of the self-description that we might utilize in valuing our “humanity” — our capacity to obligate ourselves. For we can reflect upon our decision-making capacities and value this positively (and fundamentally) but regard that “self” engaging the capacity in different ways. The Kantian model of such a self is of a pure cognizer — a reflective agent engaged in practical reason. But also involved in decision-making are our passions — emotions, desires, felt commitments, senses of attraction and aversion, alienation and comfort. These are both the objects of our judgement and partly constitutive of them — to passionately embrace an option is different from cooly determining it to be best. Judgment is involved with all such passions when decisions are made. And it (judgment) need not be understood apart from them, but as an ability to engage in those actions whose passionate and reasoned support we muster up. So when the optimal decision for me is an impassioned one, I must value my ability to engage in the right passions, not merely in the ability to cold-heartedly reflect and choose. Putting the passions outside the scope of reasoned reflection, as merely an ancillary quality of the action — to consider how to do something not merely what we are doing — is to make one kind of decision. Putting passions inside that scope — saying that what it is right to do now is to act with a certain affect or passion — is another. When we generalize from our ability to make the latter sort of decisions, we must value not only the ability to weigh options and universalize them but also the ability to engage the right affect, emotion, etc. Therefore, we value ourselves and others as passionate reasoners not merely reasoners per se.

The implication of this observation is that in generalizing our judgments in the manner Korsgaard (following Kant) says we must, we need not commit ourselves to valuing only the cognitive capacities of humanity but also its (relatively) subjective elements.

A second question is this: since the reflection that is involved in autonomy (and which, according to this view, is the source of normativity) need only be hypothetical reflection upon one’s desires and mental capacities, then the question arises: under what conditions is this hypothetical reflection meant to take place? If the capacity for reflection is the seat of obligation, then we must ask if the conditions under which such hypothetical reflection takes place are idealized in any sense — if they are assumed to be reasonable for example. Are we considering merely the reflections the (actual) person would make were she to turn her attention to the question, no matter how unreasonable such reflections might be? If so, why should we think this grounds obligations? If we assume they are reasonable, then under some conditions moral obligations are not imposed by the actual self but rather by an idealized, more rational self. This implies that morality is not literally self-imposed if by “self” one means the actual set of judgments made by the agent in question. Indeed, a Platonist/realist about moral value could claim that the objective values which (according to the theory) apply to all agents independent of choice are in fact “self-imposed” in this idealized sense: they would be imposed were the person to reflect on the matter, acting as a perfectly reasonable agent. This shows the complex and potentially problematic implications of this ambiguity.

This points to the question of whether autonomy can be the seat of moral obligation and respect if autonomy is conceived in a purely procedural manner. If no substantive commitments or value orientations are included in the conceptual specification of autonomy, then it is unclear how this capacity grounds any particular substantive value commitments. On the other hand, if autonomy includes a specification of particular values in its conditions — that the autonomous person must value her own freedom for example — then it turns out that moral obligation (and respect) attaches only to those already committed in this way, and not more generally to all rational agents as such (as traditionally advertised by the view). This echoes, of course, Hegel’s critique of Kant.

These difficulties point to ambiguities in autonomy-based moral views, ones which may well be clarified in further developments of those theories. They also pick up on traditional problems with Kantian ethics (though there are many other such difficulties not mentioned here). Before leaving moral philosophy, we should consider ethical views which focus on autonomy but which do not depend directly on a Kantian framework.

Autonomy can play a role in moral theory without that theory being fully Kantian in structure. For example, it is possible to argue that personal autonomy has intrinsic value independent of a fully worked out view of practical reason. Following John Stuart Mill, for example, one can claim that autonomy is “one of the elements of well-being” (Mill 1859/1975, ch. III). Viewing autonomy as an intrinsic value or as a constitutive element in personal well-being in this way opens the door to a generally consequentialist moral framework while paying heed to the importance of self-government to a fulfilling life (for discussion see Sumner 1996).

It may also be unclear why autonomy — viewed here as the capacity to reflect on and endorse one’s values, character and commitments — should have value independent of the results of exercising that capacity. Why is one person’s autonomy intrinsically valuable when she uses it to, say, harm herself or make rash or morally skewed choices? More generally, how can we take account of the systematic biases and distortions that plague typical human reasoning in valuing people’s capacity to make decisions for themselves (see, e.g., Conly 2013)? This question becomes more acute as we consider ways that autonomy can obtain in degrees, for then it is unclear why personal autonomy should be seen as equally valuable in persons who display different levels of it (or different levels of those abilities that are its conditions, such as rationality).

Indeed, autonomy is often cited as the ground of treating all individuals equally from a moral point of view. But if autonomy is not an all-or-nothing characteristic, this commitment to moral equality becomes problematic (Arneson 1999). It can be argued that insofar as the abilities required for autonomy, such as rational reflectiveness, competences in carrying out one’s decisions, and the like, vary across individuals (within or between species as well), then it is difficult to maintain that all autonomous beings have equal moral status or that their interests deserve the same weight in considering decisions that affect them.

The move that must be made here, I think, picks up on Korsgaard’s gloss on Kantianism and the argument that our reflective capacities ultimately ground our obligations to others and, in turn, others’ obligations to regard us as moral equals. Arneson argues, however, that people surely vary in this capacity as well — the ability to reflectively consider options and choose sensibly from among them. Recall what we said above concerning the ambiguities of Korsgaard’s account concerning the degree to which the self-reflection that grounds obligation is idealized at all. If it is, then it is not the everyday capacity to look within ourselves and make a choice that gives us moral status but the more rarified ability to do so rationally, in some full sense. But we surely vary in our ability to reach that ideal, so why should our autonomy be regarded as equally worthy?

The answer may be that our normative commitments do not arise from our actual capacities to reflect and to choose (though we must have such capacities to some minimal degree), but rather from the way in which we must view ourselves as having these capacities. We give special weight to our own present and past decisions, so that we continue on with projects and plans we make because (all other things being equal) we made them, they are ours, at least when we do them after some reflective deliberation. The pull that our own decisions have on our ongoing projects and actions can only be explained by the assumption that we confer status and value on decisions simply because we reflectively made them (perhaps, though, in light of external, objective considerations). This is an all-or-nothing capacity and hence may be enough to ground our equal status even if perhaps, in real life, we exercise this capacity to varying degrees. [ 3 ] Much has been written about conceptions of well being that rehearse these worries (see Sumner 1996, Griffin 1988). Such a view might be buttressed with the idea that the attribution of autonomous agency, and the respect that purportedly goes with it, is itself a normative stance, not a mere observation of how a person actually thinks and acts (for discussion of this position see Christman 2009, chap. 10 and Korsgaard 2014)

Autonomy is the aspect of persons that undue paternalism offends against. Paternalistic interventions can be both interpersonal (governed by social and moral norms) and a matter of policy (mediated by formal or legal rules). Such interventions are identified not by the kind of acts they involve but by the justification given for them, so that paternalism involves interference with a person’s actions or knowledge against that person’s will for the purpose of advancing that person’s good. Respect for autonomy is meant to prohibit such interventions because they involve a judgment that the person is not able to decide for herself how best to pursue her own good. Autonomy is the ability to so decide, so for the autonomous subject of such interventions paternalism involves a lack of respect for autonomy. See also Paternalism .

But as our discussion of the nature of autonomy indicated, it is often unclear exactly what that characteristic involves. Important in this context is whether autonomy can be manifested in degrees — whether the abilities and capacities that constitute autonomy obtain all at once or progressively, or I can enjoy sufficient autonomy in some areas of my life but not in others. If autonomy is a matter of degree in any of these ways, then it is unclear that a blanket prohibition against paternalism is warranted. Some people will be less able to judge for themselves what their own good is and hence be more susceptible to (justified) paternalistic intervention (Conly 2013; see also Killmister 2017, chap. 7).

Often such an obligation toward another person requires us to treat her as autonomous, independent of the extent to which she is so concerning the choice in question. At least this is the case when a person is autonomous above a certain threshold: she is an adult, not under the influence of debilitating factors, and so on. I might know that a person is to some degree under the sway of external pressures that are severely limiting her ability to govern her life and make independent choices. But as long as she has not lost the basic ability to reflectively consider her options and make choices, if I intervene against her will (for her own good), I show less respect for her as a person than if I allow her to make her own mistakes. (Which is not to say, of course, that intervention in such cases might not, in the end, be justified; only that something is lost when it is engaged in, and what is lost is a degree of interpersonal respect we owe each other.)

However, as we saw in the last section, this move depends on the determination of basic autonomy and an argument that such a threshold is non-arbitrary. Also relevant here is the question of procedural versus substantive autonomy as the ground of the prohibition of paternalism. For if by “autonomy” we mean the ability to govern oneself no matter how depraved or morally worthless are the options being exercised, it is unclear that the bar to paternalism (and respect for persons generally) retains its normative force. As I mentioned above, the response to this challenge must be that the decision making capacity itself is of non-derivative value, independent of the content of those decisions, at least if one wishes to avoid the difficulties of positing a substantive (and hence non-neutral) conception of autonomy as the basis for interpersonal respect.

This is merely a sampling of some of the central ways that the idea of autonomy figures in moral philosophy. Not discussed here are areas of applied ethics, for example in medical ethics, where respect for autonomy grounds such principles as that of informed consent. Such contexts illustrate the fundamental value that autonomy generally is thought to represent as expressive of one of the fundamentals of moral personhood.

