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• How to Write a Thesis Statement | 4 Steps & Examples

How to Write a Thesis Statement | 4 Steps & Examples

Published on January 11, 2019 by Shona McCombes . Revised on August 15, 2023 by Eoghan Ryan.

A thesis statement is a sentence that sums up the central point of your paper or essay . It usually comes near the end of your introduction .

Your thesis will look a bit different depending on the type of essay you’re writing. But the thesis statement should always clearly state the main idea you want to get across. Everything else in your essay should relate back to this idea.

You can write your thesis statement by following four simple steps:

• Start with a question
• Write your initial answer
• Develop your answer
• Refine your thesis statement

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Table of contents

What is a thesis statement, placement of the thesis statement, step 1: start with a question, step 2: write your initial answer, step 3: develop your answer, step 4: refine your thesis statement, types of thesis statements, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about thesis statements.

A thesis statement summarizes the central points of your essay. It is a signpost telling the reader what the essay will argue and why.

The best thesis statements are:

• Concise: A good thesis statement is short and sweet—don’t use more words than necessary. State your point clearly and directly in one or two sentences.
• Contentious: Your thesis shouldn’t be a simple statement of fact that everyone already knows. A good thesis statement is a claim that requires further evidence or analysis to back it up.
• Coherent: Everything mentioned in your thesis statement must be supported and explained in the rest of your paper.

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The thesis statement generally appears at the end of your essay introduction or research paper introduction .

The spread of the internet has had a world-changing effect, not least on the world of education. The use of the internet in academic contexts and among young people more generally is hotly debated. For many who did not grow up with this technology, its effects seem alarming and potentially harmful. This concern, while understandable, is misguided. The negatives of internet use are outweighed by its many benefits for education: the internet facilitates easier access to information, exposure to different perspectives, and a flexible learning environment for both students and teachers.

You should come up with an initial thesis, sometimes called a working thesis , early in the writing process . As soon as you’ve decided on your essay topic , you need to work out what you want to say about it—a clear thesis will give your essay direction and structure.

You might already have a question in your assignment, but if not, try to come up with your own. What would you like to find out or decide about your topic?

For example, you might ask:

After some initial research, you can formulate a tentative answer to this question. At this stage it can be simple, and it should guide the research process and writing process .

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Now you need to consider why this is your answer and how you will convince your reader to agree with you. As you read more about your topic and begin writing, your answer should get more detailed.

In your essay about the internet and education, the thesis states your position and sketches out the key arguments you’ll use to support it.

The negatives of internet use are outweighed by its many benefits for education because it facilitates easier access to information.

In your essay about braille, the thesis statement summarizes the key historical development that you’ll explain.

The invention of braille in the 19th century transformed the lives of blind people, allowing them to participate more actively in public life.

A strong thesis statement should tell the reader:

• Why you hold this position
• What they’ll learn from your essay
• The key points of your argument or narrative

The final thesis statement doesn’t just state your position, but summarizes your overall argument or the entire topic you’re going to explain. To strengthen a weak thesis statement, it can help to consider the broader context of your topic.

These examples are more specific and show that you’ll explore your topic in depth.

Your thesis statement should match the goals of your essay, which vary depending on the type of essay you’re writing:

• In an argumentative essay , your thesis statement should take a strong position. Your aim in the essay is to convince your reader of this thesis based on evidence and logical reasoning.
• In an expository essay , you’ll aim to explain the facts of a topic or process. Your thesis statement doesn’t have to include a strong opinion in this case, but it should clearly state the central point you want to make, and mention the key elements you’ll explain.

If you want to know more about AI tools , college essays , or fallacies make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples or go directly to our tools!

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A thesis statement is a sentence that sums up the central point of your paper or essay . Everything else you write should relate to this key idea.

The thesis statement is essential in any academic essay or research paper for two main reasons:

• It gives your writing direction and focus.
• It gives the reader a concise summary of your main point.

Without a clear thesis statement, an essay can end up rambling and unfocused, leaving your reader unsure of exactly what you want to say.

Follow these four steps to come up with a thesis statement :

• Ask a question about your topic .
• Write your initial answer.
• Develop your answer by including reasons.
• Refine your answer, adding more detail and nuance.

The thesis statement should be placed at the end of your essay introduction .

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The Dangers of Surveillance

• Neil M. Richards
• Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards  by  Danielle Keats Citron , David Gray
• See full issue

From the Fourth Amendment to George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four , and from the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to films like Minority Report and The Lives of Others , our law and culture are full of warnings about state scrutiny of our lives. These warnings are commonplace, but they are rarely very specific. Other than the vague threat of an Orwellian dystopia, as a society we don’t really know why surveillance is bad and why we should be wary of it. To the extent that the answer has something to do with “privacy,” we lack an understanding of what “privacy” means in this context and why it matters. We’ve been able to live with this state of affairs largely because the threat of constant surveillance has been relegated to the realms of science fiction and failed totalitarian states.

But these warnings are no longer science fiction. The digital technologies that have revolutionized our daily lives have also created minutely detailed records of those lives. In an age of terror, our government has shown a keen willingness to acquire this data and use it for unknown purposes. We know that governments have been buying and borrowing private-sector databases, and we recently learned that the National Security Agency (NSA) has been building a massive data and supercomputing center in Utah, apparently with the goal of intercepting and storing much of the world’s Internet communications for decryption and analysis.

Although we have laws that protect us against government surveillance, secret government programs cannot be challenged until they are discovered. And even when they are, our law of surveillance provides only minimal protections. Courts frequently dismiss challenges to such programs for lack of standing, under the theory that mere surveillance creates no harms. The Supreme Court recently reversed the only major case to hold to the contrary, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA , finding that the respondents’ claim that their communications were likely being monitored was “too speculative.”

But the important point is that our society lacks an understanding of why (and when) government surveillance is harmful. Existing attempts to identify the dangers of surveillance are often unconvincing, and they generally fail to speak in terms that are likely to influence the law. In this Article, I try to explain the harms of government surveillance. Drawing on law, history, literature, and the work of scholars in the emerging interdisciplinary field of “surveillance studies,” I offer an account of what those harms are and why they matter. I will move beyond the vagueness of current theories of surveillance to articulate a more coherent understanding and a more workable approach.

At the level of theory, I will explain why and when surveillance is particularly dangerous and when it is not. First, surveillance is harmful because it can chill the exercise of our civil liberties. With respect to civil liberties, consider surveillance of people when they are thinking, reading, and communicating with others in order to make up their minds about political and social issues. Such intellectual surveillance is especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment with new, controversial, or deviant ideas. To protect our intellectual freedom to think without state over-sight or interference, we need what I have elsewhere called “intellectual privacy.” A second special harm that surveillance poses is its effect on the power dynamic between the watcher and the watched. This disparity creates the risk of a variety of harms, such as discrimination, coercion, and the threat of selective enforcement, where critics of the government can be prosecuted or blackmailed for wrongdoing unrelated to the purpose of the surveillance.

At a practical level, I propose a set of four principles that should guide the future development of surveillance law, allowing for a more appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of government surveillance. First, we must recognize that surveillance transcends the public/private divide . Public and private surveillance are simply related parts of the same problem, rather than wholly discrete. Even if we are ultimately more concerned with government surveillance, any solution must grapple with the complex relationships between government and corporate watchers. Second, we must recognize that secret surveillance is illegitimate and prohibit the creation of any domestic-surveillance programs whose existence is secret. Third, we should recognize that total surveillance is illegitimate and reject the idea that it is acceptable for the government to record all Internet activity without authorization. Government surveillance of the Internet is a power with the potential for massive abuse. Like its precursor of telephone wiretapping, it must be subjected to meaningful judicial process before it is authorized. We should carefully scrutinize any surveillance that threatens our intellectual privacy. Fourth, we must recognize that surveillance is harmful . Surveillance menaces intellectual privacy and increases the risk of blackmail, coercion, and discrimination; accordingly, we must recognize surveillance as a harm in constitutional standing doctrine. Explaining the harms of surveillance in a doctrinally sensitive way is essential if we want to avoid sacrificing our vital civil liberties.

I develop this argument in four steps. In Part I, I show the scope of the problem of modern “surveillance societies,” in which individuals are increasingly monitored by an overlapping and entangled assemblage of government and corporate watchers. I then develop an account of why this kind of watching is problematic. Part II shows how surveillance menaces our intellectual privacy and threatens the development of individual beliefs in ways that are inconsistent with the basic commitments of democratic societies. Part III explores how surveillance distorts the power relationships between the watcher and the watched, enhancing the watcher’s ability to blackmail, coerce, and discriminate against the people under its scrutiny. Part IV explores the four principles that I argue should guide the development of surveillance law, to protect us from the substantial harms of surveillance.

May 20, 2013

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Though crime cameras have proved themselves to be an effective tool for fighting street and organized crime, concerns about their wide use still remain. Nancy La Vigne, the director of Chicago’s Justice Policy Center, says camera systems are often believed to be violating citizens’ constitutionally-protected right to privacy when they are used to identify non-lawbreakers (SmartPlanet). Though there are rules limiting cameras’ possibilities (for example, they should not be able to pan, tilt, and zoom in order not to look into the windows of the apartment buildings or backyards), how can one be sure they are not watched and these rules are observed? Surveys show about 23% of U.S. citizens tend to believe security cameras violate their privacy (Rasmussen Reports).

Opponents of surveillance also stress the fact that security cameras can evoke negative emotions in citizens, and make them feel like they are being constantly watched and controlled. This refers both to adults, who already have an established system of views on the state, the government, and the society—and children, who are in the process of developing such a system. A senior policy analyst for the American Civil Liberties Union, Jay C. Stanley, thinks “Constant surveillance, from the time children enter school to the time they leave, teaches the wrong thing about the relationship between the citizen and the government in a democratic society.” Stated succinctly, children may believe the State has a right to interfere in the private lives of its citizens, and being under control and surveillance is a norm (Association of American Educators).

Citizens sensitive to civil liberties can find surveillance through cameras extremely uncomfortable and stressing. Usually, these are people who are extremely passionate about the privacy of their lives, or about their personal security; the proponents of left-wing political and conspiracy theories also tend to treat surveillance cameras negatively, as a tool of the State oppressing its citizens. Also, people with psychological disorders—for example those with paranoid tendencies—can display severe disturbance about the fact of being watched.

Though surveillance cameras are meant to help protect citizens from street and organized crime, and are an effective tool of monitoring, there exist several issues concerning privacy and ethics. Thus, about 23% of people in the U.S. believe surveillance cameras violate their rights in regard to privacy. Children under constant surveillance (at schools, for example) are believed to adopt a wrong understanding of the relationship between the citizens and the government. In addition, the fact of observance can cause severe stress in individuals sensitive to civil liberties. References “23% Think Surveillance Cameras have Violated Their Privacy – Rasmussen Reports™.” Rasmussen Reports. N.p., 26 Apr. 2013. Web. 10 July 2013. <http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/april_2013/23_think_surveillance_cameras_have_violated_their_privacy>

Sherwood, Christina Hernandez. “Surveillance Cameras: An Eye for an Eye?” SmartPlanet. N.p., 05 June 2012. Web. 10 July 2013. <http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/pure-genius/surveillance-cameras-an-eye-for-an-eye/8134>

“Cameras in Schools: Extra Safety Measure or Violation of Privacy?” Association of American Educators. N.p., 04 June 2013. Web. 10 July 2013. <http://www.aaeteachers.org/index.php/blog/1050-cameras-in-schools-extra-safety-measure-or-violation-of-privacy->

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Government Surveillance, Privacy, and Legitimacy

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• Published: 05 February 2022
• Volume 35 , article number  8 , ( 2022 )

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The recent decades have seen established liberal democracies expand their surveillance capacities on a massive scale. This article explores what is problematic about government surveillance by democracies. It proceeds by distinguishing three potential sources of concern: (1) the concern that governments diminish citizens’ privacy by collecting their data, (2) the concern that they diminish their privacy by accessing their data, and (3) the concern that the collected data may be used for objectionable purposes. Discussing the meaning and value of privacy, the article argues that only the latter two constitute compelling independent concerns. It then focuses particularly on the third concern, exploring the risk of government surveillance being used to enforce illegitimate laws. It discusses three legitimacy-related reasons why we should be worried about the expansion of surveillance capacities in established democracies: (1) Even established democracies might decay. There is a risk that surveillance capacities that are used for democratically legitimated purposes today will be used for poorly legitimated purposes in the future. (2) Surveillance may be used to enforce laws that lack legitimacy due to the disproportionate punishment attached to their violation. (3) The democratic procedures in established democracies fail to conform to the requirements formulated by mainstream theories of democratic legitimacy. Surveillance is thus used to enforce laws whose legitimacy is in doubt.

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1 Introduction

For a long time, large-scale government surveillance was a hallmark of authoritarianism. Authoritarian states known for their extensive surveillance systems include the GDR, the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. Footnote 1 In the past few decades, however, established liberal democracies have been increasingly ready to monitor their citizens on a massive scale. One notorious surveillance program run by an alliance of democracies was uncovered by Edward Snowden. The current rise of large-scale government surveillance is widely viewed with great concern, if not outright horror. Critics fear the rise of Orwellian surveillance states and celebrate Edward Snowden as a paragon of civil disobedience. Footnote 2 Much of the criticism of government surveillance has revolved around privacy, its meaning and value, and how it is impacted by surveillance. Government surveillance and the erosion of privacy it is associated with are being discussed as a cause of distrust and feelings of vulnerability, as a potential source of discrimination and unjust domination, and as a threat to democracy and the integrity of the public sphere, to name but a few concerns. By many, existing government surveillance programs are also deemed disproportionate. Footnote 3

At the same time, there remains some ambiguity about the acceptability of surveillance in democracies. For one thing, recent technological advances have made large-scale government surveillance not only feasible and cheap but also, in one sense, less intrusive. Modern government surveillance relies increasingly on technology rather than human spies and informers. Surveillance practices include, for instance, the monitoring of public spaces with CCTV cameras, the automatic interception and retention of Internet and telecommunication traffic, and the use of artificial intelligence to make sense of the huge amounts of data collected. As a result, modern surveillance is characterized by the rarity of actual human access to the large quantities of data collected. While the quantity of data collected is staggering, only a small proportion of them are ever accessed by a human person. Human access to collected surveillance data can be expected to further decrease as artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated. This has led to a debate about whether modern surveillance even reduces the privacy of those subject to surveillance, with some arguing that modern surveillance, involving little human access to the collected data, tends to leave people’s privacy intact. Footnote 4

For another thing, surveillance operations by democracies seem much more acceptable than the kind of surveillance conducted by authoritarian regimes. Democracies are using surveillance mostly for seemingly innocuous purposes, such as combating terrorism and serious crime or, most recently, containing the spread of a deadly virus. They are less inclined to use surveillance to crush legitimate political opposition or to persecute members of stigmatized groups, notable exceptions notwithstanding. Footnote 5 There is a significant moral difference, then, between, say, the NSA and the East German Stasi . Footnote 6

In sum, when democratic governments conduct large-scale surveillance operations in the pursuit of seemingly innocuous goals, all while limiting human access to the collected data, the case against surveillance is at least not obvious. In fact, some philosophers have expressed wholehearted support for large-scale government surveillance. Noting that it is generally permissible for law enforcement agencies to secure information about past events, one advocate of government surveillance has suggested that “the State should place all of its citizens under surveillance at all times and in all places.” Footnote 7 Others have invoked catastrophic risks, such as those posed by biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction, to justify extensive government surveillance. Footnote 8 To be sure, such wholesale endorsements of government surveillance are the exception. Footnote 9 But they convey an idea of the ethical ambivalence of government surveillance.

My goal in this paper is to contribute a new perspective on what is ethically at stake when democratic governments monitor their citizens and to achieve a better understanding of what is pro tanto objectionable about it. Footnote 10 I will proceed by distinguishing three independent concerns that a critic of government surveillance may have. The first concern is that governments diminish citizens’ privacy by collecting large amounts of data. This concern focuses on the loss of privacy brought about by the collection of data as such, that is, irrespective of whether the data will be accessed or used for objectionable purposes. The second concern is that the collected data may be accessed after all, again causing a loss of privacy, though of a different kind. The data may be accessed by government employees or exposed to the public through a hack or a leak. The third concern is that the collected data may be used for objectionable purposes (other than accessing the data).

Two of the above introduced concerns revolve around privacy. Zooming in on these two concerns, this paper seeks, first, to shed light on the significance of privacy in the context of surveillance. Engaging with the debate about the meaning of privacy, I will suggest that, whereas access to data is objectionable as such, the privacy loss brought about by the mere collection of data does not constitute an independent reason to object to government surveillance. Second, moving on to the third concern, the paper seeks to achieve a better understanding of problems associated with what surveillance can be used for. I will suggest that one serious and underappreciated problem with surveillance is related to the problem of political legitimacy. Surveillance can be used to enforce laws that lack legitimacy.

My discussions of privacy and legitimacy, though motivated by concerns about government surveillance, are, I hope, of more general relevance and thus of interest to scholars who have no particular interest in surveillance.

2 Surveillance and Privacy

I want to begin by examining the first concern about privacy, that is, the notion that there is something objectionable about government surveillance because the collection of massive amounts of data reduces people’s privacy. By undermining people’s privacy, government surveillance may be deemed objectionable irrespective of whether the data are accessed (second concern) or used for objectionable purposes (third concern). It is, in this sense, an independent concern about government surveillance.

There are four reasons why this concern is worth looking at. To begin with, it is a very natural thought that surveillance is objectionable simply on the grounds that the collection of people’s data reduces their privacy. Privacy is a widely valued good, and the mere collection of data is thought by many (though not all) to undermine privacy. It is therefore natural to object to the collection of data simply on the grounds that this violates people’s privacy — irrespective of whether the other two concerns apply.

Moreover, the extent to which increasingly automated surveillance practices really involve privacy losses is, as already noted, intensely discussed among privacy and surveillance scholars. An underlying assumption here seems to be that if the collection of citizens’ data reduces their privacy, surveillance is ipso facto problematic, irrespective of whether the data will be accessed or used for malicious purposes. Why else think that it matters how we define privacy and whether it is undermined by surveillance? Surveillance may be thought to be problematic simply in virtue of the fact that it undermines people’s privacy.

