critical thinking and ethical reasoning are one and the same

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o’clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68–69; 1933: 91–92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot’s position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Moreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69–70; 1933: 92–93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond lane from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

• It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
• The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
• The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses. As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009, 2021), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on responsiveness to reasons (Siegel 1988). Kuhn (2019) takes critical thinking to be more a dialogic practice of advancing and responding to arguments than an individual ability.

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

• suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
• an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
• the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
• the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
• testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

• Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
• Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in spacing in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
• Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
• Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
• Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
• Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
• Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the spacing of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
• Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
• Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
• Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
• Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016a) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Facione (1990a: 25) divides “affective dispositions” of critical thinking into approaches to life and living in general and approaches to specific issues, questions or problems. Adapting this distinction, one can usefully divide critical thinking dispositions into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

• Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
• Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
• Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking. In three studies, Haran, Ritov, & Mellers (2013) found that actively open-minded thinking, including “the tendency to weigh new evidence against a favored belief, to spend sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to consider carefully the opinions of others in forming one’s own”, led study participants to acquire information and thus to make accurate estimations.
• Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
• Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
• Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), Black (2012), and Blair (2021).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work. It is also helpful to be aware of the prevalence of “noise” (unwanted unsystematic variability of judgments), of how to detect noise (through a noise audit), and of how to reduce noise: make accuracy the goal, think statistically, break a process of arriving at a judgment into independent tasks, resist premature intuitions, in a group get independent judgments first, favour comparative judgments and scales (Kahneman, Sibony, & Sunstein 2021). It is helpful as well to be aware of the concept of “bounded rationality” in decision-making and of the related distinction between “satisficing” and optimizing (Simon 1956; Gigerenzer 2001).

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? In a comprehensive meta-analysis of experimental and quasi-experimental studies of strategies for teaching students to think critically, Abrami et al. (2015) found that dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), Bailin et al. (1999b), and Willingham (2019).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

• reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
• distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
• indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
• orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
• being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
• being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
• doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
• reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
• attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
• winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

• Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
• Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
• Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
• In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
• Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