3. Autonomy in Social and Political Philosophy

The conception of the autonomous person plays a variety of roles in various constructions of liberal political theory (for recent discussion, see, e.g., Coburn 2010, Christman 2015 and the essays in Christman and Anderson, eds. 2005). Principally, it serves as the model of the person whose perspective is used to formulate and justify political principles, as in social contract models of principles of justice (Rawls 1971). Also (and correspondingly) it serves as the model of the citizen whose basic interests are reflected in those principles, such as in the claim that basic liberties, opportunities, and other primary goods are fundamental to flourishing lives no matter what moral commitments, life plans, or other particulars of the person might obtain (Kymlicka 1989, 10–19, Waldron 1993: 155–6). [ 4 ] Moreover, autonomy is ascribed to persons (or projected as an ideal) in order to delineate and critique oppressive social conditions, liberation from which is considered a fundamental goal of justice (whether or not those critiques are described as within the liberal tradition or as a specific alternative to it) (cf. Keornahan 1999, Cornell 1998, Young 1990, Gould 1988; cf. also Hirschmann 2002, 1–29).

For our purposes here, liberalism refers generally to that approach to political power and social justice that determines principles of right (justice) prior to, and largely independent of, determination of conceptions of the good (though see Liberalism ; see also Christman 2017, ch. 4). This implies that the liberal conception of justice, and the legitimation of political power more generally, can be specified and justified without crucial reference to controversial conceptions of value and moral principles (what Rawls calls “comprehensive moral conceptions” (Rawls 1993, 13–15). The fact of permanent pluralism of such moral conceptions is therefore central to liberalism. [ 5 ]

One manner in which debates concerning autonomy directly connect to controversies within and about liberalism concerns the role that state neutrality is to play in the justification and application of principles of justice. Neutrality is a controversial standard, of course, and the precise way in which liberal theory is committed to a requirement of neutrality is complex and controversial (see Raz 1986, 110–64, Waldron 1993, 143–67). The question to be asked here is whether the conception of autonomy utilized in liberal theories must itself attempt to be neutral concerning various conceptions of morality and value, or, alternatively, does the reliance on autonomy in the justification and specification of liberal theories of justice render them non-neutral simply because of this reliance (no matter how “neutral” the conception of autonomy utilized turns out to be) (Christman 2015).

Let us consider this first question and in so doing revisit the issue of whether the independence implicit in autonomy should best be conceived in a purely “procedural” manner or more substantively. Recall that some theorists view autonomy as requiring minimal competence (or rationality) along with authenticity, where the latter condition is fleshed out in terms of the capacity to reflectively accept motivational aspects of oneself. This view can be called “proceduralist” because it demands that the procedure by which a person comes to identify a desire (or trait) as her own is what is crucial in the determination of its authenticity and hence autonomy. This conception of autonomy is adopted, according to its defenders, because doing so is the only way to ensure that autonomy is neutral toward all conceptions of value and the good that reasonable adults may come to internalize (Dworkin 1989, Freyenhage 2017).

Critics of this view have pointed to cases where it is imagined that persons adopt what we all would call oppressive and overly restrictive life situations but in a way that meets the minimal conditions of autonomy on proceduralist accounts, so that on such accounts they count as autonomous because of the self-governing processes by which they entered such oppressive conditions. These critics argue that any conception of autonomy that ascribes that trait to such people is wrongly conceived (Benson 1987, MacKenzie & Stoljar 2001b and 2017, Waller 1993, and Oshana 1998). On the basis of such a judgment, they argue that normatively substantive conditions should be added to the requirements of autonomy, conditions such as the ability to recognize and follow certain moral or political norms (See Benson 1987, Wolf 1980; for criticism, see Berofsky 1995, ch. 7). This criticism suggests that considerations concerning the autonomous self cannot avoid questions of identity and hence whether the self of self-government can be understood independently of the (perhaps socially defined) values in terms of which people conceive of themselves; this is a subject to which we now turn.

Autonomy, as we have been describing it, certainly attaches paradigmatically to individual persons; it is not (in this usage) a property of groups or peoples. So the autonomy that grounds basic rights and which connects to moral responsibility, as this concept is thought to do, is assigned to persons without essential reference to other people, institutions, or traditions within which they may live and act. Critics claim, however, that such a view runs counter to the manner in which most of us (or all of us in some ways) define ourselves, and hence diverges problematically from the aspects of identity that motivate action, ground moral commitments, and by which people formulate life plans. Autonomy, it is argued, implies the ability to reflect wholly on oneself, to accept or reject one’s values, connections, and self-defining features, and change such elements of one’s life at will. But we are all not only deeply enmeshed in social relations and cultural patterns, we are also defined by such relations, some claim(Sandel 1982, 15–65). For example, we use language to engage in reflection but language is itself a social product and deeply tied to various cultural forms. In any number of ways we are constituted by factors that lie beyond our reflective control but which nonetheless structure our values, thoughts, and motivations (Taylor 1991, 33f; for discussion see Bell 1993, 24–54). To say that we are autonomous (and hence morally responsible, bear moral rights, etc.) only when we can step back from all such connections and critically appraise and possibly alter them flies in the face of these psychological and metaphysical realities. [ 6 ]

In a different manner, critics have claimed that the liberal conception of the person, reflected in standard models of autonomy, under-emphasizes the deep identity-constituting connections we have with gender, race, culture, and religion, among other things. Such “thick” identities are not central to the understanding of the self-governing person who, according to standard liberal models, is fully able to abstract from such elements of her self-concept and to either identify with or to reject such them. But such an ideal too narrowly valorizes the life of the cosmopolitan “man” — the world traveler who freely chooses whether to settle into this or that community, identify with this or that group, and so on (see Young 1991, Alcoff 2006 and Appiah 2010; for discussion, see Meyers, 2000b).

These challenges have also focused on the relation of the self to its culture (Margalit and Raz, 1990, Tamir 1993). What is at issue from a policy perspective is that emphasis on the individual’s self-government, with the cosmopolitan perspective that this entails, makes it difficult if not impossible to ground rights to the protection and internal self- government of traditional cultures themselves (Kymlicka, 1995). This is problematic in that it excludes from the direct protection of liberal policies those individuals and groups whose self-conceptions and value commitments are deeply constituted by cultural factors. Or, conversely, the assumption that the autonomous person is able to separate himself from all cultural commitments forestalls moves to provide state protection for cultural forms themselves, insofar as such state policies rest on the value of autonomy.

There have been many responses to these charges on behalf of a liberal outlook (e.g., Kymlicka, 1989, Gutman, 1985, Appiah 2005; for a general response to question of cultural identities see Kymlicka 1997). The most powerful response is that autonomy need not require that people be in a position to step away from all of their connections and values and to critically appraise them. Mere piecemeal reflection is all that is required. As Kymlicka puts it: “No particular task is set for us by society, and no particular cultural practice has authority that is beyond individual judgement and possible rejection” (Kymlicka, 1989:, 50).

There is a clarification that is needed in this exchange, however. For insofar as defenders of liberal principles (based on the value of autonomy) claim that all aspects of a person’s self-concept be subject to alteration in order to manifest autonomy, they needlessly exaggerate the commitments of the liberal position. For such a view is open to the charge that liberal conceptions fail to take seriously the permanent and unalterable aspects of the self and its social position (Young, 1990, 46). Our embodiment, for example, is often not something which we can alter other than marginally, and numerous other self-defining factors such as sexual orientation (for some), native language, culture and race, are not readily subject to our manipulation and transformation, even in a piecemeal manner. To say that we are heteronomous because of this is therefore deeply problematic. What must be claimed by the defender of autonomy-based liberalism is that the ability in question is to change those aspects of oneself from which one is deeply alienated (or with which one does not identify, etc.). For in those cases where, upon reflection, one experiences one’s body, culture, race, or sexuality as an external burden constricting one’s more settled and authentic nature, and still one cannot alter that factor, then one lacks autonomy relative to it (see Christman,2009 ch. 6). But if one feels fully at home within those unalterable parameters one does not lack autonomy because of that unalterability (for a different way of approach this issue see Mahmoud 2005 and Khader 2011).

As we said, several writers have claimed that proceduralist accounts of autonomy would wrongly attribute autonomy to those whose restricted socialization and stultifying life conditions pressure them into internalizing oppressive values and norms, for example women who have internalized the belief in the social authority of husbands, or that only by having and raising children are their lives truly complete, and the like. If such women reflect on these values they may well endorse them, even if doing so is free of any specific reflection-inhibiting conditions. But such women surely lack autonomy, it is claimed; so only if autonomy includes a requirement that one be able to recognize basic value claims (such as the person’s own equal moral standing) will that concept be useful in describing the oppressive conditions of a patriarchal society (see, e.g., Oshana, 1998, Stoljar, 2000; for discussion see Christman 2009 chap. 8, Benson, 1990, Friedman, 2000, Meyers, 1987, 1989). [ 7 ]

These and related considerations have sparked some to develop an alternative conception of autonomy meant to replace allegedly overly individualistic notions. This replacement has been called “relational autonomy” (MacKenzie and Stoljar, 2000a). Spurred by feminist critiques of traditional conceptions of autonomy and rights (Nedelsky, 1989, Code, 1991), relational conceptions of autonomy stress the ineliminable role that relatedness plays in both persons’ self- conceptions, relative to which autonomy must be defined, and the dynamics of deliberation and reasoning. These views offer a provocative alternative to traditional models of the autonomous individual, but it must be made clear what position is being taken on the issue: on the one hand, relational accounts can be taken as resting on a non-individualist conception of the person and then claim that insofar as autonomy is self-government and the self is constituted by relations with others, then autonomy is relational; or these accounts may be understood as claiming that whatever selves turn out to be, autonomy fundamentally involves social relations rather than individual traits (Oshana, 2006). Some such views also waiver between claiming that social and personal relations play a crucial causal role in the development and enjoyment of autonomy and claiming that such relations constitute autonomy (for discussion see Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000b, 21–26; for a recent overview, see Mackenzie 2014).