Yet another reason why the validity of the first concern matters is that some might question the force of the other two concerns. Human access to the collected data is very limited, and established liberal democracies may seem to use surveillance mainly for justifiable purposes. In light of this, some might question why we should object to large-scale government surveillance at all. If there is something objectionable about collecting large amounts of data as such (because of the privacy breaches associated with it), the critic of government surveillance has a ready answer to this question. Footnote 11

Finally, discussing this first concern will contribute towards achieving the overarching goal of this paper, namely a better understanding of how surveillance and privacy concerns relate to each other and how the potential harm done by government surveillance should be characterized. I believe that the first concern is ill-founded in that it fails to constitute a compelling independent reason to object to government surveillance, over and above the other two concerns. Appreciating why this is so allows a better understanding of the problem of government surveillance and of what is at stake in debates about the meaning and value of privacy.

Notice first, then, that the idea that there is something objectionable about the collection of data as such, though natural, can be challenged by means of a thought experiment. Imagine an unrealistically benevolent, well-organized, and stable democratic state that engages in large-scale surveillance operations. The state is characterized by the following two features:

Thanks to excellent institutional safeguards and security measures, there is no risk that data is illicitly accessed by government employees, nor that data might be exposed to the public.

It uses the collected surveillance data to enforce laws in a legitimate and just manner. It never uses the surveillance capacities for objectionable purposes. It also boasts a set of unrealistically robust checks and balances, which completely remove any risk of the surveillance capacities being used for less benign purposes in the future.

Admittedly, such perfectly benign surveillance is difficult to imagine. But when we do imagine it, it is difficult to see what might be objectionable about it. Once we stipulate that there is no risk of illicit access to the collected data and that the surveillance capacities will only ever be used for good purposes, that is, once we stipulate that the other two concerns do not apply, there just seems little cause for concern. On the contrary, it is arguable that we should welcome such perfectly benign surveillance. It provides enhanced security without any obvious downsides. To object to such perfectly benign surveillance would, it seems to me, be quite irrational. To be sure, we may have a residual feeling of unease at the thought even of such benevolent large-scale government surveillance (I, for one, certainly feel uneasy at the thought of it). But this is probably because no surveillance system in the real world resembles this perfectly benign surveillance system. Our emotional responses have been trained on a data set of surveillance practices that invariably do not meet the above two criteria. Upon rational reflection, we should welcome surveillance of this sort.

This provides at least initial grounds for thinking that the first concern must be ill-founded. The collection of large amounts of data as such — divorced from the other two concerns — seems unobjectionable. But one might still find the above line of reasoning unconvincing as it entirely brackets the key issue of privacy. Indeed, I have made two seemingly conflicting claims. On the one hand, I have just suggested that there does not seem to be anything problematic about the collection of data as such, divorced from the other two concerns. On the other hand, I have suggested that the collection of large amounts of data may diminish citizens’ privacy. This raises the question how the collection of large amounts of data could possibly diminish people’s privacy without being in any way problematic as such. If it diminishes their privacy, does this not show precisely that there is something objectionable about surveillance irrespective of whether the data are exposed or used for objectionable purposes?

To resolve this tension, and more generally to understand how surveillance and privacy relate, it is useful to briefly consider the debate about the meaning of privacy. One view in the literature is that privacy should be spelled out in terms of control. A person’s privacy remains intact as long as this person retains control over her personal information. Footnote 12 Beate Rössler, for instance, proposes the following definition: “Something counts as private if one can oneself control the access to this ‘something.’” Footnote 13 On this view, privacy is reduced as soon as one loses the relevant sort of control. A competing view holds that privacy is a matter of access, not of control. A person’s privacy is intact to the extent that no one actually accesses her personal information. Mere loss of control over one’s personal information is not enough for there to be a reduction of privacy. Kevin Macnish has made the case for the access account by appeal to the so-called threatened loss cases. Threatened loss cases are characterized by a loss of control over one’s personal information in the absence of actual access to it. He invites us to consider the case of a person who left her diary on a table in a coffee shop. When she returns to the coffee shop to pick it up, it is handed back to her by a stranger in whose possession it was for the last 30 minutes. During this interval, the diary owner had lost control over her personal information in the diary. But if the stranger did not open the diary during this time, it seems plausible that the diary owner’s privacy has not been comprised. Such threatened loss cases suggest that what matters is actual access rather than loss of control. Footnote 14

An assumption underlying this debate is that there is a lot at stake in the dispute about the meaning of privacy. Recall that modern government surveillance, relying increasingly on technology rather than people, involves relatively little actual human access to the collected data. Depending, then, on how we define privacy, modern government surveillance involves either privacy erosions on a massive scale (control account) or hardly any privacy losses at all (access account), given that it involves loss of control over one’s personal data but little actual human access to them. Footnote 15 This is why how we define privacy has been taken to matter a great deal.

Notwithstanding the many valuable insights this debate has generated, I do not believe that how we define privacy matters as much as is commonly thought. Little of substance depends on it. Whether we should think of government surveillance operations as reducing privacy in the strict sense of the term or not is, at the end of day, not that relevant. Indeed, Macnish himself, who in the title of a paper asserts that “defining privacy matters,” is (rightly, I think) adamant that government surveillance is problematic even if, technically, citizens’ privacy is not diminished. Footnote 16 This begs the question why exactly it should matter which definition of privacy we opt for. I believe it does not matter all that much. What matters are the actual wrongs and dangers of surveillance, and their exploration does not require resolving the dispute between access theorists and control theorists. Footnote 17

I therefore wish to sidestep this debate by engaging in an act of conceptual stipulation. I suggest that we distinguish two concepts of privacy: “access privacy” and “control privacy.” Access privacy is the kind of privacy that requires nonaccess to one’s personal information, whereas control privacy is reduced as soon as one loses control over one’s personal information, whether accessed or not. Modern government surveillance, to the extent that it does not involve human access to the collected data, reduces control privacy while leaving access privacy mostly intact. Footnote 18 The suggested distinction is a technical stipulation. By making this stipulation, I am not suggesting that our everyday concept of privacy is fundamentally vague or ambiguous. Perhaps it is, but I am not committed to this view. Footnote 19 Nor do I mean it to discourage further inquiry into how to best analyze everyday privacy talk, which strikes me as an interesting undertaking in its own right. But introducing these two technical concepts by means of stipulation allows us to sidestep an intricate and unresolved debate, and it yields two technical concepts that are useful for analytical purposes. To be sure, the proposed terminological stipulation tells us little of substance about the significance of privacy in the context of government surveillance. But it helps us organize our thoughts and get more quickly to the heart of what is normatively at stake. Footnote 20

With these clarifications in mind, we can return to the question at hand: How might the collection of data involve a reduction in privacy without being in any way problematic as such, that is, irrespective of whether the data may actually be accessed or used for objectionable purposes? My answer is not that we should simply reject the assumption that the mere collection of data even involves privacy losses, as adherents of the access account of privacy would do. I think both accounts of privacy are legitimate, and it is not obviously wrong to say that the mere collection of data reduces people’s (control) privacy. Instead, the answer I want to propose is that the collecting of data may well be said to diminish people’s (control) privacy, but that the value of this kind of privacy depends on the other two concerns, that is, on the risk of collected data being accessed or of them being used for objectionable purposes. In a, again unrealistic, world in which there is no risk of data access or misuse by the government, the value of control privacy would be unclear. Mere loss of control over one’s personal data would be unproblematic, if we could rest assured that the data are not accessed and that nothing bad happens with these data. I want to state unequivocally that I am not suggesting that, in normal circumstances, there is no reason to value control privacy, or that we need not be concerned about governments reducing people’s control privacy. In normal circumstances, the antecedent of the above conditional is not satisfied. The risk of our data being accessed or abused is real, and this is reason enough to be concerned about the mass collection of data. Rather, the point I wish to make is an analytical one: at least in the context of surveillance, the value of control privacy is closely tied to the other two concerns. We may plausibly define privacy in such a way that government surveillance can be said to diminish people’s privacy, namely their control privacy. Footnote 21 But its diminution does not constitute an independent concern, over and above concerns about access to one’s data (losses of access privacy) and about what these data are or might be used for. Footnote 22

Turning now to the second concern about privacy, a loss of access privacy is different from a loss of control privacy. There seems to be something problematic about people accessing personal information as such, that is, irrespective of other concerns, especially of whether the accessed information will be used for objectionable purposes. Imagine that government agents monitor your behavior, eavesdrop on your conversations, read your mail or email, or reduce your access privacy in some other such way. These privacy breaches seem harmful even when there is no risk whatsoever that the collected information is used for bad purposes (or exposed to the public so that even more people access the information). Even if we stipulate that these agents are perfectly virtuous people who, somehow isolated from the rest of society, have not the slightest opportunity to pass on the information gleaned to others, there is, I think, a distinct sense that you are being harmed. I admit that I am here appealing to intuition and that it is not easy to spell out the nature of this harm or provide further support for this view. Perhaps we are here reaching ethical rock-bottom. One way of going beyond brute intuition may be to observe that people who have had intimate information accessed by others often feel exposed, embarrassed, humiliated, or simply awkward, a response that does not appear fully reducible to fears about what the information gleaned may be used for. Maybe, as ethicists, we do well to take these responses at face value. Footnote 23 Thus, although the argument for it remains somewhat schematic, it is certainly plausible that breaches of access privacy are objectionable as such, irrespective of other concerns, in particular of what the accessed information will be used for. Footnote 24 There appears to exist a significant normative difference between whether some piece of personal information, which we had rather kept for ourselves, is actually in somebody else’s mind or not — a distinction that certainly has some plausibility on its face. Admittedly, though, my argument for this asymmetry is not uncontestable, and it is open to critics to challenge it by either disputing that access as such is problematic or by pushing the intuition that loss of control as such is problematic too.

The claims I have made are substantive ethical claims, which are independent from definitional questions. They would remain true if we opted for some other definition of privacy, although this would necessitate reformulating them. The increasingly automated character of modern surveillance matters not for reasons related to the meaning of privacy. It matters morally because it means that there can be collecting and processing of large amounts of data without any access taking place. This is relevant because access as such is morally problematic. By contrast, the mere collecting of large amounts of data, though reducing control privacy, does not constitute a compelling independent concern about surveillance, independent, that is, from the other two concerns. To understand what is ultimately problematic about government surveillance, we must therefore focus on the concern about access and the concern about what surveillance is used for. The question regarding the meaning of privacy and whether surveillance should be said to reduce “privacy” is peripheral.

The concern about access is legitimate and important. There seems to be something objectionable about human access to surveillance data in its own right , irrespective of what the accessed data are used for. The force of this concern about modern government surveillance is difficult to gauge, though. There certainly is a non-negligible risk of access taking place, in spite of the increasingly automated nature of surveillance. For instance, there are reports that employees of the US’s National Security Agency use surveillance tools to spy on their partners. Footnote 25 There is also the risk that data are hacked or leaked to the public, in which case they may be accessed by people other than government employees. Just as the extensive data collection efforts by private corporations is worrisome because the collected data are never perfectly secure, so is government surveillance. Footnote 26 Indeed, recent security breaches of government and corporate databases have exposed data of 50 million Turks and 223 million Brazilians, respectively. Footnote 27 Still, the fact that surveillance today relies on modern surveillance technologies means that the amount of access taking place is relatively low, compared to “old-fashioned” large-scale surveillance operations. The collection of massive amounts of data does typically not translate to a massive erosion of people’s access privacy. Security breaches such as the ones above are the exception, and even when they occur, only a small portion of the data made available is actually accessed. Technological and institutional safeguards may be put in place to further reduce the probability of data breaches, although they will never completely eliminate the risk. Footnote 28 Despite the recent massive expansion of government surveillance, it is arguable that today’s government surveillance in, say, the US, the UK, or the EU causes fewer reductions in access privacy than, say, government surveillance in the GDR. Footnote 29 On the whole, the concern that data might be accessed should be taken seriously, and it is no doubt part of the explanation of why real-world mass surveillance is so worrisome. But it only goes some way towards explaining the fierce opposition or even horror that large-scale government surveillance tends to elicit.

Arguably, the most compelling concern about modern government surveillance is that it can be used for objectionable purposes. Mass surveillance is a powerful instrument for controlling people, and placing an instrument this powerful in the hands of already powerful governments raises legitimate fears about what it will be used for (other than potentially for accessing the data). It was mentioned in the introduction that surveillance scholars have already raised a number of concerns regarding large-scale government surveillance. Many of these concerns can be interpreted as being ultimately about how the surveillance data are or might be used. Adding another perspective to this discussion, I will, in the remainder of this paper, explore one problem associated with the use of surveillance that in my view constitutes one of the principal problems with government surveillance and that has so far received little attention.

3 Surveillance and Legitimacy

To appreciate this particular problem, we must consider that government surveillance is a means of enforcing laws. The primary purpose of government surveillance is to ensure that people comply with the law by enabling the legal prosecution of those who fail to comply and by creating a climate of deterrence. Footnote 30 This section explores the idea that one fundamental problem with government surveillance is that it can be used to enforce laws (or, more broadly, government policies) that the government has no right to enforce. In his autobiography, Edward Snowden asserts that.

a world of total automated enforcement – of, say, all pet-ownership laws, or all zoning laws regulating home businesses – would be intolerable. Extreme justice can turn out to be extreme injustice, not just in terms of the severity of the punishment for an infraction, but also in terms of how consistently and thoroughly the law is applied and prosecuted. Footnote 31

This observation is, I think, important and to the point. One problem with extensive government surveillance is that we should not want all laws to be consistently and thoroughly applied and prosecuted. The problem of government surveillance is thus closely intertwined with the more general problem of political legitimacy. There is a sense in which a criticism of surveillance along these lines is not a criticism of surveillance per se. Surveillance is really just the tool for achieving that which is argued to be objectionable. This point is well taken. Indeed, I mentioned at the outset that I take my discussion to be of more general relevance and thus, hopefully, of interest to scholars who have no particular interest in surveillance. But it is also true that the rise of government surveillance renders concerns about legitimacy particularly salient and pertinent. It renders the “consistent and thorough application and prosecution of the law” possible in a way that until recently states could only dream of. This is why Snowden’s above-quoted concern is not “off-topic” and why, I hope, the below discussion of issues related to legitimacy is fitting.

Political legitimacy refers to the moral right of a government to pass and enforce laws. Footnote 32 Understanding the ethical significance of government surveillance requires an understanding of the conditions that must be satisfied for coercive government action to be legitimate. Although most people, political theorists and laypeople alike, accept the legitimacy of democratic governments, it is worth making explicit why government action is in need of legitimation. Essentially, the problem of political legitimacy is that government action is coercive. Government commands are backed by punishments that one cannot defy, as one is literally forced to comply. One might refuse to pay a fine, decide not to turn up to a court hearing, or continue driving one’s car after having had one’s license revoked. But at the end of the chain of sanctions, there is (typically) imprisonment, and one is ultimately made to go there by physical force.

The fact that government ultimately rests on the threat of physical force and imprisonment is morally significant, as it constitutes a serious pro tanto wrong that stands in need of moral justification. Indeed, in nonpolitical settings, people are extremely reluctant to condone or personally resort to physical coercion to achieve even desirable aims. Most people would be aghast at the idea of private individuals using physical coercion to carry out the kind of policies that they take governments to be perfectly entitled to enforce. They would, for instance, be appalled if a private individual forcibly extracted money from her neighbor for charitable purposes by threatening to use physical force to lock her up in the basement. Footnote 33 Given then the widely acknowledged considerable pro tanto badness of physical coercion and imprisonment, there is a need to justify the use of coercive measures by the government. This need for justification carries over to government surveillance, which is a part of the coercive apparatus of the state. The primary purpose of government surveillance is to ensure compliance with the law and to facilitate the prosecution of those who fail to comply.

One group of people who should find government surveillance objectionable is libertarians and anarchists, who, emphasizing the badness of physical coercion, believe that the scope of legitimate government action is very limited or, indeed, zero. Footnote 34 They should approve of government surveillance only for the enforcement of the set of policies that governments may legitimately enforce, which, according to them, is either very small or empty. The observation that there is something objectionable from a libertarian or anarchist point of view with an institution that is an instrument of law enforcement borders on the trivial. Footnote 35 Also, libertarianism and anarchism are minority views that few interested in the ethics of government surveillance share. I will therefore put libertarian or anarchist objections to one side and focus on more mainstream conceptions of political legitimacy, which are more optimistic about the capacity of democratic procedures to generate legitimacy. From such as perspective, government surveillance, when carried out by established liberal democracies, may appear prima facie legitimate. When established liberal democracies — think the US, the UK, Germany, or France — rely on surveillance for law enforcement purposes, they are enforcing what appear to be democratically legitimated laws.

