euthanasia should be legalized essay

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Multiple sclerosis sufferer Debbie Purdy with her husband Omar Puente

Why we should make euthanasia legal

The issue of euthanasia, or assisted dying, is incredibly controversial and there are legitimate concerns on either side of the debate. Today I will propose a motion to the British Medical Association's annual conference in Liverpool, which states:

This meeting supports the introduction of legislation to allow people who are terminally ill but 'mentally competent', the choice of an assisted death. Further, the law should not criminalise people who accompany those who make rational decisions to end their suffering

The motion will seek to take the issue forward in a compassionate and fair way that I believe will serve the interests of the terminally ill and our society.

The starting point has to be in the law, which at present is failing, as shown by the recurrence of cases in the courts that often place relatives, already dealing with the painful loss of a loved-one, in the middle of distressing legal battles. There is clearly a desire – whether we like it or not – among a number of patients at the end of often terrible battles with debilitating, incurable diseases to end their suffering with the support of their relatives. To deny this right is to prolong the suffering for individuals and families, something that I can simply not condone.

I do accept though that this is not like any other clinical decision – and that if society is to offer this solemn choice it must also build in safeguards to its laws that not only rectify the inadequacies of the current situation, but also protect the vulnerable, the weak and all those – doctors and nurses included – who are involved in this incredibly difficult situation.

As a start we must enact legislation to decriminalise acts of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Some of the reasons that are compelling enough for us to change our laws are:

Prevention of cruelty and protection of human rights

To allow a terminally ill individual to end their life is the only humane, rational and compassionate choice. The current prohibitions require a person with great physical and/or mental suffering to continue to endure their suffering against their wishes, which cannot be right. The right to life and the right to private and family life under the European convention on human rights should be interpreted broadly to include decisions about quality of life, including decisions about death if the life is no longer one of quality.

Regulatory Control

The terminally ill are travelling abroad to countries where the right to end of life in terminal cases is recognised and is lawful. We cannot regulate the laws of foreign lands. We must make provisions within our laws to regulate this issue within our boundaries under our control and supervision. We must not prosecute loved ones for "encouraging or assisting" suicide who enable or assist a terminally ill individual to travel abroad to end his or her life lawfully.

Ambiguity in the application of the current law

The current law conflicts with the law as it is being enforced. If the laws as written were being enforced, over a hundred people would have been prosecuted for accompanying their loved ones abroad to help them end their lives. This ambiguity and uncertainty leaves all concerned, including physicians, unprotected.

Discriminatory effect of the laws

The ability of the wealthy to travel to countries where it is lawful for the terminally ill to end their lives has the discriminatory impact of treating the haves and have-nots unequally.

The Safeguards

Many people are opposed to legislation that would allow "end of life" choices. But our concerns relating to abuses and protection of the vulnerable can be addressed by ensuring that certain objective safeguard conditions are met prior to allowing a terminally ill individual from exercising his or her right to die with dignity. Some of the safeguards include the following:

The patient must be terminally ill.

The patient must be an adult.

The patient must be mentally competent.

The patient must be in severe pain.

Two independent physicians must be satisfied that the above conditions are present.

In conclusion, the only humane choice is to allow individuals who are suffering to choose to end their suffering. Further, the discrepancies in the laws as they exist and how they are being enforced have led to uncertainty. This uncertainty leaves the doctors, their patients and patient's loved ones unprotected. If we do not address these issues openly and head-on, we will have continued uncertainty and unregulated practice of euthanasia or assisted suicide with the fear of prosecution hanging over the heads of all concerned.

The goals of the medical profession should continue to remain one of saving lives but this should not be at the expense of compassion and a terminally ill individual's right to choose to end his or her life and die with dignity.

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Why Euthanasia Should Be Legal: Analysis of Arguments and Counterarguments

Categories: Assisted Suicide Euthanasia Right to Die

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Words: 1865 |

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Published: Aug 14, 2023

Words: 1865 | Pages: 4 | 10 min read

Introduction, why euthanasia should be legal, works cited, counterarguments.

