why assignment of claims

31 U.S. Code § 3727 - Assignments of claims

In subsection (a)(1), the words “or share thereof” and “whether absolute or conditional, and whatever may be the consideration therefor” are omitted as surplus. In clause (2), the word “authorization” is substituted for “powers of attorney, orders, or other authorities” to eliminate unnecessary words.

In subsections (b) and (c), the word “official” is substituted for “officer” for consistency in the revised title and with other titles of the United States Code.

In subsection (b), the words “Except as hereinafter provided” are omitted as unnecessary. The words “read and” are omitted as surplus. The words “to the person acknowledging the same” are omitted as unnecessary. The text of 31:203(1st par. last sentence) is omitted as superseded by 39:410. The words “Notwithstanding any law to the contrary governing the validity of assignments ” and the text of 31:203(last par.) are omitted as unnecessary.

In subsection (c), before clause (1), the words “bank, trust company, or other . . . including any Federal lending agency” are omitted as surplus. The words “of money due or to become due under a contract providing for payments totaling at least $1,000” are substituted for “in any case in which the moneys due or to become due from the United States or from any agency or department thereof, under a contract providing for payments aggregating $1,000 or more” to eliminate unnecessary words. The text of 31:203(2d par. proviso cl. 1) is omitted as executed. In clause (1), the words “in the case of any contract entered into after October 9, 1940 ” are omitted as executed. In clause (2)(A), the words “payable under such contract” are omitted as surplus. In clause (3), the words “true” and “instrument of” are omitted as surplus. The words “department or” are omitted because of the restatement. The words “if any” and “to make payment” are omitted as surplus.

In subsection (d), before clause (1), the words “During a war or national emergency proclaimed by the President or declared by law and ended by proclamation or law” are substituted for “in time of war or national emergency proclaimed by the President (including the national emergency proclaimed December 16, 1950 ) or by Act or joint resolution of the Congress and until such war or national emergency has been terminated in such manner” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “ Department of Energy (when carrying out duties and powers formerly carried out by the Atomic Energy Commission)” are substituted for “Atomic Energy Commission” (which was reconstituted as the Energy Research and Development Administration by 42:5813 and 5814) because of 42:7151(a) and 7293. The words “other department or . . . of the United States . . . except any such contract under which full payment has been made” and “of any moneys due or to become due under such contract” before “shall not be subject” are omitted as surplus. The words “A payment subsequently due under the contract (even after the war or emergency is ended) shall be paid to the assignee without” are substituted for “and if such provision or one to the same general effect has been at any time heretofore or is hereafter included or inserted in any such contract, payments to be made thereafter to an assignee of any moneys due or to become due under such contract, whether during or after such war or emergency . . . hereafter” to eliminate unnecessary words. The words “of any nature” are omitted as surplus. In clause (1), the words “or any department or agency thereof” are omitted as unnecessary. In clause (2), the words “under any renegotiation statute or under any statutory renegotiation article in the contract” are omitted as surplus.

Subsection (e)(1) is substituted for 31:203(4th par.) to eliminate unnecessary words.

In subsection (e)(2), the words “person receiving an amount under an assignment or allotment” are substituted for “assignees, transferees, or allottees” for clarity and consistency. The words “or to others for them” and “with respect to such assignments , transfers, or allotments or the use of such moneys” are omitted as surplus. The words “person making the assignment or allotment” are substituted for “assignors, transferors, or allotters” for clarity and consistency.

Assignment of claims

An untraditional approach to combining the claims of plaintiffs; how it differs from class actions, joinder, consolidation, relation and coordination

A large class of plaintiffs engages you to bring a common action against a defendant or set of defendants. As counsel, you resolve to combine the plaintiffs’ various claims into a single lawsuit. In this article, we touch on some of the traditional approaches, such as a class action, joinder, consolidation, relation, and coordination. To that list, we add as an approach the assignment of claims, a procedural vehicle validated by the United States Supreme Court, but not typically employed to combine the claims of numerous plaintiffs.

Class actions

In Hansberry v. Lee (1940) 311 U.S. 32, the United States Supreme Court explained that “[t]he class suit was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of those interested in the subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable. Courts are not infrequently called upon to proceed with causes in which the number of those interested in the litigation is so great as to make difficult or impossible the joinder of all because some are not within the jurisdiction or because their whereabouts is unknown or where if all were made parties to the suit its continued abatement by the death of some would prevent or unduly delay a decree. In such cases where the interests of those not joined are of the same class as the interests of those who are, and where it is considered that the latter fairly represent the former in the prosecution of the litigation of the issues in which all have a common interest, the court will proceed to a decree.” ( Id. at pp. 41-42.)

In California’s state courts, class actions are authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 382, which applies when the issue is “‘one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.’” ( Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 968; see also, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.760-3.771.) “The party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” ( Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) “The community of interest requirement involves three factors: ‘(1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.’” ( Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435; see Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq. [Consumers Legal Remedies Act]; cf. Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 23(a) [prerequisites for federal class action].)

Parties, acting as co-plaintiffs, can also obtain economies of scale by joining their claims in a single lawsuit. Under California’s permissive joinder statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 378 (section 378), individuals may join in one action as plaintiffs if the following conditions are met:

(a)(1) They assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action; or

(2) They have a claim, right, or interest adverse to the defendant in the property or controversy which is the subject of the action.

(b) It is not necessary that each plaintiff be interested as to every cause of action or as to all relief prayed for. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective right to relief.

This strategy of joining multiple persons in one action has been referred to as a “mass action” in some decisions involving numerous plaintiffs. (See Aghaji v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1113; Petersen v. Bank of America Corp . (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 238, 240 ( Petersen ); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B) [federal definition of “mass action”].)

In Petersen , for example, 965 plaintiffs who borrowed money from Countrywide Financial Corporation in the mid-2000’s banded together and filed a single lawsuit against Countrywide and related entities. ( Petersen , supra , 232 Cal.App.4th at pp.  242-243.) The plaintiffs alleged Countrywide had developed a strategy to increase its profits by misrepresenting the loan terms and using captive real estate appraisers to provide dishonest appraisals that inflated home prices and induced borrowers to take loans Countrywide knew they could not afford. ( Id. at p. 241.) The plaintiffs alleged Countrywide had no intent to keep these loans, but to bundle and sell them on the secondary market to unsuspecting investors who would bear the risk the borrowers could not repay. ( Id. at pp. 241, 245.) Countrywide and the related defendants demurred on the ground of misjoinder of the plaintiffs in violation of section 378. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed all plaintiffs except the one whose name appeared first in the caption. ( Id . at p. 247.) The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings. ( Id . at p. 256.)

Petersen resolved two questions. First, it concluded the operative pleading alleged wrongs arising out of “‘the same . . . series of transactions’” that would entail litigation of at least one common question of law or fact. ( Petersen, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 241.) The appellate court noted the individual damages among the 965 plaintiffs would vary widely, but the question of liability provided a basis for joining the claims in a single action. ( Id. at p. 253.) Second, the appellate court concluded “California’s procedures governing permissive joinder are up to the task of managing mass actions like this one.” ( Id. at p. 242.)

Consolidation

Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (a) provides that, “[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (See also Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 42.)

There are two types of consolidation. The first is a consolidation for purposes of trial only, when the actions remain otherwise separate. The second is a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, when the actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment. ( Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147 ( Hamilton ).)

Consolidation is designed to promote trial convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to the various actions. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleadings, § 341, p. 470.) Unless all parties in the involved cases stipulate, consolidation requires a written, noticed motion (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.350(a); Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing Cases (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 514), and is subject to the trial court’s discretion. ( Hamilton, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1147.)