My project in this section is to explore why even those subscribing to more mainstream conceptions of political legitimacy have reason to be concerned about government surveillance on account of its forming part of the coercive apparatus of the state. I will identify and discuss three such reasons for concern. Footnote 36

The first and perhaps most obvious reason is that there is always the risk of democratic decay. States that are functioning liberal democracies today might degenerate into severely defective democracies in the future. This risk is today more palpable than ever. It means that there is a risk that the surveillance infrastructure and the collected data that are used for democratically legitimated purposes today will be used for poorly legitimated purposes in the future. When democratic institutions decay, they will at some point fail to generate the legitimacy that is necessary for the enforcement of laws to be rightful. This problem carries over to surveillance. There is something deeply objectionable about government surveillance when it is used to enforce laws that are illegitimate. One risk, then, is that surveillance capacities are used in the future to enforce laws that have not been adequately legitimated. A fortiori, government surveillance is objectionable when a democracy has degenerated into an authoritarian tyranny that employs surveillance to infringe basic human rights. Surveillance can and has been used to stifle free speech, to restrict the freedom of assembly, to go after dissidents, and to oppress and persecute marginalized people, which is not only illegitimate but also substantively unjust. Footnote 37

Second, most democratic theorists agree that there are limits to what can be democratically legitimated. While they regard democratic procedures as an effective way of legitimating coercion, they usually hold that some policies are illegitimate even if they have been passed in a proper democratic procedure. That is, they usually endorse at least some substantial criteria of political legitimacy, the violation of which defeats the legitimating force of democratic procedures. This proviso is typically thought to affect laws that violate basic political rights, the so-called liberties of the ancients. For instance, it is generally held that it is never legitimate to disenfranchise a certain group of people, to take away people’s right to freedom of expression, or to severely curtail the freedom of the press. But most democratic theorists also take this proviso to protect nonpolitical human rights, including the liberties of the moderns such as liberty of conscience and the right to bodily integrity. Footnote 38

Many surveillance operations serve to enforce laws against terrorism and serious crime. These are not plausible candidates for laws that involve legitimacy-defeating violations of basic liberties. In the wake of the Covid crisis, however, surveillance has also been used to enforce restrictions on people’s basic liberties. Taiwan, South Korea, and Israel have been particularly resolute, relying on mandatory surveillance instruments to enforce quarantine regulations. Footnote 39 One newspaper article reports, for instance, that “the [Taiwanese] government worked with telecommunications companies to track quarantined residents’ locations using their phone numbers. This system, called a ‘digital fence,’ notifies authorities when anyone under mandatory quarantine goes outside their designated quarantine site.” Footnote 40 Surveillance is effectively used to severely restrict citizens’ liberty of movement, liberty of assembly, freedom of trade, and other basic liberties. Whether such restrictions constitute a morally justifiable response to the Covid pandemic is debatable and will not be discussed here. I mention them as they convey an idea of how readily surveillance may be used to enforce restrictions that do infringe on citizens’ basic liberties.

There is, however, another route to arguing that government surveillance might end up being deployed to enforce democratically enacted yet illegitimate laws. This route — again anticipated by Snowden’s remark on the “severity of the punishment for an infraction” — is in my view quite compelling but perhaps also somewhat nonobvious and contrarian. It concerns not the content of the laws that are enforced, for instance, whether they curtail basic liberties, but their mode of enforcement. David Estlund observes that among the democratically enacted laws that are illegitimate are not only those that undermine the proper functioning of democratic procedures but also laws that are morally abhorrent for other reasons. He asserts, convincingly, that a “law, passed by proper democratic procedures, that established, as a punishment for anything, being boiled in oil would be neither legitimate nor authoritative even though it has no real antidemocratic dimension to it.” Footnote 41 The feature that renders this law illegitimate relates to the punishment attached to its violation, that is, to its mode of enforcement rather than to its content. While nobody is boiled in oil these days, excessively cruel punishments are by no means a thing of the past. Today, people are punished by being locked up in a prison cell, and it is arguable that this is an extremely inhumane punishment, too. As Chris Surprenant and Jason Brennan observe, “[d]epriving someone of freedom, subjecting them to extended risk of physical and sexual abuse, forcing them to remain locked in a small space, and in some cases, keeping them isolated and without entertainment for extended period[s] [is] barbaric.” Footnote 42 Incarceration also causes considerable collateral damage by negatively affecting people who are personally close to the incarcerated person and may depend on his or her support, such as family members, partners, and friends. Surprenant and Brennan imagine that an outsider might offer the following account of incarceration as a punishment:

You […] enslave your convicts, place them under constant surveillance, remove their privacy, dehumanize them, bore them, psychologically torture them, and subject them to near constant threats of capricious physical and sexual abuse. You ruin their lives, and you make it so that these people provide nothing of value to society, either. And you do this all at tremendous monetary expense. […] [Y]ou punish criminality with prolonged dehumanization punctuated by capricious, unexpected brutality. Footnote 43

Now consider again the example of death by boiling in oil. Assume, for the sake of argument, that drug offenses, theft, or tax evasion were punished by boiling the delinquent in oil. It is plausible that even if we assume that the laws that criminalize these practices and specify the punishment were democratically passed, democratic theorists should dismiss them as illegitimate on account of the disproportionate cruelty of the punishment attached to their violation. The punishment is profoundly inhumane, and its inhumanity nullifies whatever democratic legitimation the laws may have received. It would evidently be wrong to enforce these laws and to boil in oil the drug user or dealer, the thief, or the tax evader. While incarceration is certainly less inhumane than boiling in oil, it is, I submit, still sufficiently inhumane and excessive as to defeat the legitimacy of some laws that result in people being incarcerated. I am not saying that incarceration is never justified. Some wrongdoers, such as serial killers, rapists, and terrorists, ought to be locked away so as to prevent them from causing further harm. Footnote 44 But incarceration as a punishment for nonviolent crime is unjustifiably inhumane. Thus, many instances of incarceration, especially but not exclusively in the USA, are so inhumane that we should question the legitimacy of the laws responsible for them. Footnote 45

What I am suggesting, then, is that government surveillance is problematic when it is used to enforce laws that are illegitimate because of the inhumanity of the punishment attached to their violation. That is, there is a considerable risk that government surveillance is abused to enforce laws that are illegitimate because of their mode of enforcement. Although most democratic theorists focus on the content of laws rather than their mode of enforcement (Estlund being an exception), I take this concern about government surveillance to be consonant with the spirit of much of democratic theorizing, which acknowledges that grossly inhumane legislation is illegitimate irrespective of the democratic legitimation it may have received. Footnote 46

Third, the use of surveillance to enforce laws may be objectionable because the democratic institutions of established liberal democracies are already defective. So far, my argument assumed that the democratic procedures in established liberal democracies are by and large doing a good job at generating democratic legitimacy, although it was acknowledged that they might decay (first problem) or on occasion produce illegitimate laws by violating procedure-independent standards (second problem). The third problem arises from the observation that the democratic procedures of established liberal democracies are already defective and may thus fail to secure the legitimacy of the laws that surveillance is used to enforce. They are defective by the standards of at least a number of influential mainstream theories of political legitimacy.

For instance, many proponents of deliberative accounts of political legitimacy hold that policies are legitimate only if they emanate from ideal political deliberation. Seyla Benhabib asserts “that legitimacy in complex modern democratic societies must be thought to result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of common concern.” Footnote 47 But, as many have observed, actual political deliberation does not at all conform to this ideal. Footnote 48 Or consider how John Rawls conceives of legitimacy:

[T]he idea of political legitimacy based on the criterion of reciprocity says: Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions – were we to state them as government officials – are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons. Footnote 49

Often, however, the exercise of political power is not justified by public reasons in the way envisaged by Rawls and his followers in the public reason tradition. Estlund, defending an epistemic theory of democratic legitimacy, holds that “[d]emocratic legitimacy requires that the procedure can be held, in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view, to be epistemically the best (or close to it) among those that are better than random.” Footnote 50 But it is fair to say that actual democratic procedures in established liberal democracies, however, worthy of respect and protection, are not close to being the epistemically best among those that are better than random. Estlund himself, acknowledging the problem of voter ignorance, notes that he is unsure whether the requirements of epistemic proceduralism will ever be met. Footnote 51 The neo-republican approach ties legitimacy to the concept of non-domination and to popular control over government. Philip Pettit, who has offered the most comprehensive account of neo-republicanism, states: “[A] state will be legitimate just insofar as it gives each citizen an equal share in a system of popular control over government.” Footnote 52 Again, due to existing inequalities between citizens, virtually no democracy conforms to this ideal, as Pettit himself observes. Footnote 53

I cannot and need not here review all theories of political legitimacy. This selective review suffices to illustrate that at least several prominent theories of political legitimacy formulate standards of legitimacy that established liberal democracies do not meet. Perhaps, this is unsurprising. Democratic theorists are in the business of outlining to-be-emulated political ideals. They do not seek to provide descriptively adequate accounts of the imperfect status quo. But it means that if we take these theories at face value, the legitimacy of most policies enforced in established liberal democracies is in doubt. This problem has, to my knowledge, hardly been addressed in the literature, and its precise implications remain to be explored. Footnote 54 At this point, I want to cautiously point out that, by the standards of several notable theories of legitimacy, many laws seem to lack legitimacy and that there may be something problematic about enforcing such laws. To the extent that government surveillance is used to enforce such imperfectly legitimated laws, government surveillance is problematic, too.

Note that the problem of defective legitimacy affects not only laws that are enforced with the help of government surveillance but also government surveillance as a policy itself. If existing democratic procedures do not meet the requirements necessary for democratic legitimation, the actual decision-making processes that lead to the introduction of surveillance programs may fail to ensure their legitimacy. Indeed, given the secretive nature of many surveillance operations and the importance of transparency for political legitimacy, the problem may be particularly acute for surveillance policies. Footnote 55

To summarize, the three subproblems are as follows: (1) even if established liberal democracies are, by and large, legitimated to enforce laws today, their democratic institutions may decay in the future. Existing surveillance data and infrastructure might then be used for illegitimate purposes. (2) Even if established liberal democracies possess the procedural institutions that generate democratic legitimacy, there are procedure-independent standards that may defeat the legitimacy of laws decided by these institutions. The inhumanity of incarceration may be such a defeater. Government surveillance is objectionable if it is used to enforce such laws. (3) It is unclear to what extent established liberal democracies really possess the procedural institutions that generate democratic legitimacy, if judged by the standards of several prominent theories of political legitimacy. It is arguable that government surveillance is problematic when it is used to enforce laws whose legitimacy is in doubt.

To be sure, the established liberal democracies I have considered are, as of today, not authoritarian tyrannies (trivially). Also, some of the most salient mass surveillance operations, such as those uncovered by Snowden, serve to fight terrorism and similarly serious crime. One might argue that if any laws are legitimate, it is laws against terrorism and serious crime. They ought to be enforced even when they have resulted from imperfect democratic processes, and incarceration may be a morally justified response to the violation of these laws. Arguably, people who plot terrorist attacks ought to be put behind bars. However, democratic institutions are increasingly under threat, with many experts fearing an authoritarian backlash. Footnote 56 And as surveillance technologies become more sophisticated and citizens more desensitized to being monitored, it is likely that government surveillance will progressively expand beyond the purpose of counterterrorism and the like. Footnote 57 Indeed, already today, surveillance is used to enforce rather questionable legislation. One of the most extensive surveillance operations, said by some to eclipse that of the National Security Agency, is run by the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Through the “Hemisphere Project,” the DEA has access to a vast database of phone data, provided by telecommunication company AT&T, to prosecute the “war on drugs,” one of the US’s most questionable policy programs. Footnote 58 Another controversial surveillance operation is carried out by the US’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). It uses facial recognition to scan millions of driver’s licence photos, possibly in an effort to track down undocumented immigrants. Footnote 59 To such surveillance programs, the above legitimacy concerns seem readily applicable. These programs also demonstrate that government surveillance is expanding rapidly and often in an unchecked manner — the DEA’s surveillance was secret until accidentally uncovered, and the ICE proceeds without seeking state or court approval, let alone approval of the driver’s licences’ owners — giving a foretaste of what is to come. Surveillance is thus likely to continue expanding beyond the prevention of terrorism and serious crime. The more government surveillance is leading to the “total enforcement” of the law, the more applicable the above concerns about legitimacy become.

4 Conclusion

Having distinguished three potential reasons for concern, I have argued that, ultimately, we ought to be concerned about whether collected surveillance data may be accessed and about what the data are used for. The mere collecting of surveillance data, though involving privacy losses of sorts, does not constitute a compelling reason for concern in its own right, over and above the other two concerns. Debates about the meaning of privacy, though insightful, need not be settled for the ethical assessment of government surveillance. One chief problem with government surveillance in democracies is that it may be used to enforce laws that ought not to be enforced — a problem that will become increasingly acute as government surveillance expands.

I conclude with a caveat regarding the implications of my argument. The aim of this essay was to get a better grip on what is pro tanto objectionable about modern government surveillance in established liberal democracies. I have made no attempt to provide an all-things-considered judgment of its ethical acceptability. Nothing I have said entails that government surveillance is never justified. To call for an end to all government surveillance on the basis of the above concerns, perhaps by appeal to the precautionary principle, would be to ignore the opportunity costs that forgoing government surveillance may involve. Footnote 60 As mentioned in the introduction, some scholars have defended government surveillance as a useful instrument for preventing terrorist attacks of a catastrophic scale. An all-things-considered judgment that accounts for these and other potential opportunity costs, which would also require assessing the actual effectiveness of surveillance, cannot be provided within the scope of one article. Footnote 61 Indeed, it is doubtful that any such general assessment can be provided, as the moral costs and benefits of each surveillance technique or operation must be judged on its own terms. Footnote 62 What I do hope to have achieved is to contribute a new perspective on whether and why we should be concerned about government surveillance and on how the problem of government surveillance relates to questions of privacy and legitimacy.

For an overview of policing and surveillance in twentieth-century dictatorships, refer to Dunnage ( 2016 ). Dunnage reports that it is estimated that, in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union, some 30 to 60% of the population were forced to work as informers for the KGB, and in the GDR, roughly every thirtieth citizen served as an informer for the regime. Nazi Germany may have relied less on surveillance and more on denunciations (pp. 122–123). On surveillance in China and North Korea, see Denyer ( 2018 ) and Lankov and In-ok ( 2011 ), respectively.

See, e.g., Brownlee ( 2016 ) and Scheuermann ( 2014 ).

Critical discussions of government surveillance include Goold ( 2009 ); Henschke ( 2017 , ch. 9); Hoye and Monaghan ( 2018 ); Lever ( 2008 ); Nissenbaum ( 1998 ); Roberts ( 2015 ); Solove ( 2007 ); Smith ( 2020 ); Stahl ( 2016 , 2020 ); and I. Taylor ( 2017 ). For two non-privacy-centered criticisms of government surveillance, see Macnish ( 2018 , 2020 ) and Sorell ( 2018 ). A classic treatment of this topic is Foucault ( 1975 ). See also Zuboff ( 2019 ), though her focus is on “surveillance” by private companies.

Most prominently Macnish ( 2018 , 2020 ); see also Posner ( 2005 ) and Sorell ( 2018 ). For an argument that public video surveillance does not violate privacy rights, refer to Ryberg ( 2007 ).

Exceptions include surveillance in the McCarthy era, the FBI’s COINTELPRO (including the wiretapping of Martin Luther King), and undercover policing in the UK (see the ongoing Undercover Policing Inquiry). See also Goold ( 2009 , p. 43).

See Sorell ( 2011 , pp. 12–14).

J. S. Taylor ( 2005 , p. 227).

Persson and Savulescu ( 2012 )

Much more cautious defenses of surveillance have been advanced by Smith ( 2020 ) and I. Taylor ( 2017 ).

In what follows, the “pro tanto” will usually be omitted, but I will return to it in the conclusion.

The observation that no access takes place when data are processed by intelligent algorithms might be challenged on the grounds that these algorithms are themselves “agents” of sorts, who “access” the data when processing them. Whether intelligent systems qualify as “agents” or not, I agree with Macnish ( 2020 ) that there is a significant difference between access by humans and access by entities that lack “semantic understanding,” e.g., intelligent systems.

I am focusing on informational privacy, as this seems to be the relevant kind of privacy in the present context.

Roessler ( 2005 , p. 8). Other proponents of the control account include Fried ( 1984 , p. 209); Menges ( 2020a ); Moore ( 2003 , 2008 ); Westin ( 1967 , p. 7); and, tentatively, Mainz and Uhrenfeldt ( 2021 ) (the latter focus on the right to privacy, though). For an interesting exchange about its plausibility, see Lundgren ( 2020 ) and Menges ( 2020b ).

Macnish ( 2018 ); see also Macnish ( 2020 ) and Thomson ( 1975 , pp. 304–305, n. 1). An argument strikingly similar to Macnish’s (that even features a diary example) was independently developed by Tom Sorell ( 2018 ). For a subtle attempt by a control theorist to account for threatened loss cases, refer to Menges ( 2020a , forthcoming).

Note, though, that Menges, although a control theorist, tries to capture the intuition that no privacy loss occurs in threatened loss cases and thus agrees with Macnish that modern government surveillance involves very little loss of privacy (2020a, 2020b, forthcoming).

Macnish ( 2018 , 2020 ). Menges concurs (2020a, pp. 46–47). A view similar to Macnish’s has been defended by Sorell, who “den[ies] that bulk collection is seriously intrusive without denying that it is morally objectionable in other ways” (2018, p. 47).

I am here concurring with Henschke ( 2017 , p. 46), Solove ( 2007 , p. 760; 2009, pp. 39–40), and van den Hoven ( 2008 ), who have warned against getting bogged down in conceptual debates.

Henschke ( 2020 ), too, suggests distinguishing two concepts of privacy. His distinction differs from mine. In his 2017, he defends a pluralistic, “clustered” approach to privacy.

For what it is worth, I share Macnish’s linguistic intuition that privacy is only reduced in situations in which human access occurs.

An anonymous reviewer has sensibly suggested that I clarify whether this approach commits me to the views that (1) defining privacy is not crucial to assessing the ethical permissibility of surveillance, and (2) intermediate moral principles such as “Do not diminish a person’s privacy [or, for that matter, autonomy, freedom, etc.]” play little role in moral theory compared to more fundamental principles such as the categorical imperative or the utilitarian calculus. In response, I wish to state that I do believe that defining privacy matters, and I have offered two stipulative definitions of privacy. What I do not believe is that we necessarily need to determine which of several privacy definitions on offer (especially privacy as control and privacy as nonaccess) best capture everyday privacy talk before we can address the ethical issue at stake. We can proceed by exploring both the normative significance of reductions of control privacy and that of reductions of access privacy. This way, we can come to grips with the problem of surveillance without first having to identify which concept of privacy best captures everyday privacy talk. This is the approach I am taking in this essay. Relatedly, I am not committed to the view that intermediate principles do not matter for moral theorizing. Such principles as “Do not diminish a person’s privacy” do play a role in moral theorizing, but again, we can work with different versions of such principles (e.g., “Do not diminish a person’s control privacy,” “Do not diminish a person’s control privacy,” etc.), and we need not first identify which privacy concept best captures everyday privacy talk.

At least according to the standard version of the control account. See again Menges ( 2020a , b , forthcoming) for a version of the control account that entails that government surveillance need not necessarily reduce people’s privacy.

Similarly, Henderson ( 2016 , p. 962) observes that “assuming complete automation, the key privacy harm seems to occur only upon human viewing, or use.”.

A related line of research explores the connection between privacy and dignity (Bloustein, 1964 ; Floridi, 2016 ; Kleinig, 2009 ).