Corder, Mike. “Dutch Euthanasia Center Sees 22% Rise in Requests in 2019.” WAVY.com, 7 Feb. 2020, www.wavy.com/news/health/dutch-euthanasia-center-sees-22-rise-in-requests-in-2019/. Accessed 10 March 2020.
Davis, Jacky. “Kevin Davis Deserved Choice.” Dignity in Dying, www.dignityindying.org.uk/story/kevin-davis/. Accessed 13 March 2020.
De La Torre, Esther B. The Right to Assisted Suicide, www.lonestar.edu/rightto-assist-suicide.htm. Accessed 19 March 2020.
“Euthanasia Laws - Information on the Law about Euthanasia.” Information on the Law about Euthanasia - Suicide, Life, Act, and Mercy - JRank Articles, law.jrank.org/pages/11858/Euthanasia.html. Accessed 10 March 2020.

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Legalizing Euthanasia

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Medical Perspectives on Death and Dying

Several states have begun to consider legislation that would legalize active voluntary euthanasia.

Several states have begun to consider legislation that would legalize active voluntary euthanasia. To address some of the ethical issues raised by such legislation, the Center for Applied Ethics sponsored a symposium entitled Legalizing Euthanasia: Ethical Perspectives on Medicine and Dying . Principal speakers were Derek Humphry, founder and president of the Hemlock Society, and author of the current best-seller, Final Exit , a suicide manual for the terminally ill; and Richard Gula, S.S., Ph.D., a professor of moral theology at St. Patrick's Seminary in Menlo Park, California. The symposium was funded in part by the California Council for the Humanities, a state program of the National Endowment for the Humanities. The following excerpts highlight the remarks of Mr. Humphry and Father Gula.

Derek Humphry Let me explain how I became involved with the subject of euthanasia. In 1974 my first wife, Jean, was dying of bone cancer. Thrombosis had set in, her bones were cracking and she was losing control of her bowels. One day, after a very close brush with death, she sat up in her hospital bed and said to me, "Will you help me die?" That is when I first encountered the issue of euthanasia; from across my late wife's hospital bed.

After she made her request, I asked myself, "What if I were sitting in that hospital bed? What if I had had two years of pain and agony? What if I faced an imminent death? What if I was losing control of my bowels and my bones were cracking and so-forth?" I realized then that I would be asking her to help me to die. That, ladies and gentlemen, is my simple reason for what I did. It was an act of love.

Jean had been a good wife to me for 22 years. She stood by me in good times and bad. And when she was experiencing a bad time, I felt it was my duty to support her in her decision. I am not a Christian. I am an atheist. So, for me there was no question of consulting any god. It was a matter of situational ethics.

In 1980, five years after Jean's death, I helped to establish the Hemlock Society. This organization seeks to change certain laws regarding suicide. We want the government to decriminalize the actions taken by physicians in the assisted suicides of terminally ill patients.

We believe that a mentally competent adult who is dying should be able to submit a written request to their doctor that would state, "I've had all I can take. The pain and suffering are too much. I wish to die. Help me."

The physician, according to the Hemlock movement's prepared law, would have to obtain the opinion of a second doctor. They would both have to agree that the person is dying. The first doctor could then end the life of the patient with an oral or intravenous drug overdose, without the threat of prosecution or lawsuit. Our laws also state that the doctor could elect not to assist the patient with such an action.

There are those who agree with what the Hemlock movement is saying at the present time, but are fearful that such an ideology would result in a system of euthanasia similar to that used by Nazi forces. It is true that the Nazis introduced a program which they called euthanasia. They murdered about 100,000 people who were physically or mentally handicapped. No senior citizens or terminally ill people were allowed to voluntarily end their own lives.

But how can you say to a person who is dying of throat cancer today that they cannot have voluntary euthanasia because of what the Germans did in 1940 and 1942? I think that the person would respond, "It's not relevant. It's me. It's my body. It's my liberty. It's my life. And it's my death. Let me have control."

I would claim that this is the ultimate civil liberty. If we cannot go to our deaths in the manner of our own choosing, what liberty do we have?

Richard Gula Most of the focus on euthanasia so far has been dominated by what I'm going to call the paradigm of individual case analysis. My position is that euthanasia is not primarily an individual issue; it's a societal one. So discussion about euthanasia should not be governed primarily by individual case ethics, but by societal ethics.

The sanctity of life principle is probably the common ground principle. There are two extreme positions that can give sanctity of life as a principle a bad name. One extreme is what I call vitalism, and that is the extreme that tries to absolutize physical life making an idol out of biological existence. This principle says no cost is too great to keep this biological life going. The other extreme interpretation leads to what I'm calling a utilitarian perspective, which values life for its usefulness. This is the interpretation that says only the strongest and the fittest ought to survive. The danger here is the abuse of undertreatment.