In a procedure somewhat similar to consolidation, under California Rules of Court, rule 3.300(a), a pending civil action may be related to other civil actions (whether still pending or already resolved by dismissal or judgment) if the matters “[a]rise from the same or substantially identical transactions, incidents, or events requiring the determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law or fact” or “[a]re likely for other reasons to require substantial duplication of judicial resources if heard by different judges.” ( Id. , rule 3.300(a)(2), (4).) An order to relate cases may be made only after service of a notice on all parties that identifies the potentially related cases. No written motion is required. ( Id ., rule 3.300(h)(1).) The Judicial Council provides a standard form for this purpose. When a trial court agrees the cases listed in the notice are related, all are typically assigned to the trial judge in whose department the first case was filed. ( Id ., rule 3.300(h)(1)(A).)

Related cases are not consolidated cases. Related cases maintain their separate identities but are heard by the same trial judge. Consolidated cases, in contrast, essentially merge and proceed under a single case number.

Coordination

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 404, the Chairperson of the Judicial Council is authorized to coordinate actions filed in different courts that share common questions of fact or law. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.500 et seq.) The principles underlying coordination are similar to those that govern consolidation of actions filed in a single court. (See Pesses v. Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 117, 123; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407 [complex and multidistrict litigation].)

Thus, for example, in McGhan Med. Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 804 ( McGhan ), the plaintiffs petitioned for coordination of 300 to 600 breast implant cases pending in 20 different counties. Coordination was denied because the motion judge found that common questions did not predominate “in that the cases involve[d] different implants, different designs, different warnings, different defendants, different theories of defect, different modes of failure, and different injuries.” ( Id. at p. 808.) Among other factors, the trial court concluded that it was impractical to send hundreds of cases to a single county and that the benefits of coordination could be best achieved by voluntary cooperation among the judges in the counties where the cases were pending. ( Id. at p. 808, fn. 2.)

The Court of Appeal reversed in an interlocutory proceeding, ruling the trial court had misconceived the requirements of a coordinated proceeding. ( McGhan, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 811.) As the appellate court explained, Code of Civil Procedure section 404.7 gives the Judicial Council great flexibility and broad discretion over the procedure in coordinated actions. ( Id. at p. 812.) Thus, on balance, the coordinating judge would be better off confronting the coordination drawbacks (including difficulties arising from unique cases, discovery difficulties, multiple trials, the necessity of travel, and occasional delay) because the likely benefits (efficient discovery and motion practice) were so much greater. ( Id. at pp. 812-814.)

Civil Code section 954 states “[a] thing in action, arising out of the violation of a right of property, or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner.” The term “thing in action” means “a right to recover money or other personal property by a judicial proceeding.” (Civ. Code, § 953.) California’s Supreme Court has summarized these provisions by stating: “A cause of action is transferable, that is, assignable, by its owner if it arises out of a legal obligation or a violation of a property right. . . .” ( Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1003.) The enactment of Civil Code sections 953 and 954 lifted many restrictions on assignability of causes of action. ( Wikstrom v. Yolo Fliers Club (1929) 206 Cal. 461, 464; AMCO Ins. Co. v. All Solutions Ins. Agency, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 883, 891 ( AMCO ).)

Thus, California’s statutes establish the general rule that causes of action are assignable. ( AMCO, supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 891-892.) This general rule of assignability applies to causes of action arising out of a wrong involving injury to personal or real property. ( Time Out, LLC v. Youabian, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1009; see also, e.g., Bush v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1381 [“‘assignability of things [in action] is now the rule; nonassignability, the exception. . .’”].)

Although the assignment of claims on behalf of others to an assignee, or group of assignees, is not unique, it has not typically been used as a procedural vehicle for combining the claims of numerous plaintiffs. But, that’s not to say it can’t be done.

In fact, the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned such an approach. In Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc. (2008) 554 U.S. 269 ( Sprint ), approximately 1,400 payphone operators assigned legal title to their claims for amounts due from Sprint, AT&T, and other long-distance carriers to a group of collection firms described as “aggregators.” ( Id. at p. 272.) The legal issue presented to the United States Supreme Court was whether the assignees had standing to pursue the claims in federal court even though they had promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor. ( Id . at p. 271.) The Court concluded the assignees had standing.

In support of its conclusion, the Court recognized the long-standing right to assign lawsuits:

. . . [C]ourts have long found ways to allow assignees to bring suit; that where assignment is at issue, courts — both before and after the founding — have always permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and that there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection. We find this history and precedent ‘well nigh conclusive’ in respect to the issue before us: Lawsuits by assignees, including assignees for collection only, are ‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’

( Sprint , supra , 554 U.S . at p. 285.)

On this basis, the Court concluded:

Petitioners have not offered any convincing reason why we should depart from the historical tradition of suits by assignees, including assignees for collection. In any event, we find that the assignees before us satisfy the Article III standing requirements articulated in more modern decisions of this Court.

( Sprint , supra , 554 U.S at pp. 285-286.)

The Court also considered the argument that the aggregators were attempting to circumvent the class-action requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. ( Sprint, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 290-291.) The Court rejected this argument as a barrier to aggregation by assignment on the grounds that (1) class actions were permissive, not mandatory, and (2) “class actions constitute but one of several methods for bringing about aggregation of claims, i.e., they are but one of several methods by which multiple similarly situated parties get similar claims resolved at one time and in one federal forum. [Citations.]” ( Id. at p. 291.)

Granted, Sprint arose in the context of Article III, a “prudential standing” analysis. However, in reaching its decision that assignees had standing, the Court relied significantly on three California state decisions addressing assignment of rights under California law. (See Sprint, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 294-296.)

Under California law, assignment of claims is not a panacea. Not all claims can be assigned. In California, assignment is not allowed for tort causes of action based on “wrongs done to the person, the reputation or the feelings of an injured party,” including “causes of action for slander, assault and battery, negligent personal injuries, seduction, breach of marriage promise, and malicious prosecution.” ( AMCO, supra , 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 892 [exceptions to assignment also include “legal malpractice claims and certain types of fraud claims”].) Other assignments are statutorily prohibited. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, § 2985.1 [regulating assignment of real property sales contracts]; Gov. Code, § 8880.325 [state lottery prizes not assignable].)

Likewise, because a right of action cannot be split, a partial assignment will require the joinder of the partial assignor as an indispensable party. (See, e.g., Bank of the Orient v. Superior Court (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 588, 595 [“[W]here . . . there has been a partial assignment all parties claiming an interest in the assignment must be joined as plaintiffs . . . ”]; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Pleadings, § 131(2), p. 198 [“If the assignor has made only a partial assignment, the assignor remains beneficially interested in the claim and the assignee cannot sue alone”].)

That said, California’s rules of law regarding standing and assignments do not prohibit an assignee’s aggregation of a large number of claims against a single defendant or multiple defendants into a single lawsuit. To the contrary, no limitations or conditions on this type of aggregation of assigned claims is imposed from other rules of law, such as California’s compulsory joinder statute. (See Sprint , supra , 554 U.S. at p. 292 [to address practical problems that might arise because aggregators, not payphone operators, were suing, district “court might grant a motion to join the payphone operators to the case as ‘required’ parties” under Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule 19].)

There are many procedural approaches to evaluate when seeking to combine the claims of multiple plaintiffs. Class actions and joinders are more traditional methods that trial counsel rely on to bring claims together. Although a largely unexplored procedural approach, assignment appears to be an expedient way of combining the claims of numerous plaintiffs. It avoids the legal requirements imposed for class actions and joinders, and it sidesteps a trial judge’s discretion regarding whether to consolidate, relate, or coordinate actions. Indeed, under the right circumstances, an assignment of claims might provide a means of bypassing class action waivers in arbitration agreements. Perhaps an assignment of claims should be added to the mix of considerations when deciding how to bring a case involving numerous plaintiffs with similar claims against a common defendant or set of defendants.

Judith Posner

Judith Posner is an attorney at Benedon & Serlin, LLP , a boutique appellate law firm.

Gerald Serlin

Gerald Serlin is an attorney at Benedon & Serlin, LLP , a boutique appellate law firm.