This is not to deny that access to information may additionally be problematic for the reason that the accessed information may be used for objectionable purposes.

Perez ( 2013 )

For criticisms of corporate “surveillance,” see Zuboff ( 2019 ).

Belli ( 2021 ); Hern ( 2016 )

See I. Taylor ( 2017 , pp. 335–336).

It is true, though, that the advent of new surveillance technologies has made it more likely that democracies engage in surveillance that might not have engaged in surveillance without these technologies. Thus, although surveillance operations relying on these technologies involve little data access, it may still be the case that the advent of these technologies has led to an absolute reduction of access privacy, given that even modern surveillance tends to be associated with some reductions in access privacy.

This is not to deny that government surveillance may be used for other purposes that are not straightforwardly reducible to law enforcement or that the effects of government surveillance on those subjected to surveillance may go beyond mere compliance with the law (as scholars in the Foucauldian tradition might suggest).

Snowden ( 2019 , p. 196).

See, e.g., Huemer ( 2013 , p. 5), who defines political legitimacy as “the right, on the part of a government, to make certain laws and enforce them by coercion against the members of its society – in short the right to rule.” Political legitimacy can be understood as one dimension of political authority, the other being citizens’ obligation to obey laws.

See again Huemer ( 2013 , p. 11). Huemer is a skeptic about political legitimacy, but his characterization should be common ground among optimists and skeptics about political authority alike.

See, e.g., Huemer ( 2013 ), Nozick ( 1974 ), and Wolff ( 1970 ).

Though see Pilon and Epstein ( 2013 ).

For a different legitimacy-centered criticism of surveillance, inspired by Habermasian discourse theory, refer to Stahl ( 2020 ).

See also Henschke on “Deliberative Information Harms” (2017, pp. 223–227). Note that, in addition, the ready availability of a surveillance infrastructure and of surveillance data might also facilitate the transition to an authoritarian regime. It is easier to establish an authoritarian tyranny and persecute its enemies when one already possesses or can readily acquire information about the political orientation and activities of one’s subjects.

See, e.g., Christiano ( 2008 , ch. 7); Cohen ( 1997b ); Estlund ( 2007 , p. 110); Freeman ( 1990 ); Gutmann and Thompson ( 2004 , ch. 3); Habermas ( 1996 , ch. 3); and Rawls ( 1996 , ch. 8).

Altshuler and Hershkowitz ( 2020 )

Lee, McCauley, and Abadi (2020).

Estlund ( 2007 , p. 111).

Surprenant and Brennan ( 2019 , pp. 70–71); see also Huemer ( 2018 ).

Surprenant and Brennan ( 2019 , p. 72).

See again Surprenant and Brennan ( 2019 , p. 85).

Similarly, Surprenant and Brennan encourage juries to make use of their right to nullify the law (2019, pp. 140–141).

To be sure, at least Brennan is a libertarian, but while his and Surprenant’s critique of incarceration might be characteristically libertarian, it is by no means exclusively libertarian.

Benhabib ( 1994 , p. 26). According to John Dryzek, the core claim of deliberative democracy is “that outcomes are legitimate to the extent they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question” (2001, p. 651). Some theories of deliberative democracy are ambiguous as to whether legitimacy requires actual or hypothetical deliberation (e.g., Cohen, 1997a ; Habermas, 1996 ). Whether, according to these theories, legitimacy is damaged by the defects of actual deliberative procedures is somewhat unclear. The letter of these theories seems to say “no,” but their spirit suggests “yes.”.

See, e.g., Huemer ( 2013 , pp. 61–64).

Rawls ( 1997 , p. 771).

Estlund ( 2007 , p. 98).

Estlund ( 2007 , p. 14).

Pettit ( 2014 , p. 22).

Pettit ( 2014 , pp. 136–140).

Kirshner ( 2018 ) and Pettit ( 2014 , pp. 136–140) discuss the related problem of whether citizens have a duty to obey the law in defective democracies.

On the transparency requirement, see, e.g., Pettit ( 2014 , p. 215). I owe this observation to Irina Schumski.

See, e.g., Applebaum ( 2020 ), Levitsky and Ziblatt ( 2018 ), and Snyder ( 2018 ).

Besides, the risk of this happening has repercussions in the present. If there is a risk that surveillance data are used for illegitimate purposes in the future, citizens’ freedom and autonomy is curtailed in the present as they will adjust their behavior in anticipation of these risks. For related discussions on the “chilling effects” of surveillance, see, e.g., Macnish ( 2018 , p. 428), Solove ( 2006 ), Stahl ( 2020 , p. 85), and Thomsen ( 2020b , p. 381).

Shane and Moynihan ( 2013 )

Harwell ( 2019 ); Harwell and Cox ( 2020 )

See Sunstein ( 2005 ).

On the questionable effectiveness of the NSA’s surveillance program, see Greenwald ( 2014 , pp. 202–205). Refer to Macnish ( 2015 ), Rønn and Lippert-Rasmussen ( 2020 ), and Thomsen ( 2020b ) for discussions of government surveillance and proportionality, which may be helpful for reaching more comprehensive judgments.

For one moral assessment of a specific surveillance practice, see Thomsen ( 2020a ).

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Saskia Nagel, Niël Conradie, Jan-Christoph Heilinger, and Hendrik Kempt for their helpful comments. He is a member of the project group “Regulatory theories of Artificial Intelligence” within the “Centre Responsible Digitality” (ZEVEDI).

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Home — Essay Samples — Government & Politics — Government Surveillance

Essays on Government Surveillance

Embark on an in-depth exploration of government surveillance with our collection of essay samples. As a pivotal issue at the intersection of technology, law, and ethics, government surveillance offers a rich field of study for students across disciplines. These essays serve as exemplary models, dissecting the multifaceted arguments surrounding privacy rights, national security, and the balance of power.

Government Surveillance: A Multidimensional Perspective

Our essays on government surveillance delve into historical contexts, legal frameworks, and ethical considerations. Students can gain insights into the evolution of surveillance technologies, the legal battles over privacy rights, and the ethical dilemmas posed by state monitoring. These samples provide a comprehensive overview of the debates that define the discourse on government surveillance.

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The collection includes essays that evaluate the broader societal impacts of government surveillance . From the chilling effects on free speech to the implications for democratic freedoms, these essays encourage critical analysis of how surveillance shapes individuals' lives and society at large. Students are invited to engage with complex questions about the trade-offs between security and liberty.

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Recognizing the global nature of government surveillance, our essays also feature comparative analyses of surveillance practices around the world. This global perspective enriches students' understanding of how different legal systems and cultural values influence the implementation and perception of surveillance.

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Workplace Surveillance Essay

In the last two decades, employers have used workplace surveillance to monitor their employees. The methodology employed in the study of the perspectives of various stakeholders in the labor industry involved a review of secondary sources of data.

The labor process theory was used to analyze the stakeholders’ perspectives. The findings indicates that controlling workers’ activities as opposed to ensuring workers’ security is the main objective of workplace surveillance.

The labor process theory indicates that workplace surveillance enhances modern management strategies which utilize elements of scientific management (West, 2005, p. 23). Thus workplace surveillance is a matter of control that leads to invasion of privacy.

Introduction

Workplace surveillance refers to the strategies used by employers to “monitor the activities of their employees” (Ariss, 2002, pp. 553-558). It mainly involves observing the working area and employees’ activities or listening to workers in a secretive manner.

The observation or monitoring is done with the help of electronic gadgets such as cameras, wiretaps, computers and microphones. Employers mainly use workplace surveillance to promote high productivity, control the use of resources, prevent theft and ensure workers’ safety (Ariss, 2002, pp. 553-558).

However, its use often facilitates great control over the labor force. Besides, it leads to violation of workers’ privacy rights if misused. This has led to the debate as to whether workplace surveillance is a tool for ensuring workers’ safety or a tool for control and violation of workers’ privacy rights.

This paper supports the premise that workplace surveillance is a control technique and an invasion of privacy. The views of various stakeholders in regard to workplace surveillance will be illuminated and evaluated using the labor process theory.

Methodology

The findings of this paper are based on qualitative research on workplace surveillance. The topic was studied through analysis of secondary sources of data. This involved conducting a literature review on the reports of previous research works on the topic.

Other sources of secondary data included journals, labor industry reports, newspaper reports and information available on websites of labor unions. The information obtained from these sources was used to evaluate the views of workers concerning workplace surveillance.

It was also used to assess the role of workplace surveillance and how it should be implemented based on employers’ perspective, labor unions’ perspective and the role of the state.

The main limitation of the methodology is that the sources of information mainly focus on the Australian labor industry and thus may not represent a worldwide view on workplace surveillance.

Besides, some of the data obtained on workers’ perspective in regard to workplace surveillance was based on the workers’ personal views. Such views however, might not be representative of the industry.

Workplace Surveillance as a Strategy for ensuring Workers’ Safety

Employers’ or management’s perspective.

Employers usually rely on electronic surveillance to ensure security of their employees and their buildings (Ariss, 2002, pp. 553-558). They normally use cameras to monitor the activities of their employees and everyone who enters their buildings.

The rise in acts of terror in the last decade has forced the employers to monitor activities at their workplaces. This has necessitated the introduction of CCTV systems to observe and report any activities at the workplace that may lead to security breach.

Cases of physical and sexual harassments have also necessitated close monitoring at the workplace. Due to the sensitivity of offences such as sexual harassment, concrete evidence is usually needed to apprehend the perpetrators.

It is against this backdrop that employers install cameras to monitor activities of their employees at the workplace (Stanton and Weiss, 2000, pp. 423-440). Indirect bullying at the workplace especially through the spread of defamatory information or gossiping is another cause of monitoring.

In this case, the management monitors the communications of employees to ensure that information that may cause emotional injury to other employees is not circulated.

This involves verifying the contents of workers’ emails and tape-recoding conversations in order to incriminate the offenders (Stanton and Weiss, 2000, pp. 423-440). These forms of surveillance are thus used by the management to ensure safety at the workplace.

Employees’ Perspective

Safety at the workplace is a major concern to majority of employees at any given workplace. The employees are likely to perform better if they are assured of their safety or security.

Research on workplace safety indicates that the security of workers is not only threatened by external aggressors but also fellow employees (Stanton and Weiss, 2000, pp. 423-440). Due to the competition at the workplace, some employees usually embark on unorthodox means to stay a head in the competition.

For example, some employees may focus on tarnishing the reputation of their colleagues in order to prevent them from being promoted. Such behaviors involve the spread of malicious information or physical harassment.

In order to prevent such cases of criminal acts, employees normally advocate for monitoring of their behavior at workplaces (Atak and Erturgut, 2010, pp. 1452-1456). Victims of workplace harassment are usually able to defend themselves if they are able to back their claims with the aid of evidences such as camera footage.

Research indicates that cases of workplace violence or harassment are less in offices where activities of employees are closely monitored (Atak and Erturgut, 2010, pp. 1452-1456). Despite these benefits, some employees are opposed to workplace surveillance as a safety measure.

They consider acts such as verification of the contents of their emails a fundamental invasion of their privacy. Besides, some employees are normally uncomfortable to work under cameras even if they do not have criminal intentions.

Role of State and Legislation

It is the role of the sate to ensure that employers provide secure work environments to their employees. This has always been achieved through appropriate legislation that forces employers to guarantee safety of their workers.

Failure to ensure security at the workplace is normally considered an act of negligence on the part of the employer (Mishra and Orampton, 2000, pp. 2-10). Injuries resulting from such negligence can result into severe consequences such as law suits or cancelation of licenses.

While workplace surveillance is not a government requirement, it has been accepted by labor industry regulators especially if it can guarantee the safety of employees (Mishra and Orampton, 2000, pp. 2-10). The state has the dual responsibility of ensuring that employees are safe at their workplaces as well as protecting their privacy rights.

This means that the state laws only recognize safety measures that do not infringe workers’ privacy. Consequently, appropriate legislation has been put in place to guide the process of workplace surveillance.

Such guidelines define the situations under which workplace surveillance should be used and how it should be implemented in order to protect workers’ privacy. The labor unions also support the fact that workplace surveillance as a safety measure must be conducted in a manner that does not violate workers’ privacy rights (Mishra and Orampton, 2000, pp. 2-10).

Workplace Surveillance as an Inversion of Privacy and Employer Control

Management perspective.

Contrary to the popular belief, workplace surveillance is not just about security and workers’ safety. Corporations in the modern economy consider workplace surveillance an effective control technique that can facilitate control over the workforce and an increase in productivity (Stanton, 2003, pp. 257-274).

It is for this reason that they invest in advanced information and communication technology to support the surveillance. Workplace surveillance as a control tool is used by employers for the following reasons. First, it is used as a strategy for preventing theft at the workplace (Mishra and Orampton, 2000, pp. 2-10).

This is a common practice in the retail industry whereby employers install hidden cameras in their stores to monitor the activities of their staffs. The employees who steal goods from the stores are caught by the cameras and the footages are used as evidence against them in law courts.

Cases of theft at the workplace are likely to reduce significantly if the workers know that they are likely to be caught.

Second, workplace surveillance is used to control the use of the company’s resources. Control over the use of resources such as computers and internet, phones and stationery can lead to significant reduction in operating costs (Saxby, 2000, pp. 17-18).

Consequently, employers set rules or guidelines on how and when the company’s resources such as internet can be used. In order to ensure that such guidelines are being followed, they embark on workplace surveillance. For example, internet surveillance has always been used to control workers’ ability to use the internet.

This involves verifying the content of emails and the WebPages visited to ensure that the internet is being used only for official duties (Saxby, 2000, pp. 17-18). Phones are normally wiretapped to ensure that employees do not use them for their private businesses.

Third, workplace surveillance is a tool for monitoring workers’ performance in order to promote high productivity. Employers use management software that monitors employees’ activities such as “sales, contacts with customers and time taken to complete tasks” (Schmitz, 2005, pp. 727-738).

These records are used to generate computer reports that form the basis of employees’ evaluation. Finally, employers use workplace surveillance to protect privileged information or trade secrets.

In markets characterized with high competition, businesses withhold information relating to their sales strategies, marketing plans and financial performances.

In cases where intellectual property is not protected through appropriate legislation, employers control employees’ access to information relating to product development (Schmitz, 2005, pp. 727-738). In order to achieve these objectives, the employers must use effective workplace surveillance strategies to closely monitor their employees.

Software packages are normally used to track employees’ activities whenever they work online to ensure they do not access or distribute privileged information (Schmitz, 2005, pp. 727-738). These trends indicate that workplace surveillance is an effective control tool, which enhances the profitability of the firm at the expense of employees’ privacy.

Research on employees’ job satisfaction indicates that majority of them across various industries are opposed to workplace surveillance. This is because many workers consider workplace surveillance a control tool associated with the following demerits.

First, employees consider “privacy a guaranteed human right” (Stanton, 2003, pp. 257-274). Consequently, they believe that no one including their employers have the right to deny them this right since it is provided for by the constitution.

Employees’ main concern is the fact that employers verify everything without distinguishing between private communication and official communication. Employees’ opposition to acts such as verification of the content of their emails is based on the fact that the emails are their properties and not the employers (Stanton, 2003, pp. 257-274).

Consequently, the later has no right to read their emails. This means that workplace surveillance especially through electronic means is an unnecessary invasion of employees’ privacy.

Second, intense surveillance at the workplace leads to low motivation among the workers (Blass and Douglas, 2002, pp. 36-52). As machines such as computers assume supervisory roles in the monitoring process, employees become alienated from their jobs.

Majority of employees feel that workplace surveillance makes them subjects of machines which they are in-charge of (Blass and Douglas, 2002, pp. 36-52). Performance evaluations based on computer reports are not balanced since they do not take into account other aspects of the employees’ performance such as their relationships with colleagues or their emotional wellbeing.

Besides, such reports do not allow the employees to explain their failures. In some cases, workplace surveillance leads to evaluation based on perception rather than facts (Blass and Douglas, 2002, pp. 36-52).

For example, information obtained from an employee through wiretaps can be used against them by their colleagues. Thus the evaluations made using such information may lead to biased results.

Third, workplace surveillance is a major cause of workplace stress due to the high level of pressure associated with it (Bryart, 2006). As discussed earlier, workplace surveillance is used by employers to ensure high productivity. However, it is sometimes used to set unrealistic job targets which leads to stress.

For example, companies that use digital systems to monitor check-in and check-out time are very strict on time management (Bryart, 2006). In such cases, the employees who are not able to keep time can be punished even if they had a genuine reason to be late.

Employees have had to work extremely hard to meet the high job targets associated with workplace surveillance. Working under tension thus becomes a common practice at work, thereby increasing cases of stress (Bryart, 2006). Finally, workplace surveillance is used by employers to gain access to intellectual property illegally(Bryart, 2006).

This particularly happens in cases whereby new recruits use their own computers at work. Thus when their employers monitor the use of their employees’ computers, they are likely to gain access and use the employee’s private information without being noticed.

These trends indicate that employees perceive workplace surveillance to be a control mechanism meant to benefit their employers at their expense.

The state is charged with the responsibility of protecting the interest of both the employers and the employees. This means that the state through labor laws regulates the relationship and interactions between the employers and their employees (Halpern, Reville and Grunewald, 2008, pp. 175-180).

Workplace surveillance being a form of interaction that determines the relationship between employers and their workers is thus regulated by the government (Halpern, Reville and Grunewald, 2008, pp. 175-180).

Regulating workplace surveillance has been necessitated by the fact that all stakeholders including the government and the general public should benefit from the exercise. The behavior or activities of employees not only affect their employers and colleagues but also the government and the public or customers, hence the need for control over their behavior.

As a neutral party, the government through the labor laws expects workplace surveillance to be conducted according to the guidelines which include but not limited to the following. First, it should be done in a manner that complies with human rights (Halpern, Reville and Grunewald, 2008, pp. 175-180).

This means that the process of workplace surveillance must not override the basic human rights provided for by the constitution. This requirement limits the level of privacy invasion that employers can engage in. for example, they can not install cameras in washrooms or engage in unnecessary recording of conversations at the workplace (Electronic Frontiers Australia, 2005).