Another relational element to autonomy that has been developed connects social support and recognition of the person’s status to her capacities for self-trust, self-esteem, and self-respect. The core argument in these approaches is that autonomy requires the ability to act effectively on one’s own values (either as an individual or member of a social group), but that oppressive social conditions of various kinds threaten those abilities by removing one’s sense of self-confidence required for effective agency. Social recognition and/or support for this self-trusting status is required for the full enjoyment of these abilities (see Anderson and Honneth 2005, Grovier 1993, Benson 2005, McCleod and Sherwin 2005, and Westlund 2014).

These claims often are accompanied with a rejection of purportedly value-neutral, proceduralist accounts of autonomy, even those that attempt to accommodate a fully social conception of the self. One question that arises with relational views connected to self-trust in this way: why, exactly are such relations seen as conceptually constitutive of autonomy rather than contributory to it (and its development), where the self-confidence or self-trust in question is the core element to which these sorts of social relations are an important (albeit contingent) contributor. Another question to be considered arises from those cases where self-trust is established despite lack of social recognition, as when runaway slaves manage to heroically push on with their quest for freedom while facing violent denials from surrounding others (and surrounding social structures) that they enjoy the status of a full human being capable of authentic decision making. Finally, self-trust is not always merited: consider the brash teenager who insists on exercising social independence based on her unwarranted confidence in her abilities to make good judgments (see Mackenzie 2008, n. 36).

Nevertheless, these approaches have all importantly shifted philosophical attention concerning autonomy to the social and interpersonal dynamics that shape its enjoyment, connecting ideas about autonomy with broader issues of social justice, recognition, and social practices. This brings us back, then, to considerations of the liberal project and its potential limitations, where autonomy remains central.

3.4 Autonomy, Liberalism, and Perfectionism

As noted earlier, there are various versions of liberal political philosophy. All of them, however, are committed to a conception of political legitimacy in which political power and authority is justified only if such authority is acceptable to all citizens bound by it (see Rawls 1993, 144–50). This connects to a broader view of the foundations of value that at least some liberal theorists present as central to that tradition. That is the claim that values are valid for a person only if those values are or can be reasonably endorsed by the person in question. By extension, principles guiding the operation of institutions of social and political power — what Rawls calls the institutions of the basic structure (Rawls 1993, 258) — are legitimate only if they can be endorsed in this way by those subject to them. In this way, liberalism (in most of its forms) is committed to what some have called the “endorsement constraint” (Kymlicka 1989, 12f, R. Dworkin 2000, 216–18).

Models of autonomy considered above include a condition that mirrors this constraint, in that a person is autonomous relative to some action-guiding norm or value only if, upon critical reflection of that value, she identifies with it, approves of it, or does not feel deeply alienated from it. Combining this view with the endorsement constraint, liberalism carries the implication that autonomy is respected only when guiding values or principles in a society can be embraced in some way by those governed by them. This will connect directly to the liberal theory of legitimacy to be discussed below.

Perfectionists reject this set of claims. Perfectionism is the view that there are values valid for an individual or a population even when, from the subjective point of view of those agents or groups, that value is not endorsed or accepted (Wall 1998, Sumner 1996, 45–80, Hurka 1993, Sher 1997; see also Perfectionism ). In short, it is the view that there are entirely objective values. While there are perfectionist liberals, this view generally resists the liberal claim that the autonomous acceptance of the central components of political principles is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of those principles. Moreover, perfectionists question the liberal commitment to neutrality in the formulation and application of political principles (Hurka 1993, 158–60).

Perfectionists specifically target the liberal connection between respect for autonomy and neutrality of political principles (Wall 1998, 125–204). For many, liberalism rests on the value of individual autonomy, but this reliance either assumes that respect for autonomy is merely one value among others in the liberal view, or autonomy has overriding value. In either case, however, neutrality is not supported. If autonomy is merely one value among others, for example, then there will clearly be times when state support of those other values will override respect for autonomy (paternalistic restrictions imposed to promote citizen safety, for example) (Sher 1997, 45–105, Hurka 1993, 158–60, Conly 2013). On the other hand, autonomy could be seen as an absolute constraint on the promotion of values, or, more plausibly, as a constitutive condition of the validity of all values for a person, as the endorsement constraint implies. Perfectionists reply, however, that this is itself a controversial value position, one that may not find unqualified general support (Hurka 1993, 148–52, Sher 1997, 58–60, Sumner 1996, 174–83; cf. Griffin 1986, 135– 36). To answer these objections, one must turn to consideration of the liberal principle of legitimacy. For the claim that liberals make concerning the limits of state promotion of the good — a limit set by respect for autonomy — depends heavily on their view about the ultimate ground of political power.

Liberalism is generally understood to arise historically out of the social contract tradition of political philosophy and hence rests on the idea of popular sovereignty. The concept of autonomy, then, figures centrally in at least one dominant strand in this tradition, the strand the runs through the work of Kant. The major alternative version of the liberal tradition sees popular sovereignty as basically a collective expression of rational choice and that the principles of the basic institutions of political power are merely instrumental in the maximization of aggregate citizen welfare (or, as with Mill, a constitutive element of welfare broadly considered).

But it is the Kantian brand of liberalism that places autonomy of persons at center stage. Rawls’s Theory of Justice was seen as the contemporary manifestation of this Kantian approach to justice, where justice was conceived as those principles that would be chosen under conditions of unbiased rational decision-making (from behind the veil of ignorance). The original position where such principles would be chosen was said by Rawls to mirror Kant’s Categorical Imperative. That is, it is a device in which persons can choose principles to impose upon themselves in a way which is independent of contingencies of social position, race, sex, or conception of the good (Rawls 1971, 221–27). But as is well known, the Kantian foundations of Rawls’s theory of justice rendered it vulnerable to the charge that it was inapplicable to those populations (all modern populations in fact) where deep moral pluralism abounds. For under such conditions, no theory of justice which rests on a metaphysically grounded conception of the person could claim full allegiance from members of a population whose deep diversity causes them to disagree about metaphysics itself, as well as about moral frameworks and conceptions of value related to it. For this reason, Rawls developed a new (or further developed) understanding of the foundations of his version of liberalism, a political conception (Rawls 1993).

Under political liberalism, autonomy of persons is postulated, not as a metaphysically grounded “fact” about moral personality or practical reason as such, but rather as one of several “device[s] of representation” under which diverse citizens can focus on the methods of derivation (such as the original position) for substantive principles of justice (Rawls 1999, 303–58). Justice is achieved only when an overlapping consensus among people moved by deeply divergent but reasonable comprehensive moral views can be attained, a consensus in which such citizens can affirm principles of justice from within those comprehensive views.

Political Liberalism shifts the focus from a philosophical conception of justice, formulated abstractly and meant to apply universally, to a practical conception of legitimacy where consensus is reached without pretension of deep metaphysical roots for the principles in question. More than merely a “modus vivendi” for the participating parties, justice must be affirmed in a way that finds a moral basis for all participating citizens, albeit from different frameworks of value and moral obligation. The operation of public reason, then, serves as the means by which such a consensus might be established, and hence public discussion and democratic institutions must be seen as a constitutive part of the justification of principles of justice rather than merely a mechanism for the collective determination of the social good.

But the role of autonomy in the specification of this picture should not be under- emphasized (or the controversies it invites ignored). For such a consensus counts as legitimate only when achieved under conditions of free and authentic affirmation of shared principles. Only if the citizens see themselves as fully able to reflectively endorse or reject such shared principles, and to do so competently and with adequate information and range of options, can the overlapping political consensus step beyond the purely strategic dynamics of a modus vivendi and ground legitimate institutions of political power.

Indeed, the assumption that all those subject to political authority enjoy the developed capacity to reflectively accept their life path and the values inherent in it invokes a level of idealization that belies the conditions of many victims of past and ongoing oppression. This virtually ensures that such structural conditions of society as racial domination, profound inequality of power, and patterns of exclusion of groups from equal standing in social space will be assumed away as irrelevant to the question of legitimacy (Mills 2005).

Therefore, social conditions that hamper the equal enjoyment of capacities to reflectively consider and (if necessary) reject principles of social justice, due, say, to extreme poverty, disability, ongoing injustice and inequality, or the like, restrict the establishment of just principles. Autonomy, then, insofar as that concept picks out the free reflective choice operating in the establishment of legitimacy, is basic to, and presupposed by, even such non-foundational (political) conceptions of justice.