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What Is an Assignment of Claims?

An assignment of claims is a legal and financial process that allows one party to transfer or “assign” a claim to someone else, provided that the other party is in full knowledge of the assignment and agrees to it. In this process, the party that transfers the claim is called the assignor, and the party to whom the claim is transferred is called the assignee. Essentially, this situation entitles the assignee to the rights previously held by the assignor, according to the claim or contract. The assignment of claims, however, may also involve transference of some liabilities and legal responsibilities to the assignee.

There are many situations wherein assignment of claims can be applicable, such as in insurance claims , bankruptcies, and damages to compensate for an accident or injury. In the US, companies abide by the “Assignment of Claims Act of 1940” to carry out an assignment of claim when a contract between the said company and a client expires or is about to expire. One condition under the act is that there is a sum of $1,000 US Dollars or higher involved in the contract; if the sum is lower than that, then an assignment may not be able to push through.

The company may only assign the claim to an assignee of a “financing institution,” like banks, government-funded lending agencies, or trust companies or corporations. This condition ensures that the assignee is able to take on the responsibilities involving the claim, especially for financial aspects. The existing contract between the assignor and another party should also not state any problem with assigning the claim to a new assignee; otherwise, the party with whom the assignor has a contract can sue the assignor for contract violation. Another condition would be that the assignor can only assign the claim to only one assignee, and that the latter cannot transfer the claim to another party.

Many cases require that the assignment be formally filed, especially when it involves property of high value, such as a huge sum or money, land, or forms of collateral . Generally, the courts do not have to investigate why an assignment was filed, but require the filing primarily for documentation purposes. In this process, another contract should be drawn up, stating that the claim will be transferred from the assignor to the assignee. Once the contract is agreed to and the two parties have willingly signed the contract, the assignment of claims is complete and a novation takes place, making the assignee the new claim holder.

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Post-Loss Assignments of Claims Under Insurance Policies

In the settlement of lawsuits involving insured claims, it is not uncommon that one condition of the settlement is that the defendant assign his or her claims under all applicable insurance policies to the party that filed suit.

Indeed, it is frequently the case that the defendant, particularly when the defendant is an individual, has a limited ability to pay a judgment and insurance coverage offers the best opportunity for a recovery by the suing party. Usually, such settlements are made without any serious thought being given to whether the defendant’s claim against its insurer is assignable; the assumption being that it is assignable.

However, insurance policies generally have anti-assignment clauses which prohibit the assignment of the policy, or an interest in the policy, without the insurer’s consent. These clauses come into play in determining the validity or enforceability of the assignment of a claim under an insurance policy and should be considered when such an assignment is part of a settlement.

When considering the enforceability of anti-assignment clauses in insurance policies, the courts generally draw a distinction between an assignment made prior to the occurrence of a covered loss (a “pre-loss” assignment) and an assignment made after the occurrence of a covered loss (a “post-loss” assignment).

In analyzing pre-loss assignments, the courts recognize that requiring an insurer to provide coverage to an assignee of its policy prior to the occurrence of a covered loss would place the insurer in the position of covering a party with whom it had not contracted nor been allowed to properly underwrite to assess the risks posed by that potential insured, and, accordingly, determine the appropriate premium to charge for the risks being undertaken or choose to decline coverage.

Post-loss assignments, on the other hand, take place after the insurer’s obligations under its policy have become fixed by the occurrence of a covered loss, thus the risk factors applicable to the assignee are irrelevant with regard to the covered loss in question. For these reasons, the majority of the courts enforce anti-assignment clauses to prohibit or restrict pre-loss assignments, but refuse to enforce anti-assignment clauses to prohibit or restrict post-loss assignments.

Katrina Cases

The Louisiana Supreme Court, which had not previously addressed the enforceability of anti-assignment clauses for post-loss assignments, was recently confronted with this issue in the In re: Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, litigation involving consolidated cases arising out of Hurricane Katrina. The issue arose as a result of a lawsuit brought by the State of Louisiana as the assignee of claims under numerous insurance policies as part of the “Road Home” Program. The Road Home Program was set up following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to distribute federal funds to homeowners suffering damage from the hurricanes. In return for receiving a grant of up to $150,000, homeowners were required to execute a Limited Subrogation/Assignment agreement, which provided in pertinent part:

Pursuant to these Limited Subrogation/Assignments, the State of Louisiana brought suit against more than 200 insurance companies to recover funds dispensed under the Road Home Program. The suit was removed to Federal Court under the Class Action Fairness Act and the insurers filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the assignments to the State of Louisiana were invalid under the anti-assignment clauses in the homeowner policies at issue.

On appeal, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the following question to the Louisiana Supreme Court: “Does an anti-assignment clause in a homeowner’s insurance policy, which by its plain terms purports to bar any assignment of the policy or an interest therein without the insurer’s consent, bar an insured’s post-loss assignment of the insured’s claims under the policy when such an assignment transfers contractual obligations, not just the right to money due?”

In answering this question, the Louisiana Supreme Court began by noting that, as a general matter, contractual rights are assignable unless the law, the contract terms or the nature of the contract preclude assignment. Specific to the certified question, Louisiana Civil Code article 2653 provides that a right “cannot be assigned when the contract from which it arises prohibits the assignment of that right.” The Louisiana Supreme Court observed that the language of article 2653 is broad and, on its face, applies to all assignments, including post-loss assignments of insurance claims. The Court, therefore, construed the issue confronting it as whether Louisiana public policy would enforce an anti-assignment clause to preclude post-loss assignments of claims under insurance policies.

In addressing the public policy question, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the distinction between pre-loss assignments and post-loss assignments discussed by courts from other states and noted that the prevailing view was that anti-assignment clauses were invalid and/or unenforceable when applied to post-loss assignments. Notwithstanding this weight of authority, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:

“[W]hile the Louisiana legislature has clearly indicated an intent to allow parties freedom to assign contractual rights, by enacting La. C.C. art. 2653, it has also clearly indicated an intent to allow parties freedom to contractually prohibit assignment of rights. We recognize the vast amount of national jurisprudence distinguishing between pre-loss and post-loss assignments and rejecting restrictions on post-loss assignments, however we find no public policy in Louisiana favoring assignability of claims over freedom of contract.”

Thus, Court refused to invalidate the enforceability of the anti-assignment clauses to the post-loss assignments before it based on public policy, adding that public policy determinations are better suited to the legislature.

Nonetheless, after having recognized the general enforceability of anti-assignment clauses to post-loss assignments, the Court immediately placed limits on when those clauses would be applicable, stating that to be applicable, they “must clearly and unambiguously express that the non-assignment clause applies to post-loss assignments.” The Court refused “to formulate a test consisting of specific terms or words,” which would satisfy this condition and remanded the case to the federal courts to determine whether the individual anti-assignment clauses in the various policies were sufficiently clear and explicit to be enforced with respect to post-loss assignments at issue.

A Broad Application

It should be noted that the Court’s opinion appears to apply broadly to all post-loss assignments irrespective of what specific rights are being assigned, despite the fact that the certified question was narrower and asked only about the applicability of a post-loss assignment where the assignment “transfers contractual obligations, not just the right to money due.”

In a footnote at the beginning of its opinion, the Louisiana Supreme Court observed that in certifying the question to it, the Fifth Circuit “disclaimed any intent” that the Court “confine its reply to the precise form or scope of the legal questions certified.” The footnote indicates that the Court’s opinion was not intended to be limited to only those post-loss assignments involving the assignment of contractual obligations.

Louisiana has departed from the majority view in holding that as a matter of general law, anti-assignment clauses are not inherently void with regard to post-loss assignments. However, it may be that in practical application, the results of individual cases may well be consistent with the majority rule of not enforcing anti-assignment clauses with regard to post-loss assignments because Louisiana courts may be reluctant to find that the anti-assignment clauses are sufficiently “clear and explicit” unless they specifically state that they apply to post-loss assignments, notwithstanding the Louisiana Supreme Court’s unwillingness to “formulate a test consisting of specific terms or words.”