I want to think about the sanctity of life from the middle position. This is the interpretation of the principle that recognizes we have limited dominion over life. It's the interpretation that says we are stewards of life, that we ought to care for life and promote it and enhance it in order to allow our lives to flourish and to achieve our potential. This is the interpretation that wants to respect life in all its forms and in all its stages. Interpreting sanctity of life in this way entails two obligations: a positive one--to nurture and support life„and a negative obligation not to harm life. Therefore, to appeal to sanctity of life in a discussion of euthanasia is to create a presumption in favor of life.

The second principle is the principle against the prohibition of killing. I want to look at three ways of interpreting this principle. The first says there is no moral difference between killing and allowing to die -- that once you decide that life no longer needs to be sustained, because the use of treatment would be futile, then it makes no difference whether you actively intervene or simply withhold or withdraw treatment.

The second interpretation is that there is a qualified moral difference. That qualified moral difference is that the distinction holds but gives way at a certain point. Some will say when the person has gone beyond the reach of human care, when there is no longer the capacity to receive love, or to receive comfort, then the distinction dissolves. Others will say when the person is in intractable pain and there's nothing more that can be done to relieve the pain, then the distinction between killing and allowing to die dissolves. Others would say when the patient is overtaken by the dying process -- that is to say, once you have decided that nothing more needs to be done, that life has reached its limits, then it makes no difference whether you withhold treatment or intervene, because in that condition, you are not usurping the dominion that is not yours. Then there's the third position that says the distinction holds all the way through.

The next principle is the principle of autonomy, which is probably going to be at the core of this discussion of whether euthanasia ought to be legalized. In our culture, we interpret autonomy as the right to self determination. The prevailing interpretation of autonomy in our culture is that autonomy is there to maximize self-interest. That means that we are able to pursue our own goals and life plans without external constraints. When we interpret autonomy this way, we answer the question "whose life is it anyway?" in favor of the one whose life is in question. This is solid ground for supporting euthanasia.

Can the principle of autonomy be used to challenge euthanasia? Some argue that the very interpretation of autonomy that says that you have the freedom to have another person intervene to take your life is a contradiction of what autonomy means -- that actually what you're doing is giving away your freedom. The other way of looking at it is to say that euthanasia is not primarily a private affair. It's a public or societal action that involves others, and therefore it is something that ought to be treated as a form of public action.

The third principle is the principle of the common good. To show that euthanasia ought to be sanctioned as a public practice, we need to be able to show that we can justify it in more than the individual case. This is the principle that says that when we establish a policy, we are sanctioning actions as a common practice. When we apply that principle to euthanasia, we need to ask, "how does the goal of my own private killing contribute towards making society the context in which human life can flourish?"

Now let's turn to the perspective of virtue. Virtue asks whether or not a policy on euthanasia creates the right kind of relationship between the physician and the patient, and would a policy on euthanasia create the right kind of community in which health care is delivered. The perspective of virtue asks that the physician deliver compassionate care within the limits of the physician's role. The trust that we extend to the medical profession to heal and protect life is something that we would want to sustain and the perspective of virtue asks whether that kind of trusting relationship would be enhanced or hindered if euthanasia became part of the options that are available to the physician. The perspective of virtue looks on ourselves as a community of interdependents in which we are partners to one another. It sustains the community of trust and care by promising not to abandon anyone, and it tries to be realistic about accepting the limits about what it means to be human. We recognize that life will not be free of suffering, that life will be burdensome, and there will be tragedy. The perspective of virtue tries to be realistic about accepting that. It encourages us to construct structures of support which will enable us to raise those who suffer into the network of the supportive, caring community.

Ultimately we cannot convert individual cases into public policy without having something remaining. The common good resists the temptation. How do the burdens to one individual compare to the burdens and the benefit on society as a whole? I think all of this ultimately is going to turn not on the basis of principles we argue with, but on the kind of people we are. Are we a virtuous people that creates a community of caring or are we going to compromise that in the way we allow euthanasia to become a practice in our healing society?

Videotapes of the symposium are available for $16.50 by writing to the Center for Applied Ethics, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, CA 95053.