Critics of political liberalism arise from several quarters. However, among the objections to it that focus on autonomy are those that question whether a political conception of legitimacy that rests on shared values can be sustained without the validity of those values being seen as somehow objective or fundamental, a position that clashes with the purported pluralism of political liberalism. Otherwise, citizens with deeply conflicting worldviews could not be expected to affirm the value of autonomy except as a mere modus vivendi (see, e.g., Wall 2009; cf. also Larmore 2008, 146–6). A line of response to this worry that could be pursued would be one that claimed that values that amount to autonomy (in some conceptualization of that idea) are already functional in the social structures and cultural practices of otherwise defensible democratic practices (as well as some critical projects that emphasize oppression and domination, as we saw above). This point raises the issue, to which we now turn, of the connection between autonomy, political liberalism, and democracy.

In closing, we should add a word about the implications of political liberalism for the traditional division between liberal justice and democratic theory. I say “division” here, but different views of justice and democracy will convey very different conceptions of the relation between the two (see Christiano 1996, Lakoff 1996). But traditionally, liberal conceptions of justice have viewed democratic mechanisms of collective choice as essential but highly circumscribed by the constitutional provisions that principles of justice support. Individual rights and freedoms, equality before the law, and various privileges and protections associated with citizen autonomy are protected by principles of justice and hence not subject to democratic review, on this approach (Gutmann 1993).

However, liberal conceptions of justice have themselves evolved (in some strains at least) to include reference to collective discussion and debate (public reason) among the constitutive conditions of legitimacy. It could be claimed, then, that basic assumptions about citizens’ capacities for reflective deliberation and choice — autonomy — must be part of the background conditions against which an overlapping consensus or other sort of political agreement concerning principles of justice is to operate.

Some thinkers have made the connection between individual or “private” autonomy and collective or “public” legitimacy — prominent, most notably Habermas (Habermas 1994). On this view, legitimacy and justice cannot be established in advance through philosophical construction and argument, as was thought to be the case in natural law traditions in which classical social contract theory flourished and which is inherited (in different form) in contemporary perfectionist liberal views. Rather, justice amounts to that set of principles that are established in practice and rendered legitimate by the actual support of affected citizens (and their representatives) in a process of collective discourse and deliberation (see e.g., Fraser 1997, 11–40 and Young 2000). Systems of rights and protections (private, individual autonomy) will necessarily be protected in order to institutionalize frameworks of public deliberation (and, more specifically, legislation and constitutional interpretation) that render principles of social justice acceptable to all affected (in consultation with others) (Habermas 1994, 111).

This view of justice, if at all acceptable, provides an indirect defense of the protection of autonomy and, in particular, conceptualizing autonomy in a way that assumes reflective self- evaluation. For only if citizen participants in the public discourse that underlies justice are assumed to have (and provided the basic resources for having) capacities for competent self- reflection, can the public defense and discussion of competing conceptions of justice take place (cf. Gaus 1996, Parts II and III, Gaus 2011). Insofar as autonomy is necessary for a functioning democracy (considered very broadly), and the latter is a constitutive element of just political institutions, then autonomy must be seen as reflective self-appraisal (and, I would add, non-alienation from central aspects of one’s person) (see Cohen 2002, Richardson 2003, Christman 2015).

This approach to justice and autonomy, spelled out here in rough and general form, has certainly faced criticism. In particular, those theorists concerned with the multi-dimensional nature of social and cultural “difference” have stressed how the conception of the autonomous person assumed in such principles (as well as criteria for rational discourse and public deliberation) is a contestable ideal not internalized by all participants in contemporary political life (see, e.g., Brown 1995, Benhabib 1992). Others motivated by post-modern considerations concerning the nature of the self, rationality, language, and identity, are also suspicious of the manner in which the basic concepts operative in liberal theories of justice (“autonomy” for example) are understood as fixed, transparent, and without their own political presuppositions (see, e.g., Butler 1990; for general discussion see White 1990).

These charges are stated here much too generally to give an adequate response in this context. But the challenge remains for any theory of justice which rests on a presumption of the normative centrality of autonomy. To be plausible in a variously pluralistic social setting, one marked by ongoing histories of oppressive practices and institutions, such a view must avoid the twin evils of forcibly imposing a (reasonably) contested value on resistant citizens, on the one hand, and simply abandoning all normative conceptions of social order in favor of open ended struggle for power on the other. The view that individuals ought to be treated as, and given the resources to become, autonomous in one of the minimal senses outlined here will, I submit, be a central element in any political view that steers between the Scylla of oppressive forms of perfectionism and the Charybdis of interest-group power politics.

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autonomy: personal | communitarianism | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on the self | free will | identity politics | liberalism | paternalism | privacy | well-being

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Argumentative Essay: The Importance of Discipline

Discipline is something that we have all experienced personally in different forms, seen used on others, and is also something that many of us will go on to use later in life, both in the form of self-discipline and as something to keep children and even employees in check. It is essential to life as we know it, and we need it in its many different forms in many different situations.

The first reason that discipline is so important is that we all need to exercise self-discipline to be successful in life. Self-discipline can mean very different things to different people; for students, for example, self-discipline is often about motivating yourself and making yourself concentrate on your studies and get your assignments in on time. For working people, it can be as simple as getting up on time every morning, however tired you may be and how much you may hate your job, getting to work on time and doing your job. Without this kind of self-discipline, people would not be able to enjoy academic success, or be successful in their careers either.

Self-discipline is also required for dieters and anyone doing regular exercise, because given the chance, most of us would prefer to be lazy rather than get up and exercise, and eat burgers and fries rather than healthy food. Without it, even more people would be fat and unhealthy, and a lack of self-discipline in some people certainly contributes to the obesity crisis.

Discipline is also something that needs to be used on others where necessary. If parents didn’t discipline their children when they were naughty, children wouldn’t grow up knowing right from wrong, or be able to become productive members of society who contribute to the system. Equally, schoolteachers need to be able to dish out punishments to children who don’t behave themselves. Without discipline in the classroom, there would be a great deal of disruption and nobody would ever learn anything. Indeed, teachers who struggle to command the respect of students and who fail to use discipline effectively will often have trouble even making themselves heard in a classroom.

In the workplace, discipline is also essential to maintaining a hierarchy and dealing with employees who do not follow company policies and procedures, regularly arrive late or not at all, or treat their co-workers unfairly. Then, you have to consider that without discipline, there would be no law enforcement. Murderers would be roaming the streets and everybody would be stealing from each other, because there would be no consequences for their actions.

Discipline acts as a vital deterrent to stop children being naughty, people from missing work, and even potential criminals from stealing and killing, and for this reason it is vital in human society.

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George Washington and Self-Governance

This lesson provides

Guiding Questions

• How did George Washington’s self- governance influence the early republic?
• How did it influence what we value in both citi zens and   leaders?  
• Students will understand what self-governance means .    
• Student will know how George Washington incorporated self-governan ce in early American government.  
• Students will describe how this idea of self-governance has an impact on  the world today .  

Expand Materials Materials

Student handouts.

• Close-Reading : Washington in Houdon’s Art
• Close-Reading :  Washington in  Trumbull’s  Art
• Self-Governance: George Washington and Self-Governance Essay
• Self-Governance: George Washington and Self-Governance Discussion Guide
• Virtue in Action Class Activity: Washington’s Farewell Address
• Virtue in Action Class Activity: Critical Thinking Questions  

Virtue in Action: Individual Activities

Self-governance worksheet, teacher resources.

• George Washington and Self-Governance Answer Key

Expand Key Terms Key Terms

• Contribution
• Perseverance
• Responsibility
• Self-Governance

Expand More Information More Information

Ellis, Joseph J. His Excellency: George Washington . New York: Vintage, 2005.

Leibiger, Stuart. Founding Friendship: George Washington, James Madison, and the Creation of the American Republic. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001.

Washington, George. “Farewell Address.” September 19, 1796

Washington, George. George Washington’s Rules of Civility & Decent Behavior. N.p.: CreateSpace Independent Platform, 2013.

Expand Prework Prework

Have students read  Self-Governance: George Washington and Self-Governance Essay , and have students read the Excerpts from Washington’s Farewell Address (found on the Virtue in Action Class Activity worksheet . )  

Expand Warmup Warmup

Before class, post pictures of the Jean-Antoine Houdon sculpture of George Washington and of the John Trumbull painting of General Washington resigning his commission.  

Separate the class into two groups. Distribute Close-Reading Washington in Houdon’s Art  to one group, and Close-Reading Washington in Trumbull’s Art to the other group.  

Have students work in pairs or trios to analyze their assigned work of art using the questions provided.  

Once students have completed their analyses, post a photo of the sc ulpture and invite the students who close-read it to explain it to the students who did not study it. Invite additional observations from other students. Do the same with the Trumbull painting.  

Introduce this definition of self-governance: To be self-cont rolled, avoiding extremes and not to be excessively influenced or controlled  by others .  

Transition to the George Washington and Self-Governance narrative by asking: Given what you have  considered  in this sculpture and this painting, how did George Washington’ s character influence the early U.S. republic? How did it influence what our society values in its citizens as well as its leaders?  

Expand Activities Activities

Activity 1 (30 minutes).

Working in groups of 2 – 4, students talk through the Discussion Guide Questions accompanying the George Washi ngton and Self-Governance Essay . Instruct each small group to select up to 3 questions that they think  are  most important for whole-class discussion in light of the significance of civic virtue in a republic. After students have had a chance to talk through all the questions, take a quick poll to identify which questions the class as a whole is most interested in discussing.  Then invite the whole class to weigh in on  their responses to  the  most-recommended  questions .