Second, workplace surveillance must take into account the interest of both the organization and the public. For example, it should be done in order to prevent employees from committing crime at the workplace or promoting disorder (Electronic Frontiers Australia, 2005).

The crimes that can be prevented through workplace surveillance include drug abuse, tax evasion and watching pornographic materials. Third, workplace surveillance should be used to ensure public safety and health. The management should use it to ensure that workers’ activities do not result into production of goods that are not fit for consumption.

In order to achieve these objectives, the government expects the employers to conduct an impact assessment before embarking on workplace surveillance. The assessment should enable the employers to highlight the purpose and expected benefits of the surveillance (Halpern, Reville and Grunewald, 2008, pp. 175-180).

It should also enable the employers to indentify the negative effects of the surveillance. If a particular form of workplace surveillance is associated with adverse effects on the employees, the employers are expected to explore alternative ways of monitoring their staffs.

The employers are expected to understand the employees’ privacy rights and be ready to accept liability in the event that such privacy rights are violated. These trends thus define the best practice that should be observed by employers in regard to workplace surveillance.

They indicate that the government as a regulator of the labor industry remains neutral on the issue of workplace surveillance. However, the government provides guidelines to ensure that workplace surveillance is beneficial to all parties.

Labor Union’s Perspective

As representatives of the employees, labor unions believe that they must be involved in the process of implementing workplace surveillance. The unions are interested in the implementation process in order to ensure that the rights of their clients’, employees, are not being violated (Effey, Glass and Behly, 2000, pp. 167-177).

Consequently, most labor unions are involved in the bargaining process that determines how workplace surveillance should be implanted, the expected benefits and the punishments that should be used in response to the accusations based on evidence emanating from workplace surveillance.

As stakeholders, labor unions believe that they have a right to access the information obtained from employees through surveillance. For example, they can use information recoded in cameras to prepare defense for their accused clients.

According to labor unions, best practice in workplace surveillance should include the following. First, the employers must realize that surveillance at the workplace involves invasion of workers’ privacy. Thus it must be done in a legal and careful manner.

This is based on the fact that “employees have a legitimate expectation to keep their privacy at the workplace” (Effey, Glass and Behly, 2000, pp. 167-177). Second, the employers must clearly state the purpose of the surveillance and the monitoring activities associated with it should be warranted by real benefits. This means that unions are opposed to surveillance if it is of no value to all stakeholders.

Third, the reasons for conducting the surveillance must be communicated to the workers. Fourth, the employers should clearly specify the degree to which workers should use resources at the workplace (Effey, Glass and Behly, 2000, pp. 167-177).

This will help in avoiding ambiguity when determining whether an employee violated the company’s rules as reported by the surveillance system. Finally, the unions believe that they have a right to contest in a court of law, any accusations made on their clients based on evidence provided by the surveillance system.

These trends indicate that labor unions only support workplace surveillance when it is associated with real benefits to all parties and it is done in a manner that does not infringe the privacy rights of the employees.

Theoretical Framework: Labor Process Theory

This is a Marxist theory which describes the organization of work in the modern or capitalist society (West, 2005, p. 21). The theory explains the workers’ bargaining power in the capitalist labor market. According to this theory, the pursuit of strategies associated with capitalism culminates in deskilling of the workers and routine work.

The rationale for deskilling the workforce is to reduce the costs of production and facilitate high output (West, 2005, p. 26). The capitalists focus on deskilling the workforce since such a labor-force is cheap and can be controlled easily.

This theory explains the process of workplace surveillance as follows. Organization of work in the modern workplaces is based on elements of scientific management. Such elements include setting targets for employees, specifying what the employees are expected to do and how it should be done (Morden, 2004, p. 41).

The main task is broken down into small units which are executed by different workers on a routine basis. Thus in order to realize the objectives of the production process, the activities of each worker must be monitored to ensure that they meet their job targets.

According to the labor process theory, this forms the basis of workplace surveillance. Since the modern labor force is highly skilled, the workers might not be easily controlled even if they are alienated from the production process.

Consequently, employers in the modern or capitalist economy focus on the use of technology to control workers (Morden, 2004, p. 47). This explains the use of technologies such as internet surveillance and desktop surveillance to monitor the employees.

According to labor process theory, evaluation of workers’ performance is heavily reliant on the intelligence obtained from workplace surveillance (Morden, 2004, p. 49).

Workplace surveillance enhances high productivity since it forms the basis for rewarding workers who meet the expectations of the employers as well as punishing those who do not meet such expectations (Griffin, 2006, p. 67). The labor process theory is against this kind of control due to its negative effects on the workers.

As discussed above, monitoring at the workplace leads to stress, alienation, low motivation and job dissatisfaction. This means that intense workplace surveillance finally leads to low productivity instead of high productivity (Griffin, 2006, p. 67).

In regard to the debate on the purpose of workplace surveillance, the labor process theory indicates that it is meant to facilitate control which leads to invasion of workers’ privacy. Maintaining safety is just one of the many functions of workplace surveillance rather than its core objective.

Despite its demerits, employers continue to implement workplace surveillance due to the benefits accruing from the control it facilitates. This leads to the conclusion that workplace surveillance is a mechanism of control over employees and can lead to infringement of employees’ privacy rights.

Recommendations

According to the labor process theory, workplace surveillance can lead to infringement of workers’ privacy rights as well as lowering production as discussed above. In order to maximize the benefits of workplace surveillance, the following recommendations can be considered.

First, the company should develop a clear surveillance policy. The policy should be accompanied by controls that ensure protection of employees’ privacy rights.

Second, the employers should focus on reducing the negative effects such as stress and alienation which are caused by workplace surveillance (Griffin, 2006, p. 70). Finally, employers should encourage responsible autonomy instead of intense surveillance. This will help in boosting workers’ morale.

Workplace surveillance is a strategy used by employers to monitor the activities of their employees (Griffin, 2006, p. 56). It is used to ensure workers’ safety, prevent theft at the workplace, control the use of resources and encourage high productivity.

However, it is also associated with demerits which include low motivation, stress and alienation of workers (Stanton, 2003, pp. 257-274). The analysis of the perspectives of various stakeholders indicates that the primary objective of workplace surveillance is to control the activities of employees at the workplace. However, this control normally leads to the invasion of workers’ privacy.

According to the labor process theory, the use of elements of scientific management in the capitalist society necessitates control over employees. This is best achieved through workplace surveillance. This justifies the premise that workplace surveillance is a matter of control that can lead to invasion of privacy if misused.

Ariss, S. 2002. Computer monitoring: benefits and pitfalls facing management. Information and Management . 39(7), pp. 553-558.

Atak, M. and Erturgut, R. 2010. Importance of educated human resources in the information age view of information society organization on human. Social and Behavioral sciences . 2(2), pp. 1452-1456.

Blass, J. and Douglas, L. 2002. Monitoring colleagues at work. Labor Economics . 10(1), pp. 36-52.

Bryart, L. 2006. What are the pros and cons of monitoring employees using video surveillance? [Online] Web.

Effey, O., Glass, R. and Behly, R. 2000. Electronic workplace monitoring: what employees think. Omega . 27(2), pp. 167-177.

Electronic Frontiers Australia, 2005. Workplace privacy and surveillance . [Online] Web.

Griffin, R. 2006. Principles of management . New York: Cengage learning.

Halpern, D., Reville, P. and Grunewald, D. 2008. Management and legal issues regarding electronic surveillance of employees in the workplace. Journal of Business Ethics . 80(2), pp. 175-180.

Mishra, J. and Orampton, S. 2000. Employee monitoring: privacy in the workplace? SAM Advanced Management Journal . 36(1), pp. 2-10.

Morden, T. 2004. Principles of management . New York: Ashgate Publishing.

Saxby, S. 2000. Electronic monitoring poses email dilemma. Network Security . 20(1), pp. 17-18.

Schmitz, P. 2005. Workplace surveillance, privacy protection and efficiency wages. Labor Economics . 12(6), pp.727-738.

Stanton, J. 2003. Effects of workplace monitoring policies on potential employment discrimination and organizational attractiveness for African Americans in the technical professions. Journal of Black psychology . 29(3), pp. 257-274.

Stanton, J. and Weiss, E. 2002. Electronic monitoring in their own words: an exploration study of employees’ experience with new types of surveillance. Computer in Human behavior . 46(4), pp. 423-440.

West, R. 2005. Marx’s labor theory of value . New York: iUniverse.

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IvyPanda. (2023, October 27). Workplace Surveillance. https://ivypanda.com/essays/workplace-surveillance/

"Workplace Surveillance." IvyPanda , 27 Oct. 2023, ivypanda.com/essays/workplace-surveillance/.

IvyPanda . (2023) 'Workplace Surveillance'. 27 October.

IvyPanda . 2023. "Workplace Surveillance." October 27, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/workplace-surveillance/.

1. IvyPanda . "Workplace Surveillance." October 27, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/workplace-surveillance/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Workplace Surveillance." October 27, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/workplace-surveillance/.

• Surveillance Assemblage
• Workplace Monitoring's Legality and Ethics
• Are Law Enforcement Cameras an Invasion of Privacy?
• Electronic Privacy in the Workplace
• CCTV Cameras: Surveillance and the Reduction of Crime
• The Use of Video Surveillance Cameras in the Workplace Should Be Abolished/Reaffirmed
• Surveillance as the Answer to the Crime Issue
• Surveillance Cameras and Information Technologies
• The Moral Side of Government Surveillance
• Effects of Surveillance Technology on Privacy
• PGL Management: Motivational Strategy
• Needs of the employees of Melbourne Aquarium
• Global Challenges Faced By Fast Food Companies
• Hotel and Catering Business
• Cultural Implications of Information Systems in the Knowledge Management

INFO 290: Surveillance, Sousveillance, Coveillance, and Dataveillance, Fall 2009

• Assignments

Course Description

Assignments and grading.

Your grade is based on class participation and a course deliverable, research proposal or project that may be done individually or with a classmate.

Class participation accounts for 50% of your grade. It includes your oral participation in class discussion, targeted participation as called for in the syllabus below, as well as participation on the class listserv and/or blog. This class is designed to hone your critical inquiry skills. You are expected to fully participate--present, actively listen, engage with your classmates and the materials, bring your own insights to the discussion, share your experience and knowledge. Please come prepared to argue, explain, revise, borrow, refine, and of course junk your ideas. Thinking out loud is encouraged. This is how one learns. The success of this class depends upon student's diligent preparation and active participation--both listening and speaking--in class. The topics of discussion are likely to elicit strong emotions and views. You are encouraged to express them and to listen to others equally charged opinions in a respectful manner. I expect that you will "try-on" and "try-out" new, novel and controversial concepts, including many that do not reflect your view. Within class we will aim to create an environment in which you are free to express opinions and make contributions for the sake of advancing the discussion and without fear that the views and opinions you offer during class will be permanently attributed to you in other contexts.

Course Deliverable: final paper, research proposal or project. Drawing on the readings and insights gained through class discussion you will prepare a paper applying the theories and concepts of the course to an area of interest, a research proposal (potentially for your masters final project), or develop design requirements or a prototype. During our first few classes we will discuss your interests, potential topics, and identify opportunities for collaboration in an effort to kick-start your final project.

Late assignments will be penalized: each day an assignment is late will result in a half a grade deduction. Recognizing that emergencies arise, exceptions will be made on a case-by-case basis.

In an effort to respect increasing fiscal constraints on students, I've aimed to use readings that are readily accessible for free to UCB students.

Links to articles are provided in the syllabus. A few short pieces are from the following two books:

David Lyons, Surveillance Studies: An Overview

Levin et al. CTRL [SPACE]

Excerpts required below will be available online and/or in the folder outside my office (212 South Hall)

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U.s. and uk announce partnership on science of ai safety, office of public affairs.

U.S. and UK AI Safety Institutes to work seamlessly with each other, partnering on research, safety evaluations, and guidance for AI safety

Institutes to develop shared capabilities through information-sharing, close cooperation, and expert personnel exchanges

The U.S. and UK have today signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which will see them work together to develop tests for the most advanced AI models, following through on commitments made at the AI Safety Summit last November.  

Signed by U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo and UK Technology Secretary Michelle Donelan, the partnership will see both countries working to align their scientific approaches and working closely to accelerate and rapidly iterate robust suites of evaluations for AI models, systems, and agents.

The U.S. and UK AI Safety Institutes have laid out plans to build a common approach to AI safety testing and to share their capabilities to ensure these risks can be tackled effectively. They intend to perform at least one joint testing exercise on a publicly accessible model. They also intend to tap into a collective pool of expertise by exploring personnel exchanges between the Institutes.

The partnership will take effect immediately and is intended to allow both organizations to work seamlessly with one another. AI continues to develop rapidly, and both governments recognize the need to act now to ensure a shared approach to AI safety which can keep pace with the technology’s emerging risks. As the countries strengthen their partnership on AI safety, they have also committed to develop similar partnerships with other countries to promote AI safety across the globe.

“AI is the defining technology of our generation. This partnership is going to accelerate both of our Institutes’ work across the full spectrum of risks, whether to our national security or to our broader society. Our partnership makes clear that we aren’t running away from these concerns – we're running at them. Because of our collaboration, our Institutes will gain a better understanding of AI systems, conduct more robust evaluations, and issue more rigorous guidance,” said U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo . “By working together, we are furthering the long-lasting special relationship between the U.S. and UK and laying the groundwork to ensure that we’re keeping AI safe both now and in the future.”

“This agreement represents a landmark moment, as the UK and the United States deepen our enduring special relationship to address the defining technology challenge of our generation,” said UK Secretary of State for Science, Innovation, and Technology, Michelle Donelan. “We have always been clear that ensuring the safe development of AI is a shared global issue. Only by working together can we address the technology’s risks head on and harness its enormous potential to help us all live easier and healthier lives. The work of our two nations in driving forward AI safety will strengthen the foundations we laid at Bletchley Park in November, and I have no doubt that our shared expertise will continue to pave the way for countries tapping into AI’s enormous benefits safely and responsibly.”  

Reflecting the importance of ongoing international collaboration, today’s announcement will also see both countries sharing vital information about the capabilities and risks associated with AI models and systems, as well as fundamental technical research on AI safety and security. This will work to underpin a common approach to AI safety testing, allowing researchers on both sides of the Atlantic—and around the world—to coalesce around a common scientific foundation.

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AUKUS Defense Ministers' Joint Statement

The Honourable Richard Marles MP, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Australia; the Right Honourable Grant Shapps, Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom; and the Honorable Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of Defense, United States. 

Just over a year ago, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the Optimal Pathway to deliver conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) to Australia — the first major initiative of AUKUS. Today, we take stock of the progress our nations have made, both to deliver this capability and to deepen our work on other advanced capabilities.

Our three countries seek to maximize the strategic benefits of the AUKUS partnership to support security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Australia's acquisition of a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability is a necessary response to the rapidly evolving strategic environment. Strengthening our trilateral defense capabilities and our industrial capacity will enable AUKUS partners to deter coercion or aggression in the region more effectively.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretaries remain strongly committed to continued implementation of the ambitious plan set out in the Optimal Pathway for Australia's acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. Maintaining steady delivery of this plan will enhance the collective ability of AUKUS partners to promote stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. 

All AUKUS nations have reaffirmed their commitment to take full advantage of the technological opportunities of AUKUS by combining national strengths to deepen collaboration and deliver game-changing capabilities at pace. The AUKUS nations have bolstered efforts to break down barriers to collaboration, spur a more integrated defense industrial base and private sector partnership, and identify new opportunities for trilateral capability development.

The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretaries endorse the following announcements and initiatives across Pillar I and Pillar II. 

PILLAR I – CONVENTIONALLY ARMED, NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINES  Significant, tangible steps to implement the Optimal Pathway have occurred in all three nations in the past year. AUKUS partners remain committed to progressing Australia's acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines in a way that sets the highest non-proliferation standards.

Leveraging the power of defense industry  AUKUS partners note the significant milestone for trilateral submarine cooperation provided by the important industry announcements of March 22, 2024, including Australia's selection of ASC Pty Ltd and BAE Systems to build its SSN-AUKUS submarines, and its selection of ASC as Australia's nuclear-powered submarine sustainment partner. These strategic partnerships with industry will leverage respective knowledge, skills, and capabilities across AUKUS nations and will form the foundation for Australia's new nuclear-powered submarine production and maintenance activities. 

Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are making significant investments in their respective submarine industrial bases, which will ensure the supply chains of all three nations are more resilient, integrated, and productive. This will generate economic growth in defense and national security sectors in all three countries. These partnerships will pave the way for further opportunities for industry to expand and strengthen trilateral supply chains, supporting a sovereign sustainment and build capability in Australia. 

Establishing Submarine Rotational Force-West  Building on the success of earlier SSN visits to Australia since the Optimal Pathway announcement, AUKUS partners welcomed a visit by USS Annapolis to HMAS Stirling in March 2024. This latest visit is part of a trilateral commitment to more frequent SSN visits to HMAS Stirling under the Optimal Pathway. This, and future such visits from UK and U.S. SSNs, will contribute to building Australia's capacity to support a rotational presence of UK and U.S. SSNs under Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) from as early as 2027, and Australia's future sovereign SSN capability. 

The most significant maintenance activity to be conducted on an SSN in Australia, to date, is scheduled to occur in the second half of 2024. The maintenance activity, supported by a Submarine Tender, will be critical to building Australia's ability to safely and securely sustain U.S. SSNs in preparation for the establishment of SRF-West. In anticipation of this forthcoming activity, 37 Royal Australian Navy sailors reported to the USS Emory S. Land in Guam in late January 2024, to begin training and to gain the necessary skills and qualifications. Australian industry personnel will also be involved in supporting this activity to continue to grow the submarine sustainment workforce and supply chain. UK Royal Navy officers will observe the activity to enable integration of UK maintenance requirements for future UK SSN port visits and future UK rotational presence as part of SRF-West. This will be the first time that Australian personnel will actively participate in the maintenance of a U.S. SSN in Australia, enabled by the provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. 