This article was originally published in Issues in Ethics - V. 5, N. 2 Fall 1991

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Voluntary Euthanasia

The entry sets out five conditions often said to be necessary for anyone to be a candidate for legalized voluntary euthanasia (and, with appropriate qualifications, physician-assisted suicide), outlines the moral case advanced by those in favor of legalizing voluntary euthanasia, and discusses the five most important objections made by those who deny that voluntary euthanasia is morally permissible and who are, in consequence, opposed to its being legalized.

1. Introduction

2. five conditions often proposed as necessary for candidacy for voluntary euthanasia, 3. a moral case for voluntary euthanasia, 4. five objections to the moral permissibility of voluntary euthanasia, other internet resources, related entries.

When a person performs an act of euthanasia, she brings about the death of another person because she believes the latter’s present existence is so bad that he would be better off dead, or believes that unless she intervenes and ends his life, his life will very soon become so bad that he would be better off dead. Accordingly, the motive of the person who performs an act of euthanasia is to benefit the one whose death is brought about. (This also holds for many instances of physician-assisted suicide, but use of the latter term is usually restricted to forms of assistance which stop short of the physician ‘bringing about the death’ of the patient, for example, those involving means that have to be activated by the patient.)

It is important to emphasize the motive of benefiting the person who is assisted to die because well-being is a key value in relation to the morality of euthanasia (see Section 3 below). Nonetheless, the defensibility of the contention that someone can be better off dead has been the subject of extensive philosophical deliberation. Those who claim that a person can be better off dead believe this to be true when the life that remains in prospect for that person has no positive value for her (a possibility which is discussed by e.g., Foot, 1977; McMahan 2002; Bradley 2009), whereas some of those who hold that a person’s life is inviolable deny that a person can ever be better off dead (e.g., Keown in Jackson and Keown 2012). A Kant-inspired variant on this latter position has been advanced by Velleman (1999). He considers that a person’s well-being can only matter if she is of intrinsic value and so that it is impermissible to violate a person’s rational nature (the source of her intrinsic value) for the sake of her well-being. Accordingly, he holds that it is impermissible to assist someone to die who judges that she would be better off dead and competently requests assistance with dying. The only exception is when a person’s life is so degraded as to call into question her rational nature, albeit he thinks it unlikely that anyone in that position will remain competent to request assistance with dying. This position appears to be at odds with the well-established right of a competent patient to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment, at least when further treatment is refused because she considers that her life no longer has value for her and further treatment will not restore its value to her. (For further reasons to reject arguments for the inviolability of the life of a person, including Velleman’s, see e.g., McMahan 2002; Young 2007; Sumner 2011, 2017.)

Because our concern will be with voluntary euthanasia – that is, with those instances of euthanasia in which a clearly competent person makes a voluntary and enduring request to be helped to die (or, by extension, when an authorised proxy makes a substituted judgment by choosing in the manner the no-longer-competent person would have chosen had he remained competent) – a second key value is the competence of the person requesting assistance with dying. There will be occasion to mention non-voluntary euthanasia – instances of euthanasia where a person lacks the competence at the time when a decision is to be made to request euthanasia and has not previously competently declared a preference for it via an advance directive (see the entry on advance directives ) – only when consideration is given to the claim that permitting voluntary euthanasia will lead via a slippery slope to permitting non-voluntary euthanasia. Nothing will be said here about involuntary euthanasia , where a competent person’s life is brought to an end despite an explicit expression of opposition to euthanasia, beyond saying that, no matter how honorable the perpetrator’s motive, such a death is, and ought to be, unlawful.

Debate about the morality and legality of voluntary euthanasia has been, for the most part, a phenomenon of the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty first century. Certainly, the ancient Greeks and Romans did not believe that life needed to be preserved at any cost and were, in consequence, tolerant of suicide when no relief could be offered to a dying person or, in the case of the Stoics and Epicureans, when a person no longer cared for his life. In the sixteenth century, Thomas More, in describing a utopian community, envisaged such a community as one that would facilitate the death of those whose lives had become burdensome as a result of ‘torturing and lingering pain’. But it has only been in the last hundred years that there have been concerted efforts to make legal provision for voluntary euthanasia. Until quite recently there had been no success in obtaining such legal provision (though assisted suicide, including, but not limited to, physician-assisted suicide, has been legally tolerated in Switzerland for a number of decades). However, the outlook changed dramatically in the 1970s and 80s because of a series of court cases in the Netherlands which culminated in an agreement between the legal and medical authorities to ensure that no physician would be prosecuted for assisting a patient to die as long as certain guidelines were strictly adhered to (see Griffiths, et al., 1998). In brief, the guidelines were established to permit physicians to practise voluntary euthanasia in those instances in which a competent patient had made a voluntary and informed request to be helped to die, the patient’s suffering was unbearable, there was no way of making that suffering bearable that was acceptable to the patient, and the physician’s judgements as to diagnosis and prognosis were confirmed after consultation with another physician.