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Assignment of claims: Are there any constraints to assigning claims or seeking cost guarantees?

June 18, 2019 > > Litigation & Dispute Resolution

IR Global | View firm profile

The following article discusses session three in the IR Global Virtual Series on 'Litigation Funding: Handling commercial and financial disputes

Germany – FW The assignment of claims to a third party for the purpose of their recovery is allowed without further ado, if the assignee bears the full financial risk of recovering the claims and acts for his own account (e.g. factoring).

If an assignee collects debts for the account of the assignor and if the debt collection is conducted as a stand-alone business, this is considered a collection service (Inkassodienstleistung) under the Legal Services Act (Rechtsdienstleistungsgesetz).

Pursuant to the latter, persons who provide such collection services (collection service providers) have to seek the permission of competent authorities and have to be registered with the Legal Services Register (Rechtsdienstleistungsregister). The assignment of claims to a collection service provider which is not registered is null and void; the unauthorised collection service provider lacks the capacity to sue.

With regard to certain types of litigation, e.g. consumer actions, the assignment of claims (to registered collection service providers) is common. In general, such assignments appear reasonable to pool small claims in order to benefit from synergy effects and to create a certain ‘balance of power’ vis-à-vis more financially powerful counter-parties. With regard to bigger claims, however, litigation funding will usually be the better, or even only, option to get financial support from third parties.

Spain – DJ The situation is similar in Spain, because the Spanish civil courts were inspired by the Napoleonic French Code. A lot of opportunistic funds arrived in Spain following the economic crisis, to buy bad credits and assets from banks. This has led to a lot of assignments of claims and the courts have established that they are valid and enforceable.

France – MCC Contractual assignment of claims is valid under French law with a condition and a limit. As a condition, the claim has to be fundamentally legitimate and conform to the public order. The debtor’s consent is not required unless the right was provided to be non-assignable.

Unless the debtor has already agreed to it, the assignment may be set up against him only if it was previously served to him by a Bailiff, or he has acknowledged it. The debtor may set up against the assignee defences inherent to the debt itself, such as nullity, the defence of non-performance, termination or the right to set off related debts.

He may also set up defences which arose from the relations with the assignor before the assignment became enforceable against him, such as the grant of a deferral, the release of a debt, or the set-off of debts which are not related. The assignor and the assignee are jointly and severally liable for any additional costs arising from the assignment which the debtor did not have to advance. Subject to any contractual term to the contrary, the burden of these costs lies on the assignee.

As a limit, if the claim subject to assignment is litigious, the debtor may obtain a release from the assignee by reimbursing him the actual price paid for the assignment, plus costs and reasonable expenses, plus interest calculated from the date on which the assignee paid the price of the assignment made to him. The claim then disappears.

Because of this rule called ‘retrait litigieux’, assignees have to be very careful and research what happened before the assignment.

US – ES There is no prohibition in the US against assigning a claim, or part of a claim, to a third party, but, of course, any third party taking an assignment of all or part of the claim is subject to all potential offsets and defences that exist against the primary holder of the claim.

Assigning claims is done fairly often, mostly in the intellectual property patent world. Patent trolls are big in the US, buying up patent claims and aggressively litigating and pursuing those claims.

Sweden – DE Almost any claim can be assigned in Sweden, the main rule is that the original claimant must have initiated a lawful claim, then it can be assigned. Claims based on unlawful contracts (Pactum Turpe) can neither be enforced by the first holder of the claim, nor its successor. Apart from that, there are no restrictions of any kind, or any constraints to assigned claims.

As far as cost guarantees are concerned, we have the same situation as any other European country in that EU citizens or companies founded in another country within the EU cannot be forced to provide a guarantee for legal costs in litigation proceedings in Sweden.

The same applies for claimants in a country that has entered into an international agreement with Sweden, such as The Hague Convention.

Austria – KO If you are representing a client from outside the EU, the opponent may ask the court to order a cost deposit covering all the procedural costs of the defendant.

US – ES Is there a limit on that?

Austria – KO No, if you have a multi million-dollar dispute, your client pays the court fees of 1.2 per cent, plus also the estimated court-related fees including legal fees for the defendant. The policy is clear – if someone is suing us from somewhere in the world and we, as a defendant in Austria, end up winning the case, we might not be able to enforce our cost award against this claimant. As a result, there is an interest of security deposit which has to be paid upon request by a claimant outside the EU.

US – ES Do you find that a successful application by a defendant to require a large security deposit will often end a case?

Austria – KO Yes, it’s one of the best strategies to fend off a claimant or to make them reduce the claim, and a common strategy for the defendant’s lawyer to ask for a huge security deposit. It’s at the discretion of the judge, but overall you will have to deposit a huge amount of money to get the case going. There is discussion going on about legislation to reduce that, but there are two interests to be weighed against each other.

It’s another argument for why third-party funding can be crucial to get cases going.

As to assignments, one single action containing several claims is permitted if the claims get assigned to another legal entity; such legal entity acts as the sole claimant if the claims rely on the same or similar legal and factual basis. The concept has been approved by the Supreme Court.

Hong Kong – NG An order for security for costs in litigation offers protection to a party from the risk of their opponent not being able to pay the party’s litigation costs if ordered to do so.

Applications for security for costs are a common feature of civil litigation before the first-instance courts in Hong Kong. Sometimes liability for security for costs and the amount can be agreed between the parties. As for the form of the security for costs, the most common method to give security is to make a payment into court. Other methods included an undertaking to pay, a bond, a bank guarantee or a charge.

Despite their abolition in some other common law jurisdictions, the crimes and torts of maintenance and champerty are still part of Hong Kong law. Third party funding is considered to infringe the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, so it is not generally permitted for litigation in the Hong Kong courts (except for specific cases).

Litigation funding is allowed in some insolvency cases, because debtors often siphon away assets when insolvent, yet liquidators or trustees in bankruptcy often find themselves without sufficient funds to recover assets or pursue other legitimate claims in the name of the debtor.

In light of this, the Hong Kong law has accepted litigation funding arrangements as a legitimate practice in liquidation proceedings. Such arrangements may include the sale and assignment by a liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy, of an action commenced in the bankruptcy, to a purchaser for value.

As far as arbitration is concerned, the Arbitration Ordinance or AO (Cap. 609) has recently been amended, such that the common law tort and offence of champerty and maintenance no longer apply to third party funding of arbitration and mediation.

Under the AO, a Code of Practice sets out the standards with which third party funders are ordinarily expected to comply in connection with arbitration funding. It states the requirements for funding agreements, the minimum amount of capital a third-party funder is required to have, the procedure for addressing conflicts of interest and whether third party funders will be liable to funded parties for adverse costs.

Contributors

Klaus Oblin (KO) Oblin Melichar – Austria www.irglobal.com/advisor/dr-klaus-oblin

Marie-Christine Cimadevilla (MCC) Cimadevilla Avocats – France www.irglobal.com/advisor/marie-christine-cimadevilla

Daniel Jimenez (DJ) SLJ Abogados – Spain www.irglobal.com/advisor/daniel-jimenez

Erwin Shustak (ES) Shustak Reynolds & Partners – US – California www.irglobal.com/advisor/erwin-shustak

Nick Gall (NG) Gall Solicitors – Hong Kong www.irglobal.com/advisor/nick-gall

Dan Engström (DE) Advokatfirman Nova AB – Sweden www.irglobal.com/advisor/dan-engstrom

Florian Wettner (FW) METIS Rechtsanwälte – Germany www.irglobal.com/advisor/florian-wettner

More from IR Global

When Assigning the Right to Pursue Relief, Always Remember to Assign Title to, Or Ownership in, The Claim

• Posted on: Oct 4 2016

Whether a party has standing to bring a lawsuit is often considered through the constitutional lens of justiciability – that is, whether there is a “case or controversy” between the plaintiff and the defendant “within the meaning of Art. III.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To have Article III standing, “the plaintiff [must have] ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant [its] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on [its] behalf.” Id. at 498–99 (quoting Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).