Activity 2 (30 minutes)

Divide the students into 3 groups and ask each group to focus on one of the three pages of the  Farewell Address excerpts ( Virtue in Action Class Activity ). Each group should talk through their specific assigned section of the Farewell Address, using the Critical Thinking Questions .

Expand Wrap Up Wrap Up

Reconvene the class as a whole. Ask each of the three groups to report their answer to Critical Thinking Question #3: Which civic virtue and constitutional principle was most apparent in their  section of the Farewell Address?  

Keep notes on the board  list in  the virtues and principles students  identify.  

Engage the whole class in a discussion of the last question on the page:   In what way  are the  civic virtue s  we’ve  identified   an  important part of maintaining a form of government based, in   part, on that particular constitutional principle?    

Expand Homework Homework

Option 1: Self-Governance Writing Prompt 

Provide this prompt for a writing exercise that encourages students to make a personal application of the big ideas in this lesson:  Self-governance integrates self-reliance and moderation. What relationship do you see   between individual self-governance and political self-government? In what ways can you   govern yourself to ensure the success of American self-government?

Option 2: Performance based assignment 

Students will produce a  performance-based assignment (P owerPoint , poster, vi deo, etc . )  of their own choice  showing their understanding of the essential question: How did George Washington’s self- governance influence the early republic? How did it influence what we value in both citizens and leaders?

Expand Extensions Extensions

Excerpts from Washington’s Farewell Address, class activity variation   ( f or students who have some prior background in constitutional principles ) :  

• Make a set of cards in one color, with one civic virtue on each card. Make another set of cards in a second color, with one constitutional principle on each card. Duplicate some constitutional principles so that you have the same number of cards in each set, and make enough cards for each student to have one.  
• Conduct an “inside-outside circle” activity. Students form two concentric circles with the inner circle facing out, and the outer circle facing in. Two “matched up” students (one inner circle, one outer) show each other their cards and explain how that civic virtue and constitutional principle relate to each other. Then, the outer circle rotates clockwise one person while the  inner  circle stays in the same position. Repeat the process until the circle has made a full rotation and each student has had at least one “match-up” conversation.  

Optional Extension:  Project and r ead the following excerpt from Federalist No. 55 and respond to the question s  that   follow .  

“As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and   distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and   confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree   than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among   us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would  be,  that there is not sufficient virtue   among men for self-government; and that nothing less  than the chains of despotism can restrain them   from destroying and devouring one another.”   —James Madison, Federalist No. 55  

Discuss:  What could happen in a self-governing society if citizens  don’t  have self-restraint? If elected   leaders,  and those they appoint, don’t have self-restraint?  

Optional Extension: Virtue in Action Individual Activities

All citizens must play a role for self-government to succeed. For the next month, make   a special effort to be aware of and act in ways that promote your own self-governance.  

• Write a personal mission statement and a plan for living it out.
• If you start or lead a club, a business, or any new initiative, find ways to ensure it can continue to endure without you there.
• If you play a team sport, be aware of your chance to work with teammates. Instead of trying to make every shot, pass the ball to others who are better positioned .  
• Thomas Paine said, “Moderation in temper is always a virtue; but moderation in principle is always a vice.” Draft a written response to Paine’s statement, identifying areas where you find it applicable in your own life.  

Close Reading Washington in Houdon’s Art

Close reading washington in trumbull’s art, self governance: george washington and self-governance essay, discussion guide – george washington and self-governance, virtue in action – george washington and self-governance, critical thinking questions, related resources.

George Washington

Washington secured American independence as commander of the Continental Army and established traditions as the nation’s first president.

Washington’s Cabinet with Lindsay Chervinsky | BRI Scholar Talks

Among the different constitutional traditions George Washington established as America’s first president, perhaps one of the more overlooked was the creation of the cabinet. Join us today as Dr. Lindsay Chervinsky, Scholar in Residence at the Institute for Thomas Paine Studies at Iona College, and BRI Senior Teaching Fellow Tony Williams discuss her new book, "The Cabinet: George Washington and the Creation of an American Institution." In this episode, Dr. Chervinsky explores topics such as how Washington’s military experience shaped the cabinet, how cabinet members were picked, and the famous Jefferson-Hamilton dispute of the early republic. What historical precedents did Washington establish for the American presidency related to the principles of republicanism and separation of powers?"

George Washington and the Proclamation of Neutrality

By the end of this section, you will explain how and why competition intensified conflicts among peoples and nations from 1754 to 1800.

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Self-Discipline: The Key to Unlocking Your Full Potential

Discipline has long been considered a valuable quality in our society. From early childhood we are taught to follow rules, adhere to schedules and meet external expectations. Discipline, when enforced, can certainly help maintain order and structure. But there is another form of discipline that is often overlooked but has incredible power: self-discipline.

Let’s explore the differences between discipline and self-discipline.

The difference between discipline and self-discipline

Discipline, as we commonly understand it, means following rules and regulations set by others. This often means following the expectations that others place on us. It can be both positive, involving rewards for compliance, and negative, involving punishments for non-compliance.

Self-discipline, on the other hand, is an entirely different matter. It is an inner quality driven by your own values, goals and ambitions. It is the ability to control your own behavior, make responsible choices, and be committed to your path forward toward your own goals, even when there are no external consequences.

Self-discipline is based on self-control, willpower, and the ability to resist temptation or distraction. That is, do what is good for yourself.

Why self-discipline is more important than discipline

• Your own intrinsic motivation Self-discipline is rooted in what really matters to you. It is driven by your desires, not someone else’s. When you are motivated, you are more likely to put in the effort required to achieve your goals.
• Long-term success External discipline may ensure short-term compliance, but it often wanes when the external pressure is removed. However, self-discipline is maintained in the long run because it is rooted in one’s own will to achieve something. It is the secret to achieving lasting success.
• Freedom and self-determination Self-discipline empowers you to make choices that align with your values. It gives you the freedom to design your life, rather than being limited by someone else’s rules.
• Resilience In the face of challenges, self-discipline keeps you going. It helps you persevere when the going gets tough because you’re not just following orders; you strive for a meaningful purpose.

Cultivate your self-discipline

Now that we understand the power of self-discipline, how can we cultivate it?

• Set clear goals Define what is really important to you. Set clear, achievable goals that align with your values ​​and desires. Feel free to write them down and look at them often so that they are in your mind and align with where you want to go.
• Create a routine Establish daily routines and habits that support your goals. Tie a small behavioral change to something you already do, for example as part of your morning routine. Deeply understanding the meaning of consistency is often the key to building self-discipline.
• Practice self-control Learn to understand your impulses and avoid distractions. This may mean saying no to short-term gratification in favor of long-term rewards. Feel how you feel about having been able to resist in order to turn the behavior of abstaining into something that feels good.
• Maintain responsibility Share your goals with a friend or mentor who can help keep you accountable if you feel it will help. Accountability can strengthen your commitment.
• Learn from setbacks Don’t be discouraged by occasional failures. Instead, treat them as opportunities to learn and grow stronger. Accepting setbacks and quickly rebounding is key to staying resilient.

While discipline has its benefits in maintaining some sort of order, self-discipline is the true key to unlocking your full potential. It is the inner drive that propels you toward your goals and sustains your efforts through thick and thin.

By cultivating self-discipline, you get to decide and shape your own life and the freedom to pursue your passions.

So distinguish between discipline and self-discipline and let the latter be your guiding force on the path to success and fulfillment.

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Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality

Professor of Philosophy

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Our human capacity for planning agency plays central roles in the cross-temporal organization of our agency, in our acting and thinking together, and in our self-governance. Intentions can be understood as states in such a planning system. The practical thinking essential to this planning capacity is guided by norms that enjoin synchronic plan consistency and coherence as well as forms of plan stability over time. This book’s essays aim to deepen our understanding of these norms and defend their status as norms of practical rationality for planning agents. General guidance by these planning norms has many pragmatic benefits, especially given our cognitive and epistemic limits. But appeal to these pragmatic benefits does not fully explain the normative force of these norms in application to the particular case. In response, some think these norms are norms of theoretical rationality on belief; or are constitutive of agency; or are just a myth. These essays chart an alternative path, which sees these planning norms as tracking conditions of a planning agent’s self-governance, both at a time and over time. This path articulates associated models of self-governance; it appeals to the agent’s end of her self-governance over time; and it argues that this end is rationally self-sustaining. This end is thereby in a position to play a role in our planning framework that is analogous to the role of a concern with quality of will within the framework of the reactive attitudes, as understood by Peter Strawson.

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Essay on Discipline

Here we have shared the Essay on Discipline in detail so you can use it in your exam or assignment of 150, 250, 400, 500, or 1000 words.

You can use this Essay on Discipline in any assignment or project whether you are in school (class 10th or 12th), college, or preparing for answer writing in competitive exams. 

Topics covered in this article.

Essay on Discipline in 150-250 words

Essay on discipline in 300-400 words, essay on discipline in 500-1000 words.

Discipline is an essential aspect of life that plays a crucial role in shaping our character, behavior, and overall success. It refers to the practice of following rules, regulations, and codes of conduct in a consistent and orderly manner.

Discipline is the foundation of personal and professional growth. It helps us develop self-control, responsibility, and the ability to make sound decisions. It instills a sense of order and structure in our lives, enabling us to manage our time, resources, and commitments effectively.