The first legislative approval for voluntary euthanasia was achieved with the passage in the parliament of Australia’s Northern Territory of a bill enabling physicians to practise voluntary euthanasia. Subsequent to the Act’s proclamation in 1996, it faced a series of legal challenges from opponents of voluntary euthanasia. In 1997 the challenges culminated in the Australian National Parliament overturning the legislation when it prohibited Australian territories from enacting legislation to permit voluntary euthanasia on constitutional grounds. Australia is a federation consisting of six states and two territories. Unlike the territories, the states do have the constitutional right to enact such legislation and in 2017 the state of Victoria did just that. The legislation came into effect in 2019. In 2019, a second state, Western Australia, enacted legislation to enable voluntary medically assisted death. The legislation became effective in 2021. In 2021 three further states, Tasmania, South Australia and Queensland enacted legislation to enable voluntary medically assisted death which came into force in 2022 for the first two, and 2023 for the third. Finally, in 2022 NSW enacted legislation which came into force in 2023 resulting in voluntary medically assisted death being available in each of the states. Attempts are currently being made in both the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory to introduce legislation in favor of voluntary medically assisted death that will avoid being vetoed by the federal parliament.

In November 2000, the Netherlands passed legislation to legalize the practice of voluntary euthanasia. The legislation passed through all the parliamentary stages early in 2001. The Belgian parliament passed similar legislation in 2002 and Luxembourg followed suit in 2009. (For a very helpful comparative study of relevant legislation see Lewis 2007. See also Griffiths, et al. 2008.)

In Oregon in the United States, legislation was introduced in 1997 to permit physician-assisted suicide after a referendum strongly endorsed the proposed legislation. Later in 1997 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that there is no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide; however, the Court did not preclude individual states from legislating in favor of physician-assisted suicide (so the Oregon legislation was unaffected). Since that time the Oregon legislation has been successfully utilised by a significant number of people and similar legislation has been passed in the state of Washington in 2009, in Vermont in 2013, and more recently still in California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico and the District of Columbia. A series of judicial decisions in the state of Montana in 2008 and 2009 established that the state could not prohibit physician-assisted suicide but legislation has not yet been introduced to codify the legal situation. A number of the remaining states are currently considering physician-assisted suicide bills.

A similar legal position to that in Montana obtained in the nation of Colombia from the late 1990s as a result of a majority ruling by its Constitutional Court in favor of the legality of physician-assisted suicide but legislative provision was finally made only quite recently. In 2021, Spain legalized voluntary euthanasia. In Austria and Germany courts have authorised physician-assisted suicide but no legislative backing for the practice has been introduced, while in Italy legislation for voluntary medically assisted death has been passed in one house of the bicameral parliament. In Portugal legislation for physician-assisted suicide was passed but was subsequently rejected by the Constitutional Court.

In Canada, the province of Quebec introduced legislation permitting medical aid in dying in 2014. The legislation came into effect in 2016 at around the same time that the Canadian National Parliament passed legislation permitting both physician-assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia throughout all of the Canadian federation. (For a brief account of events leading up to the enactment of the various pieces of legislation in Canada see Downie and Schuklenk 2021.)

New Zealand held a referendum in 2019 which resulted in approval for the introduction of legislation for voluntary medically assisted death. The legislation came into effect late in 2021.

In the following countries legislative proposals for voluntary medically assisted death are presently under review: the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, the Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, South Korea, the Philippines, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.

With that brief sketch of the historical background in place, we will proceed first to consider the conditions that those who have advocated making voluntary medically assisted death legally permissible have typically insisted should be satisfied. Consideration of the proposed conditions will establish a framework for the moral interrogation that will follow in Sections 3 and 4. Section 3 will outline the positive moral case put forward by those who want voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide to be legally permissible. Section 4 will be devoted to scrutinising the most important of the objections that have been levelled against that case by those opposed to the legalization of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.