To show a personal stake in the litigation, the plaintiff must establish three things: First, he/she has sustained an “injury in fact” that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the injury has to be caused in some way by the defendant’s action or omission. Id . Finally, a favorable resolution of the case is “likely” to redress the injury. Id . at 561.

When a person or entity receives an assignment of claims, the question becomes whether he/she can show a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, i.e. , a case and controversy “of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’” Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 285 (2008) (quoting Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 777–78 (2000)).

To assign a claim effectively, the claim’s owner “must manifest an intention to make the assignee the owner of the claim.” Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc. , 106 F.3d 11, 17 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). A would-be assignor need not use any particular language to validly assign its claim “so long as the language manifests [the assignor’s] intention to transfer at least title or ownership , i.e., to accomplish ‘a completed transfer of the entire interest of the assignor in the particular subject of assignment.’” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). An assignor’s grant of, for example, “‘the power to commence and prosecute to final consummation or compromise any suits, actions or proceedings,’” id. at 18 (quoting agreements that were the subject of that appeal), may validly create a power of attorney, but that language would not validly assign a claim, because it does “not purport to transfer title or ownership” of one. Id.

On September 15, 2016, the New York Appellate Division, First Department, issued a decision addressing the foregoing principles holding that one of the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert claims because the assignment of the right to pursue remedies did not constitute the assignment of claims.  Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecom., S.à.r.l. , 2016 NY Slip Op. 06051.

BACKGROUND :

Cortlandt involved four related actions in which the plaintiffs – Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp. (“Cortlandt”), an assignee for collection, and Wilmington Trust Co. (“WTC”), an indenture trustee – sought payment of the principal and interest on notes issued in public offerings. Each action alleged that Hellas Telecommunications, S.a.r.l. and its affiliated entities, the issuer and guarantor of the notes, transferred the proceeds of the notes by means of fraudulent conveyances to two private equity firms, Apax Partners, LLP/TPG Capital, L.P. – the other defendants named in the actions.

The defendants moved to dismiss the actions on numerous grounds, including that Cortlandt, as the assignee for collection, lacked standing to pursue the actions. To cure the claimed standing defect, Cortlandt and WTC moved to amend the complaints to add SPQR Capital (Cayman) Ltd. (“SPQR”), the assignor of note interests to Cortlandt, as a plaintiff. The plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia , SPQR entered into an addendum to the assignment with Cortlandt pursuant to which Cortlandt received “all right, title, and interest” in the notes.

The Motion Court granted the motions to dismiss, holding that, among other things, Cortlandt lacked standing to maintain the actions and that, although the standing defect was not jurisdictional and could be cured, the plaintiffs failed to cure the defect in the proposed amended complaint. Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecom., S.à.r.l. , 47 Misc. 3d 544 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 2014).

The Motion Court’s Ruling

As an initial matter, the Motion Court cited to the reasoning of the court in Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch , No. 12 Civ. 9351 (JPO), 2013 WL 3762882, 2013 US Dist. LEXIS 100741 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2013) (the “SDNY Action”), a related action that was dismissed on standing grounds.  The complaint in the SDNY Action, like the complaints before the Motion Court, alleged that Cortlandt was the assignee of the notes with a “right to collect” the principal and interest due on the notes. As evidence of these rights, Cortlandt produced an assignment, similar to the ones in the New York Supreme Court actions, which provided that as the assignee with the right to collect, Cortlandt could collect the principal and interest due on the notes and pursue all remedies with respect thereto. In dismissing the SDNY Action, Judge Oetken found that the complaint did not allege, and the assignment did not provide, that “title to or ownership of the claims has been assigned to Cortlandt.” 2013 WL 3762882, at *2, 2013 US Dist. LEXIS 100741, at *7. The court also found that the grant of a power of attorney (that is, the power to sue on and collect on a claim) was “not the equivalent of an assignment of ownership” of a claim. 2013 WL 3762882 at *1, 2013 US Dist. LEXIS 100741 at *5. Consequently, because the assignment did not transfer title or ownership of the claim to Cortlandt, there was no case or controversy for the court to decide ( i.e. , Cortlandt could not prove that it had an interest in the outcome of the litigation).

The Motion Court “concur[red] with” Judge Oeken’s decision, holding that “the assignments to Cortlandt … were assignments of a right of collection, not of title to the claims, and are accordingly insufficient as a matter of law to confer standing upon Cortlandt.”  In so holding, the Motion Court observed that although New York does not have an analogue to Article III, it is nevertheless analogous in its requirement that a plaintiff have a stake in the outcome of the litigation:

New York does not have an analogue to article III. However, the New York standards for standing are analogous, as New York requires “[t]he existence of an injury in fact—an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated.”

Under long-standing New York law, an assignee is the “real party in interest” where the “title to the specific claim” is passed to the assignee, even if the assignee may ultimately be liable to another for the amounts collected.

Citations omitted.

Based upon the foregoing, the Motion Court found that Cortlandt lacked standing to pursue the actions.

Cortlandt appealed the dismissal. With regard to the Motion Court’s dismissal of Cortlandt on standing grounds, the First Department affirmed the Motion Court’s ruling, holding:

The [IAS] court correctly found that plaintiff Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp. lacks standing to bring the claims in Index Nos. 651693/10 and 653357/11 because, while the assignments to Cortlandt for the PIK notes granted it “full rights to collect amounts of principal and interest due on the Notes, and to pursue all remedies,” they did not transfer “title or ownership” of the claims.

The Takeaway

Cortlandt limits the ability of an assignee to pursue a lawsuit when the assignee has no direct interest in the outcome of the litigation. By requiring an assignee to have legal title to, or an ownership interest in, the claim, the Court made clear that only a valid assignment of a claim will suffice to fulfill the injury-in-fact requirement. Cortlandt also makes clear that a power of attorney permitting another to conduct litigation on behalf of others as their attorney-in-fact is not a valid assignment and does not confer a legal title to the claims it brings. Therefore, as the title of this article warns: when assigning the right to pursue relief, always remember to assign title to, or ownership in, the claim.

Tagged with: Business Law

• assignments basic law

Assignments: The Basic Law

The assignment of a right or obligation is a common contractual event under the law and the right to assign (or prohibition against assignments) is found in the majority of agreements, leases and business structural documents created in the United States.

As with many terms commonly used, people are familiar with the term but often are not aware or fully aware of what the terms entail. The concept of assignment of rights and obligations is one of those simple concepts with wide ranging ramifications in the contractual and business context and the law imposes severe restrictions on the validity and effect of assignment in many instances. Clear contractual provisions concerning assignments and rights should be in every document and structure created and this article will outline why such drafting is essential for the creation of appropriate and effective contracts and structures.

The reader should first read the article on Limited Liability Entities in the United States and Contracts since the information in those articles will be assumed in this article.

Basic Definitions and Concepts:

An assignment is the transfer of rights held by one party called the “assignor” to another party called the “assignee.” The legal nature of the assignment and the contractual terms of the agreement between the parties determines some additional rights and liabilities that accompany the assignment. The assignment of rights under a contract usually completely transfers the rights to the assignee to receive the benefits accruing under the contract. Ordinarily, the term assignment is limited to the transfer of rights that are intangible, like contractual rights and rights connected with property. Merchants Service Co. v. Small Claims Court , 35 Cal. 2d 109, 113-114 (Cal. 1950).

An assignment will generally be permitted under the law unless there is an express prohibition against assignment in the underlying contract or lease. Where assignments are permitted, the assignor need not consult the other party to the contract but may merely assign the rights at that time. However, an assignment cannot have any adverse effect on the duties of the other party to the contract, nor can it diminish the chance of the other party receiving complete performance. The assignor normally remains liable unless there is an agreement to the contrary by the other party to the contract.