Discipline is particularly important in educational settings. It helps students stay focused, attentive, and committed to their studies. It promotes regular attendance, punctuality, and completion of assignments. Students who embrace discipline are more likely to achieve academic success and develop a strong work ethic.

Discipline is also crucial in personal relationships and professional environments. It fosters respect, accountability, and teamwork. It allows individuals to work together harmoniously, resolve conflicts, and achieve common goals. Discipline enables individuals to maintain integrity, adhere to ethical standards, and demonstrate professionalism.

In conclusion, discipline is an indispensable virtue that contributes to personal growth, academic achievement, and success in various aspects of life. By cultivating discipline, individuals can develop self-control, responsibility, and a sense of order. It is a quality that helps us navigate challenges, maintain focus, and achieve our goals. Embracing discipline paves the way for a more fulfilling and purposeful life.

Discipline is a fundamental aspect of personal and societal development. It refers to the practice of adhering to rules, regulations, and codes of conduct, both in our personal lives and in the larger community. Discipline instills a sense of order, responsibility, and self-control, and it plays a crucial role in shaping our character, behavior, and overall success.

In personal life, discipline enables individuals to lead a well-organized and purposeful existence. It helps us manage our time effectively, prioritize tasks, and set and achieve goals. Discipline ensures that we follow a routine, maintain good health habits, and make conscious choices that align with our long-term objectives. It fosters self-control, enabling us to resist temptations and make wise decisions.

In educational institutions, discipline is essential for creating a conducive learning environment. It promotes regular attendance, punctuality, and completion of assignments. Students who practice discipline are more likely to stay focused, attentive, and committed to their studies. They develop effective study habits, demonstrate academic integrity, and engage in active learning, leading to higher academic achievement.

Discipline is also vital in professional settings. It fosters productivity, professionalism, and accountability. Employees who exhibit discipline adhere to work schedules, meet deadlines, and demonstrate a strong work ethic. They follow ethical guidelines, respect company policies, and contribute to a harmonious and productive work environment. Disciplined professionals are more likely to achieve career success and earn the respect and trust of their colleagues and superiors.

Moreover, discipline is crucial for the smooth functioning of society. It ensures that individuals respect the laws, regulations, and norms that govern social behavior. Discipline encourages citizens to be responsible, law-abiding members of society, promoting social harmony and stability. It fosters a sense of civic duty, encouraging individuals to actively participate in community activities, volunteerism, and initiatives that benefit society as a whole.

In conclusion, discipline is a vital virtue that contributes to personal growth, academic success, professional excellence, and a well-functioning society. By practicing discipline, individuals develop self-control, responsibility, and a sense of order. It enables us to lead purposeful lives, make wise choices, and achieve our goals. Discipline is an essential aspect of personal development and plays a significant role in shaping the progress and well-being of our communities and society as a whole.

Title: Discipline – The Path to Success and Personal Growth

Introduction :

Discipline is a virtue that encompasses self-control, adherence to rules, and the ability to maintain order and focus in various aspects of life. It is a fundamental characteristic that plays a significant role in personal development, academic achievement, and professional success. Discipline enables individuals to cultivate self-discipline, responsibility, and a sense of purpose, leading to enhanced productivity and personal growth. In this essay, we will explore the importance of discipline, its impact on different areas of life, and strategies for developing and maintaining discipline.

The Importance of Discipline

Discipline is vital for personal growth and success. It serves as the foundation for achieving goals, managing time effectively, and making wise choices. By practicing discipline, individuals develop self-control, which enables them to resist distractions, temptations, and impulsive behavior. Discipline helps individuals prioritize tasks, set realistic goals, and work towards them systematically. It fosters a sense of responsibility, ensuring that commitments are fulfilled and tasks are completed on time. Without discipline, it becomes challenging to stay focused, maintain motivation, and accomplish objectives.

Discipline also plays a crucial role in academic achievement. Students who practice discipline are more likely to attend classes regularly, submit assignments on time, and engage actively in their studies. They develop effective study habits, manage their time efficiently, and utilize resources effectively. Disciplined students show commitment to their education, leading to improved academic performance, enhanced learning outcomes, and a deeper understanding of the subject matter.

In the professional realm, discipline is a key attribute for success. It allows individuals to maintain professional standards, adhere to work schedules, and meet deadlines. Disciplined professionals demonstrate a strong work ethic, take ownership of their responsibilities, and work efficiently. They show dedication, consistency, and professionalism, which enhances their reputation, increases opportunities for growth and advancement, and earns the respect of their peers and superiors.

Strategies for Developing Discipline

Developing discipline requires conscious effort and practice. Here are some strategies to cultivate discipline in various areas of life:

Set Clear Goals: Define clear and specific goals for yourself. Establishing goals provides direction and motivation, making it easier to stay focused and disciplined.

Create a Routine: Establish a daily routine that includes specific time slots for various activities, such as work, study, exercise, and leisure. Following a routine helps in managing time effectively and ensuring tasks are completed without procrastination.

Prioritize Tasks: Identify and prioritize tasks based on their importance and urgency. This helps in avoiding distractions and ensures that important tasks are given appropriate attention and completed on time.

Practice Self-Control: Develop self-control by consciously making choices that align with your goals and values. Practice resisting immediate gratification and impulse behaviors that may hinder progress.

Break Tasks into Manageable Chunks: Large tasks can be overwhelming, leading to procrastination. Break them down into smaller, manageable chunks and tackle them one at a time. Celebrate small accomplishments along the way to stay motivated.

Create a Supportive Environment: Surround yourself with people who encourage discipline and share similar values. Seek accountability partners or join study or work groups to stay motivated and inspired.

Eliminate Distractions: Minimize distractions that can hinder discipline and focus. Turn off notifications on your devices, create a designated study or work area, and establish boundaries to protect your time and concentration.

Practice Time Management: Develop effective time management skills by setting realistic deadlines, prioritizing tasks, and allocating specific time slots for different activities. Use productivity tools, such as calendars and to-do lists, to stay organized and on track.

Practice Self-Care: Prioritize self-care activities, such as exercise, proper nutrition, and sufficient sleep. Taking care of your physical and mental well-being improves focus, energy levels, and overall discipline.

Stay Motivated: Find ways to stay motivated and inspired. Set rewards for accomplishing tasks or milestones, seek inspiration from role models and remind yourself of the long-term benefits of discipline.

Conclusion :

Discipline is a vital attribute that contributes to personal growth, academic success, and professional achievements. It enables individuals to develop self-control, responsibility, and a sense of purpose. By practicing discipline, individuals can effectively manage their time, make wise choices, and achieve their goals. Cultivating discipline requires conscious effort, perseverance, and the implementation of various strategies. However, the rewards of discipline are immense, leading to enhanced productivity, personal growth, and a path to success. Embracing discipline as a way of life can bring about positive changes and open doors to new opportunities.

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Essay on Self Discipline and its Importance in English for Children and Students

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A disciplined person is far more productive and successful compared to someone who lacks this quality. Self-discipline is important but not easy to achieve. However, once you achieve it, you can do wonders.

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Long and Short Essays on Self Discipline and its Importance in English

Here are Essay on Self Discipline and its Importance of varying lengths to help you with the topic in your exams and competitions. You can choose any Self Discipline and its Importance Essay as per your need and requirement.

All the essays are well written using easy language to fulfil the purpose of all users across India. All the points, related to Self Discipline and its Importance, are covered in these essays to help you to get all the related information at one place.

Short Essay on Self Discipline and its Importance (200 Words) – Essay 1

Self-discipline is a term commonly used. Our parents as well as teachers stress upon its importance time and again. This is because practicing self-discipline helps in leading a wholesome life. Self-discipline is essential for every person irrespective of his age, class or profession. It helps in making optimal use of the available time. This results in increased productivity and enhanced efficiency.

Some of the most successful people around the world practice self-discipline. They claim that one of the main reasons they have been able to attain high stature is because of self-discipline. They did not start big but made the most of the small things they had and have reached high positions.

Small changes in routine life such as sleeping and waking up at the same time each day, eating healthy food, exercising and setting goals can help in achieving self-discipline. These small changes in life can bring about a huge difference and encourage a person to lead a life of self-discipline.

Self-discipline shows a person’s character and shapes his relationship with those around him. Not giving into temptations and distractions is a virtue people admire. Those who practice self-discipline are always looked up to in society. People seek their advice. So, they do not only improve their lives but also aid in enhancing the life of those around them.

Essay on Self Discipline and its Importance (300 Words) – Essay 2

‘Benefits of Self-Discipline’

Introduction

Self-discipline is the ability to stay in control, resist temptations, stay away from distractions, overcome procrastination and addictions and stay determined to achieve the set goals. Everyone should practice self-discipline in order to lead a good life.

Self Discipline for a Healthy and Wealthy Life

Self-discipline is one of the key ingredients for leading a healthy and wealthy life. A person who is self-disciplined does not indulge in addictions such as smoking, drinking, etc. He also resists the temptation to have junk food. He sticks to healthy eating habits. He does not procrastinate when it comes to exercising, meditating, and completing his work. Thus, he does not just dream about leading a healthy and wealthy life he works hard to make it happen.