• Abrami, Philip C., Robert M. Bernard, Eugene Borokhovski, David I. Waddington, C. Anne Wade, and Tonje Person, 2015, “Strategies for Teaching Students to Think Critically: A Meta-analysis”, Review of Educational Research , 85(2): 275–314. doi:10.3102/0034654314551063
• Aikin, Wilford M., 1942, The Story of the Eight-year Study, with Conclusions and Recommendations , Volume I of Adventure in American Education , New York and London: Harper & Brothers. [ Aikin 1942 available online ]
• Alston, Kal, 1995, “Begging the Question: Is Critical Thinking Biased?”, Educational Theory , 45(2): 225–233. doi:10.1111/j.1741-5446.1995.00225.x
• –––, 2001, “Re/Thinking Critical Thinking: The Seductions of Everyday Life”, Studies in Philosophy and Education , 20(1): 27–40. doi:10.1023/A:1005247128053
• American Educational Research Association, 2014, Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing / American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, National Council on Measurement in Education , Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association.
• Anderson, Lorin W., David R. Krathwohl, Peter W. Airiasian, Kathleen A. Cruikshank, Richard E. Mayer, Paul R. Pintrich, James Raths, and Merlin C. Wittrock, 2001, A Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching and Assessing: A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives , New York: Longman, complete edition.
• Bailin, Sharon, 1987, “Critical and Creative Thinking”, Informal Logic , 9(1): 23–30. [ Bailin 1987 available online ]
• –––, 1988, Achieving Extraordinary Ends: An Essay on Creativity , Dordrecht: Kluwer. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2780-3
• –––, 1995, “Is Critical Thinking Biased? Clarifications and Implications”, Educational Theory , 45(2): 191–197. doi:10.1111/j.1741-5446.1995.00191.x
• Bailin, Sharon and Mark Battersby, 2009, “Inquiry: A Dialectical Approach to Teaching Critical Thinking”, in Juho Ritola (ed.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09 , CD-ROM (pp. 1–10), Windsor, ON: OSSA. [ Bailin & Battersby 2009 available online ]
• –––, 2016a, “Fostering the Virtues of Inquiry”, Topoi , 35(2): 367–374. doi:10.1007/s11245-015-9307-6
• –––, 2016b, Reason in the Balance: An Inquiry Approach to Critical Thinking , Indianapolis: Hackett, 2nd edition.
• –––, 2021, “Inquiry: Teaching for Reasoned Judgment”, in Daniel Fasko, Jr. and Frank Fair (eds.), Critical Thinking and Reasoning: Theory, Development, Instruction, and Assessment , Leiden: Brill, pp. 31–46. doi: 10.1163/9789004444591_003
• Bailin, Sharon, Roland Case, Jerrold R. Coombs, and Leroi B. Daniels, 1999a, “Common Misconceptions of Critical Thinking”, Journal of Curriculum Studies , 31(3): 269–283. doi:10.1080/002202799183124
• –––, 1999b, “Conceptualizing Critical Thinking”, Journal of Curriculum Studies , 31(3): 285–302. doi:10.1080/002202799183133
• Blair, J. Anthony, 2021, Studies in Critical Thinking , Windsor, ON: Windsor Studies in Argumentation, 2nd edition. [Available online at https://windsor.scholarsportal.info/omp/index.php/wsia/catalog/book/106]
• Berman, Alan M., Seth J. Schwartz, William M. Kurtines, and Steven L. Berman, 2001, “The Process of Exploration in Identity Formation: The Role of Style and Competence”, Journal of Adolescence , 24(4): 513–528. doi:10.1006/jado.2001.0386
• Black, Beth (ed.), 2012, An A to Z of Critical Thinking , London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
• Bloom, Benjamin Samuel, Max D. Engelhart, Edward J. Furst, Walter H. Hill, and David R. Krathwohl, 1956, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. Handbook I: Cognitive Domain , New York: David McKay.
• Boardman, Frank, Nancy M. Cavender, and Howard Kahane, 2018, Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason in Everyday Life , Boston: Cengage, 13th edition.
• Browne, M. Neil and Stuart M. Keeley, 2018, Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to Critical Thinking , Hoboken, NJ: Pearson, 12th edition.
• Center for Assessment & Improvement of Learning, 2017, Critical Thinking Assessment Test , Cookeville, TN: Tennessee Technological University.
• Cleghorn, Paul. 2021. “Critical Thinking in the Elementary School: Practical Guidance for Building a Culture of Thinking”, in Daniel Fasko, Jr. and Frank Fair (eds.), Critical Thinking and Reasoning: Theory, Development, Instruction, and Assessmen t, Leiden: Brill, pp. 150–167. doi: 10.1163/9789004444591_010
• Cohen, Jacob, 1988, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences , Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2nd edition.
• College Board, 1983, Academic Preparation for College. What Students Need to Know and Be Able to Do , New York: College Entrance Examination Board, ERIC document ED232517.
• Commission on the Relation of School and College of the Progressive Education Association, 1943, Thirty Schools Tell Their Story , Volume V of Adventure in American Education , New York and London: Harper & Brothers.
• Council for Aid to Education, 2017, CLA+ Student Guide . Available at http://cae.org/images/uploads/pdf/CLA_Student_Guide_Institution.pdf ; last accessed 2022 07 16.
• Dalgleish, Adam, Patrick Girard, and Maree Davies, 2017, “Critical Thinking, Bias and Feminist Philosophy: Building a Better Framework through Collaboration”, Informal Logic , 37(4): 351–369. [ Dalgleish et al. available online ]
• Dewey, John, 1910, How We Think , Boston: D.C. Heath. [ Dewey 1910 available online ]
• –––, 1916, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education , New York: Macmillan.
• –––, 1933, How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process , Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
• –––, 1936, “The Theory of the Chicago Experiment”, Appendix II of Mayhew & Edwards 1936: 463–477.
• –––, 1938, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry , New York: Henry Holt and Company.
• Dominguez, Caroline (coord.), 2018a, A European Collection of the Critical Thinking Skills and Dispositions Needed in Different Professional Fields for the 21st Century , Vila Real, Portugal: UTAD. Available at http://bit.ly/CRITHINKEDUO1 ; last accessed 2022 07 16.
• ––– (coord.), 2018b, A European Review on Critical Thinking Educational Practices in Higher Education Institutions , Vila Real: UTAD. Available at http://bit.ly/CRITHINKEDUO2 ; last accessed 2022 07 16.
• ––– (coord.), 2018c, The CRITHINKEDU European Course on Critical Thinking Education for University Teachers: From Conception to Delivery , Vila Real: UTAD. Available at http:/bit.ly/CRITHINKEDU03; last accessed 2022 07 16.
• Dominguez Caroline and Rita Payan-Carreira (eds.), 2019, Promoting Critical Thinking in European Higher Education Institutions: Towards an Educational Protocol , Vila Real: UTAD. Available at http:/bit.ly/CRITHINKEDU04; last accessed 2022 07 16.
• Ennis, Robert H., 1958, “An Appraisal of the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal”, The Journal of Educational Research , 52(4): 155–158. doi:10.1080/00220671.1958.10882558
• –––, 1962, “A Concept of Critical Thinking: A Proposed Basis for Research on the Teaching and Evaluation of Critical Thinking Ability”, Harvard Educational Review , 32(1): 81–111.
• –––, 1981a, “A Conception of Deductive Logical Competence”, Teaching Philosophy , 4(3/4): 337–385. doi:10.5840/teachphil198143/429
• –––, 1981b, “Eight Fallacies in Bloom’s Taxonomy”, in C. J. B. Macmillan (ed.), Philosophy of Education 1980: Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society , Bloomington, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, pp. 269–273.
• –––, 1984, “Problems in Testing Informal Logic, Critical Thinking, Reasoning Ability”, Informal Logic , 6(1): 3–9. [ Ennis 1984 available online ]
• –––, 1987, “A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities”, in Joan Boykoff Baron and Robert J. Sternberg (eds.), Teaching Thinking Skills: Theory and Practice , New York: W. H. Freeman, pp. 9–26.
• –––, 1989, “Critical Thinking and Subject Specificity: Clarification and Needed Research”, Educational Researcher , 18(3): 4–10. doi:10.3102/0013189X018003004
• –––, 1991, “Critical Thinking: A Streamlined Conception”, Teaching Philosophy , 14(1): 5–24. doi:10.5840/teachphil19911412
• –––, 1996, “Critical Thinking Dispositions: Their Nature and Assessability”, Informal Logic , 18(2–3): 165–182. [ Ennis 1996 available online ]
• –––, 1998, “Is Critical Thinking Culturally Biased?”, Teaching Philosophy , 21(1): 15–33. doi:10.5840/teachphil19982113
• –––, 2011, “Critical Thinking: Reflection and Perspective Part I”, Inquiry: Critical Thinking across the Disciplines , 26(1): 4–18. doi:10.5840/inquiryctnews20112613
• –––, 2013, “Critical Thinking across the Curriculum: The Wisdom CTAC Program”, Inquiry: Critical Thinking across the Disciplines , 28(2): 25–45. doi:10.5840/inquiryct20132828
• –––, 2016, “Definition: A Three-Dimensional Analysis with Bearing on Key Concepts”, in Patrick Bondy and Laura Benacquista (eds.), Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18–21 May 2016 , Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1–19. Available at http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA11/papersandcommentaries/105 ; last accessed 2022 07 16.
• –––, 2018, “Critical Thinking Across the Curriculum: A Vision”, Topoi , 37(1): 165–184. doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9401-4
• Ennis, Robert H., and Jason Millman, 1971, Manual for Cornell Critical Thinking Test, Level X, and Cornell Critical Thinking Test, Level Z , Urbana, IL: Critical Thinking Project, University of Illinois.
• Ennis, Robert H., Jason Millman, and Thomas Norbert Tomko, 1985, Cornell Critical Thinking Tests Level X & Level Z: Manual , Pacific Grove, CA: Midwest Publication, 3rd edition.
• –––, 2005, Cornell Critical Thinking Tests Level X & Level Z: Manual , Seaside, CA: Critical Thinking Company, 5th edition.
• Ennis, Robert H. and Eric Weir, 1985, The Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test: Test, Manual, Criteria, Scoring Sheet: An Instrument for Teaching and Testing , Pacific Grove, CA: Midwest Publications.
• Facione, Peter A., 1990a, Critical Thinking: A Statement of Expert Consensus for Purposes of Educational Assessment and Instruction , Research Findings and Recommendations Prepared for the Committee on Pre-College Philosophy of the American Philosophical Association, ERIC Document ED315423.
• –––, 1990b, California Critical Thinking Skills Test, CCTST – Form A , Millbrae, CA: The California Academic Press.
• –––, 1990c, The California Critical Thinking Skills Test--College Level. Technical Report #3. Gender, Ethnicity, Major, CT Self-Esteem, and the CCTST , ERIC Document ED326584.
• –––, 1992, California Critical Thinking Skills Test: CCTST – Form B, Millbrae, CA: The California Academic Press.
• –––, 2000, “The Disposition Toward Critical Thinking: Its Character, Measurement, and Relationship to Critical Thinking Skill”, Informal Logic , 20(1): 61–84. [ Facione 2000 available online ]
• Facione, Peter A. and Noreen C. Facione, 1992, CCTDI: A Disposition Inventory , Millbrae, CA: The California Academic Press.
• Facione, Peter A., Noreen C. Facione, and Carol Ann F. Giancarlo, 2001, California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory: CCTDI: Inventory Manual , Millbrae, CA: The California Academic Press.
• Facione, Peter A., Carol A. Sánchez, and Noreen C. Facione, 1994, Are College Students Disposed to Think? , Millbrae, CA: The California Academic Press. ERIC Document ED368311.
• Fisher, Alec, and Michael Scriven, 1997, Critical Thinking: Its Definition and Assessment , Norwich: Centre for Research in Critical Thinking, University of East Anglia.
• Freire, Paulo, 1968 [1970], Pedagogia do Oprimido . Translated as Pedagogy of the Oppressed , Myra Bergman Ramos (trans.), New York: Continuum, 1970.
• Gigerenzer, Gerd, 2001, “The Adaptive Toolbox”, in Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten (eds.), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 37–50.
• Glaser, Edward Maynard, 1941, An Experiment in the Development of Critical Thinking , New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University.
• Groarke, Leo A. and Christopher W. Tindale, 2012, Good Reasoning Matters! A Constructive Approach to Critical Thinking , Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 5th edition.
• Halpern, Diane F., 1998, “Teaching Critical Thinking for Transfer Across Domains: Disposition, Skills, Structure Training, and Metacognitive Monitoring”, American Psychologist , 53(4): 449–455. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.53.4.449
• –––, 2016, Manual: Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment , Mödling, Austria: Schuhfried. Available at https://pdfcoffee.com/hcta-test-manual-pdf-free.html; last accessed 2022 07 16.
• Hamby, Benjamin, 2014, The Virtues of Critical Thinkers , Doctoral dissertation, Philosophy, McMaster University. [ Hamby 2014 available online ]
• –––, 2015, “Willingness to Inquire: The Cardinal Critical Thinking Virtue”, in Martin Davies and Ronald Barnett (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Thinking in Higher Education , New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 77–87.
• Haran, Uriel, Ilana Ritov, and Barbara A. Mellers, 2013, “The Role of Actively Open-minded Thinking in Information Acquisition, Accuracy, and Calibration”, Judgment and Decision Making , 8(3): 188–201.
• Hatcher, Donald and Kevin Possin, 2021, “Commentary: Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking Assessment”, in Daniel Fasko, Jr. and Frank Fair (eds.), Critical Thinking and Reasoning: Theory, Development, Instruction, and Assessment , Leiden: Brill, pp. 298–322. doi: 10.1163/9789004444591_017
• Haynes, Ada, Elizabeth Lisic, Kevin Harris, Katie Leming, Kyle Shanks, and Barry Stein, 2015, “Using the Critical Thinking Assessment Test (CAT) as a Model for Designing Within-Course Assessments: Changing How Faculty Assess Student Learning”, Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines , 30(3): 38–48. doi:10.5840/inquiryct201530316
• Haynes, Ada and Barry Stein, 2021, “Observations from a Long-Term Effort to Assess and Improve Critical Thinking”, in Daniel Fasko, Jr. and Frank Fair (eds.), Critical Thinking and Reasoning: Theory, Development, Instruction, and Assessment , Leiden: Brill, pp. 231–254. doi: 10.1163/9789004444591_014
• Hiner, Amanda L. 2021. “Equipping Students for Success in College and Beyond: Placing Critical Thinking Instruction at the Heart of a General Education Program”, in Daniel Fasko, Jr. and Frank Fair (eds.), Critical Thinking and Reasoning: Theory, Development, Instruction, and Assessment , Leiden: Brill, pp. 188–208. doi: 10.1163/9789004444591_012
• Hitchcock, David, 2017, “Critical Thinking as an Educational Ideal”, in his On Reasoning and Argument: Essays in Informal Logic and on Critical Thinking , Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 477–497. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-53562-3_30
• –––, 2021, “Seven Philosophical Implications of Critical Thinking: Themes, Variations, Implications”, in Daniel Fasko, Jr. and Frank Fair (eds.), Critical Thinking and Reasoning: Theory, Development, Instruction, and Assessment , Leiden: Brill, pp. 9–30. doi: 10.1163/9789004444591_002
• hooks, bell, 1994, Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom , New York and London: Routledge.
• –––, 2010, Teaching Critical Thinking: Practical Wisdom , New York and London: Routledge.
• Johnson, Ralph H., 1992, “The Problem of Defining Critical Thinking”, in Stephen P, Norris (ed.), The Generalizability of Critical Thinking , New York: Teachers College Press, pp. 38–53.
• Kahane, Howard, 1971, Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric: The Use of Reason in Everyday Life , Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
• Kahneman, Daniel, 2011, Thinking, Fast and Slow , New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
• Kahneman, Daniel, Olivier Sibony, & Cass R. Sunstein, 2021, Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgment , New York: Little, Brown Spark.
• Kenyon, Tim, and Guillaume Beaulac, 2014, “Critical Thinking Education and Debasing”, Informal Logic , 34(4): 341–363. [ Kenyon & Beaulac 2014 available online ]
• Krathwohl, David R., Benjamin S. Bloom, and Bertram B. Masia, 1964, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook II: Affective Domain , New York: David McKay.
• Kuhn, Deanna, 1991, The Skills of Argument , New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511571350
• –––, 2019, “Critical Thinking as Discourse”, Human Development, 62 (3): 146–164. doi:10.1159/000500171
• Lipman, Matthew, 1987, “Critical Thinking–What Can It Be?”, Analytic Teaching , 8(1): 5–12. [ Lipman 1987 available online ]
• –––, 2003, Thinking in Education , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition.
• Loftus, Elizabeth F., 2017, “Eavesdropping on Memory”, Annual Review of Psychology , 68: 1–18. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010416-044138
• Makaiau, Amber Strong, 2021, “The Good Thinker’s Tool Kit: How to Engage Critical Thinking and Reasoning in Secondary Education”, in Daniel Fasko, Jr. and Frank Fair (eds.), Critical Thinking and Reasoning: Theory, Development, Instruction, and Assessment , Leiden: Brill, pp. 168–187. doi: 10.1163/9789004444591_011
• Martin, Jane Roland, 1992, “Critical Thinking for a Humane World”, in Stephen P. Norris (ed.), The Generalizability of Critical Thinking , New York: Teachers College Press, pp. 163–180.
• Mayhew, Katherine Camp, and Anna Camp Edwards, 1936, The Dewey School: The Laboratory School of the University of Chicago, 1896–1903 , New York: Appleton-Century. [ Mayhew & Edwards 1936 available online ]
• McPeck, John E., 1981, Critical Thinking and Education , New York: St. Martin’s Press.
• Moore, Brooke Noel and Richard Parker, 2020, Critical Thinking , New York: McGraw-Hill, 13th edition.
• Nickerson, Raymond S., 1998, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises”, Review of General Psychology , 2(2): 175–220. doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175
• Nieto, Ana Maria, and Jorge Valenzuela, 2012, “A Study of the Internal Structure of Critical Thinking Dispositions”, Inquiry: Critical Thinking across the Disciplines , 27(1): 31–38. doi:10.5840/inquiryct20122713
• Norris, Stephen P., 1985, “Controlling for Background Beliefs When Developing Multiple-choice Critical Thinking Tests”, Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice , 7(3): 5–11. doi:10.1111/j.1745-3992.1988.tb00437.x
• Norris, Stephen P. and Robert H. Ennis, 1989, Evaluating Critical Thinking (The Practitioners’ Guide to Teaching Thinking Series), Pacific Grove, CA: Midwest Publications.
• Norris, Stephen P. and Ruth Elizabeth King, 1983, Test on Appraising Observations , St. John’s, NL: Institute for Educational Research and Development, Memorial University of Newfoundland.
• –––, 1984, The Design of a Critical Thinking Test on Appraising Observations , St. John’s, NL: Institute for Educational Research and Development, Memorial University of Newfoundland. ERIC Document ED260083.
• –––, 1985, Test on Appraising Observations: Manual , St. John’s, NL: Institute for Educational Research and Development, Memorial University of Newfoundland.
• –––, 1990a, Test on Appraising Observations , St. John’s, NL: Institute for Educational Research and Development, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2nd edition.
• –––, 1990b, Test on Appraising Observations: Manual , St. John’s, NL: Institute for Educational Research and Development, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2nd edition.
• OCR [Oxford, Cambridge and RSA Examinations], 2011, AS/A Level GCE: Critical Thinking – H052, H452 , Cambridge: OCR. Past papers available at https://pastpapers.co/ocr/?dir=A-Level/Critical-Thinking-H052-H452; last accessed 2022 07 16.
• Ontario Ministry of Education, 2013, The Ontario Curriculum Grades 9 to 12: Social Sciences and Humanities . Available at http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/curriculum/secondary/ssciences9to122013.pdf ; last accessed 2022 07 16.
• Passmore, John Arthur, 1980, The Philosophy of Teaching , London: Duckworth.
• Paul, Richard W., 1981, “Teaching Critical Thinking in the ‘Strong’ Sense: A Focus on Self-Deception, World Views, and a Dialectical Mode of Analysis”, Informal Logic , 4(2): 2–7. [ Paul 1981 available online ]
• –––, 1984, “Critical Thinking: Fundamental to Education for a Free Society”, Educational Leadership , 42(1): 4–14.
• –––, 1985, “McPeck’s Mistakes”, Informal Logic , 7(1): 35–43. [ Paul 1985 available online ]
• Paul, Richard W. and Linda Elder, 2006, The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking: Concepts and Tools , Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking, 4th edition.
• Payette, Patricia, and Edna Ross, 2016, “Making a Campus-Wide Commitment to Critical Thinking: Insights and Promising Practices Utilizing the Paul-Elder Approach at the University of Louisville”, Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines , 31(1): 98–110. doi:10.5840/inquiryct20163118
• Possin, Kevin, 2008, “A Field Guide to Critical-Thinking Assessment”, Teaching Philosophy , 31(3): 201–228. doi:10.5840/teachphil200831324
• –––, 2013a, “Some Problems with the Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment (HCTA) Test”, Inquiry: Critical Thinking across the Disciplines , 28(3): 4–12. doi:10.5840/inquiryct201328313
• –––, 2013b, “A Serious Flaw in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA) Test”, Informal Logic , 33(3): 390–405. [ Possin 2013b available online ]
• –––, 2013c, “A Fatal Flaw in the Collegiate Learning Assessment Test”, Assessment Update , 25 (1): 8–12.
• –––, 2014, “Critique of the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal Test: The More You Know, the Lower Your Score”, Informal Logic , 34(4): 393–416. [ Possin 2014 available online ]
• –––, 2020, “CAT Scan: A Critical Review of the Critical-Thinking Assessment Test”, Informal Logic , 40 (3): 489–508. [Available online at https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/6243]
• Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Rear, David, 2019, “One Size Fits All? The Limitations of Standardised Assessment in Critical Thinking”, Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education , 44(5): 664–675. doi: 10.1080/02602938.2018.1526255
• Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 1762, Émile , Amsterdam: Jean Néaulme.
• Scheffler, Israel, 1960, The Language of Education , Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.
• Scriven, Michael, and Richard W. Paul, 1987, Defining Critical Thinking , Draft statement written for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction. Available at http://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/defining-critical-thinking/766 ; last accessed 2022 07 16.
• Sheffield, Clarence Burton Jr., 2018, “Promoting Critical Thinking in Higher Education: My Experiences as the Inaugural Eugene H. Fram Chair in Applied Critical Thinking at Rochester Institute of Technology”, Topoi , 37(1): 155–163. doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9392-1
• Siegel, Harvey, 1985, “McPeck, Informal Logic and the Nature of Critical Thinking”, in David Nyberg (ed.), Philosophy of Education 1985: Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society , Normal, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, pp. 61–72.
• –––, 1988, Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, and Education , New York: Routledge.
• –––, 1999, “What (Good) Are Thinking Dispositions?”, Educational Theory , 49(2): 207–221. doi:10.1111/j.1741-5446.1999.00207.x
• Simon, Herbert A., 1956, “Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment”, Psychological Review , 63(2): 129–138. doi: 10.1037/h0042769
• Simpson, Elizabeth, 1966–67, “The Classification of Educational Objectives: Psychomotor Domain”, Illinois Teacher of Home Economics , 10(4): 110–144, ERIC document ED0103613. [ Simpson 1966–67 available online ]
• Skolverket, 2018, Curriculum for the Compulsory School, Preschool Class and School-age Educare , Stockholm: Skolverket, revised 2018. Available at https://www.skolverket.se/download/18.31c292d516e7445866a218f/1576654682907/pdf3984.pdf; last accessed 2022 07 15.
• Smith, B. Othanel, 1953, “The Improvement of Critical Thinking”, Progressive Education , 30(5): 129–134.
• Smith, Eugene Randolph, Ralph Winfred Tyler, and the Evaluation Staff, 1942, Appraising and Recording Student Progress , Volume III of Adventure in American Education , New York and London: Harper & Brothers.
• Splitter, Laurance J., 1987, “Educational Reform through Philosophy for Children”, Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children , 7(2): 32–39. doi:10.5840/thinking1987729
• Stanovich Keith E., and Paula J. Stanovich, 2010, “A Framework for Critical Thinking, Rational Thinking, and Intelligence”, in David D. Preiss and Robert J. Sternberg (eds), Innovations in Educational Psychology: Perspectives on Learning, Teaching and Human Development , New York: Springer Publishing, pp 195–237.
• Stanovich Keith E., Richard F. West, and Maggie E. Toplak, 2011, “Intelligence and Rationality”, in Robert J. Sternberg and Scott Barry Kaufman (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd edition, pp. 784–826. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511977244.040
• Tankersley, Karen, 2005, Literacy Strategies for Grades 4–12: Reinforcing the Threads of Reading , Alexandria, VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.
• Thayer-Bacon, Barbara J., 1992, “Is Modern Critical Thinking Theory Sexist?”, Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines , 10(1): 3–7. doi:10.5840/inquiryctnews199210123
• –––, 1993, “Caring and Its Relationship to Critical Thinking”, Educational Theory , 43(3): 323–340. doi:10.1111/j.1741-5446.1993.00323.x
• –––, 1995a, “Constructive Thinking: Personal Voice”, Journal of Thought , 30(1): 55–70.
• –––, 1995b, “Doubting and Believing: Both are Important for Critical Thinking”, Inquiry: Critical Thinking across the Disciplines , 15(2): 59–66. doi:10.5840/inquiryctnews199515226
• –––, 2000, Transforming Critical Thinking: Thinking Constructively , New York: Teachers College Press.
• Toulmin, Stephen Edelston, 1958, The Uses of Argument , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Turri, John, Mark Alfano, and John Greco, 2017, “Virtue Epistemology”, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition). URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/epistemology-virtue/ >
• Vincent-Lancrin, Stéphan, Carlos González-Sancho, Mathias Bouckaert, Federico de Luca, Meritxell Fernández-Barrerra, Gwénaël Jacotin, Joaquin Urgel, and Quentin Vidal, 2019, Fostering Students’ Creativity and Critical Thinking: What It Means in School. Educational Research and Innovation , Paris: OECD Publishing.
• Warren, Karen J. 1988. “Critical Thinking and Feminism”, Informal Logic , 10(1): 31–44. [ Warren 1988 available online ]
• Watson, Goodwin, and Edward M. Glaser, 1980a, Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal, Form A , San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation.
• –––, 1980b, Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal: Forms A and B; Manual , San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation,
• –––, 1994, Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal, Form B , San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation.
• Weinstein, Mark, 1990, “Towards a Research Agenda for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking”, Informal Logic , 12(3): 121–143. [ Weinstein 1990 available online ]
• –––, 2013, Logic, Truth and Inquiry , London: College Publications.
• Willingham, Daniel T., 2019, “How to Teach Critical Thinking”, Education: Future Frontiers , 1: 1–17. [Available online at https://prod65.education.nsw.gov.au/content/dam/main-education/teaching-and-learning/education-for-a-changing-world/media/documents/How-to-teach-critical-thinking-Willingham.pdf.]
• Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus, 1996, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139174763