The effect of a valid assignment is to remove privity between the assignor and the obligor and create privity between the obligor and the assignee. Privity is usually defined as a direct and immediate contractual relationship. See Merchants case above.

Further, for the assignment to be effective in most jurisdictions, it must occur in the present. One does not normally assign a future right; the assignment vests immediate rights and obligations.

No specific language is required to create an assignment so long as the assignor makes clear his/her intent to assign identified contractual rights to the assignee. Since expensive litigation can erupt from ambiguous or vague language, obtaining the correct verbiage is vital. An agreement must manifest the intent to transfer rights and can either be oral or in writing and the rights assigned must be certain.

Note that an assignment of an interest is the transfer of some identifiable property, claim, or right from the assignor to the assignee. The assignment operates to transfer to the assignee all of the rights, title, or interest of the assignor in the thing assigned. A transfer of all rights, title, and interests conveys everything that the assignor owned in the thing assigned and the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor. Knott v. McDonald’s Corp ., 985 F. Supp. 1222 (N.D. Cal. 1997)

The parties must intend to effectuate an assignment at the time of the transfer, although no particular language or procedure is necessary. As long ago as the case of National Reserve Co. v. Metropolitan Trust Co ., 17 Cal. 2d 827 (Cal. 1941), the court held that in determining what rights or interests pass under an assignment, the intention of the parties as manifested in the instrument is controlling.

The intent of the parties to an assignment is a question of fact to be derived not only from the instrument executed by the parties but also from the surrounding circumstances. When there is no writing to evidence the intention to transfer some identifiable property, claim, or right, it is necessary to scrutinize the surrounding circumstances and parties’ acts to ascertain their intentions. Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Servs., 295 Ill. App. 3d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998)

The general rule applicable to assignments of choses in action is that an assignment, unless there is a contract to the contrary, carries with it all securities held by the assignor as collateral to the claim and all rights incidental thereto and vests in the assignee the equitable title to such collateral securities and incidental rights. An unqualified assignment of a contract or chose in action, however, with no indication of the intent of the parties, vests in the assignee the assigned contract or chose and all rights and remedies incidental thereto.

More examples: In Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Servs ., 295 Ill. App. 3d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998), the court held that the assignee of a party to a subordination agreement is entitled to the benefits and is subject to the burdens of the agreement. In Florida E. C. R. Co. v. Eno , 99 Fla. 887 (Fla. 1930), the court held that the mere assignment of all sums due in and of itself creates no different or other liability of the owner to the assignee than that which existed from the owner to the assignor.

And note that even though an assignment vests in the assignee all rights, remedies, and contingent benefits which are incidental to the thing assigned, those which are personal to the assignor and for his sole benefit are not assigned. Rasp v. Hidden Valley Lake, Inc ., 519 N.E.2d 153, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). Thus, if the underlying agreement provides that a service can only be provided to X, X cannot assign that right to Y.

Novation Compared to Assignment:

Although the difference between a novation and an assignment may appear narrow, it is an essential one. “Novation is a act whereby one party transfers all its obligations and benefits under a contract to a third party.” In a novation, a third party successfully substitutes the original party as a party to the contract. “When a contract is novated, the other contracting party must be left in the same position he was in prior to the novation being made.”

A sublease is the transfer when a tenant retains some right of reentry onto the leased premises. However, if the tenant transfers the entire leasehold estate, retaining no right of reentry or other reversionary interest, then the transfer is an assignment. The assignor is normally also removed from liability to the landlord only if the landlord consents or allowed that right in the lease. In a sublease, the original tenant is not released from the obligations of the original lease.

Equitable Assignments:

An equitable assignment is one in which one has a future interest and is not valid at law but valid in a court of equity. In National Bank of Republic v. United Sec. Life Ins. & Trust Co. , 17 App. D.C. 112 (D.C. Cir. 1900), the court held that to constitute an equitable assignment of a chose in action, the following has to occur generally: anything said written or done, in pursuance of an agreement and for valuable consideration, or in consideration of an antecedent debt, to place a chose in action or fund out of the control of the owner, and appropriate it to or in favor of another person, amounts to an equitable assignment. Thus, an agreement, between a debtor and a creditor, that the debt shall be paid out of a specific fund going to the debtor may operate as an equitable assignment.

In Egyptian Navigation Co. v. Baker Invs. Corp. , 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30804 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2008), the court stated that an equitable assignment occurs under English law when an assignor, with an intent to transfer his/her right to a chose in action, informs the assignee about the right so transferred.

An executory agreement or a declaration of trust are also equitable assignments if unenforceable as assignments by a court of law but enforceable by a court of equity exercising sound discretion according to the circumstances of the case. Since California combines courts of equity and courts of law, the same court would hear arguments as to whether an equitable assignment had occurred. Quite often, such relief is granted to avoid fraud or unjust enrichment.

Note that obtaining an assignment through fraudulent means invalidates the assignment. Fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters. It vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. Walker v. Rich , 79 Cal. App. 139 (Cal. App. 1926). If an assignment is made with the fraudulent intent to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors, then it is void as fraudulent in fact. See our article on Transfers to Defraud Creditors .

But note that the motives that prompted an assignor to make the transfer will be considered as immaterial and will constitute no defense to an action by the assignee, if an assignment is considered as valid in all other respects.

Enforceability of Assignments:

Whether a right under a contract is capable of being transferred is determined by the law of the place where the contract was entered into. The validity and effect of an assignment is determined by the law of the place of assignment. The validity of an assignment of a contractual right is governed by the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the assignment and the parties.

In some jurisdictions, the traditional conflict of laws rules governing assignments has been rejected and the law of the place having the most significant contacts with the assignment applies. In Downs v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co ., 14 N.Y.2d 266 (N.Y. 1964), a wife and her husband separated and the wife obtained a judgment of separation from the husband in New York. The judgment required the husband to pay a certain yearly sum to the wife. The husband assigned 50 percent of his future salary, wages, and earnings to the wife. The agreement authorized the employer to make such payments to the wife.

After the husband moved from New York, the wife learned that he was employed by an employer in Massachusetts. She sent the proper notice and demanded payment under the agreement. The employer refused and the wife brought an action for enforcement. The court observed that Massachusetts did not prohibit assignment of the husband’s wages. Moreover, Massachusetts law was not controlling because New York had the most significant relationship with the assignment. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the wife.

Therefore, the validity of an assignment is determined by looking to the law of the forum with the most significant relationship to the assignment itself. To determine the applicable law of assignments, the court must look to the law of the state which is most significantly related to the principal issue before it.

Assignment of Contractual Rights:

Generally, the law allows the assignment of a contractual right unless the substitution of rights would materially change the duty of the obligor, materially increase the burden or risk imposed on the obligor by the contract, materially impair the chance of obtaining return performance, or materially reduce the value of the performance to the obligor. Restat 2d of Contracts, § 317(2)(a). This presumes that the underlying agreement is silent on the right to assign.

If the contract specifically precludes assignment, the contractual right is not assignable. Whether a contract is assignable is a matter of contractual intent and one must look to the language used by the parties to discern that intent.

In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, the rights and duties under a bilateral executory contract that does not involve personal skill, trust, or confidence may be assigned without the consent of the other party. But note that an assignment is invalid if it would materially alter the other party’s duties and responsibilities. Once an assignment is effective, the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and assumes all of assignor’s rights. Hence, after a valid assignment, the assignor’s right to performance is extinguished, transferred to assignee, and the assignee possesses the same rights, benefits, and remedies assignor once possessed. Robert Lamb Hart Planners & Architects v. Evergreen, Ltd. , 787 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1992).