Benefits of Self Discipline

Self-discipline helps us practice the following:

• Work hard to achieve the set goals
• Finish work on time
• Resist impulsive actions and reactions
• Overcome procrastination and laziness
• Stick to the schedule
• Wake up early
• Connect with the inner self
• Bond better with those around
• Attain success at work

Self-discipline Programs

While people understand the importance of self-discipline they are unable to inculcate it mainly because they keep procrastinating. Many lack the will power to achieve it. This is the reason why many self-discipline programs have been introduced. It is a good idea to enrol for one such program and try incorporating this habit along with others who are struggling hard to inculcate it.

These programs are easy to follow and make use of interesting exercises to achieve self-discipline. Since it is a group activity it does not seem like a task.

Self Discipline is certainly helpful in leading a healthy and wealthy life. However, there is no doubt about the fact that it is difficult to inculcate. This is the reason why self-discipline programs have been initiated. It is much easier to learn this virtue by enrolling in one such program.

Essay on Self Discipline and its Importance (400 Words) – Essay 3

‘Self Discipline: Important for a Healthy Life’

Self-discipline is a skill that can be achieved with practice and patience. If one is determined to inculcate self-discipline, he can do it with some effort. It may seem difficult initially and one may be tempted to quit but the key is to try a little harder and achieve it. Self-discipline is important to lead a healthy life.

Self Discipline Furthers Healthy Habits

Many people understand and acknowledge the importance of self-discipline but are not ready to make efforts to achieve it. Some try and give up too early. Others feel it is overrated and does not make any effort to achieve it. Self-discipline is very important. It would not be wrong to say that self-discipline promotes good health.

People who lead a disciplined life make sure they sleep on time each day and have adequate sleep. They wake up fresh and can take better charge of their day. They understand the importance of exercise and indulge in the same regularly. They have complete self-control and do not give in to temptations. They can very well control the urge to have junk food.

On the other hand, those who lack self-discipline procrastinate and avoid exercise. They do not have self-control and give in to temptations easily. They often end up eating junk food in large quantities only to regret later.

Correlation between Self Discipline and Healthy Eating Habits

Self-discipline helps in inculcating healthy eating habits. Healthy eating habits help in promoting self-discipline. The two are correlated. A person who is self-disciplined understands the importance of eating healthy and has enough self- control to let go of the urge to eat junk food. So, self-discipline helps in inculcating healthy eating habits that in turn aids in keeping fit.

Likewise, a person who eats healthy food is able to take better charge of his day and feel in control. He stays energized throughout the day and stands a better chance to accomplish his goals. On the other hand, someone who consumes oily and sugary food feels lethargic and out of control. He feels too low on energy and even as he wants to accomplish his goals he is too tired to do so.

Self-discipline is essential for leading a healthy life. People struggling to quit addictions such as smoking and drinking should try to practice self-discipline. This will give them the power to take control of their life and get rid of these habits.

Essay on Self Discipline and its Importance (500 Words) – Essay 4

‘Self Discipline Promotes Wholesome Living’

Self-discipline is essential for leading a wholesome life. A person who imbibes this quality enhances his chances of success at work. He also leads a more fulfilling personal life. This quality is rare but essential.

Success at Work

Procrastination is one of the biggest hindrances in achieving success at work. A self-disciplined person does not procrastinate. He practices self- control and concentrates on work instead of just whiling away time. He does not give in to distractions and temptations. He knows that work comes first and other things can wait. He does not hesitate to put his mobile phone aside as he sits to work.

He also resists the temptation of being a part of unnecessary office gossip. He indulges in productive tasks that can help him achieve success at work. He is particular about the deadlines as well as the quality of work. He completes and submits his work on time and ensures good quality.

A person who practices self-discipline does not waste much time viewing television or chit chatting on his mobile. He rather prefers reading a book or joining a part-time course to enhance his skills and knowledge. All this helps in moving up the success ladder.

Family Bonding

A person who practices self-discipline can maintain work- life balance. This is because he makes good use of his time. Working without any distractions helps in completing the tasks quickly. So, he can devote enough time to his family too. He also understands that when he is with his family, he does not just have to be present physically but also mentally.

Unlike, most people who are engrossed in their mobiles or television sets even as they sit with their close ones; a self-disciplined person puts these distractions aside. He focuses on one thing at a time. When he is with his family he makes sure he gives his undivided attention to them. Such a person is thus able to bond well with his family members. He builds happier and healthier relationships.

Time for Self

A self-disciplined person understands the importance of spending time with himself. He takes out time to practice meditation. This helps him connect with his inner self. It is possible to bond well with others and perform well at work only when one is connected to his inner self. It also helps in combating unnecessary stress and aids in making better decisions.

A self-disciplined person never procrastinates or hesitates when it comes to putting efforts to maintain good physical and mental health. He indulges in exercise regularly. He also eats healthy food and dons a positive attitude.

Everyone around us lays stress upon leading a life of discipline. We often hear about the benefits of self-discipline. But unfortunately, no one teaches us how to inculcate self-discipline and lead a disciplined life. There should be an exclusive period in schools where students should be taught how to imbibe self-discipline to lead a better life. Likewise, parents must also help their kids attain self-discipline.

Long Essay on Self Discipline and its Importance (600 Words) – Essay 5

‘Ways to Inculcate Self Discipline’

Self-discipline comes naturally to some people while others can achieve it with some effort. The effort made is worth it as it changes life for the better. Self-discipline doesn’t mean one has to be too harsh towards himself/herself. It just means exercising self- control. A person who stays in control has the ability to take charge of his/her actions and reactions.

The below mentioned points can be helpful in inculcating self-discipline:

The first step towards leading a disciplined life is to set goals. Goals give you a clear idea about what needs to be achieved. You must always set a timeline for your goals. This serves as a driving force and motivates you to work hard. It is a good idea to set both short term and long term goals and create a well thought out plan to achieve them.

• Get Rid of Distractions

In this technology- driven world, there are numerous things that can distract us and take charge of our lives. Our mobile phones, television, and chatting apps are some of the new age things that are a big hindrance in practicing self-discipline. No matter how determined we are to study, work or sleep on time, we tend to get distracted at the beep of our phone.

Social media platforms, chatting apps and web series are extremely addictive and hamper work. In order to practice self-discipline, it is important to stay away from these distractions. Put your phone on silent or keep it at a distance when you sit to study or work. Similarly, just put your phone away at bedtime and instead pick a book to read.

Meditation is one of the best ways to channel our energy in the right direction. It helps maintain focus, acquaints us with our inner self and furthers better self- control. It is the stepping stone for a disciplined life. Meditating for half an hour every day can help in inculcating self-discipline.

• Keep a Check on Your Eating Habits

No matter how hard pressed you are to follow your to-do list and accomplish your goals, you may not be able to do so if you are not eating right. Oily, fried and sugary food can drain your energy and make you feel lethargic. Junk food is a hindrance to leading a disciplined life. It is important to eat healthy food to inculcate self-discipline.

• Reward Yourself

Reward yourself for every goal you achieve. This will motivate you to work harder to achieve more. The reward can be anything from watching your favourite movie to going out with your friends. This is a good way to trick your brain to inculcate self-discipline.

• Set a Routine

Those who set a routine and follow it daily lead a more disciplined life. It is suggested to list all the tasks that you require accomplishing in a given day. Write them in the order of their priority, set a timeline for each and act accordingly. This is a good way to lead an organized and disciplined life.

You can inculcate self-discipline only when you are well rested. So, it is essential to sleep for eight hours each night. Maintaining a good sleep cycle is also essential. This means that you should try sleeping and waking up at the same time each day. A power nap during the afternoon can help further.

• Stay Positive

Many people want to inculcate self-discipline but are unable to because they somehow believe that it is difficult to achieve. They feel that it is too much to ask for and that they shall not be able to practice it. This is the wrong approach. You can achieve anything in life if you stay positive and believe in yourself. So, you should stay positive. It is a pre-requisite for inculcating self-discipline.

Achieving self-discipline may be difficult but it is important to lead a healthy personal and professional life. We must thus make some effort to achieve it. The above mentioned points can help in this direction.

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Essay on Self Discipline

Students are often asked to write an essay on Self Discipline in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Self Discipline

Introduction.

Self-discipline is the ability to control one’s feelings and overcome weaknesses. It’s about making choices that lead to healthy, productive behaviors.

Importance of Self-Discipline

Self-discipline is crucial for success. It helps us focus on our goals, resist temptations, and persist in the face of adversity.

Building Self-Discipline

Building self-discipline requires practice. Start small, create routines, and gradually take on bigger challenges.

Benefits of Self-Discipline

Self-discipline leads to improved focus, better health, and achievement of goals. It also fosters resilience and self-confidence.

In conclusion, self-discipline is a vital skill that everyone should cultivate for a successful and fulfilling life.

Also check:

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250 Words Essay on Self Discipline

Self-discipline, an essential attribute for personal and professional success, refers to the ability to control one’s emotions, behavior, and desires, aligning them with set goals. It is a skill that enables individuals to overcome impulses, procrastinate less, and stay focused on their objectives.

The Importance of Self-Discipline

Self-discipline is a cornerstone of personal development and self-improvement. It fosters resilience, enabling individuals to endure hardships and persevere in the face of challenges. Furthermore, it promotes time management, allowing for the prioritization of tasks according to their importance and urgency. This leads to increased productivity and efficiency.

Self-Discipline and Success

The correlation between self-discipline and success is well-established. Those with high self-discipline tend to perform better academically and professionally. They are also more likely to maintain a healthy lifestyle, manage stress effectively, and demonstrate higher levels of happiness.