Important steps have been taken towards delivering a sovereign conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine training capability for Australia. In December 2023, the United States and Australia finalised a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case to procure submarine training devices to support the establishment of SRF-West. As part of the FMS case, the first contracts were awarded this month by the United States for submarine training simulators. These will be used to train Royal Australian Navy personnel on the Virginia class platform in advance of Australia operating its own sovereign Virginia class SSNs, and supporting visiting and rotational U.S. Virginia class SSNs through SRF-West. The FMS case will also enable the training of Australian Defence and industry personnel in the United States. In March 2024, a cohort of 20 Australian industry personnel completed a successful three-month placement at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility. 

Enabling legislative and policy change  AUKUS partners welcomed the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 by the U.S. Congress in December 2023. This was essential for implementation of the Optimal Pathway, including through the U.S. Congress' AUKUS Submarine Transfer Authorization Act regarding the sale of Virginia class SSNs to Australia, and enabling critical workforce development activities. A further legislative milestone was achieved through the introduction of nuclear safety legislation – the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 and Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023 – to the Australian Parliament in November 2023. Once passed by the Australian Parliament, this legislation will establish the nuclear safety framework for Australia's nuclear-powered submarine enterprise. 

Accelerating workforce growth  Progress has been made to implement the education and training initiatives announced by AUKUS Defense Ministers in December 2023, supporting workforce development for Australia's nuclear-powered submarine enterprise. Australians are undertaking placements in the United Kingdom and United States throughout 2024 to build Australia's industrial workforce. These placements will be undertaken in accordance with AUKUS partners' respective obligations and commitments under international and domestic law, including with respect to nuclear non-proliferation. Later this year, ASC employees will commence placements at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to develop the skills necessary to sustain Virginia class SSNs. They will be the first Australian civilian industry personnel to train in the United States following the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024. 

More than 20 Royal Australian Navy sailors and officers are currently in the U.S. Navy Submarine Training system. The first three Royal Australian Navy submarine officers completed the U.S. naval nuclear power training pipeline and are on track to graduate from the Submarine Officer Basic Course in Groton, Connecticut later this month. They will report to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in June to serve on U.S. Virginia class SSNs while completing further qualifications. Over the next 12 months, these numbers will increase to more than 100 Royal Australian Navy personnel in training across the United States, including serving at sea on U.S. Virginia class SSNs. These training opportunities are critical to ensure Australia is ready to operate its sovereign Virginia class SSNs from the early 2030s. In the United Kingdom, three Royal Australian Navy officers have completed initial nuclear power training at HMS Sultan. They will undertake further engineering courses and are on track to graduate from the UK Nuclear Reactor course in July this year, before commencing practical qualification within the Royal Navy Submarine Arm. These officers will be deployed on a UK Astute class SSN. 

Australia and the United Kingdom, and Australia and the United States, have signed bilateral Memoranda of Understanding for personnel exchanges to help accelerate growth of Australia's sovereign workforce. 

PILLAR II – ADVANCED CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT  Advancing commitments from December 2023, AUKUS partners highlighted efforts under Pillar II to bolster industry and innovation sector collaboration. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are pooling the talents of our defense sectors to catalyze, at an unprecedented pace, the delivery of advanced capabilities. Partners are working with investors, private capital, and traditional and non-traditional industry to translate disruptive technology into asymmetric capability for our three defense forces.  Progress on the AUKUS Defense Ministers' commitments into the AUKUS Advanced Capabilities endeavour is continuing. Although much of this activity remains classified, AUKUS partners are making strides towards jointly realizing greater maritime awareness through networked autonomy, decision advantage, and enhanced strike. 

Private sector financing AUKUS partners welcomed the first meeting of the Defense Investors Network on February 28, 2024. Pillar II is embracing innovative finance and investment as key enablers for advanced capability development. Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States look forward to engaging with the Defense Investors Network and similarly focused groups on opportunities under Pillar II.

Aligning our systems AUKUS partners are continuing to update laws and policies to enable effective implementation of AUKUS Pillar II. Partners are working through our respective National Armaments Directors towards better harmonization of our capability development and acquisition systems to support more seamless and agile cooperation. A National Armaments Directors' tabletop exercise in March tested our respective national processes in three scenarios against co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment. 

Securing licence-free defense trade AUKUS partners are making progress in aligning exports and trade regulations to drive deeper defense trade. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are taking significant and tangible steps to meet their commitment to streamline trade among and between the AUKUS partners. In December 2023, the U.S. Congress included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 a pathway to a historic export control exemption to streamline the flow of defense trade for Australia and the United Kingdom. To complement this, on March 27, 2024, Australia passed the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 that provides the reciprocal national exemption for the United States and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is progressing reform to its Open General Export License Program to provide reciprocal exemption for Australia and the United States. These collective mechanisms will enable most defense items to transfer or re-transfer between the three countries without needing further authorization. This environment will set the conditions for unparalleled levels of defense cooperation between AUKUS partners and enable the integration of our industrial bases to accelerate our technological advantage.

Strengthening links across our industrial bases Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States acknowledged the launch of the AUKUS Advanced Capabilities Industry Forum, which will hold its first meeting on April 9, 2024. The Forum is the key interface between AUKUS governments and industrial bases, via our trade associations. It will focus on trilateral requirements, capability planning, development, and delivery of AUKUS Advanced Capabilities. The Industry Forum provides an opportunity for government and industry representatives to come together to exchange ideas and deepen industrial collaboration on advanced capabilities.

Innovation driven capability AUKUS partners launched the inaugural Pillar II Innovation Challenge on electronic warfare on March 26, 2024, as a collaborative initiative between respective innovation accelerator units. This will be the first in a series of AUKUS innovation challenges that will identify opportunities to harness commercial technologies from all three nations to support advanced capability development under AUKUS.

Responding to operational demand Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States welcomed the Land Commanders Statement of Intent to develop a land contribution to AUKUS Pillar II, the AUKUS Army Armaments Cooperation Forum, and the Combined Multi-Domain Task Force. All three countries affirmed their support for Land Commanders to pursue opportunities in Long Range Fires under AUKUS Pillar II in 2024.

Engaging close partners and allies Since the inception of AUKUS, our nations have been clear in our intent to engage others in Pillar II projects as our work progresses. Over the past two and a half years, we have built a strong, trilateral foundation for delivering advanced military capabilities at speed and scale. AUKUS partners have developed principles and models for additional partner engagement in individual Pillar II projects and will undertake consultations in 2024 with prospective partners regarding areas where they can contribute to, and benefit from, this historic work. 

In identifying collaboration opportunities, we will take into account factors such as technological innovation, financing, industrial strengths, ability to adequately protect sensitive data and information, and impact on promoting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Our objective remains to further the delivery of advanced military capabilities to our respective defense forces in support of regional stability and security; we are confident that engaging like-minded partners in the work of Pillar II will only strengthen this pursuit. Recognizing Japan's strengths and its close bilateral defense partnerships with all three countries, we are considering cooperation with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects. 

Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States are committed to continued openness and transparency with international partners on AUKUS. We look forward to continuing close collaboration to advance the generational potential of AUKUS. Through the activities of both Pillars, all three countries affirm their commitment to work jointly and together with the region to ensure a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, complementing the existing regional architecture.

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Secretary Mayorkas Testimony to the House Appropriations Committee on the FY 2025 Budget Request for the Department of Homeland Security

Secretary Mayorkas delivered the following opening statement at a House Appropriations Committee hearing on the FY 2025 Budget Request for the Department of Homeland Security.

Chairman Joyce, Ranking Member Cuellar, distinguished members of this committee:

Every day, the 268,000 men and women of the Department of Homeland Security carry out our mission to protect the safety and security of the American people. They protect our shores, harbors, skies, cyberspace, borders, and leaders. They stop fentanyl and other deadly drugs from entering our country. They lead the response to maritime emergencies; as we speak, they are engaged in the response to the tragic Francis Scott Key Bridge collapse in Baltimore. They help communities recover and rebuild after a natural disaster. They combat the scourges of human trafficking, forced labor, and online child sexual exploitation; and so much more.

All this despite a perennially insufficient budget.

The dedicated public servants of DHS deserve full support, and the American people deserve the results a fully resourced DHS can deliver. The funding opportunities outlined in the President’s Fiscal Year 2025 Budget for DHS are critical to meeting both goals. I welcome the opportunity to discuss this proposed budget, and highlight some of its key proposals, with you today.

When our Department was founded in the wake of 9/11, the threat of foreign terrorism against high-visibility targets was our primary concern. That foreign threat persists, and the U.S. continues to be in a heightened threat environment. We now also confront the terrorism-related threat of radicalized lone offenders and small groups already resident here in the United States. This budget provides for an $80 million increase to our Department’s Nonprofit Security Grant Program, and additional funds for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention grants so that DHS can better help communities prevent tragedies from occurring.

As lone actors and nation-states increasingly target our critical infrastructure and our data, the President’s budget provides CISA with needed funding to improve our cybersecurity and resiliency.

Fentanyl is wreaking tragedy in communities across the country. DHS has interdicted more illicit fentanyl and arrested more individuals for fentanyl-related crimes in the last two fiscal years than in the previous five combined. We must do more. The President’s budget includes critical funding to advance our strategy, including funds for Non-Intrusive Inspection technology and targeted operations.

During a time when the world, including our hemisphere, is experiencing the greatest displacement of people since World War II, DHS has toughened our border enforcement and is maximizing our available resources and authorities. In the last 11 months, we have removed or returned more than 630,000 individuals who did not have a legal basis to stay – more than in every full fiscal year since 2013.

The President’s budget would further expand these efforts. It provides $25.9 billion for CBP and ICE, including funds for hiring more enforcement personnel. A separate $265 million would be used by USCIS to bolster refugee processing, as we continue to expand lawful pathways and ensure that protection remains accessible for those who qualify under our laws.

Our immigration system, however, is fundamentally broken, including our asylum system that so significantly impacts the security of our borders and the processes we administer at it. Only Congress can fix our broken and outdated system, and only Congress can address our need for more border patrol agents, asylum officers and immigration judges, facilities, and technology. Our Administration worked closely with a bipartisan group of Senators to reach agreement on a national security supplemental package – one that would make the system changes that are needed and give DHS the tools and resources needed to meet today’s border security challenges. We remain ready to work with you to pass this tough, fair, bipartisan agreement.

Finally, extreme weather continues to devastate communities. Last year, FEMA responded to more than 100 disasters. Our budget provides $22.7 billion to assist community leaders and help survivors in the aftermath of major disasters, and additional funds to invest in resilience strategies that will save lives and taxpayer money in the decades to come.

Essential to our success across all mission sets is our Department’s ability to recruit and retain a world-class workforce. In addition to the frontline border workforce I mentioned, the President’s budget includes $1.5 billion to maintain our commitment to fairly compensate the TSA workforce, continuing the long-overdue Fiscal Year 2023 initiative we worked together to implement.

I look forward to working and further discussing with you these critical missions, and our Department’s needs for both the coming and current fiscal years. The recently passed 2024 budget, though welcome and helpful to many of our operations, was enacted too late to implement an appreciable hiring surge. It reduced by 20 percent much-needed support for cities dealing with migrant-related challenges, and it cut critical research and development funding, the compounding effects of which our Department will feel for years.

I am eager to work with you to address these and other shortfalls in the weeks ahead, as I am eager to deliver, together, the sustained funding, resources, and support that the extraordinarily talented and dedicated public servants of DHS need and deserve.

• Secretary of Homeland Security
• Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas

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FACT SHEET: Japan Official Visit with State Dinner to the United   States

Today, President Biden welcomed Prime Minister Kishida of Japan for an Official Visit with State Dinner to celebrate the deep and historic ties between our two countries. This visit also reflects the upward trajectory of the U.S.-Japan Alliance as it evolves into a global partnership that promotes a shared vision of progress and prosperity for the future. The two leaders’ ambitious efforts span the depth and breadth of the Alliance to include cooperation on defense and security; space; advanced technology and economic cooperation; diplomacy and development; and people-to-people ties.

This bilaterally coordinated fact sheet provides an overview of political understandings that were affirmed or reaffirmed during the Official Visit with State Dinner, as well as plans for further cooperative activities between the United States and Japan.

DEFENSE AND SECURITY COOPERATION

Our defense and security ties form the core of our Alliance and are the cornerstone of regional peace and security. Recognizing that the Alliance has reached new heights, we plan to further bolster our defense and security cooperation to allow for greater coordination and integration.

Upgrading Alliance Command and Control: The United States and Japan intend to bilaterally upgrade our respective command and control frameworks to enable seamless integration of operations and capabilities and allow for greater interoperability and planning between U.S. and Japanese forces in peacetime and during contingencies. More effective U.S.-Japan Alliance command and control provides strengthened deterrence and promotes a free and open Indo-Pacific in the face of pressing regional security challenges. In order to support this initiative, they reaffirm to deepen Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation and Alliance information sharing capabilities, including through the Bilateral Information Analysis Cell.

Exploring Advanced Capabilities Cooperation under AUKUS Pillar II: Recognizing Japan’s strengths and the close bilateral defense partnerships with the AUKUS countries, AUKUS partners – Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – are considering cooperation with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects.

Bolstering Regional Networked Security: As our two countries deepen cooperation and coordination within the Alliance, we also look to expand our efforts to enhance regional security. The United States and Japan intend to work together toward our vision to cooperate on a networked air defense architecture, incorporating future capabilities with Australia. We will explore enhanced cooperation, including missile defense information sharing to counter growing air and missile threats. As our two countries look to ensure a secure and peaceful region, the United States and Japan plan to conduct deterrence operations to address escalatory or provocative activities around Japan.

Deepening U.S.-Japan Defense Industry Cooperation : The United States and Japan plan to leverage our respective industrial bases to establish an Alliance defense production capacity to meet the demand for critical capabilities over the long term. We will convene a Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) co-led by the U.S. Department of Defense and Japan Ministry of Defense to identify priority areas for partnering U.S. and Japanese industry, including on co-development, co-production and co-sustainment. As a part of this mutually beneficial effort, we announce our intention to explore co-production of advanced and interoperable missiles for air defense and other purposes to further bolster the Alliance deterrence posture. Our two countries also commit to establishing a working group to explore opportunities for future fighter pilot training and readiness, including AI and advanced simulators, and co-development and co-production of cutting-edge technologies such as common jet trainers to maintain combat-ready next-generation fighter airpower.

Leveraging Regional Maintenance and Repair Capabilities: The U.S. Department of Defense plans to work with U.S. Congress to authorize the U.S. Navy to use private shipyards to conduct maintenance and repairs of 90 days or less on U.S. Navy ships deployed to the Indo-Pacific from homeports in the United States, including Guam. Additionally, the U.S. Navy continues to review opportunities to conduct maintenance and repair of forward-deployed U.S. Navy ships at Japanese commercial shipyards. The United States and Japan plan to explore the possibility of conducting maintenance and repair on engines of Japan-based U.S. Air Force aircrafts including fourth generation fighters. Supporting the new DICAS’s oversight of co-sustainment, the two countries will convene the first Working Group for Ship Repair in Japan by June 2024 to coordinate future maintenance and repair opportunities

Enabling Japan’s Stand-off Defense and Counter-hypersonic Capabilities: The United States continues to support Japan’s capability development, highlighting the signing of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance for Japan to acquire U.S. Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles and the start of a training pipeline and ship modifications for Japan to acquire operational capability. The United States and Japan plan to also continue to pursue cooperative development of a Glide Phase Interceptor program to counter hypersonic threats, which aims to strengthen regional deterrence and build on long-standing missile defense cooperation between the two countries.

Advancing Trilateral Cooperation : The United States and Japan with Australia intend to seek to advance trilateral intelligence reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) operational coordination, including by identifying key capabilities to integrate into exercises and training. Building on the announcement at the Australia Official Visit in October 2023 to pursue trilateral cooperation with Japan on unmanned aerial systems (UAS), our three countries are pursuing cooperative opportunities in the rapidly emerging field of collaborative combat aircraft and autonomy. Continuing the momentum from the Camp David trilateral summit, we welcome progress on establishing an annual multidomain exercise between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Recognizing the commitments made in the Atlantic Declaration and the Hiroshima Accord, and as the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions become ever more interlinked, both countries welcome the announcement of regular U.S.-Japan-UK trilateral exercises, beginning in 2025, as they enhance their shared and enduring security.

Deepening Cooperation on Information and Cyber Security: The two countries pledge to continue to deepen their cooperation on information and cyber security to ensure the Alliance stays ahead of growing threats and builds resilience in the information and communication technology (ICT) domain. They plan to also enhance their cooperation on the protection of critical infrastructure. The United States and Japan plan to establish a working group of relevant experts to develop an action plan on achieving mutual recognition on cybersecurity labelling schemes for Internet of Things.

Boosting our Humanitarian Response Capacity : Recognizing the importance of rapidly responding to frequent and severe climate change-related and other natural disasters, we plan to explore cooperation on the establishment of a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief hub in Japan.

Deepening U.S.-Japan Defense Science and Technology Cooperation:   The United States and Japan continue to evolve bilateral science and technology cooperation through the Defense Science and Technology (S&T) Cooperation Group (DSTCG). Co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) and the Commissioner for the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA), the DSTCG aims to better integrate and align U.S. and Japan defense S&T ecosystems.

Mitigating Impacts on Local Communities: In order to maintain deterrence and mitigate impact on local communities, we are firmly committed to the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan in accordance with Okinawa Consolidation Plan, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.

Cooperation on Environmental Issues: The United States and Japan affirm the importance of continued bilateral coordination on stable stationing of USFJ, including on environmental cooperation.

SPACE COOPERATION

As we further strengthen the foundation of our alliance, we also are looking to the future. Our two countries will continue to pioneer and lead on space exploration to include on the Moon.

Signing of Historic Lunar Surface Exploration Implementing Arrangement: The United States and Japan signed a historic implementing arrangement for human spaceflight cooperation on the Moon. Japan will provide and maintain a pressurized rover to support astronauts living and working on the Moon, while the United States will allocate two astronaut flight opportunities to the lunar surface for Japan on future Artemis missions . The shared goal is fora Japanese national to be the first non-American astronaut to land on the Moon on a future Artemis mission. This pressurized rover is intended to enable astronauts to travel farther and work for longer periods on the lunar surface.

Negotiating a Space Technology Safeguards Agreement: The United States and Japan commenced negotiations on a space technology safeguards agreement which is designed to provide the legal and technical framework for U.S. commercial space launch from Japan. The space technology safeguards agreement has the potential to open new commercial opportunities in a range of advanced technologies related to space.