On the other hand, an assignee’s right against the obligor is subject to “all of the limitations of the assignor’s right, all defenses thereto, and all set-offs and counterclaims which would have been available against the assignor had there been no assignment, provided that these defenses and set-offs are based on facts existing at the time of the assignment.” See Robert Lamb , case, above.

The power of the contract to restrict assignment is broad. Usually, contractual provisions that restrict assignment of the contract without the consent of the obligor are valid and enforceable, even when there is statutory authorization for the assignment. The restriction of the power to assign is often ineffective unless the restriction is expressly and precisely stated. Anti-assignment clauses are effective only if they contain clear, unambiguous language of prohibition. Anti-assignment clauses protect only the obligor and do not affect the transaction between the assignee and assignor.

Usually, a prohibition against the assignment of a contract does not prevent an assignment of the right to receive payments due, unless circumstances indicate the contrary. Moreover, the contracting parties cannot, by a mere non-assignment provision, prevent the effectual alienation of the right to money which becomes due under the contract.

A contract provision prohibiting or restricting an assignment may be waived, or a party may so act as to be estopped from objecting to the assignment, such as by effectively ratifying the assignment. The power to void an assignment made in violation of an anti-assignment clause may be waived either before or after the assignment. See our article on Contracts.

Noncompete Clauses and Assignments:

Of critical import to most buyers of businesses is the ability to ensure that key employees of the business being purchased cannot start a competing company. Some states strictly limit such clauses, some do allow them. California does restrict noncompete clauses, only allowing them under certain circumstances. A common question in those states that do allow them is whether such rights can be assigned to a new party, such as the buyer of the buyer.

A covenant not to compete, also called a non-competitive clause, is a formal agreement prohibiting one party from performing similar work or business within a designated area for a specified amount of time. This type of clause is generally included in contracts between employer and employee and contracts between buyer and seller of a business.

Many workers sign a covenant not to compete as part of the paperwork required for employment. It may be a separate document similar to a non-disclosure agreement, or buried within a number of other clauses in a contract. A covenant not to compete is generally legal and enforceable, although there are some exceptions and restrictions.

Whenever a company recruits skilled employees, it invests a significant amount of time and training. For example, it often takes years before a research chemist or a design engineer develops a workable knowledge of a company’s product line, including trade secrets and highly sensitive information. Once an employee gains this knowledge and experience, however, all sorts of things can happen. The employee could work for the company until retirement, accept a better offer from a competing company or start up his or her own business.

A covenant not to compete may cover a number of potential issues between employers and former employees. Many companies spend years developing a local base of customers or clients. It is important that this customer base not fall into the hands of local competitors. When an employee signs a covenant not to compete, he or she usually agrees not to use insider knowledge of the company’s customer base to disadvantage the company. The covenant not to compete often defines a broad geographical area considered off-limits to former employees, possibly tens or hundreds of miles.

Another area of concern covered by a covenant not to compete is a potential ‘brain drain’. Some high-level former employees may seek to recruit others from the same company to create new competition. Retention of employees, especially those with unique skills or proprietary knowledge, is vital for most companies, so a covenant not to compete may spell out definite restrictions on the hiring or recruiting of employees.

A covenant not to compete may also define a specific amount of time before a former employee can seek employment in a similar field. Many companies offer a substantial severance package to make sure former employees are financially solvent until the terms of the covenant not to compete have been met.

Because the use of a covenant not to compete can be controversial, a handful of states, including California, have largely banned this type of contractual language. The legal enforcement of these agreements falls on individual states, and many have sided with the employee during arbitration or litigation. A covenant not to compete must be reasonable and specific, with defined time periods and coverage areas. If the agreement gives the company too much power over former employees or is ambiguous, state courts may declare it to be overbroad and therefore unenforceable. In such case, the employee would be free to pursue any employment opportunity, including working for a direct competitor or starting up a new company of his or her own.

It has been held that an employee’s covenant not to compete is assignable where one business is transferred to another, that a merger does not constitute an assignment of a covenant not to compete, and that a covenant not to compete is enforceable by a successor to the employer where the assignment does not create an added burden of employment or other disadvantage to the employee. However, in some states such as Hawaii, it has also been held that a covenant not to compete is not assignable and under various statutes for various reasons that such covenants are not enforceable against an employee by a successor to the employer. Hawaii v. Gannett Pac. Corp. , 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Haw. 1999)

It is vital to obtain the relevant law of the applicable state before drafting or attempting to enforce assignment rights in this particular area.

Conclusion:

In the current business world of fast changing structures, agreements, employees and projects, the ability to assign rights and obligations is essential to allow flexibility and adjustment to new situations. Conversely, the ability to hold a contracting party into the deal may be essential for the future of a party. Thus, the law of assignments and the restriction on same is a critical aspect of every agreement and every structure. This basic provision is often glanced at by the contracting parties, or scribbled into the deal at the last minute but can easily become the most vital part of the transaction.

As an example, one client of ours came into the office outraged that his co venturer on a sizable exporting agreement, who had excellent connections in Brazil, had elected to pursue another venture instead and assigned the agreement to a party unknown to our client and without the business contacts our client considered vital. When we examined the handwritten agreement our client had drafted in a restaurant in Sao Paolo, we discovered there was no restriction on assignment whatsoever…our client had not even considered that right when drafting the agreement after a full day of work.

One choses who one does business with carefully…to ensure that one’s choice remains the party on the other side of the contract, one must master the ability to negotiate proper assignment provisions.

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Assignment of Claim after a Loss: What Homeowners Should Know

Let’s start with the basics. If you, as a homeowner, sustain property damage or losses because of a covered event (like a fire, for example), you will need your home repaired. You choose a contractor or restoration company to do the work – but the check from the insurance company has not come through yet, and you need them to start right away. So, what can you do?

You can sign an “assignment of claim,” which assigns your rights (as the policyholder) to benefits and proceeds from the loss, to the company or contractors. In the simplest of terms, the assignment of claim allows your contractor to get paid directly from the insurance company.

What is the anti-transfer clause in insurance?

However, many contractors and purchasers of the damaged property have found themselves in a tight spot over the years, because of something called the anti-transfer clause. As explained on the Tennessee Insurance Litigation Blog ,  the anti-transfer clause usually reads something like this: “Your rights and duties under this policy may not be transferred without our written consent except in the case of death of an individual named insured.” Sometimes, the insurance company requires written consent before an assignment of claim can be made.

This clause routinely allows insurers to deny payments to contractors – but it shouldn’t, when an assignment of claim is made post-loss.

What’s the difference between pre-loss vs. post-loss assignments?

The Courts of Tennessee have routinely ruled on behalf of contractors and purchasers who were assigned the claim after the loss occurred. That is because the original assignee – the homeowner – was approved by the insurance company in the first place, and because the damage occurred regardless. There was no additional risk for the insurance company. Therefore, even if the contractor has a long and storied history of rule-breaking (or even criminal activity), the homeowner can assign the claim however he or she chooses; after all, the loss already happened.

Where insurance companies can (and do) have a leg up is for pre-loss assignments. The insurance company underwrote the risk on Bob and Jane Homeowner because it felt confident enough to do so. Bob and Jane cannot assign their policy to another person without the approval of the insurer, even when no loss has occurred.

Even if there is an anti-transfer clause in your policy, the chances are very good that a post-loss assignment cannot be legally denied by your insurer. If it is, seek out an experienced insurance dispute lawyer to help you argue the denial.

One last note for Tennessee policyholders

In some cases, the insurance company may decide that the amount of your loss is worth less than the cost of the renovations for which the contractor is charging. If this happens, you could be on the hook for the remainder of the costs, depending, of course, on the language of the deal with your contractor.

Because of this risk, it’s wise to contact an attorney before making any decisions. Get informed about your rights from the start, and let your lawyer address any potential hiccups along the way. If your insurer lowballs your claim, your attorney can  handle the dispute , to ensure that you are compensated fairly.