Developing Self-Discipline

Developing self-discipline requires consistent effort and practice. It starts with setting clear, achievable goals, followed by creating a plan to reach them. Regular self-reflection is crucial to assess progress and make necessary adjustments. Moreover, cultivating a positive mindset can significantly enhance one’s self-discipline.

In conclusion, self-discipline is a vital skill that significantly impacts personal and professional life. It is a key determinant of success and can be cultivated through consistent effort, goal setting, and self-reflection. Thus, it is imperative for college students to understand its importance and work towards enhancing their self-discipline.

500 Words Essay on Self Discipline

Introduction to self-discipline.

Self-discipline, an essential characteristic for personal and professional success, is the ability to control one’s feelings and overcome weaknesses. It involves acting according to what you think instead of how you feel in the moment. It’s a sign of inner strength and control of oneself and one’s actions.

Self-discipline is of paramount importance for achieving goals. It is the backbone of successful people who manage to excel in their fields. It is the driving force that compels individuals to resist negative impulses and distractions. Self-discipline is the key to consistency and continuity in any endeavor, be it academic, personal, or professional. It helps in maintaining focus, thus enabling individuals to make constructive decisions that lead to positive outcomes.

Self-Discipline and Time Management

Time management and self-discipline are intertwined. Effective time management necessitates self-discipline, and conversely, self-discipline aids in the efficient use of time. When one practices self-discipline, they can better allocate their time, prioritizing tasks based on their importance and deadlines. This results in improved productivity and efficiency.

Self-Discipline and Emotional Control

Self-discipline also plays a crucial role in emotional control. It helps individuals manage their emotions, preventing them from taking impulsive actions that could have negative consequences. By practicing self-discipline, individuals can make rational decisions rather than emotional ones, leading to better outcomes in both personal and professional life.

Building self-discipline is a gradual process that requires patience and perseverance. It begins with setting clear goals and establishing a plan to achieve them. It requires consistent practice and the willingness to step out of one’s comfort zone. Regular exercise, a healthy diet, and adequate sleep are also integral in fostering self-discipline as they enhance mental strength and focus.

Challenges and Solutions

The path to self-discipline is fraught with challenges. Procrastination, lack of motivation, and distractions are common obstacles. However, these can be overcome by developing a strong will, maintaining a positive mindset, and implementing effective strategies like time-blocking, goal-setting, and mindfulness.

In conclusion, self-discipline is a vital skill that significantly contributes to success in various life aspects. It enhances focus, aids in time management, and helps control emotions. Despite the challenges encountered in its cultivation, with determination and the right strategies, one can successfully develop and strengthen their self-discipline.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

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An Effort to End ‘Judge-Shopping’ Turns Into a ‘Political Firestorm’

A policy meant to prevent plaintiffs from steering their cases to sympathetic judges has drawn widespread attention, with both Republicans and Democrats accusing each other of politicizing the judiciary.

By Mattathias Schwartz

When the Judicial Conference, the national policy-making body of the federal courts, announced last month that plaintiffs would no longer be able to engage in “judge-shopping” — choosing to file major lawsuits at courthouses where they could be sure that a sympathetic judge would hear them — the policy sounded like a done deal.

Instead, the policy turned out to be guidance, rather than a binding rule. Conservative politicians are encouraging judges to reject it, while Democrats are pushing to make the policy mandatory. And some Texas judges have stated that they will make up their own minds about what to do.

“It’s very unusual for a conference policy to become a political firestorm like this,” said Jeremy Fogel, a retired federal judge who served in the Northern District of California. “I think that is unprecedented.”

Mitch McConnell, the Senate minority leader, swiftly condemned the new policy, which would deprive conservative activists of a potent weapon in their legal arsenal, one that they have wielded with great success in rolling back abortion rights and some Biden administration policies.

“Democrats are salivating at the possibility of shutting down access to justice in the venues favored by conservatives,” he said on the Senate floor. Individual district courts, he noted in a letter to a chief judge in Kentucky, could choose to simply ignore the new policy.

And last week, Chief Judge David C. Godbey of the Northern District of Texas sent a letter that appeared to say his district would do exactly that. The judges of his district met on March 27, Judge Godbey wrote, and “the consensus was not to make any change to our case assignment process at this time.”

The Northern District of Texas is arguably the jurisdiction that has been used to greatest effect by conservatives looking for judges willing to advance their policy agenda with sweeping nationwide injunctions. It has several one-judge and two-judge divisions where appointees of President Donald J. Trump are sure to preside over any case filed there. These divisions have become magnets for conservative plaintiffs seeking favorable rulings on issues like health care, L.G.B.T.Q. rights and immigration.

But in an interview, Judge Sam A. Lindsay, one of the Northern District judges who attended the March 27 meeting, said Judge Godbey’s letter did not mean that the judges had made a decision to reject the policy. He said their meeting at the Earle Cabell Federal Building in Dallas had not been called to discuss how to assign cases randomly, as the Judicial Conference had recommended, but to interview magistrate judge candidates. The assignment issue, he said, came up briefly at the end.

“I want to make one thing unequivocally clear,” Judge Lindsay said. “There was no vote taken at the meeting. The only consensus we reached was to postpone discussion of the matter.”

In response to questions sent to Judge Godbey, the clerk of court, Karen Mitchell, said there were concerns about how to implement the policy — among them, determining which cases it would apply to and making the policy compatible with the court’s existing automated case assignment system.

Russell Wheeler, a judicial expert at the Brookings Institution, said that the Northern District’s concerns about implementation were understandable, up to a point.

“The devil is always in the details,” Mr. Wheeler said. “I would not fault the Northern District for taking a little while to implement it. But what I want to know is, are they going to implement it at all, or is it just a smoke screen?”

The Southern District of Texas seems to be taking a similar go-slow approach. “The policy is under advisement by the court,” Chief Judge Randy Crane said in a statement. “No immediate action is expected.”

One of the best-known recent instances of apparent judge-shopping occurred in the Northern District. An anti-abortion coalition incorporated itself in Amarillo, the location of one of the district’s single-judge divisions, and then filed a lawsuit there seeking a ban on the abortion drug mifepristone, in the near certainty that the case would be heard by Judge Matthew J. Kacsmaryk, an outspoken opponent of abortion. The judge granted a sweeping injunction that would ban mifepristone, but it has yet to take effect while an appeal is pending before the Supreme Court.

The attorney general of Texas, Ken Paxton, and other plaintiffs have often turned to small federal courthouses with one or two judges to file suits intended to block Biden administration policies, particularly on immigration.

The Judicial Conference policy was intended to make it harder for plaintiffs to cherry-pick judges by calling for the most consequential cases to be assigned randomly among all judges in a district, not just those in the particular division where the cases were filed. The American Bar Association endorsed the idea last year .

Judge Godbey’s letter struck a rare note of public discord in the collegial world of federal judges.

Amanda Shanor, who teaches law at the Wharton School and wrote a proposal for the Brennan Center for Justice on randomizing case assignments, called the letter’s apparent rejection of the policy “aggressive envelope pushing” by the Northern District. “It doesn’t reflect well on the district, or on the judiciary,” she said.

While conservatives make the most use of judge-shopping at the courthouse level, liberals use the tactic as well. Lawyers who are seeking to overturn Alabama’s ban on transgender care for minors may face discipline after a panel of three federal judges found that they had engaged in impermissible judge-shopping there, using procedural motions to try to get a suit before a particular judge.

And during the Trump presidency, advocates for immigrants often filed their lawsuits in federal courts in California, where the odds of being assigned a liberal judge at the district or appellate level was higher than elsewhere.

Not all judge-shopping has a partisan bent. At one point, a quarter of all patent cases nationwide were being heard by a single judge in Waco, Texas. After two U.S. senators raised concerns, the Western District of Texas changed its case assignment rules to randomly assign such cases, and the number filed in Waco plunged to 22 a month from 76, according to a 2024 study .

The clash over assignment practices suggests that the judiciary’s tradition of informal self-governance is facing stress from the bitter political fights being waged on its docket.

“We are all getting a lesson in the power of trial court judges,” said Judith Resnik, a professor at Yale Law School. “If I can pick my judge, I am picking the initial decision maker for my case. That’s enormously important, because that is where a case’s record is made. District court judges decide pretrial motions. They admit evidence or keep it out, and they instruct juries.”

In their initial announcement, Judicial Conference leaders appear to have made the new policy recommending random case assignment sound more binding than it actually was, because many district courts have followed such policies in the past and they were not expecting any pushback.

Instead, what seemed to be an attempt by senior judges to shore up the judiciary’s legitimacy turned into an invitation for the legislative branch to try to put a thumb on the scale. Each party is accusing the other of politicizing the judiciary.

Intended or not, the letter from Judge Godbey drew widespread attention because it was read as a firm rejection of the Judicial Conference’s policy. As Mr. Wheeler, the Brookings Institution expert, who was once deputy director of the Federal Judicial Center, put it: “Godbey’s letter says: ‘the Judicial Conference has recommended X. Well, we’ve decided not to do that, thank you very much.’”

If the Northern District of Texas does not adopt random assignment for consequential cases, the Judicial Conference could try to put forth a binding rule under the Rules Enabling Act. Such a rule would have to survive review by the Supreme Court and Congress, and some judges have questioned whether it would supersede the statutory authority of the district courts.