Expanding Space Science Cooperation : Building on the 2023 U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement, Japan will participate in NASA missions, including Dragonfly and the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope. Dragonfly is NASA’s robotic mission to Saturn’s moon Titan to investigate its habitability and prebiotic chemistry wherein Japan will provide a seismometer to Dragonfly’s suite of scientific instruments. The Roman Space Telescope is NASA’s flagship next generation observatory; Japan will contribute hardware to support the Coronagraph instrument as well as ground station support. The United States and Japan plan to also collaborate on JAXA’s Next-generation Solar-observing Satellite, SOLAR-C, which is intended to investigate the mysteries of solar atmospheres by conducting spectroscopic observations of UV radiations from the Sun.

Deepening Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) Constellation Cooperation: The United States and Japan announced their intention to collaborate on a future Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) detection and tracking constellation. This includes cooperation on demonstration, bilateral analysis, information sharing, and potential collaboration with the U.S. industrial base. The integration between U.S. and Japanese constellations of LEO satellites provides an opportunity to improve communications and increase the resilience of both nations’ space capabilities.

Enhancing Satellite Cooperation : The United States and Japan announced the completion of three new operational ground stations for Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) in Alaska, California, and Guam. The new ground stations will enhance Japan’s ability to monitor and maintain the accuracy of QZSS. Furthermore, Japan will launch two QZSS satellites hosting payloads from the Department of Defense by March 2026.

ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGY, AND CLIMATE COOPERATION

Technology innovation will drive the alliance in the 21 st century. Our two countries pledge to continue to work closely together on critical and emerging technologies such as AI, quantum, semiconductors, and clean energy. Our enhanced collaboration and investment in these technologies provide opportunities for greater ties and prosperity for both of our countries as we seek to secure our economic and technological futures.

Economic Cooperation

Major Commercial Deals: The private sector in both of our countries recognize the incredible opportunities and promise of growing our commercial ties, especially in areas such as critical and emerging technologies. We welcome the establishment of a Japan Innovation Campus supporting Japanese startups in Silicon Valley and the “Global Startup Campus” in Tokyo, and support accelerating investment in our two countries to foster innovation. We also welcome the following major new and recent commercial deals, among the many, that demonstrate our strong and vibrant economic ties:

Private Sector Investment

• Microsoft has announced it will invest $2.9 billion over the next two years in Japan in artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud computing and data centers, an expanded digital skilling program to train more than three million people, the founding of a Microsoft Research lab in Japan, and cybersecurity cooperation with the Government of Japan to enhance Japan’s cybersecurity resilience.
• Google plans to invest $1 billion in digital connectivity for North Pacific Connect, which expands the Pacific Connect Initiative, with NEC, to improve digital communications infrastructure between the United States, Japan, and Pacific Island Nations.
• Daiichi Sankyo intends to invest $350 million in constructing a new manufacturing building, laboratory and warehouse at its facility in New Albany, Ohio. Daiichi Sankyo estimates the creation of 900 jobs across the United States over three years.
• Amazon Web Services (AWS) has announced it will invest approximately $15 billion in Japan by 2027 to expand existing cloud infrastructure to serve as the backbone for AI and other digital services in the country. AWS estimates this planned investment could contribute up to $37 billion to Japan’s GDP and support an estimated average of more than 30,500 full-time equivalent jobs in local Japanese businesses each year.
• Toyota has announced an additional investment of nearly $8 billion that it expects will add an estimated 3,000 more jobs to increase capacity to support battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid vehicles battery production in Greensboro, North Carolina.  This is Toyota’s first automotive battery plant in North America, and the plant’s total investment is now nearly $13.9 billion; Toyota expects it will create an estimated 5,100 jobs.
• Honda Aircraft Company has announced an additional investment of $55.7 million for production of its new HondaJet 2600 model in North Carolina. It brings the total investment in the HondaJet business in North Carolina to $573.4 million.
• UBE Corporation has invested $500 million in its Waggaman, Louisiana, a Justice40 community, electrolyte solvent facility project for batteries which it expects to create 60 new jobs.
• Yaskawa Electric Corporation is investing approximately $200 million in new manufacturing facilities for robotics and semiconductor motion solutions in the states of Wisconsin and Ohio which is expected to employ about 1,750 workers and increase the Yaskawa footprint in the United States by about 25 percent.
• MITSUI E&S, its U.S.-based subsidiary PACECO, and Brookfield are working together to reestablish final assembly of port cranes in California. This is the first time since 1989 that the United States has had this capacity, and it is expected to contribute to securing the safety of U.S. port infrastructure.
• FUJIFILM Corporation announced an investment of $200 million in two U.S. subsidiaries to expand its global cell therapy contract development and manufacturing (CDMO) capabilities. The investments are earmarked for Madison, Wisconsin and Thousand Oaks, California, and FUJIFILM estimates the investment could create up to 160 new jobs.

Collaborative Government-Private Sector Engagement:

• General Atomics Aeronautical Systems plans to provide two MQ-9B SeaGuardian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which will add high performance and surveillance ability to the Japan Coast Guard (JCG). This project will provide $152 million in U.S. exports and is expected to support 700 U.S. jobs.
• As the first foreign company named as a trusted partner in Japan’s Moonshot program of Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) on quantum computers, Infleqtion will collaborate with the Japanese Institute of Molecular Science (IMS) on developing a powerful quantum computer using Infleqtion’s quantum technology.
• Quantinuum, a U.S. quantum computer manufacturer, plans to provide RIKEN, a Government of Japan National Research and Development Agency, exclusive access to and use of a quantum computer for a period of five years – representing $50 million in quantum service exports.

Enhancing Financial Sector Cooperation : The United States and Japan are committed to strengthening our partnership to bolster cross-border investment and support financial stability. To this end, we intend to organize a roundtable this year, convening public and private sector stakeholders to discuss capital markets integration, identify potential key reforms, and bring to bear expertise from our respective financial sectors and regulatory authorities.

Engaging on Sustainable Investment: The United States and Japan pledge to continue to collaborate and build upon their foundation of successful public-private sector engagement. This initiative enables dialogues and forums through which to share best practices and promote mutually beneficial opportunities for U.S. and Japanese businesses in the areas of sustainable investment, risk management, and corporate value creation. By the end of next year, we intend to jointly host one or more roundtables to connect U.S. and Japanese private sector companies with investment opportunities while promoting sustainable value creation (SX).

Building Transparent, Resilient, and Sustainable Supply Chains : The United States and Japan welcome the initiation of discussions between the U.S. Department of Commerce and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) under the framework of the U.S.-Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee (our economic “2+2”) to accelerate joint efforts to address supply chain challenges and opportunities in mutually determined strategic sectors, such as current-generation and mature-node (“legacy”) semiconductors, along with like-minded countries, as appropriate. Both sides seek to cooperate to address supply chain vulnerabilities, such as those posed by non-market policies and practices, including by gaining a better comprehension of such vulnerabilities in strategic sectors.

Critical and Emerging Technology and Innovation

Strengthening Artificial Intelligence Research Collaboration: Building on the landmark university-corporate strategic partnerships in quantum computing and semiconductor engineering launched on the sidelines of the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Hiroshima, the United States and Japan welcome a new $110 million joint Artificial Intelligence partnership with the University of Washington and University of Tsukuba as well as Carnegie Mellon University and Keio University through funding from NVIDIA, Arm, and Amazon, Microsoft, and a consortium of Japanese companies. This innovative partnership is expected to advance AI research and development and enhance U.S.-Japan global leadership in cutting-edge technology. We welcome the initiation of AI and quantum technology cooperation between Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) and NVIDIA, exploring the potential cooperation in the field of computing and development. We welcome the new Project Arrangement on high-performance computing and AI between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Japan’s Ministry of Education Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and the new Memorandum of Understanding on AI for Science between Argonne National Laboratory and RIKEN to foster collaboration. We welcome cooperation between U.S. and Japanese companies toward the development of foundation models for generative AI, including contribution of NVIDIA’s GPUs to Japanese computational resources companies such as Sakura Internet and Softbank and other computational resources from Google and Microsoft to Japanese AI foundation models development companies.

Launching Quantum Technology Partnerships: To promote our bilateral industrial cooperation on quantum computing, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) intends to partner with Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) to build robust supply chains for quantum technology and related standardization. The University of Chicago, the University of Tokyo, and Seoul National University established a partnership to train a quantum workforce and strengthen their collective competitiveness in the global economy.

Enhancing Cooperation on Semiconductors: Building on our long history of cooperation on semiconductor technology, we welcome the initiation of discussions among Japan’s Leading-Edge Semiconductor Technology Center (LSTC) and U.S. research initiatives, such as the U.S. National Semiconductor Technology Center (NSTC) and the U.S. National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing Program (NAPMP), toward the creation of an agenda for U.S.- Japan cooperation, including an R&D roadmap and workforce development. We welcome robust U.S.-Japan private sector cooperation, especially in next-generation semiconductors and advanced packaging. U.S. and Japanese companies are exploring the wide range of possibilities available through optical semiconductors through partnerships like the Global Innovative Optical and Wireless Networks (IOWN) Forum.

The U.S. Department of Labor plans to invite Japanese counterparts in the semiconductor sector to participate in technical workshops with the U.S. private sector and educational institutions to discuss optimal ways to train the next generation of designers, builders, and professionals in advanced semiconductor research and manufacturing.

Strengthening Cooperation for Safe, Secure and Trustworthy AI: The United States and Japan are committed to further advancing the Hiroshima AI Process by expanding support from partner governments and AI actors. The United States and Japan acknowledged and plan to support each other in establishing national AI Safety Institutes and committed to future collaboration, including on interoperable standards, methods, and evaluations for AI safety. A crosswalk of Japan’s AI Guidelines for Business with the NIST AI Risk Management Framework is currently underway and is designed to promote interoperability in our policy frameworks for AI.

Reducing AI Risks and Harms from Synthetic Content: The United States and Japan pledge to cooperate on reducing risks and harms of AI-generated content. The countries commit to provide transparency to the public, to the extent possible and appropriate, by authenticating and labeling official government produced content as well as detecting and identifying AI-generated content and content altered or manipulated by AI. Both governments plan to take steps independently and cooperatively on technical research and standards development.

Establishing a New Science and Technology Partnership: The United States and Japan announce a partnership to catalyze innovation, facilitate knowledge exchange, and promote entrepreneurial endeavors that contribute to the advancement of science and technology, and through the State Department’s Global Innovation through Science and Technology (GIST) program. The United States and Japan also endorse joint efforts among their universities and companies to foster human capital for the purpose of increasing governability on digital and emerging technologies under the initiative of U.S.-Japan Digital Innovation Hub and Advanced Technology Workshop

Expanding National Science Foundation Collaboration: The United States and Japan welcome the signing of the Memorandum of Cooperation between the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) to partner on NSF’s Innovation Corps (I-Corps) program. This entrepreneurship training program aims to strengthen lab to market transition by helping researchers more effectively target their discoveries to customer needs. Through the Global Centers program, NSF has committed $25 million in awards for bioeconomy research and JST will support at least three awards. The two agencies also plan to collaborate on research on the designing materials which will revolutionize our engineering future.

Strengthening International Joint Research in Scientific and Technological Fields: The United States and Japan welcomed strengthening collaboration between the national research institutes and universities in science, technology, and innovation as well as the exchange of researchers through joint research to promote U.S.-Japan talent mobility and circulation, such as the Adopting Sustainable Partnerships for Innovative Research Ecosystem (ASPIRE) in eight areas: AI and information, biotechnology, energy, materials, quantum, semiconductors, telecommunications, and healthcare. We welcome further bilateral collaboration on global ocean observation and Arctic research. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and Fukushima Institute for Research, Education and Innovation (F-REI) are pursuing a Memorandum of Cooperation to establish a collaborative relationship to increase opportunities for joint research in select topics including energy, robotics, radiation science, nuclear disaster response, and agriculture.

Promoting Open and Interoperable Approaches to Telecommunications Networks: As the world becomes more interconnected, the United States and Japan pledge to continue to promote open, standards-based approaches to telecommunications networks that are interoperable, secure, and multi-vendor in nature. The United States and Japan intend to explore opportunities to promote Open RAN commercialization in third countries, including Indo-Pacific countries. The United States and Japan commit to continuing to engage both bilaterally and with like-minded partner countries through fora such as the Quad.

Climate and Clean Energy

Expanding U.S.-Japan Clean Energy and Climate Cooperation: The United States and Japan are launching a new high-level dialogue on our two countries’ implementation of respective domestic measures and maximize respective synergies and impacts, including the Inflation Reduction Act and Green Transformation (GX) Promotion Strategy, aimed at accelerating energy transition progress this decade, promoting complementary and innovative clean energy supply chains, and improving industrial competitiveness.  For the advancement of the U.S.-Japan Climate Partnership, recalling relevant CMA decisions, we further plan to aggressively implement our 2030 nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and develop ambitious 2035 NDCs in line with a 1.5C warming limit. We encourage all major economies to submit bold, 1.5C-aligned 2035 NDCs that reflect economy-wide absolute reduction targets including all greenhouse gases, sectors, and categories, and commit to prioritizing concrete and timely steps towards the goal of accelerating the phase-out of domestic unabated coal power. The United States and Japan intend to also work together to secure a successful outcome at the 29 th UN Climate Change Conference on a new collective quantified goal that reflects a realistic increment and broadened contributor base.

Expanding Quality Infrastructure Investment: The United States and Japan plan to work together and with partner countries in strategic economic corridors on fostering investment under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), including cooperation in the Indo-Pacific through the PGI-IPEF InvestmentAccelerator. Our two countrieswill continue to seek cooperation on critical minerals and other projects, including those along the PGI Lobito Corridor. The United States and Japan have worked to establish a Blue Dot Network Secretariat at the OECD to certify quality infrastructure projects.

Building Resilient Critical Mineral Supply Chains: The United States and Japan resolve to explore joint projects, including through the Minerals Security Partnership and the Partnership for Resilient and Inclusive Supply-chain Enhancement (RISE), including ones that diversify key supply chains of critical minerals, and support recycling efforts for electrical and electronic scrap in the United States, Japan, and other Indo-Pacific likeminded partners. To that end, the United States welcomes the MOU between the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security (JOGMEC) and La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (GECAMINES) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in alignment with our shared commitment with PGI’s development of the Lobito Corridor.

The United States and Japan intend to continue facilitating $170 million in annual U.S. e-scrap exports to Japan for environmentally sound recycling under the OECD Council Decision on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Wastes Destined for Recovery Operations and strengthen cooperation through facilitating a policy dialogue on increasing circularity of critical minerals and raw materials, which are indispensable for decarbonization and reducing negative environmental impacts.

Deepening Energy Cooperation : Both of our countries recognize the importance of clean energy as we look to combat the effects of climate change and lay the groundwork for clean and resilient economic growth this century. The United States and Japan announced the U.S.-Japan Strategic Partnership to Accelerate Fusion Energy Demonstration and Commercialization . The United States and Japan reaffirmed their commitment to accelerating the global transition to zero-emissions energy and working with other fossil energy importers and producers to minimize methane emissions across the fossil energy value chain to the fullest extent practicable. Both countries also intend to support the establishment of green shipping corridors including a new grain corridor to support global efforts to decarbonize the international shipping sector.

Today we announce Japan joins as the first international collaborator of the U.S. Floating Offshore Wind Shot. Japan recognizes the ambition of the U.S. Floating Offshore Wind Shot, which aims to reduce the cost of floating offshore wind in deep waters by more than 70 percent and reach 15GW of U.S. domestic deployment by 2035. Through the partnership, the United States and Japan will collaborate to make progress towards global ambition in line with the U.S. Floating Offshore Wind Shot, taking into consideration national circumstances, to accelerate breakthroughs across engineering, manufacturing, and other innovation areas that dramatically reduce the cost of floating offshore wind in deep waters by 2035. The United States and Japan announced they would report publicly on progress each year through CEESI. To work towards global ambition, Japan will contribute with its efforts of “the Vision for Offshore Wind Industry” and approximately 120 billion yen through the Green Innovation Fund. The United States also welcomes Japan’s newly-launched industry platform, the Floating Offshore Wind Technology Research Association (FLOWRA), aiming to reduce costs and achieve mass production of floating offshore wind through collaboration with academia. The United States will continue its efforts under the Department of Energy’s Strategy to Advance Offshore Wind Energy to leverage more than $5.8 billion in cumulative public and private sector supply chain investments under the Biden-Harris Administration. We also intend to advance research and development for perovskite solar cell technology through the Green Innovation Fund and the Perovskite PV Accelerator for Commercializing Technologies (PACT) Center, led by Sandia National Laboratory.

Expanding Infrastructure to Support Clean Energy: Our two nations acknowledge the need to expand and modernize power grids and energy infrastructure to keep pace with our ambitious goals for renewable energy deployment. We plan to explore means to boost investment in our power grids and share best practices for grid modernization. We also look to expand the use of market-based power purchase agreements by companies and industries to assist access to clean energy, including from both large nuclear reactors and advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs), as they attempt to meet their own decarbonization goals and drive innovation in power intensive industries such as Artificial Intelligence, quantum computing, and data centers.

Partnering to Deploy Safe and Secure Nuclear Energy: The United States and Japan recognize the crucial role of civil nuclear power to meet our overarching climate goals, as affirmed in our participation in the COP28 pledge to triple globally installed nuclear energy by 2050. In pursuit of this vision, the United States applauds the Prime Minister’s plan to restart nuclear reactors to meet its 2030 decarbonization goals. Our two countries acknowledge the transformational opportunities presented through our continued cooperation on A/SMRs, and affirm our continued partnership on joint efforts both bilaterally and multilaterally to deploy A/SMRs this decade.

Our two countries plan to launch the Fukushima Daiichi Decommissioning partnership with Tokyo Electric Power Company and U.S. national laboratories to deepen research cooperation for the steady implementation of decommissioning the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, especially for fuel debris retrieval. Recognizing the important role of nuclear energy to both accelerate the energy transition and enhance energy security, the United States and Japan also resolve to promote public-private investment in enriched uranium production capacity free from Russian material.