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT)
• Critical Thinking Across the European Higher Education Curricula (CRITHINKEDU)
• Critical Thinking Definition, Instruction, and Assessment: A Rigorous Approach
• Critical Thinking Research (RAIL)
• Foundation for Critical Thinking
• Insight Assessment
• Partnership for 21st Century Learning (P21)
• The Critical Thinking Consortium
• The Nature of Critical Thinking: An Outline of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities , by Robert H. Ennis

abilities | bias, implicit | children, philosophy for | civic education | decision-making capacity | Dewey, John | dispositions | education, philosophy of | epistemology: virtue | logic: informal

Copyright © 2022 by David Hitchcock < hitchckd @ mcmaster . ca >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2024 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Morality, Ethics, and Gifted Minds pp 117–131 Cite as

Critical Thinking, Creativity, Ethical Reasoning: A Unity of Opposites

• Richard Paul 3 &
• Linda Elder 4  
• First Online: 01 January 2009

2493 Accesses

6 Citations

In this chapter, we argue for an intimate interrelationship between critical thinking, creative thinking and ethical reasoning. Indeed we argue for an underlying unity between them. We begin by establishing the interdependence of criticality and creativity in the life of the mind. That life is manifest in three basic forms: uncriticality, sophistic criticality, and Socratic criticality. Each of these forms of thought implies an ethically significant pattern, which we illuminate. This leads to the challenge of living an ethical life when humans so routinely confuse ethics with other modes of thinking. Thus, the most common “counterfeits” of ethics are analyzed at length. The chapter concludes with some important implications of the absence of any one of the triad in human thought, given their innate dependence on one another.

Ever since the nineteenth century, and increasingly thereafter, knowledge, reasoning, and insight have become more and more specialized and compartmentalized. The threads that unify them have become obscured. The threads that diversify them are now highlighted. Yet life itself is not compartmentalized. Reality does not offer itself up to us in sealed compartments. The various dimensions of who we are interact and interrelate. So it is with modes of thinking. The critical and creative dimensions of thought interpenetrate and interface with our capacity to reflect ethically. Each of the three is better understood in relation to the other two. Each deepens and develops one another.

If we would understand the creative mind, then we must study the manner in which it is dependent on criticality. If we would understand the critical mind, then we must study the way it is dependent on creativity. If we would understand the highest levels of criticality and creativity, we must study their dependence on ethical reflection. Intellectual work is a common denominator of all three: creativity, criticality, and ethical reflection. Intellectual constructs are their shared products (constructs such as novels, editorials, critiques). Intellectual traits are what take them to higher levels of functioning. Let us consider first how to overcome the dichotomy between thought that is fundamentally creative and thought that is fundamentally critical.

• Religious Belief
• Vested Interest
• Social Convention
• Intellectual Virtue
• Ethical Reflection

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution .

Buying options

• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Compact, lightweight edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

For deeper understanding of intellectual virtues, see Paul & Elder ( 2006a ).

The U.S. now has a higher percentage of its citizens in prison than any other country in the world (recently surpassing Russia) (Human Rights Watch, August 2008 )

See the website of Amnesty International for acts that are unethical in themselves: http://www.amnesty.org/

Human Rights Watch (2008). http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/usdom12292.htm

Lakoff, G. (2002). Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think (2nd ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Google Scholar  

Meier, A. (2003). Black Earth: A Journey Through Russia After the Fall . New York: W.W. Norton.

Moore, B., Jr. (2000). Moral Purity and Persecution in History . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (1948). United Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/

Paul, R. & Elder, L. (2006a). Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your Learning and Your Life . Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice-Hall.

Paul, R., & Elder, L. (2006b). The Thinker's Guide to Fallacies: The Art of Mental Trickery and Manipulation . Dillon Beach, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Foundation for Critical Thinking, P.O. BOX 220, Dillon Beach, CA, 94929, USA

Richard Paul

Foundation for Critical Thinking, P.O. BOX 220, Dillon Beach, CA, 94929

Linda Elder

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Richard Paul or Linda Elder .

Editor information

Editors and affiliations, rights and permissions.

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2009 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

About this chapter

Cite this chapter.

Paul, R., Elder, L. (2009). Critical Thinking, Creativity, Ethical Reasoning: A Unity of Opposites. In: Cross, T., Ambrose, D. (eds) Morality, Ethics, and Gifted Minds. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-89368-6_8

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-89368-6_8

Published : 12 February 2009

Publisher Name : Springer, Boston, MA

Print ISBN : 978-0-387-89367-9

Online ISBN : 978-0-387-89368-6

eBook Packages : Humanities, Social Sciences and Law Philosophy and Religion (R0)

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research

Want to create or adapt books like this? Learn more about how Pressbooks supports open publishing practices.

11 The Basics of Ethical Reasoning

The Basics of Ethical Reasoning

Radford University, Radford University Core Handbook, https://lcubbison.pressbooks.com/

Let’s begin by refreshing our memory on what is meant by “ethics.”

Ethics is the study of the standards of right and wrong that inform us as to how we ought to behave. These standards relate to unwritten rules that are necessary for humans to live amongst each other, such as “don’t hurt others.” We function better as a society when we treat each other well.

Ethics can also refer to the standards themselves. They often pertain to rights, obligations, fairness, responsibilities, and specific virtues like honesty and loyalty.

They are supported by consistent and well-founded reasons; as such, they have universal appeal. It’s never good to have a society that supports hurting others as a general rule; honesty and loyalty are positive attributes.

Can we think of instances when hurting others is condoned (such as in war) and where honesty or loyalty may be misplaced? Of course! That’s one of the reasons why ethics are so complicated.

Next, let’s briefly look at what is not “ethics.”

We need to distinguish ethics from what it is not. It’s easier if you can remember that ethics doesn’t change:

Ethics is not what’s legal.  The law often puts into writing our ethical standards (don’t hurt others=don’t commit homicide) but it also usually reflects our cultural beliefs at the time. For example, hunting is legal in Virginia, but it would be difficult to say that everyone agrees that it is ethical to hunt. Some people will argue that hunting is ethical because it manages the wildlife population, while others will argue that it is never ethical because it creates pain and suffering.

Ethics is not what you feel . In fact, most times our feelings are very egocentric: what’s best for me and my nearest and dearest? But making judgments based on these sentiments could be detrimental to society as a whole,

Ethics is not religion.  Religions may teach ethical standards, and you may personally use religion to guide your beliefs, but people can have ethics without necessarily belonging to a religion. Therefore, ethics and religion are not interchangeable.

Ethics is not a political ideology.  A political party may share your values and offer ethical arguments to supports its policies, but your decisions aren’t automatically ethical, just because you belong to one political party or another. In fact, many, if not most, political debates are built from arguments that claim one aspect of an ethical dilemma is more significant than another.

What does it mean to be ethical?

When we explore what it means to be ethical, we are looking at what is rationally “right” and “wrong.” We need to have such conversations so that we can live with other people in society. Philosophers would also argue that the best way to achieve our fullest potential is by being ethical.

In this course, we are not teaching you what to believe. We are building on the skills you learned in Core 201 to identify, evaluate, create and analyze ethical arguments.

Again, let’s look at the terms “ethical” and “moral”  and examine if they mean the same thing.

For the purposes of this course, the answer is ‘yes’. The terms ethical and moral are often used as synonyms, and we will adopt this convention and use these terms interchangeably. For most purposes this works fine, but some authors and teachers do see a distinction between these ideas. Usually when the terms are distinguished it is because “morals” can connote very culture-specific norms or expectations. Hence “the mores of the Azande” describes the moral norms of that particular tribe or culture, but without expectation that these norms are universally valid. When “ethics” is contrasted with “morals,” the writer is usually discussing certain normative ethical theories that maintain that certain principles, rules, or virtues have universal ethical validity. A slightly more comprehensive answer would describe the difference; say from an ethical relativist positions definition, as hinging on ethical standards being subjected to the scrutiny of reason or rationality as its fundamental method.

What do we mean by “values”?

Frequently when used in discussions of ethics the term values is used to refer to the fundamental ideals that an individual relies on to describe praise-worthy behavior. A person’s values are the bedrock concepts used to determine their ethical decisions. Most generally speaking values represent aspirational goals common within your culture or society. Values such as honesty, benevolence, wisdom, duty, or compassion are universally recognized laudable and desirable features of a well-developed character. But which values are most important may differ from individual to individual, or across cultures. We could refer to the values of the feudal Japanese samurai culture placing the highest emphasis on the concept of personal honor. We could compare and contrast that with the European knightly virtues as a similar yet distinctively different set of cultural values. We could draw on political beliefs to describe the concepts of equality and freedom at the heart of democratic ideals, contrasting them with a constitutional monarchy that perhaps places the highest importance on duty and tradition as its central political ideals

Let’s examine a few examples of ethical issues.

Ethical issues abound in contemporary society. Ethical issues involve questions of the ethical rightness or wrongness of public policy or personal behavior.  Actions or policies that affect other people always have an ethical dimension, but while some people restrict ethical issues to actions that can help or harm others (social ethics) others include personal and self-regarding conduct (personal ethics).