At McWherter Scott & Bobbitt, we have spent years fighting against unfair insurance claims policies in Tennessee and Mississippi. Let  Brandon McWherter ,  Jonathan Bobbitt  and  Clint Scott   put their knowledge and experience to work for you. Please call  731-664-1340 or fill out our  contact form . We maintain offices in Nashville, Chattanooga, Memphis, Jackson and Knoxville.

Brandon McWherter has dedicated his practice to assisting insurance policyholders with their claims against insurance companies, including claims for bad faith. He is licensed in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Mississippi. Learn More

• Practical Law

Assignment of a claim or cause of action

Practical law uk practice note 1-522-7861  (approx. 32 pages).

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Assignment of Claims Act Documentation

We are often asked, by lenders and borrowers alike, what the current market trend is with respect to lenders requiring documentation proscribed by the Federal Assignment of Claims Act  of 1940, as amended, 31 U.S.C.3727 ,  41 U.S.C.6305 (the “Assignment of Claims Act” or “FACA”), such as instruments of assignment and notices of assignment.  Are lenders still requiring their borrowers to complete, execute and deliver these documents?  What are the risks of not obtaining them?  Is there something short of full compliance with the Assignment of Claims Act that can be done to adequately protect a lender and not unduly burden a borrower?

Anyone who has been involved in the process of obtaining FACA assignments knows that it is frequently a tedious and sometimes burdensome process, especially if a borrower has many smaller contracts with a number of different government agencies.  As a result, we have found that the vast majority of lenders are not requiring borrowers to provide FACA assignments at the closing of a loan, but instead reserve the right to require them to be provided at a later date – typically upon the occurrence of an event of default under the loan documents.

The question then becomes, if FACA assignments are not being required at loan closing, how is a lender protected, and what are the potential risks of not having FACA assignments in place?

Before describing some of the specific benefits afforded by the Assignment of Claims Act, we will point out a common misunderstanding with respect to FACA assignments.  Many people believe that FACA assignments perfect a lender’s security interest in government accounts receivable.  That is simply not the case.  Perfection of a lender’s security interest in government accounts receivable, like any other account receivable, is accomplished by filing a properly completed UCC-1 financing statement among the state records of the jurisdiction of organization, jurisdiction of incorporation or state of residence of the borrower.  What then are the benefits of having FACA assignments in effect?  There are 4 primary benefits.

First, a properly processed FACA assignment obligates the government to make contract payments directly to the bank or financial institution identified in the FACA assignment.  Put another way, the government is prohibited from sending government contract payments to any other person or entity while the FACA assignment is in effect.  Just to be clear though, the actual obligation of the government to make payments under a government contract is set forth in the contract itself (or by reference to a particular Federal Acquisition Regulation set forth in the government contract).  However, once the obligation to pay ripens (pursuant to the terms of the applicable government contract), the payment direction of the FACA assignment then governs and (as further described below) not even the contractor/borrower can change that payment direction without the lender’s consent.

Second, a properly processed FACA assignment puts the government “on notice” that a lender is relying on the payment direction afforded by the FACA assignment – typically for purposes of collateralizing a loan, credit facility or some other financial accommodation made by the lender to the borrower.  And if the government is “on notice” of the FACA assignment, then the government is prohibited from clawing back from the lender any government contract payment received by the lender on behalf of its borrower that may have been made in error (or that could have been retained by the government as an offset to some other liability that the borrower may owe to the government).  Of course, the government would still have recourse against the borrower for the return of any such payment, but it would not have any such recourse against the lender.

Third (albeit similar to the first point), a properly processed FACA assignment protects a lender from borrower-fraud.  When a FACA assignment has been accepted by the government, the borrower is unable to redirect the government to make contract payments elsewhere.  The government can only act pursuant to the written instructions of the lender (as to where payments should be sent – either by mail, ACH or wire) while the FACA assignment is in effect.  A few years back, one of our lender clients shut down a revolving line of credit of one of its customers (simply because the customer failed to provide requested financial information to renew the line).  And, while suspending the customer’s line of credit quickly got the customer’s attention, the customer was also quick to re-direct future payments under its government contracts to a different financial institution.  For the record, this particular lender client of ours hadn’t retained us until after it had already shut down the line of credit and discovered that its customer had redirected payments elsewhere.  Had FACA assignments been in effect, the customer would not have been able to redirect the payment on its government accounts receivable to a different account maintained by another financial institution.

And fourth, a properly processed FACA assignment provides the lender with the right to pursue collection of a government contract receivable against the government.  If, for example, the government was obligated to make a government contract payment pursuant to the terms of the applicable government contract, but simply failed to do so, then the lender can pursue a collection action directly against the government for the payment of the assigned government contract receivable (which, unlike commercial account debtors, the lender would not be able to do in the absence of a FACA assignment).  Obviously, to the extent that the government had a valid defense against the borrower as to the payment of the government contract receivable, the lender would likewise be subject to that defense.

So, notwithstanding the benefits afforded by FACA assignments, why aren’t lenders insisting on them and what are lenders doing to otherwise minimize the risk that their government contract receivable collateral will not disappear?  There are a number of reasons, but we will only highlight the most common ones in this article.  First and foremost, many lenders find comfort in having a perfected security interest in the government account receivable by virtue of simply filing a UCC-1 financing statement.  Second, government contracts are awarded, expire, terminate and are renewed all the time, and many lenders cannot keep up with processing FACA assignments for every government contract of their borrowers.  Instead, some lenders obligate their borrower to periodically provide FACA assignments for only those government contracts which meet certain criteria, such as having a remaining value of $500,000 or more and a remaining term (including renewal options) of 6 months or longer.  The dollar threshold is intended to quantify a certain credit risk tolerance while the “6 months or longer” criteria is appropriate from a practical perspective because sometimes it could take a few months just to get the government to acknowledge receipt of a properly filed FACA assignment.  And while there is certainly the “inconvenience” factor that borrowers oftentimes claim, the fact is that the task of completing FACA assignments is ministerial in nature and not very time consuming to accomplish.  Nevertheless, for our lender clients who elect not to require FACA assignments either at loan closing and/or periodically thereafter, we include a provision in our loan documents which grants the lender the right to require them at any time after the occurrence of an event of default.  The savvy lender knows, however, that it cannot count on a borrower performing a post-event of default obligation if that borrower is presumably already in default for failing to perform some other obligation.  For that reason, our loan documents also include a corresponding right of the lender to obtain injunctive or other equitable relief (such as specific performance) to compel the borrower to deliver FACA assignments to the lender (if requested) after the occurrence of an event of default.  This adds an extra level of protection to the lender in the event that a borrower, who is already in default, fails to timely comply with the lender’s request.

There are many nuances to properly completing and processing FACA assignments, as well as details with respect to the mechanics of complying with the Assignment of Claims Act, which we have not fully vetted in this article.  If you would like further information, or would like to discuss government contract financing generally, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Note: This Bulletin is not intended as legal advice.  Readers should seek professional legal counseling before acting on the information it contains.

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Change Number: Change 178 GSAR Case 2020-G511 Effective Date: 03/25/2024

Subpart 532.8 - Assignment of Claims

532.805 procedure..

(a)  When acknowledging receipt of the notice of assignment, the contracting officer shall notify the contractor that all future invoices or other requests for payment under the contract must specify the name and address of the assignee and include a notation that payments due thereunder have been duly assigned. The contracting officer must send a copy of the acknowledgment to the contract finance office.

(b)  When payments under requirements or indefinite quantity contracts that are for the sole use of GSA have been assigned, the contracting officer shall provide all GSA offices that will place orders against the contract the name and address of the assignee that will receive amounts due under the contract. The notification should also state that the contracting officer requested the contractor to specify the name and address of the assignee on future invoices.

532.806 Contract clauses.

Insert the clause at 552.232-23 , Assignment of Claims, in solicitations and requirements or indefinite quantity contracts under which more than one agency may place orders.

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