Improving Methane Emissions Data: The United States and Japan are collaborating, including with other international partners, to share greenhouse gas emissions satellite observations data and make it freely available to the public, including providing greenhouse gas information to governments in low- and middle-income countries to support the development of climate mitigation policies. The United States and Japan intend to also leverage existing efforts, such as the International Methane Emissions Observatory, to develop and disseminate accurate, transparent methane emissions data to support methane reduction interventions globally.

Carbon Management: The United States and Japan reaffirm our commitment to the Carbon Management Challenge, Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage (CCUS) Initiative, and to the Mission Innovation CDR Launchpad in the pursuit of developing carbon management technologies to support achieving the Paris Agreement goals. Additionally, the United States commits to supporting collaboration with Japanese counterparts to evaluate the potential for cross-border carbon dioxide transport and storage hubs between Alaska and Japan. For example, the United States is pursuing carbon dioxide shipping feasibility studies and tools such as life cycle assessment and technoeconomic analysis that can aid in this goal. We welcome the progress of ongoing projects in carbon capture, utilization, and storage, as well as carbon recycling, between U.S. and Japanese companies. On e-methane, Japanese companies have signed Letters of Intent (LOIs) with U.S. companies to avoid CO 2 double counting.

Sustainable Aviation Fuel: The United States and Japan reaffirm our joint aim of decarbonizing the aviation industry, including the goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. We recognize the importance of realizing the U.S. Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) Grand Challenge 2030 goal of three billion gallons of SAF that, compared to a petroleum-based jet fuel baseline, will provide a significant reduction in lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, as well as Japan’s 2030 target of replacing 10% of the fuel consumed by Japanese airlines with SAF. To support achieving these goals, the United States pledges to seek to support the increase of globally available supplies of SAFs or feedstocks, including those that are ethanol-based, and commit to working in ICAO to identify solutions that accurately measure and actively reduce the carbon intensity of global SAF feedstocks and products. Simultaneously, Japan commits to advancing R&D efforts to develop and commercialize SAF technologies, including Alcohol-to-Jet (ATJ), through support measures by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

Collaborating on Hydrogen and its Derivatives, and Geothermal: We welcome the progress of collaboration between U.S. and Japanese companies on building hydrogen hubs, and shared expectations for further cooperation to build a large-scale and resilient global supply chains based on carbon intensity and to expand utilization of hydrogen. A Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) on Geothermal Energy was signed between DOE-METI at the G7 Ministers’ Meeting on Climate, Energy and Environment in Sapporo in April 2023. Through this MOC, the United States and Japan have been exploring next steps for collaboration.

Investing in U.S. Infrastructure : The U.S. Department of Transportation and Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism welcomed Amtrak’s leadership of the Texas Central High Speed Rail Project, utilizing Shinkansen technologies, which was recently selected for the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) Corridor Identification and Development grant program. The successful completion of development efforts and other requirements would position the project for potential future funding and financing opportunities.

Biotechnology, Biopharmaceutical, and Health-Related Cooperation

Tackling Cancer Together: In alignment with the Biden Cancer Moonshot to end cancer as we know it, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Japan’s Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA) intend to collaborate and exchange information on oncology drug products. Specifically, under initiatives Project Nozomi and Project Orbis, FDA and PMDA intend to work to enable earlier access to cancer medication for patients and hold discussions on future drug development, including multiregional clinical trials and ways to prevent drug shortages.

Advancing Pharmaceutical Innovation: The United States and Japan welcome the Japan’s Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA)’s intent to establish an office in the Washington, D.C. metro area. This office provides opportunities to enhance PMDA’s cooperation with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and facilitate information sharing with private industry.

Opening of CDC Regional Office: The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) opened a Regional Office for East Asia and the Pacific in Tokyo in February. This new regional office provides support to 26 countries and territories in the region to strengthen core global health security capacities and collaboration to improve detection, rapid response to disease threats, and knowledge and information exchange.

Global Health Collaboration:   The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue to discuss ways to advance shared global health priorities.

Expanding Biotechnology and Healthcare Cooperation : The United States and Japan welcome the launch of a new U.S.-Japan biotechnology and healthcare discussion, focused on promoting responsible development, protecting key technologies, and establishing reliable and secure supply chains. The exchange prioritizes efforts to advance industrial competitiveness, including joint events in close partnership with relevant U.S. and Japanese ministries and agencies, as well as academic and private sector partners. It also bolsters work to prioritize the safe, secure, and responsible development and use of emerging biotechnology through close policy coordination.

DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

As global leaders, the United States and Japan remain committed to ensuring a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific region with a conviction that the security in Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions are interlinked. Beyond these regions, our two countries recognize the global challenges we jointly face and reaffirm commitments made at the G7 Hiroshima Summit in upholding the rule of law, which protects all nations, especially the vulnerable, and continued cooperation with partners beyond the G7. To that end, we intend to launch a new strategic dialogue to coordinate global diplomacy and development efforts and to be held at the Deputy Secretary of State/Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs level. Our two countries remain committed to supporting Ukraine’s right to self-defense and its long-term security and economic recovery. The United States has contributed $74.6 billion in humanitarian, development, military, and economic assistance to Ukraine, and Japan has been providing continuous support to Ukraine, a commitment of which adds up to $12.1 billion in total. We are also committed to addressing the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Japan has provided approximately $107 million in support of the Palestinian people and the United States has contributed $180 million in humanitarian assistance for civilians in Gaza since October 7, 2023. Moreover, the United States and Japan underscore the importance and urgency of the situation in Haiti and reiterate our support to the mandate of the UN-authorized Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission to Haiti.

Investing in the Indo-Pacific :  The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) have renewed an MOU that enables greater collaboration in financing projects in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

The United States and Japan acknowledge the importance of improving the Amata Kabua International Airport in the Republic of Marshall Island (RMI) in support of sustaining RMI’s economy.

Building on the U.S.-Australia joint funding commitment for subsea cables last October, the United States and Japan will collaborate with like-minded partners to build trusted and more resilient networks and intend to contribute funds to provide subsea cables in the Pacific region, including $16 million towards subsea cable systems for Tuvalu, which will connect it for the first time in history, as well as the Federated States of Micronesia. In addition, Taiwan also plans to provide funding to deliver connectivity to Tuvalu.

In southeast Asia, the United States has announced $5 million in new funding to the Japan-U.S.-Mekong Power Partnership (JUMPP), which puts the U.S. commitment to $35 million since JUMPP’s launch in 2019. The $5 million helps fulfill Vice President Harris’ announcement that she plans to work with U.S. Congress to harness up to $20 million in new JUMPP funding. The U.S. and Japan’s work in the Mekong region has supported over 100 technical cooperation projects to expand cross-border power trade and clean energy integration in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Strengthening the International Financial Architecture : The United States and Japan intend to continue our collaboration to strengthen the international financial architecture and support developing countries to promote our shared values. This includes advancing the MDB Evolution agenda, planned contributions that would enable more than $30 billion in new lending headroom at the World Bank to support low- and middle-income countries in addressing global challenges, securing ambitious International Development Association and Asian Development Fund replenishments, addressing debt vulnerabilities that are holding back low- and middle-income countries’ growth potential and ability to invest in critical areas like climate and development including through advancing debt treatment through the G20 Common Framework and enhancing debt transparency, and solidifying the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a quota-based institution at the center of the global financial safety net.

Deepening our Commitment to Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: President Biden commended Japan’s safe, responsible, and science-based discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) treated water into the sea. The two leaders welcomed that the U.S. Department of Energy and Japan’s MEXT have removed all excess highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Kyoto University Critical Assembly and Japan Atomic Energy Agency’s Japan Materials Testing Reactor Critical Assembly to the United States and a new joint commitment to convert the Kindai University Teaching and Research Reactor from HEU to low-enriched uranium fuel and to return its HEU to the United States. The United States also joined the Japan-led “Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) Friends” effort to demonstrate our shared commitment toward disarmament.

Combatting Gender-Based Online Harassment and Abuse : Recognizing the importance of partnerships to combat technology-facilitated gender-based violence, including the Global Partnership for Action on Gender-Based Online Harassment and Abuse, the United States and Japan concur to strengthen our work at the nexus of gender equality and digital technology. These efforts underscore our commitments to advance our shared values, including human rights and gender equality, and further Women, Peace, and Security goals in an increasingly technology-dependent world.

Countering Foreign Information Manipulation: The United States and Japan are committed to working together and last year committed to the joint U.S.-Japan Memorandum of Cooperation on Countering Foreign Information Manipulation. The United States and Japan recognize that foreign information manipulation poses a challenge to the Indo-Pacific region and beyond and warrants enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Partnership to Combat Commercial Spyware: Japan has joined the Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware. The United States and Japan are committed to implementing domestic controls and building the international coalition to combat the misuse of such surveillance tools that pose a threat to our mutual national security interests and that enable human rights abuses.

Countering the Growing Threat of Transnational Repression: The United States and Japan are committed to reinforcing our partnership on countering transnational repression. To effectively address the rising concern of transnational repression globally it will take a coordinated multilateral response. 

Bolstering Whole-of-Society Resilience : The United States and Japan welcome the National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Resilience, Japan’s MEXT, and NVIDIA’s efforts on joint research and development on nation-scale resilience.

Building Resilient and Responsible Seafood Supply Chains: Our two countries pledge to work together, as part of the efforts under the Task Force on the Promotion of Human Rights and International Labor Standards in Supply Chains, led by the U.S. Trade Representative and METI, to explore ways to combat forced labor and advance responsible labor practices in seafood supply chains. We also intend to build resilient seafood supply chains through strengthened trade channels and increased business opportunities.

Strengthening Food Security and Sustainable Agriculture : To enhance existing food security efforts, the United States and Japan recently launched the U.S.-Japan Dialogue on Sustainable Agriculture, and we plan to continue joint research on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural production. Together, we intend to promote new technologies and climate-smart production practices to build sustainable and resilient agriculture and food systems able to feed a growing global population while conserving natural resources and mitigating climate change. As an example, the United States and Japan intend to be founding contributors to the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils seed and soil health research This research helps bolster diverse food production in developing partner countries.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE TIES

Our people-to-people ties serve as the bedrock of our Alliance. Civil society has been one of the driving factors of our close relationship over the past 170 years. Our two countries recognize the legacy of Ambassador Mansfield, the longest-serving U.S. Ambassador to Japan and his incredible contributions to the relationship through the Mansfield Center and Mansfield Foundation.

The success of the Alliance is due to the bonds between our peoples, and our two governments recognize the achievements of organizations and programs, such as Fulbright Japan, the JET Programme, the Japan Foundation, the KAKEHASHI Project, and the U.S.-Japan Council’s TOMODACHI Initiative, Asia Kakehashi Project +(Plus), and their contributions to the alliance. Our two countries celebrate the unique and historic role of the 38 Japan-America Societies located throughout the United States and 29 America-Japan Societies across Japan.

This year is the U.S.-Japan Tourism Year 2024, ahead of Japan hosting the 2025 World Expo in Osaka. For the first time since 1988, the United States approved federal funding to support the design, build, and operation of the U.S. Pavilion at the World Expo.

Our two countries remain steadfast in our commitment to foster close connections, and to promote close ties between current changemakers and future generations of leaders.

Boosting Educational Exchanges : The United States and Japan announce a new $12 million “Mineta Ambassadors Program (MAP)” education exchange endowment administered by the U.S.-Japan Council for U.S. and Japanese high school and university students who will “map” the future of the relationship, with support from Apple, the BlackRock Foundation, Toshizo Watanabe Foundation, and other founding donors. As a long-term investment in U.S.-Japan relations, the endowment plans to increase exchange opportunities in both directions. In this regard, we also welcome Japan’s new initiative to expand scholarship for Japanese students through the Japan Student Servicers Organization. We also recognize the importance of educational cooperation among high schools and universities between the two countries and enhance mid-to-long term educational exchange, including those seeking degree certificates or professional training and internship opportunities. The two governments also announce the restart of STEM scholarships in Japan via the Fulbright Program for the first time in 50 years, ensuring our flagship education exchange program supports our most important economic security priorities, and removal of the tuition cap for Japanese Fulbright participants.

Engaging the Next Generation of Leaders: President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida applaud the Japanese American National Museum’s new Toshizo Watanabe Democracy Fellowship to promote global democracy and strengthen U.S.-Japan ties. Beginning with an eight-person pilot program this summer, this new Fellowship is designed to provide opportunities for Japan’s future leaders to experience the United States, network with Japanese leaders and others who seek to strengthen democracy and the bilateral relationship and develop a cohort of up-and-coming professionals who have to promise to become advocates for stable and secure democracies in the years ahead.

We applaud the efforts of the U.S.-Japan Council’s exchange program of local high school students and leadership/professionals for Maui reconstruction. We also welcome Japan’s intention to broaden the scope of the invitation program for Japanese American leaders to raise their next generation.

Promoting Exchanges among Professionals: We welcomed the initiative of the Japan Foundation that is promoting exchanges among professionals and practitioners addressing common issues facing the Indo-Pacific region, such as climate change and disaster management, and we look forward to further development in the future. The two leaders also welcomed the establishment of the Mansfield Professor of Japanese and Indo-Pacific affairs.

Women, Peace and Security (WPS):  The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Parliamentarians’ Network Japan hosted U.S. WPS Caucus Member Rep. Sydney Kamlager-Dove and Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues Geeta Rao Gupta on April 3-4 for a legislative exchange to reaffirm our shared commitment to promote WPS globally.

Increasing Exchange Opportunities for Japanese Language Specialists in the United States:   The United States and Japan signed a memorandum of cooperation to expand exchange opportunities for Japanese language specialists to observe U.S. institutions and methods in the United States and share their specialized knowledge of Japanese language education with U.S. colleagues. We also emphasize the value of in-person learning for Japanese language in the U.S. and welcome efforts to expand the Japanese Language Education Assistant Program (J-LEAP).

Enhancing Cultural and Educational Interchange: The United States and Japan reaffirmed their confidence in the role of the U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (CULCON) in further enhancing people-to-people ties. The United States and Japan also welcomed the inaugural U.S.-Japan High Level Policy Dialogue on Education and instruct the respective departments and ministries to accelerate the preparation of the second dialogue to examine and follow up on the issues raised above. We also acknowledge the importance of cultural exchanges including through promoting creative and cultural content industries such as in music, movies, animation and manga.

Strengthening Tourism Ties:   To coincide with the U.S.-Japan Tourism Year, Airbnb has announced it will commit $1 million to an International Visitors Leadership Program to bring Japanese tourism professionals to the United States to study best practices on rural tourism and support local economies in each nation.

The United States also welcomes Japan’s intention to support the National Park Service as it begins a multi-year rehabilitation project around the Tidal Basin and West Potomac Park. Each year, millions of visitors from around the United States and indeed the world visit the National Mall for the Cherry Blossom Festival.  These cherry trees, first gifted by the people of Japan to the United States in 1912, are an enduring reminder of the close bonds of friendship between Americans and Japanese.

Expanding Global Entry Program : The United States welcomes Japan’s expected full membership this year in Customs and Border Protection’s Global Entry program, a Trusted Traveler Program that allows expedited clearance for pre-approved, low-risk travelers upon arrival at U.S. airports. Japan’s full inclusion in Global Entry provides opportunity to bolster our countries’ security while facilitating travel and commerce between our nations.

Strengthening the Resilience of Democracy : President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida welcomed the launch of the U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue of Democratic Resilience and reaffirmed their commitment through the second round of the Strategic Dialogue on March 8, 2024.

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• Security Council

Press Statement on Humanitarian Workers and Threat of Famine in Gaza

The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Vanessa Frazier (Malta):

The members of the Security Council expressed grave concern over the Israeli air strikes that killed seven team members of the World Central Kitchen.  These horrific attacks brought the number of humanitarian personnel killed in Gaza during the ongoing conflict to at least 224, more than three times as many humanitarian aid workers killed in any single conflict recorded in a single year.  The members of the Security Council underlined the need for accountability for all of these incidents, and noted that Israel has announced the initial results of an investigation into the incident of 1 April 2024.  They stressed the need for a full, transparent and comprehensive investigation into the incident, that is fully publicized.

The members of the Security Council expressed sincere condolences to the relatives and friends of all who had lost their lives since the start of hostilities on 7 October 2023.

The members of the Security Council also demanded that all parties to the conflict fully respect the protected status of humanitarian workers, facilities, and operations under international law, abide by humanitarian notification and deconfliction mechanisms, and immediately remediate any deficiencies in these mechanisms.

The members of the Security Council recognized the outstanding and admirable efforts of all humanitarian, medical and United Nations workers serving in Gaza and acknowledged the extremely difficult and dangerous conditions under which they are operating, as well as the tremendous courage they continued to demonstrate in pursuing their lifesaving mission.

The members of the Security Council reiterated their deep concern over the human toll of the conflict, the catastrophic humanitarian situation, and the threat of imminent famine in Gaza and called for the immediate lifting of all barriers to the delivery of humanitarian aid at scale to the civilian population and to the unhindered distribution of such assistance.  They took note of the announcement by Israel to open the Erez crossing and allow the use of the Ashdod port for aid deliveries into Gaza, but stressed that more should be done to bring the required relief given the scale of needs in Gaza.  Council members insisted on the need to immediately and fully implement this decision in a sustained manner, and reiterated their demand to the parties to allow, facilitate and enable the immediate, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance at scale directly to the Palestinian civilian population throughout the Gaza Strip, consistent with resolution 2720 (2023).

The members of the Security Council called for full respect of international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law.  They underlined their demands for an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan respected by all parties leading to a lasting sustainable ceasefire, and for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, as well as ensuring humanitarian access to address their medical and other humanitarian needs, and for the parties to comply with their obligations under international law in relation to all persons they detain, in line with resolution 2728 (2024).

The members of the Security Council further reiterated their full support for the work of Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator for Gaza, in line with resolution 2720 (2023).  They also underlined their support for the lifesaving efforts of all UN personnel and agencies, including the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), that are working to deliver humanitarian assistance to civilians in Gaza.

The members of the Security Council condemned all violence and hostilities against civilians, and all acts of terrorism.  They emphasized the imperative of all parties immediately and fully implementing resolutions 2728 (2024), 2720 and 2712 (2023).

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Compromise of Sisense Customer Data

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