Many of today’s most pressing issues of social ethics are complex and multifaceted and require clear and careful thought. Some of these issues include:

• Should states allow physician-assisted suicide?
• Is the death penalty an ethically acceptable type of punishment?
• Should animals have rights?
• Is society ever justified in regulating so-called victimless crimes like drug use, not wearing a helmet or a seatbelt, etc.?
• What are our responsibilities to future generations?
• Are affluent individuals and countries obligated to try to prevent starvation, malnutrition, and poverty wherever we find them in the world?
• Is there such a thing as a just war?
• How does business ethics relate to corporate responsibility?

To reach careful conclusions, these public policy issues require people to engage in complicated ethical reasoning, but the ethical reasoning involving personal issues can be just as complex and multifaceted:

• What principles do I apply to the way I treat other people?
• What guides my own choices and my own goals in life?
• Should I have the same expectations of others in terms of their behavior and choices as I have of myself?
• Is living ethically compatible or incompatible with what I call living well or happily?

Now you might be asking, “How can I effectively apply critical reasoning to an ethical issue?”

People care quite a bit about ethical issues and often voice varied and even sharply opposed perspectives. So when looking at how we debate ethical issues publicly, it is not surprising to find debate ranging from formal to informal argumentation, and from very carefully constructed arguments with well-qualified conclusions, to very biased positions and quite fallacious forms of persuasion. It’s easy to be dismayed by the discord we find over volatile issues like gun control, immigration policy, and equality in marriage or in the workplace, gender and race equality, abortion and birth control, jobs versus environment, freedom versus security, free speech and censorship, and so on. But it is also easy to go the other direction and be drawn into the often fallacious reasoning we hear all around us.

Critical thinkers want to conduct civil, respectful discourse, and to build bridges in ways that allow progress to be made on difficult issues of common concern. Progress and mutual understanding is not possible when name-calling, inflammatory language, and fallacies are the norm. Some mutual respect, together with the skill of being able to offer a clearly-structured argument for one’s position, undercuts the need to resort to such tactics. So critical thinkers resist trading fallacy for fallacy, and try to introduce common ground that can help resolve disputes by remaining respectful of differences, even about issues personally quite important to them. When we support a thesis (such as a position on one of the above ethical issues) with a clear and well-structured argument, we allow and invite others to engage with us in more constructive fashion. We say essentially, “Here is my thesis and here are my reasons for holding it. If you don’t agree with my claim, then show me what is wrong with my argument, and I will reconsider my view, as any rational person should.”

Another question you may be asking is, “When I debate ethical issues, what is my responsibility to people who are part of the dialogue?”

When we evaluate (analyze) somebody else’s position on an ethical issue, we are not free to simply reject out-of-hand a conclusion we don’t initially agree with. To be reasonable, we must accept the burden of showing where the other person errs in his facts or reasoning. If we cannot show that there are errors in the person’s facts or reasoning, to be reasonable we must reconsider whether we should reject the other person’s conclusion.

By applying the common standards of critical thinking to our reasoning about ethical issues, our arguments will become less emotionally driven and more rational. Our reasoning will become less dependent upon unquestioned beliefs or assumptions that the other people in the conversation may not accept. We become better able to contribute to progressive public debate and conflict resolution through a well-developed ability to articulate a well-reasoned position on an ethical issue.

And, you might be thinking, “What are ethical judgments?”

Ethical judgments are a subclass of value judgments. A value judgment involves an argument as to what is correct, superior, or preferable. In the case of ethics, the value judgment involves making a judgment, claim, or statement about whether an action is morally right or wrong or whether a person’s motives are morally good or bad. Ethical judgments often prescribe as well as evaluate actions, so that to state that someone (or perhaps everyone) ethically “should” or “ought to” do something is also to make an ethical judgment.

And you may be asking yourself, “How can I distinguish ethical judgments from other kinds of value judgments?”

If ethical judgments are a subclass of value judgments, how do we distinguish them?  Ethical judgments typically state that some action is good or bad, or right or wrong, in a specifically ethical sense. It is usually not difficult to distinguish non-ethical judgments of goodness and badness from ethical ones. When someone says “That was a good action, because it was caring,” or “That was bad action, because it was cruel” they are clearly intending goodness or badness in a distinctly ethical sense.

By contrast, non-moral value judgments typically say that something is good (or bad) simply for the kind of thing it is; or that some action is right or wrong, given the practical goal or purpose that one has in mind. “That’s a good car” or “That’s a bad bike” would not be considered to moral judgments about those objects. Goodness and badness here are still value judgments, but value judgments that likely track features like comfort, styling, reliability, safety and mileage ratings, etc.

The use of “should” or “ought to” for non-moral value judgments is also easy to recognize. “You ought to enroll early” or “You made the right decision to go to college” are value-judgments, but no one would say they are ethical judgments. They reflect a concern with wholly practical aims rather than ethical ones and with the best way to attain those practical aims.

Let’s end by looking at what is meant by  the term “ethical arguments.”

Ethical arguments are arguments whose conclusion makes an ethical judgment. Ethical arguments are most typically arguments that try to show a certain policy or behavior to be either ethical or unethical. Suppose you want to argue that “The death penalty is unjust (or just) punishment” for a certain range of violent crimes. Here we have an ethical judgment, and one that with a bit more detail could serve as the thesis of a position paper on the death penalty debate.

An ethical judgment rises above mere opinion and becomes the conclusion of an ethical argument when you support it with ethical reasoning. You must say why you hold the death penalty to be ethically right or wrong, just or unjust. For instance, you might argue that it is unjust because of one or more of the reasons below:

• It is cruel, and cruel actions are wrong.
• Two wrongs don’t make a right.
• It disrespects human life.
• In some states the penalty falls unevenly on members of a racial group.
• The penalty sometimes results in the execution of innocent people.

Of course you could also give reasons to support the view that the death penalty is a just punishment for certain crimes. The point is that whichever side of the debate you take, your ethical argument should develop ethical reasons and principles rather than economic or other practical but non-moral concerns. To argue merely that the death penalty be abolished because that would save us all money is a possible policy-position, but it is essentially an economic argument rather than an ethical argument.

This work ( The Basics of Ethical Reasoning by Radford University, Radford University Core Handbook, https://lcubbison.pressbooks.com/) is free of known copyright restrictions.

Share This Book

• school Campus Bookshelves
• menu_book Bookshelves
• perm_media Learning Objects
• login Login
• how_to_reg Request Instructor Account
• hub Instructor Commons
• Download Page (PDF)
• Download Full Book (PDF)
• Periodic Table
• Physics Constants
• Scientific Calculator
• Reference & Cite
• Tools expand_more
• Readability

selected template will load here

This action is not available.

10: Ethical Reasoning and Evaluation

• Last updated
• Save as PDF
• Page ID 223766

One of the most important things we reason about is what to do . How should we live our lives? What’s a good person? What’s the best life? What sorts of actions are out-of-bounds? What is required of us in situations of great need? What action is best in this situation?

These are ethical or moral questions.

We also reason about how to get things done, what the best means for attaining our goals are, what strategies work, etc.

These are prudential or pragmatic or practical questions.

We also reason about a lot of other things. Scientific questions, philosophical questions, legal questions, aesthetic questions, epistemic questions (questions about what we know and how we come to know things).

• 10.1: Ethics vs. Morality
• 10.2: Universalism vs. Relativism
• 10.3: Three Basic Systems of Morality
• 10.4: Levels of Evaluation

What is Ethics?

Andrew Fisher; David Svolba; Henry Imler; and Mark Dimmock

Click to print this chapter: What Is Ethics?

Welcome to Ethics! This field of study can be thought of in several ways, but for our purposes, we will think of Ethics as the study of applied value. [1]   When we talk about Ethics, we are generally talking about one of three things:

• Descriptive Ethics
• Normative Ethics, or

Descriptive Ethics is describing what and how a person or group thinks about right and wrong. The goal is to understand the Other. Here we are not attempting to evaluate the Other’s positions. We will not be spending much time doing descriptive ethics – we will leave that to the fields of Religious Studies, Sociology, History, et cetera.

Normative Ethics is the process of figuring out what is morally permissible or impermissible by applying a moral theory to a given problem or situation. The goal is to figure out what is right and wrong. Another way of saying this is that normative ethics is the do-ing of ethics. We will be spending a portion of our time in this course doing normative ethics. You will encounter lots of moral dilemmas, thought experiments, and historical reflections that will challenge you to coherently apply a given (or your own) moral approach to the problem to create solutions.

Metaethics is the process of thinking about Ethics itself. [2] This is what we will primarily be concerning ourselves with in this class. Some questions we will cover will include the following.

• What is the nature of value? Is it a fiction, created, or discovered?
• What beings are valuable (and to what degree)?
• What is the right or wrong making feature of our actions?
• What determines a valuable life (the good life)?

We will also look at various moral theories that have been posed as methods of determining what is moral and immoral. Major approaches include:

• Natural Law Theory,
• Utilitarianism,
• Deontology, and
• Virtue Ethics.

Our goal here is to understand the nature of Ethics and determine which ethical approaches are worthwhile. We might ask if the approach is coherent (consistent with itself without contradiction), complete (is able to address most ethical questions), pragmatic (is able to be lived out), et cetera. In this class, we will primarily be doing Metaethics.

Methods of Thinking about Ethical Problems [3]

Throughout this class, we will deal with ethical problems, situations in the abstract or real people’s lives in which we must make a moral determination (example of doing normative ethics).  We begin with a hard case , one which might pull us in different directions.

Baby Theresa . Theresa is born an anencephalic infant, which means that she will never be conscious, though she may live for several months since she has a functioning brain-stem that controls respiration and other life-sustaining processes.  Theresa’s parents are understandably devastated.  After consulting with Theresa’s doctors, the parents make a decision: they request that Theresa’s healthy organs be removed, thereby killing her, and given to otherwise healthy children who will die if they do not receive an organ.  The alternative is to donate Theresa’s organs after she dies, but as we wait for nature to take its course children will die who could have been saved, and Theresa’s organs will become less viable. [4]

Would it be ethically wrong to kill Baby Theresa in order to save the lives of other children?

How would we even begin to answer a question like this?

Some False Starts

Why not seek an answer to the question by…

Consulting the law?

But there may not be a law that covers the hard case, in which case the law will not offer us any guidance.  More importantly, however:

Is the law a reliable guide to right and wrong?  Let’s consider: can we think of actions (real or imagined, current or historical) that are legal but unethical?  Can we think of actions that are illegal but ethical? If so – if legality and ethics can diverge – then the law probably isn’t a reliable guide to determining the right thing to do.

Conducting an opinion poll?

But others may be as torn as we are concerning what to do, in which case an opinion poll won’t offer us any guidance.  More importantly, however:

Are opinion polls a reliable guide to right and wrong?  Let’s consider: can we think of actions that are (or were ) popularly approved of but unethical?  Can we think of ethical actions that are not popularly approved of?  If so – if popular opinion and ethics can diverge – then opinion polls will not be a reliable guide to determining the right thing to do.

Going with ‘gut feelings,’ or the dictates of conscience?

But especially when it comes to hard cases, we may not have clear feelings one way or the other—or, more likely still, our feelings might pull us in opposing directions, leading us to draw different conclusions about right and wrong.  More importantly, however:

Are ‘gut feelings’ (or conscience) a reliable guide to right and wrong?  Again, let’s apply the same divergence test we applied when considering the first two suggestions: can we think of examples in which conscience errs, or a person’s gut feelings lead her astray?  We might also reasonably wonder about the source of gut feelings or dictates of conscience.  Why think that these give us glimpses of ethical truth, rather than, for example, merely reflecting on assumptions and biases that we have accumulated through our upbringing and socialization?

Ethical Argument

There is a better approach to ethical hard cases than any of the false starts canvassed above: we can think about them.  We can consider the reasons for and against certain ethical evaluations.  We can construct and evaluate ethical arguments and see in which direction the weight of reasons tilt.

You might not be accustomed to thinking of ethics as a subject we can reason about.  After all, many ethical disagreements seem anything but reasonable: they are often passionately emotional and intractable.  But this might simply reflect the fact that we are not prone to reason about ethics well .  Really, this is not so surprising, since reasoning well about any subject, and certainly a subject as complex and difficult as ethics, requires considerable experience.

A first step in learning how to reason well about ethical issues is to learn how ethical arguments work.  One standard form of ethical argument seeks to derive particular ethical judgments— for example, the judgment that it would be wrong to kill Baby Theresa—from general ethical principles .  A general ethical principle is a statement that says that a certain kind of action is ethical or unethical.

Here, for example, is a general ethical principle, which we may call the Benefits-Without-Harm Principle , or

BWHP :  If an action will benefit people, without harming anyone, then it is ethically right.

BWHP identifies what philosophers call a sufficient condition for ethically right action.  If an action benefits people without causing any harm, then that’s enough – it’s sufficient – to make that action ethically right, regardless of other features of the action or the circumstances in which the action is performed.

Suppose we find BWHP intuitively compelling.  Does it shed any light on our question about whether killing Baby Theresa would be unethical?  It might seem to, for one could appeal to BWHP in making the following ethical argument:

Argument 1 (A1)

• 1) If an action will benefit people, without harming anyone, then it is ethically right.
• 2) Killing Baby Theresa will benefit people, without harming anyone.
• 3) Therefore, killing Baby Theresa is ethically right.

For the moment, never mind whether this argument is convincing.  Rather, try to appreciate how this method of arriving at ethical judgments differs significantly from the false starts we considered above.

Evaluating Ethical Arguments

In evaluating a simple ethical argument like A1, there are two basic questions we can ask:

• 1) Is the general principle to which the argument appeals (in this case, BWHP) a plausible one?
• 2) Is the principle correctly applied to the case under consideration?

As for the first question, one common way to assess the plausibility of a general ethical principle is by using what philosophers call the method of counterexample .  This involves searching for cases (real or imagined) in which the principle gives the intuitively wrong result.  Let’s illustrate this method by devising a possible counterexample to our sample principle, BWHP:

Benefactor .  I am a very wealthy man in a small city with two hospitals.  One hospital (Sunnyvale) serves the very rich and is decked out with all the latest and greatest medical equipment and is staffed by the most talented doctors and nurses.  The other hospital (City General) serves the rest of the city (a majority of the population) and is badly under-equipped, under-staffed, and desperately in need of upgrades and repairs.  Despite being aware of the dramatic inequality in the relative state of these two hospitals, I donate several million dollars to Sunnyvale and give nothing to City General. My reason is that I have been a patient at Sunnyvale several times in the past and am grateful for the treatment and care I received there.

Have I acted ethically right?  Was giving several million dollars to Sunnyvale the right thing to do ? BWHP suggests that it was.  After all:

Argument 2 (A2)

• 2) Donating the money to Sunnyvale benefits people without harming anyone.
• 3) Therefore, donating the money to Sunnyvale is ethically right.

But suppose we disagree with the claim that donating the money to Sunnyvale is the ethically right thing to do.  What I should have done, we might argue, is donate the money to the hospital that needed it most—City General—where it could have done significantly more good.  In our estimation then, BWHP yields the incorrect verdict in the case of Benefactor , and that’s a reason to doubt its validity.

Of course, counterexamples in ethics are never conclusive , since one always has the option to ‘bite the bullet’ and take on-board the counterintuitive ethical judgment. For example, a proponent of BWHP could give up the judgment that the money should have been donated to City General (and thereby state that giving it to Sunnyvale was the right thing) instead of giving up on BWHP. In ethics, counterexamples give us a choice: we can modify our principles to fit our ethical judgments, or we can modify our ethical judgments to fit our principles.  Unfortunately, there is no algorithm for deciding when to do which.  The best we can do is try to use good judgment and be on guard against various forms of bias.

In any case, let’s suppose that BWHP passes our tests.  Let’s suppose we’ve considered a wide range of cases in which an action benefits people without harming anyone, and without exception we are disposed to judge these actions ethically right.  When evaluating arguments like A1, there is still work to be done even if we find acceptable the general ethical principle to which the argument appeals.  We need to ask whether the principle actually applies to the case under consideration.  In evaluating A1, for example, we have to ask whether it is true that killing Baby Theresa would benefit people without harming anyone.  We may disagree about whether an individual like Baby Theresa is harmed by being killed.  In evaluating A2, we might disagree about whether there can be circumstances in which not bestowing a gift constitutes a harm, and, if so, whether these circumstances obtain in Benefactor .  Complex conceptual and empirical issues like these arise all the time when thinking about right and wrong and form a large part of the workload in philosophical ethics.

Other Important Argument Forms

Thus far we’ve looked only at ethical arguments in which a particular action is said to conform to a general ethical principle.  These arguments have the following form or pattern :

• General Principle: Actions of type X are ethically right (or ethically wrong).
• Particular judgment: This action, a , is an X.
• Conclusion: Thus, a is ethically right (or ethically wrong).

As you begin to read more widely in philosophical ethics you will notice that there are many different argument-forms that philosophers commonly employ.  Learning these patterns will improve your comprehension of arguments in ethics and your ability to offer compelling support for your own ethical views.  Here we will cover two more forms: arguments from analogy and arguments from inference to the best explanation .

Arguments from Analogy

• X is ethically right (or ethically wrong).
• Y is just like X in all ethically relevant respects.
• Thus, Y is ethically right (or ethically wrong).

Arguments from analogy are very common and can be very powerful. They derive their persuasive force from a basic principle of rational consistency stating that we should treat like cases alike .

A great illustration of this argument-form can be found in the philosopher Peter Singer’s essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.”  In that essay Singer aims to show that people in an affluent society like ours have an ethical obligation to contribute money to charitable organizations working to help the global poor.  In supporting this claim, Singer asks us to imagine that we are passing by a shallow pond in which a small child is drowning. Supposing we could save the child at little cost to ourselves, Singer thinks that

• Nearly everyone would acknowledge that they have in these circumstances an ethical obligation to help the drowning child.

He then argues:

• There are no ethically relevant differences between the situation of the drowning child and the situation of the global poor.

And so, Singer concludes:

• We have an ethical obligation to help the global poor.

In evaluating any argument from analogy, Singer’s included, the most important (but not the only) question to ask is whether it is true that there are no ethically relevant differences between the cases being compared.  After all, if there are ethically relevant differences, these could justify reaching a different conclusion about the two cases (there is no principle stating we must treat unlike cases alike).  And indeed this is the issue on which Singer and critics of his now classic essay have focused.

Arguments from Inference to the Best Explanation

• The best explanation for why X is ethically right (or ethically wrong) is captured by a general principle P.
• Thus, we should accept P.
• But P implies that Y is ethically right (or ethically wrong).

Another common argument-form in ethics, arguments from inference to the best explanation trade on the fact that when we accept an ethical principle we commit ourselves to accepting its implications. A great illustration of this argument-form can be found in Don Marquis’ essay, “Why Abortion is Immoral.”  In that essay Marquis argues as follows:

• It is wrong to kill a normal, adult human being.
• The best explanation for why it is wrong to kill a normal, adult human being is the Deprivation Principle: it is wrong to deprive an individual of a future-of-value.
• Thus, we should accept the Deprivation Principle.
• But the Deprivation Principle implies that abortion is wrong, since abortions deprive individuals (the fetuses) of a future-of-value.
• Thus, abortion is wrong.

In evaluating arguments from inference to the best explanation, Marquis’ included, the most important (but not the only) question to ask is whether the proffered explanation for the initial ethical judgment really is best .  Perhaps there is an alternative principle that explains the initial judgment just as well or better, and which doesn’t imply what the proffered principle implies.  And indeed this is the issue on which Marquis and his critics have focused.

Critical Thinking

By critical thinking , we refer to thinking that is recursive in nature. Any time we encounter new information or new ideas, we double back and rethink our prior conclusions on the subject to see if any other conclusions are better suited. [5]

Critical thinking can be contrasted with Authoritarian thinking . This type of thinking seeks to preserve the original conclusion. Here, thinking and conclusions are policed, as to question the system is to threaten the system. And threats to the system demand a defensive response. Critical thinking is short-circuited in authoritarian systems so that the conclusions are conserved instead of being open for revision.

Humility and vulnerability are key to critical thinking. We might also frame critical thinking in terms of having an open vs. an arrogant mind. The Greek philosopher Plato used two terms that help us name poor thinking. In the dialog Alcibiades , Socrates accuses his friend of being both ignorant and foolish. [6] Agnoeo (ignorance) for Plato, is a simple lack of knowledge — something which can be fixed with ease. Amathia (foolishness) , on the other hand, is a lack of awareness of one’s ignorance. [7] The opposite of amathia is not knowledge itself, but of an awareness of one’s ignorance . Socrates, in The Apology , concludes his search for wisdom in realizing that he is ignorant. [8] And so humility and vulnerability are key parts of critical thinking.

Liberation, not Banking — On Attitude and Practice

Ethics is more than just fact-learning, or a “history of ideas”. It is different from chemistry, mathematics, languages, theology etc. It is unique. Sure, it is important to learn some facts, and learn what others believed, but a successful student needs to do more than simply regurgitate information . One aim of this book is to aid you in engaging with a living discipline. Ethics is a live and evolving subject. When you study philosophy, you are entering a dialog with those that have gone before you and those beside you. Learning about what various philosophers think will enable you to become clearer about what you think and add to that evolving dialog.

Ethics, like much of life, is more developing an attitude vs. accumulating facts. Paulo Freire develops the idea of the “Banking Model of Education” where facts, concepts, et cetera are deposited in the student by a learned master. [9] Such a view considers education to be static and a mere tool in the accumulation of wealth. You may recall politicians on both sides talk about education primarily in terms of job-training. While this is a useful benefit of education, the primary goal of education is to transform an “empty mind into an open one.” [10]

Notice the shift from banking to liberation in the quote. The term “empty mind” implies the purpose of education is to fill the mind with facts, terms, procedures, and directions. But we are not robots whose function is to merely recall information and process orders! We are something else entirely. Just what will be explored throughout this course. An open mind is a liberated mind. The open mind searches for what is good and what is true for their own sakes, not because it will increase one’s bottom line.

Freire contrasts the Banking Model of Education with what can be called a “Liberation Model of Education.” This approach to education places an emphasis upon the humanization of the self and the Other. The goal for the student and the teacher to partner together to solve the problems that face their communities. Sometimes this will involve unmasking the machines that govern our lives but remain hidden from public view. Other times it will involve imagining a more just society or efficient contraption. It might even involve naming and reckoning with current systems of oppression as well as coming to terms with how injustices of the past echo forward. It always resists demonizing the Other and refuses to turn the tables, allowing the oppressed to become the vengeful oppressors, as is the temptation.

The Liberation Educational model is able to simultaneously realize that in some ways we have been the beneficiaries of unjust social contracts, even though we have not been signatories to them. A Banking Model of Education is unable to evaluate the systems in which it is embedded because within it, all knowledge is stable and depends upon the legitimacy of the system for its stability. In contrast, in the Liberation Model of Education, we can question the systems themselves, demanding better and more just systems. We will talk about the connection between power, justice, and knowledge elsewhere in the course.

For Reflection and Discussion – Set 1

• In your educational history, have you encountered something like the banking or liberation model?
• If you have experienced both, which did you find more humanizing?
• What problems face your community? How might you partner others to work on solving those problems?
• In what ways might you be the beneficiaries of an unjust social contracts even though you are not signatories of the contract?
• What sort of attitude is required in regurgitating facts vs. doing ethics?

Distinctions

As we embark on our study of ethics, there are some concepts we need to carefully keep separate. It will be easy to fall victim to these flaws in reasoning. The authors have been guilty of these things from time to time! Before we get to these distinctions, let us talk about one distinction we do not make. Some people distinguish between “ethics” and “morality”. We do not. For us, nothing hangs on the difference between them. In this book you will see us switching between the terms, so do not get hung up on this distinction.

Is vs. Ought – Hume’s Guillotine

David Hume famously pointed out that we cannot move from an is to an ought . [11] He notes that many systems of ethics do, but that he can find no reason that justifies such a transcendence of categories. While this separation of is and ought by Hume is used to argue in part for his skepticism of prescriptive ethical theories we can use the distinction more broadly to note that just because someone is doing something is not evidence that they ought to be doing something. We can illustrate the concept with the following diagram.

Let’s examine these regions:

• Region A – What people are doing, but should not be doing (These are the things we need to stop doing.)
• Region B –Those actions people should be doing and are doing. (This is the sweet spot.)
• Region C – Those hypothetical actions we should be doing, but are not doing. (Where we need to move.)
• Region D – Those hypothetical actions we are not doing and should not be doing. (Stay away!)

Consider some examples that concern what people are doing (IS) and what they should be doing (OUGHT). Imagine the headline: “Scientists discover a gene explaining why we want to punch people wearing red trousers”. The article includes lots of science showing the genes and the statistical proof. Yet, none of this will tells us whether acting violently towards people wearing red trousers is morally acceptable. The explanation of why people feel and act in certain ways leaves it open as to how people morally ought to act.

For Reflection and Discussion – Set 2

1. What actions would you place within regions A, B, C, and D?

2. Discuss why you all placed those actions within their corresponding reasons.

3. What does your answer to #2 say about your ethical viewpoint?

Consider a more serious example, relating to the ethics of eating meat. Supporters of meat-eating often point to our incisor teeth. This shows that it is natural for us to eat meat, a fact used as a reason for thinking that it is morally acceptable to do so. But this is a bad argument. Just because we have incisors does not tell us how we morally ought to behave. It might explain why we find it easy to eat meat, and it might even explain why we like eating meat. But this is not relevant to the moral question. Don’t you believe us? Imagine that dentists discover that our teeth are “designed” to eat other humans alive. What does this tell us about whether it is right or wrong to eat humans alive? Nothing.

Legal vs. Moral

It is easy for people to conflate that which moral with that which is legal . But, in fact, these are two very different categories, much like is vs ought. We can represent this with the following diagram.

The relation between the sets of actions that are legal (within a given jurisdiction) and the actions that are moral.

In the figure above, the categories of actions that are legal overlap with the collection of actions that are moral, but they are not the same set of things. Once again, we have used the letters A, B, C, and D to denote positions in the diagram. Let us look at some possible examples for each of these locations:

• Region A – Legal but not Moral – Jim Crow Laws;
• Region B – Legal and Moral- Refraining from Killing the Innocent;
• Region C – Moral but not Legal – Breaking Jim Crow Laws; and
• Region D – Not moral and not Legal – Killing the Innocent.

Using your knowledge of history or your googling devices, look up instances of immoral behaviors that have been legal in their local jurisdictions.

And so, we can see that we need to be careful when talking about issues of legality and morality. Just because something is legal does not make it moral. In fact, most of the worst atrocities we humans have inflicted upon ourselves have been legal within their jurisdictions. Similarly, we can identify instances of illegal behaviors which are, in fact, moral.

The Issue of Disagreement

Finally, we want to draw your attention to a common bad argument as we want you to be aware of the mistake it leads to. Imagine that a group of friends are arguing about which country has won the most Olympic gold medals. Max says China, Alastair says the US, Dinh says the UK. There is general ignorance and disagreement; but does this mean that there is not an answer to the question of “which country has won the most Olympic gold medals?” No! We cannot move from the fact that people disagree to the conclusion that there is no answer.

Now consider a parallel argument that we hear far too often. Imagine that you and your friends are discussing whether euthanasia is morally acceptable. Some say yes, the others say no. Each of you cite how different cultures have different views on euthanasia. Does this fact — that there is disagreement — mean that there is no answer to the question of whether euthanasia is morally acceptable? Again, the answer is no. That answer did not follow in the Olympic case, and it does not follow in the moral one either.

So just because different cultures have different moral views, this does not show, by itself, that there is no moral truth and no answer to the question. If you are interested in the idea that there is a lack of moral truth in ethics, then Moral Error Theorists defend exactly this position in the chapter on Metaethics.

In this introduction, we have sketched out some basic ideas necessary to start the study of Ethics. We have examined the basics of critical thinking and discussed 3 methods of talking about ethics: Descriptive Ethics, Normative Ethics, and Metaethics. We also looked at the three major positions on the nature of Ethics itself: Nonrealism, Relativism, and Realism. We have signposted some errors to avoid when it comes to thinking about ethics, and some strategies to consider instead. It may be worth occasionally revisiting the ideas discussed here during your studies, to test your own lines of argument and evaluate how “thinking well” is progressing for you. This would not be a weakness! The authors, and any honest philosopher, can reassure you — philosophy is hard, but it is worth it. We hope you find this textbook useful and rewarding in helping you on your own journey through Ethics.

For Reflection and Discussion – Set 3

• What did you think Ethics and Philosophy were before you came into class? How about now?
• What are the most pressing ethical problems facing you and your community?
• Give examples of the is/ought and legal/moral distinctions. When have you or others conflated the them in the past?
• Given what limited exposure you have had to the concepts, do you agree with the Nonrealist, Relativist, or Realist positions? Explain your reasoning and use an example to showcase your thinking.

Check Your Understanding

Select the best answer for each item.

Citation & Use

This chapter was sourced from Phronesis: An Open Introduction to Ethical Theory with Readings , by Henry Imler, which holds a CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0 license.

• Mark Schroeder, “Value Theory,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2016 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/value-theory/. ↵
• Geoff Sayre-McCord, “Metaethics,” in  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2014 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/metaethics/. ↵
• This section was drawn from David Svolba's chapter on the same topic in Introduction to Ethics from NGE Press. His work is licensed under the Creative Commons open culture licence (CC-BY). ↵
• Drawn from the actual case of Theresa Ann Campo Pearson.  For an overview of the ethical issues involved, see https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5606434/.  ↵
• This discussion of critical thinking is drawn from Professor Barrett’s critical thinking model. For more, see Mike Barrett, “Critical Thinking,” in  Reading, Thinking, Writing (LOGOS Project at MACC, 2017). ↵
• Plato, “Alcibiades,” in  Plato in 12 Volumes , trans. Harold North Flower, vol. 1 (London: Harvard University Press, 1966), sec. 118b, http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg013.perseus-eng1:118b. ↵
• Euripides, in  Bacchae , invokes the idea of “willful blindness” with this term. See Robert Scott and H.G. Liddell,  An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon  (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1945). and Euripides and T.A. Buckley, “Bacchae,” in  The Tragedies of Euripides (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1850), l. 490, http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0006.tlg017.perseus-eng1:476-518. ↵
• Plato, “The Apology,” in  Plato in 12 Volumes , trans. Harold North Flower, vol. 1 (London: Harvard University Press, 1966), secs. 20e–23c, http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg002.perseus-eng1:20e. ↵
• Paulo Freire and Donaldo Macedo,  Pedagogy of the Oppressed: 50th Anniversary Edition , 4 edition (Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), chap. 2. ↵
• Quote by Malcom Forbes as recorded in: Richard Lederer,  A Tribute to Teachers: Wit and Wisdom, Information and Inspiration about Those Who Change Our Lives (Marion Street Press, 2011), chap. 9. ↵
• David Hume,  A Treatise on Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects; and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Longmans, Green and Company, 1874), 245–46. ↵

What is Ethics? Copyright © 2024 by Andrew Fisher; David Svolba; Henry Imler; and Mark Dimmock is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Share This Book

VCU Writes: A Student’s Guide to Research and Writing

Focused inquiry, ethical reasoning.

Ethical reasoning is a crucial aspect of decision-making to help individuals navigate complex moral issues: a systematic process of analyzing and evaluating situations and problems to determine whether our decisions are right or wrong, just or unjust. It involves understanding the moral principles and values that guide common human behavior–anything from “Should I walk instead of drive to the store?” to “What is entailed in one’s right to free speech?” Ethical reasoning helps us assess the impact of our potential actions on individuals and society: considering the perspectives of all parties involved, weighing the potential consequences of different courses of action, and making a decision based on one’s determined beliefs and values. Ethical reasoning is a crucial skill in both our professional and daily lives, as it helps individuals make decisions that are in line with their own standards to ultimately try and better society as a whole.

The resources below not only help you understand how to come to informed decisions on what is good or bad in any given situation, but to come to your own conclusions as to how you should mindfully and consistently live your own life.

ConnectED skills related to Ethical Reasoning : Ethical reasoning; Global and Cultural Responsiveness; Problem Solving

• A Framework for Ethical Decision Making (article) – The Markkula Center for Applied Ethics
• A Framework for Ethical Decision Making (video) – The Markkula Center for Applied Ethics
• Elements of Ethical Reasoning – Dr. Andrew Marx, VCU
• Making an Ethical Decision – The Markkula Center for Applied Ethics
• Thinking about Ethics – Dr. Andrew Marx, VCU
• What is Ethics? – The Markkula Center for Applied Ethics

• Thinker's Guides

The Thinker's Guide to Ethical Reasoning (Based on Critical Thinking Concepts & Tools)

Richard paul and linda elder, order from rowman & littlefield here., contact info for rowman & littlefield:.

• Toll free: (800) 462-6420 ext. 3024
• Fax: (800) 338-4550
• Orders to [email protected]
• Queries to [email protected]

Additional Information About: The Thinker's Guide to Ethical Reasoning (Based on Critical Thinking Concepts & Tools)

Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4

The proper role of ethical reasoning is to highlight acts of two kinds: those which enhance the well-being of others—that warrant our praise—and those that harm or diminish the well-being of others—and thus warrant our criticism. Developing one’s ethical reasoning abilities is crucial because there is in human nature a strong tendency toward egotism, prejudice, self-justification, and self-deception. These tendencies are exacerbated by pow­erful sociocentric cultural influences that shape our lives—not least of which is the mass media. These tendencies can be actively combated only through the systematic cultivation of fair-mindedness, honesty, integrity, self-knowledge, and deep concern for the welfare of others. We can never eliminate our egocentric tendencies absolutely and finally. But we can actively combat them as we learn to develop as ethical persons.

Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 The ultimate basis for ethics is clear: Human behavior has consequences for the welfare of others. We are capable of acting toward others in such a way as to increase or decrease the quality of their lives. We are capable of helping or harming. What is more, we are theoretically capable of understanding when we are doing the one and when the other. This is so because we have the capacity to put ourselves imaginatively in the place of others and recognize how we would be affected if someone were to act toward us as we are acting toward others.

Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 This mini-guide will not automatically make anyone an ethical person. But it does provide an essential foundation, without which ethical discussion will often end in hopeless disputation or discouraging contradiction and misunderstanding. Developing as an insightful ethical reasoner and person takes time and much practice.

Contents include:

• The Function of Ethics
• Egocentrism as a Fundamental Barrier to Ethical Reasoning
• The Problem of Pseudo-Ethics—the Sociocentric Counterfeits of Ethical Reasoning
• Religious Beliefs are Culturally Variant
• Socially or Culturally Variant Practices
• Ethics and Sexual Taboos
• Ethics and Political Ideology
• Ethics and the Law
• Acts that are Unethical In-and-Of Themselves
• Distinguishing Among Questions of Ethics, Social Conventions, Religion, and the Law
• How to Figure Out the Logic of an Ethical Question
• Language as a Guide to Ethical Reasoning
• Distinguishing Between Simple and Complex Ethical Questions
• Facts in Relationship to Ethical Perspectives
• Intellectual Standards for Assessing Ethical Reasoning
• Ethical Reasoning Abilities
• Essential Ethical Virtues

• Open access
• Published: 26 March 2024

The effect of “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” on the critical thinking of midwifery students: Evidence from China

• Yuji Wang 1   na1 ,
• Yijuan Peng 1   na1 &
• Yan Huang 1  

BMC Medical Education volume  24 , Article number:  340 ( 2024 ) Cite this article

116 Accesses

Metrics details

Assessment ability lies at the core of midwives’ capacity to judge and treat clinical problems effectively. Influenced by the traditional teaching method of “teacher-led and content-based”, that teachers involve imparting a large amount of knowledge to students and students lack active thinking and active practice, the clinical assessment ability of midwifery students in China is mostly at a medium or low level. Improving clinical assessment ability of midwifery students, especially critical thinking, is highly important in practical midwifery education. Therefore, we implemented a new teaching program, “typical case discussion and scenario simulation”, in the Midwifery Health Assessment course. Guided by typical cases, students were organized to actively participate in typical case discussions and to promote active thinking and were encouraged to practice actively through scenario simulation. In this study, we aimed to evaluate the effect of this strategy on the critical thinking ability of midwifery students.

A total of 104 midwifery students in grades 16–19 at the West China School of Nursing, Sichuan University, were included as participants through convenience sampling. All the students completed the Midwifery Health Assessment course in the third year of university. Students in grades 16 and 17 were assigned to the control group, which received routine teaching in the Midwifery Health Assessment, while students in grades 18 and 19 were assigned to the experimental group, for which the “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” teaching mode was employed. The Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory-Chinese Version (CTDI-CV) and Midwifery Health Assessment Course Satisfaction Questionnaire were administered after the intervention.

After the intervention, the critical thinking ability of the experimental group was greater than that of the control group (284.81 ± 27.98 and 300.94 ± 31.67, p  = 0.008). Furthermore, the experimental group exhibited higher scores on the four dimensions of Open-Mindedness (40.56 ± 5.60 and 43.59 ± 4.90, p  = 0.005), Analyticity (42.83 ± 5.17 and 45.42 ± 5.72, p  = 0.020), Systematicity (38.79 ± 4.70 and 41.88 ± 6.11, p  = 0.006), and Critical Thinking Self-Confidence (41.35 ± 5.92 and 43.83 ± 5.89, p  = 0.039) than did the control group. The course satisfaction exhibited by the experimental group was greater than that exhibited by the control group (84.81 ± 8.49 and 90.19 ± 8.41, p  = 0.002).

The “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class mode can improve the critical thinking ability of midwifery students and enhance their curriculum satisfaction. This approach carries a certain degree of promotional significance in medical education.

Typical case discussion and scenario simulation can improve midwifery students’ critical thinking ability.

Typical case discussion and scenario simulation can enhance students’ learning interest and guide students to learn independently.

Midwifery students were satisfied with the new teaching mode.

Peer Review reports

Maternal and neonatal health are important indicators to measure of the level of development of a country’s economy, culture and health care. The positive impact of quality midwifery education on maternal and newborn health is acknowledged in the publication framework for action strengthening quality midwifery education issued by the World Health Organization (WHO) [ 1 ]. Extensive evidence has shown that skilled midwifery care is crucial for reducing preventable maternal and neonatal mortality [ 2 , 3 , 4 ]. Clinical practice features high requirements for the clinical thinking ability of midwives, which refers to the process by which medical personnel analyze and integrate data with professional medical knowledge in the context of diagnosis and treatment as well as discover and solve problems through logical reasoning [ 5 ]. Critical thinking is a thoughtful process that is purposeful, disciplined, and self-directed and that aims to improve decisions and subsequent actions [ 6 ]. In 1986, the American Association of Colleges of Nursing formulated the “Higher Education Standards for Nursing Specialty”, which emphasize the fact that critical thinking is the primary core competence that nursing graduates should possess [ 7 ]. Many studies have shown that critical thinking can help nurses detect, analyze and solve problems creatively in clinical work and is a key factor in their ability to make correct clinical decisions [ 8 , 9 , 10 ].

However, the traditional teaching method used for midwifery students in China is “teacher-led and content-based”, and it involves efficiently and conveniently imparting a large amount of knowledge to students over a short period. Students have long failed to engage in active thinking and active practice, and the cultivation of critical thinking has long been ignored [ 5 ]. As a result, the critical thinking ability of midwifery students in China is mostly at a medium or low level [ 5 ]. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a new teaching mode to improve the critical thinking ability of midwifery students.

In 2014, Professor Xuexin Zhang of Fudan University, Shanghai, China, proposed a novel teaching method: the divided class mode. The basic idea of this approach is to divide the class time into two parts. The teachers explain the theoretical knowledge in the first lesson, and the students discuss that knowledge in the second lesson. This approach emphasizes the guiding role of teachers and encourages and empowers students to take responsibility for their studies [ 11 ]. Research has shown that the divided class mode can improve students’ enthusiasm and initiative as well as teaching effectiveness [ 12 ].

The problem-originated clinical medical curriculum mode of teaching was first established at McMaster University in Canada in 1965. This model is based on typical clinical cases and a problem-oriented heuristic teaching model [ 13 ]. The process of teaching used in this approach is guided by typical cases with the goal of helping students combine theoretical knowledge and practical skills. This approach can enhance the enthusiasm and initiative of students by establishing an active learning atmosphere. Students are encouraged to discuss and analyze typical cases to promote their ability to digest and absorb theoretical knowledge. Research has shown that the problem-originated clinical medical curriculum teaching mode can enhance students’ confidence and improve their autonomous learning and exploration ability. Scenario simulation teaching can provide students with real scenarios, allowing them to practice and apply their knowledge in a safe environment [ 14 ], which can effectively improve their knowledge and clinical skills and enhance their self-confidence [ 15 , 16 ].

Based on the teaching concept of divided classes, our research team established a new teaching model of “typical case discussion and scenario simulation”. Half of the class time is allocated for students to discuss typical cases and carry out scenario simulations to promote their active thinking and active practice. The Midwifery Health Assessment is the final professional core course that midwifery students must take in our school before clinical practice. All students must complete the course in Grade 3. Teaching this course is important for cultivating the critical thinking and clinical assessment ability of midwifery students. Therefore, our team adopted the new teaching mode of "typical case discussion and scenario simulation" in the teaching of this course. This study explored the teaching mode’s ability to improve the critical thinking ability of midwifery students.

Study design

The study employed a semiexperimental design.

Participants

A convenience sample of 104 third-year midwifery students who were enrolled in the Midwifery Health Assessment course volunteered to participate in this research at a large public university in Sichuan Province from February 2019 to June 2022 (grades 16 to 19). All the students completed the course in the third year of university. Students in grades 16 and 17 were assigned to the control group, which received the traditional teaching mode. Students in grades 18 and 19 were assigned to the experimental group, in which context the “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class mode was used. The exclusion criteria for midwifery students were as follows: (1) dropped out of school during the study, (2) took continuous leave from school for more than two weeks, or (3) were unable to complete the questionnaire. The elimination criterion for midwifery students was that all the items were answered in the same way. No significant differences in students’ scores in their previous professional courses (Midwifery) were observed between the two groups. Textbooks, teachers, and teaching hours were the same for both groups.

Development of the “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class mode

This study is based on the implementation of the new century higher education teaching reform project at Sichuan University. With the support of Sichuan University, we first established a “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class mode team. The author of this paper was the head of the teaching reform project and served as a consultant, and the first author is responsible for supervising the implementation of the project. Second, the teaching team discussed and developed a standard process for the “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class mode. Third, the entire team received intensive training in the standard process for the “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class mode.

Implementation of the “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class mode

Phase i (before class).

Before class, in accordance with the requirements for evaluating different periods of pregnancy, the teacher conceptualized typical cases and then discussed those cases with the teaching team and made any necessary modifications. After the completion of the discussion, the modified cases were released to the students through the class group. To ensure students’ interest, they were guided through the task of discovering and solving relevant problems using an autonomous learning approach.

Phase II (the first week)

Typical case discussion period. The Midwifery Health Assessment course was taught by 5 teachers and covered 5 health assessment periods, namely, the pregnancy preparation, pregnancy, delivery, puerperium and neonatal periods. The health assessment course focused on each period over 2 consecutive teaching weeks, and 2 lessons were taught per week. The first week focused on the discussion of typical cases. In the first lesson, teachers introduced typical cases, taught key knowledge or difficult evaluation content pertaining to the different periods, and explored the relevant knowledge framework. In the second lesson, teachers organized group discussions, case analyses and intergroup communications for the typical cases. They were also responsible for coordinating and encouraging students to participate actively in the discussion. After the discussion, teachers and students reviewed the definitions, treatments and evaluation points associated with the typical cases. The teachers also encouraged students to internalize knowledge by engaging in a process of summary and reflection to achieve the purpose of combining theory with practice.

Phase III (the second week)

Scenario simulation practice period. The second week focused on the scenario simulation practice period. In the first lesson, teachers reviewed the focus of assessment during the different periods and answered students’ questions. In the second lesson, students performed typical case assessment simulations in subgroups. After the simulation, the teachers commented on and summarized the students’ simulation evaluation and reviewed the evaluation points of typical cases to improve the students’ evaluation ability.

The organizational structure and implementation of the “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class mode showed in Fig.  1 .

“Typical case discussion and scenario simulation” teaching mode diagram

A demographic questionnaire designed for this purpose was used to collect relevant information from participants, including age, gender, single-child status, family location, experience with typical case discussion or scenario simulation and scores in previous professional courses (Midwifery).

The Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory-Chinese Version (CTDI-CV) was developed by Peng et al. to evaluate the critical thinking ability of midwifery students [ 17 ]. The scale contains 70 items across a total of seven dimensions, namely, open-mindedness, truth-seeking, analytical ability, systematic ability, self-confidence in critical thinking, thirst for knowledge, and cognitive maturity. Each dimension is associated with 10 items, and each item is scored on a 6-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating “extremely agree” and 6 representing “extremely disagree”. The scale includes 30 positive items, which receive scores ranging from “extremely agree” to “extremely disagree” on a scale of 6 to 1, and 40 negative items, which receive scores ranging from “extremely agree” to “extremely disagree” on a scale of 1 to 6. A total score less than 210 indicates negative critical thinking ability, scores between 211 and 279 indicate an unclear meaning, scores of 280 or higher indicate positive critical thinking ability, and scores of 350 or higher indicate strong performance. The score range of each trait is 10–60 points; a score of 30 points or fewer indicates negative trait performance, scores between 31 and 39 points indicate that the trait meaning is incorrect, scores of 40 points or higher indicate positive trait performance, and scores of 50 points or higher indicate extremely positive trait performance. The Cronbach’s α coefficient of the scale was 0.90, thus indicating good content validity and structure. The higher an individual’s score on this measure is, the better that individual’s critical thinking ability.

The evaluation of teaching results was based on a questionnaire used to assess undergraduate course satisfaction, and the researchers deleted and modified items in the questionnaire to suit the context of the “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” teaching mode. Two rounds of discussion were held within the study group to form the final version of the Midwifery Health Assessment satisfaction questionnaire. The questionnaire evaluates the effect of teaching in terms of three dimensions, namely, curriculum content, curriculum teaching and curriculum evaluation. The questionnaire contains 21 items, each of which is scored on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating “extremely disagree” and 5 representing “extremely agree”. The higher the score is, the better the teaching effect.

Data collection and statistical analysis

We input the survey data into the “Wenjuanxing” platform ( https://www.wjx.cn/ ), which specializes in questionnaire services. At the beginning of the study, an electronic questionnaire was distributed to the students in the control group via student WeChat and QQ groups for data collection. After the intervention, an electronic questionnaire was distributed to the students in the experimental group for data collection in the final class of the Midwifery Health Assessment course. All the data were collected by the first author (Yuji Wang). When students had questions about the survey items, the first author (Yuji Wang) immediately explained the items in detail. To ensure the integrity of the questionnaire, the platform required all the items to be answered before submission.

Statistical Package for Social Sciences Version 26.0 (SPSS 26.0) software was used for data analysis. The Shapiro‒Wilk test was used to test the normality of the data. The measurement data are expressed as the mean ± standard deviation (X ± S), and an independent sample t test was used for comparisons among groups with a normal distribution. The data presented as the number of cases (%), and the chi-square test was performed. A P value < 0.05 indicated that a difference was statistically significant.

Ethical considerations

The study was funded by the New Century Teaching Reform Project of Sichuan University and passed the relevant ethical review. Oral informed consent was obtained from all individual participants in the study.

Characteristics of the participants

A total of 104 third-year midwifery students were enrolled from February 2019 to June 2022, and 98.1% (102/144) of these students completed the survey. Two invalid questionnaires that featured the same answers for each item were eliminated. A total of 100 participants were ultimately included in the analysis. Among the participants, 48 students were assigned to the control group, and 52 students were assigned to the experimental group. The age of the students ranged from 19 to 22 years, and the mean age of the control group was 20.50 years (SD = 0.61). The mean age of the experimental group was 20.63 years (SD = 0.65). Of the 100 students who participated in the study, the majority (96.0%) were women. No significant differences were observed between the intervention and control groups in terms of students’ demographic information (i.e., age, gender, status as an only child, or family location), experience with scenario simulation or typical case discussion and scores in previous Midwifery courses (Table  1 ).

Examining the differences in critical thinking ability between the two groups

The aim of this study was to evaluate the effect of the new teaching mode of “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” on improving the critical thinking ability of midwifery students. Independent sample t tests were used to examine the differences in critical thinking ability between the two groups (Table  2 ). The results showed that the total critical thinking scores obtained by the experimental group were greater than those obtained by the control group (284.81 ± 27.98 and 300.94 ± 31.67, p  = 0.008). The differences in four dimensions (Open-Mindedness (40.56 ± 5.60 and 43.59 ± 4.90, p  = 0.005), Analyticity (42.83 ± 5.17 and 45.42 ± 5.72, p  = 0.020), Systematicity (38.79 ± 4.70 and 41.88 ± 6.11, p  = 0.006), and Critical Thinking Self-Confidence (41.35 ± 5.92 and 43.83 ± 5.89, p  = 0.039)) were statistically significant.

Examining the differences in curriculum satisfaction between the two groups

To evaluate the effect of the new teaching mode of “the typical case discussion and scenario simulation” on the course satisfaction of midwifery students. Independent sample t tests were used to examine the differences in course satisfaction between the two groups (Table  3 ). The results showed that the curriculum satisfaction of the experimental group was greater than that of the control group (84.81 ± 8.49 and 90.19 ± 8.41, p  = 0.002). Independent sample t tests were used to examine the differences in the three dimensions of curriculum satisfaction between the two groups (Table  3 ). The results showed that the average scores of the intervention group on the three dimensions were significantly greater than those of the control group (curricular content: 20.83 ± 1.96 and 22.17 ± 2.23, p  = 0.002; curriculum teaching: 34.16 ± 3.89 and 36.59 ± 3.66, p  = 0.002; curriculum evaluation: 29.81 ± 3.27 and 31.42 ± 3.19, p  = 0.015).

Midwifery is practical and intensive work. To ensure maternal and child safety, midwives must make decisions and take action quickly. Therefore, midwives should have both critical thinking ability and clinical decision-making ability [ 18 ]. In addition, the Australian Nursing and Midwifery Accreditation Council (ANMAC) regulates the educational requirements for the programs required for registration as a midwife. According to these standards, education providers must incorporate learning activities into curricula to encourage the development and application of critical thinking and reflective practice [ 19 ]. Therefore, the challenge of cultivating the critical thinking ability of midwifery students is an urgent problem that must be solved. However, influenced by the traditional teaching method of “teacher-led and content-based”, the critical thinking ability of midwifery students in China is mostly at a medium or low level. In order to improve the critical thinking ability of midwifery students. Our research team has established a new teaching model, the “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class model. And applied to the midwifery core curriculum Midwifery Health Assessment. This study aimed to investigate the implementation of a novel systematic and structured teaching model for midwifery students and to provide evidence regarding how to improve the critical thinking ability of midwives.

The results showed that the total CTDI-CV score obtained for the experimental group was greater than that obtained for the control group. These findings indicate that the “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class mode had a positive effect on the cultivation of students’ critical thinking ability, a conclusion which is similar to the findings of Holdsworth et al. [ 20 ], Lapkin et al. [ 21 ] and Demirören M et al. [ 22 ]. We indicate the following reasons that may explain these results.The core aim of the typical case discussion teaching mode is to raise questions based on typical clinical cases and to provide heuristic teaching to students [ 23 ]. This approach emphasizes asking questions based on specific clinical cases, which enables students to engage in targeted learning. Moreover, scenario simulation allows students to attain certain inner experiences and emotions and actively participate in curriculum practice, which can enhance their ability to remember and understand knowledge [ 24 ]. Through the divided class mode, half of the class time was divided into the students. This method emphasizes the guiding role of teachers and encourages and empowers students to assume learning responsibilities. In addition, students can think, communicate and discuss actively [ 22 , 23 ]. Furthermore, this approach created opportunities for students to analyze and consider problems independently and give students sufficient time to internalize and absorb knowledge and deepen their understanding of relevant knowledge, which can increase their confidence in their ability to address such problems and improve their critical thinking ability [ 12 , 25 , 26 ].

In addition, the results showed that except for Truth-Seeking and Systematicity, the other five dimensions were all positive. These findings are similar to the results reported by Atakro et al.. and Sun et al. [ 27 , 28 ]. Through the intervention, the Systematicity scores became positive, suggesting that the new teaching mode can help students deal with problems in an organized and purposeful way. However, Truth-Seeking still did not become positive; this notion focuses on intellectual honesty, i.e., the disposition to be courageous when asking questions and to be honest and objective in the pursuit of knowledge even when the topics under investigation do not support one’s self-interest [ 29 ]. Studies have shown that this factor is related to the traditional teaching mode used [ 30 ]. The traditional teaching mode focuses on knowledge infusion, helps students remember the greatest possible amount of knowledge in a short time, and does not focus on guiding students to seek knowledge with sincerity and objectivity. Therefore, in future educational practice, we should focus on cultivating students’ ability to seek truth and engage in systematization.

Student evaluative feedback is an important way to test the effectiveness teaching mode. Therefore, understanding students’ evaluations of the effects of classroom teaching is key to promoting teaching reform and improving teaching quality. Therefore, we distributed a satisfaction questionnaire pertaining to the midwifery health assessment curriculum, which was based on the “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class mode, with the goal of investigating curriculum satisfaction in terms of three dimensions (curriculum content, curriculum teaching and curriculum evaluation). The results showed that the satisfaction scores for each dimension increased significantly. This finding suggests that the new teaching method can enrich the teaching content, diversify the teaching mode and improve students’ curriculum evaluations.

In summary, the “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class mode focuses on typical cases as its main content. Students’ understanding of this content is deepened through group discussion and scenario simulation. The subjectivity of students in curriculum learning should be accounted for. Students can be encouraged to detect, analyze and solve problems with the goal of improving their critical thinking ability. Moreover, this approach can also enhance curriculum satisfaction. It is recommended that these tools should be used continuously in future curriculum teaching.

This study has several limitations. First, the representativeness of the sample may be limited since the participants were recruited from specific universities in China. Second, we used historical controls, which are less effective than simultaneous controlled trials. Third, online self-report surveys are susceptible to response biases, although we included quality control measurements in the process of data collection. Fourth, we did not use the same critical thinking instrument, CTDI-CV, to investigate the critical thinking of the students in the experimental group or the control group before intervention but used professional course grades from the Midwifery for substitution comparison. This may not be a sufficient substitute. However, these comparisons could be helpful since those grades included some sort of evaluation of critical thinking. In light of these limitations, future multicenter simultaneous controlled studies should be conducted. Nonetheless, this study also has several strengths. First, no adjustment of teachers or change in learning materials occurred since the start of the midwifery health assessment, thus ensuring that the experimental and control groups featured the same teaching materials, teachers and teaching hours. In addition, to ensure the quality of the research, the first author of this paper participated in the entirety of the course teaching.

The “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” class mode can improve the critical thinking of midwifery students, which is helpful for ensuring maternal and child safety. Students are highly satisfied with the new teaching mode, and this approach has a certain degree of promotional significance. However, this approach also entails higher requirements for both teachers and students.

Availability of data and materials

The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

World Health Organisation, Strengthening quality midwifery education for Universal Health Coverage2030,2019, https://www.who.int/maternal_child_adolescent/topics/quality-of-care/midwifery/strengthening-midwifery-education/en/ (accessed 21.01.20).

Akombi BJ, Renzaho AM. Perinatal mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa: a meta-analysis of demographic and health surveys. Ann Glob Health. 2019;85(1):106.

Article   Google Scholar  

Campbell OM, Graham WJ. Strategies for reducing maternal mortality: getting on with what works. Lancet. 2006;368(9543):1284–99.

Gage AD, Carnes F, Blossom J, Aluvaala J, Amatya A, Mahat K, Malata A, Roder-DeWan S, Twum-Danso N, Yahya T, et al. In low- and middle-income countries, is delivery in high-quality obstetric facilities geographically feasible? Health Aff (Millwood). 2019;38(9):1576–84.

Xing C, Zhou Y, Li M, Wu Q, Zhou Q, Wang Q, Liu X. The effects of CPBL + SBAR teaching mode among the nursing students. Nurse Educ Today. 2021;100:104828.

Carter AG, Creedy DK, Sidebotham M. Critical thinking evaluation in reflective writing: development and testing of Carter assessment of critical thinking in midwifery (Reflection). Midwifery. 2017;54:73–80.

Yeh SL, Lin CT, Wang LH, Lin CC, Ma CT, Han CY. The Outcomes of an Interprofessional simulation program for new graduate nurses. Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2022;19(21):13839.

Chang MJ, Chang YJ, Kuo SH, Yang YH, Chou FH. Relationships between critical thinking ability and nursing competence in clinical nurses. J Clin Nurs. 2011;20(21–22):3224–32.

Shoulders B, Follett C, Eason J. Enhancing critical thinking in clinical practice: implications for critical and acute care nurses. Dimens Crit Care Nurs. 2014;33(4):207–14.

Jalalpour H, Jahani S, Asadizaker M, Sharhani A, Heybar H. The impact of critical thinking training using critical thinking cards on clinical decision-making of CCU nurses. J Family Med Prim Care. 2021;10(10):3650–6.

Xuexin Z. PAD class: a new attempt in university teaching reform. Fudan Educ Forum. 2014;12(5):5–10 [in Chinese].

Google Scholar  

Zhai J, Dai L, Peng C, Dong B, Jia Y, Yang C. Application of the presentation-assimilation-discussion class in oral pathology teaching. J Dent Educ. 2022;86(1):4–11.

Colliver JA. Effectiveness of problem-based learning curricula: research and theory. Acad Med. 2000;75(3):259–66.

Bryant K, Aebersold ML, Jeffries PR, Kardong-Edgren S. Innovations in simulation: nursing leaders’ exchange of best practices. Clin Simul Nurs. 2020;41:33-40.e31.

Cicero MX, Whitfill T, Walsh B, Diaz MC, Arteaga G, Scherzer DJ, Goldberg S, Madhok M, Bowen A, Paesano G, et al. 60 seconds to survival: a multisite study of a screen-based simulation to improve prehospital providers disaster triage skills. AEM Educ Train. 2018;2(2):100–6.

Lee J, Lee H, Kim S, Choi M, Ko IS, Bae J, Kim SH. Debriefing methods and learning outcomes in simulation nursing education: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Nurse Educ Today. 2020;87:104345.

Peng G, Wang J, Chen M, Chen H, Bai S, Li J, Li Y, Cai J, Wang L. Yin Validity and reliability of the Chinese critical thinking disposition inventory Chin. J Nurs. 2004;39(09):7–10 [in Chinese].

Papathanasiou IV, Kleisiaris CF, Fradelos EC, Kakou K, Kourkouta L. Critical thinking: the development of an essential skill for nursing students. Acta Inform Med. 2014;22(4):283–6.

Australian Nursing and Midwifery Accreditation Council Midwife accreditation standards, 2014 ANMAC, Canberra. 2014. https://anmac.org.au/document/midwife-accreditation-standards-2014 .

Holdsworth C, Skinner EH, Delany CM. Using simulation pedagogy to teach clinical education skills: a randomized trial. Physiother Theory Pract. 2016;32(4):284–95.

Lapkin S, Fernandez R, Levett-Jones T, Bellchambers H. The effectiveness of using human patient simulation manikins in the teaching of clinical reasoning skills to undergraduate nursing students: a systematic review. JBI Libr Syst Rev. 2010;8(16):661–94.

Demirören M, Turan S, Öztuna D. Medical students’ self-efficacy in problem-based learning and its relationship with self-regulated learning. Med Educ Online. 2016;21:30049.

Spaulding WB, Neufeld VR. Regionalization of medical education at McMaster University. Br Med J. 1973;3(5871):95–8.

Rossler KL, Kimble LP. Capturing readiness to learn and collaboration as explored with an interprofessional simulation scenario: A mixed-methods research study. Nurse Educ Today. 2016;36:348–53.

Yang YL, Luo L, Qian Y, Yang F. Cultivation of undergraduates’ self-regulated learning ability in medical genetics based on PAD class. Yi Chuan. 2020;42(11):1133–9.

Felton A, Wright N. Simulation in mental health nurse education: the development, implementation and evaluation of an educational innovation. Nurse Educ Pract. 2017;26:46–52.

Atakro CA, Armah E, Menlah A, Garti I, Addo SB, Adatara P, Boni GS. Clinical placement experiences by undergraduate nursing students in selected teaching hospitals in Ghana. BMC Nurs. 2019;18:1.

Sun Y, Yin Y, Wang J, Ding Z, Wang D, Zhang Y, Zhang J, Wang Y. Critical thinking abilities among newly graduated nurses: a cross-sectional survey study in China. Nurs Open. 2023;10(3):1383–92.

Wangensteen S, Johansson IS, Björkström ME, Nordström G. Critical thinking dispositions among newly graduated nurses. J Adv Nurs. 2010;66(10):2170–81.

Salsali M, Tajvidi M, Ghiyasvandian S. Critical thinking dispositions of nursing students in Asian and non-Asian countries: a literature review. Glob J Health Sci. 2013;5(6):172–8.

Download references

Acknowledgements

Not applicable.

The study was supported by Sichuan University’s New Century Education and Teaching Reform Project (SCU9316).

Author information

Yuji Wang and Yijuan Peng are co-first authors.

Authors and Affiliations

Department of Nursing, West China Second University Hospital, Sichuan University/West China School of Nursing, Sichuan University/Key Laboratory of Birth Defects and Related Diseases of Women and Children (Sichuan University), No. 20 Third Section, Renmin South Road, Chengdu, Sichuan Province, 610041, China

Yuji Wang, Yijuan Peng & Yan Huang

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Contributions

All authors contributed to the study conception and design. Material preparation, data collection and analysis were performed by Yuji Wang, Yijuan Peng and Yan Huang. The first draft of the manuscript were written by Yuji Wang and Yijuan Peng, and all authors commented on previous versions of the manuscript.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Yan Huang .

Ethics declarations

Ethics approval and consent to participate.

This study was supported by Sichuan University. And it was approved by the Ethics Review Committee of West China School of Nursing, Sichuan University. As it is a teaching research with no harm to samples, we only obtained oral informed consents from the participants including teachers and midwifery students and it was approved by the Ethics Review Committee of West China School of Nursing, Sichuan University(approval number 2021220). We comfirm that all methods were performed in accordance with the relevant guidelines and regulations in Ethics Approval and Consent to participate in Declarations.

Consent for publication

Competing interests.

The authors declare no competing interests.

Additional information

Publisher’s note.

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ . The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver ( http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ ) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article.

Wang, Y., Peng, Y. & Huang, Y. The effect of “typical case discussion and scenario simulation” on the critical thinking of midwifery students: Evidence from China. BMC Med Educ 24 , 340 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12909-024-05127-5

Download citation

Received : 19 November 2022

Accepted : 02 February 2024

Published : 26 March 2024

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1186/s12909-024-05127-5

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Medical education
• Critical thinking
• Nurse midwives

BMC Medical Education

ISSN: 1472-6920

• Submission enquiries: [email protected]
• General enquiries: [email protected]