Advocates of voluntary euthanasia typically contend that if a person

is suffering from a terminal illness;
is unlikely to benefit from the discovery of a cure for that illness during what remains of her life expectancy;
is, as a direct result of the illness, either suffering intolerable pain, or only has available a life that is unacceptably burdensome (e.g., because the illness has to be treated in ways that lead to her being unacceptably dependent on others or on technological means of life support);
has an enduring, voluntary and competent wish to die (or has, prior to losing the competence to do so, expressed a wish to be assisted to die in the event that conditions (a)-(c) are satisfied); and
is unable without assistance to end her life,

there should be legal and medical provision to facilitate her being allowed to die or assisted to die.

It should be acknowledged that these conditions are quite restrictive, indeed more restrictive than many think appropriate. In particular, the first condition restricts access to voluntary euthanasia to those who are terminally ill . While that expression is not free of all ambiguity, for present purposes it can be agreed that it does not include those who are rendered quadriplegic as a result of accidents, or sufferers from chronic diseases, or individuals who succumb to forms of dementia like Alzheimer’s Disease, to say nothing of those afflicted by ‘existential suffering’. Those who consider that cases like these show the first condition to be too restrictive (e.g., Varelius 2014, Braun, 2023) may, nonetheless, agree that including them as candidates for legalized voluntary euthanasia is likely to make it far harder in many jurisdictions to gain sufficient support for legalization (and so to make it harder to help those terminally ill persons who wish to die). Even so, they believe that voluntary euthanasia should be permitted for those who consider their lives no longer worth living, not just for for the terminally ill. Whether those who judge that their lives are no longer worth living, and so believe their lives are in that sense ‘complete’, should be afforded medical assistance with dying, has recently become a pressing concern in Belgium and the Netherlands. Several court cases have affirmed that such assistance may sometimes be provided for individuals in the former category even though the question remains as to whether it is properly a medical responsibility to render assistance with dying to someone who believes her life is complete despite her not suffering from a terminal medical condition (see, e.g., Young 2017). Relatedly, the issues of whether those suffering from a disability which will not reasonably foreseeably lead to death and those suffering because of a mental illness should be able to access medical assistance with dying have recently been the subject of intense debate in Canada. The debate culminated in disabled individuals, whose conditions are the cause of enduring, intolerable and irremediable suffering, being given access to medical assistance with dying as long as they are capable of making a competent request for that assistance. An intention to make a similar arrangement for those whose sole underlying condition is a mental illness was flagged for introduction in 2024, but has been temporarily shelved until further research has been conducted on the issue. It seems likely that the changes that have been made, or mooted, in these jurisdictions to the eligibility conditions for medical assistance with dying will lead to an expansion of the eligibility conditions for voluntary medically assisted death in other jurisdictions.

The fifth condition further restricts access to voluntary euthanasia by excluding those capable of ending their own lives, and so may be thought unduly restrictive by those who would wish to discourage terminally ill patients from attempting suicide. There will be yet others who consider this condition to be too restrictive because competent patients can always refuse nutrition and hydration (see, e.g., Bernat, et al. 1993; Savulescu 2014). Though this is true, many competent dying persons still wish to have access to legalized medically assisted death, rather than having to rely on refusing nutrition and hydration, so that they may retain control over the timing of their deaths and avoid needlessly prolonging the process of dying.

The second condition is intended simply to reflect the fact that it is normally possible to say when someone’s health status is incurable. So-called ‘miracle’ cures may be proclaimed by sensationalist journalists, but progress toward medical breakthroughs is typically painstaking. If there are miracles wrought by God that will be quite another matter entirely, but it is at least clear that not everyone’s death is thus to be staved off.

The third condition recognises what many who oppose the legalization of voluntary euthanasia do not, namely, that it is not only a desire to be released from pain that leads people to request help with dying. In the Netherlands, for example, pain has been found to be a less significant reason for requesting assistance with dying than other forms of suffering like frustration over loss of independence (see e.g., Marquet, et al. 2003; Onwuteaka-Philipsen, et al. 2012; Emanuel, et al. 2016). Sufferers from some terminal conditions may have their pain relieved but have to endure side effects that, for them, make life unbearable. Others may not have to cope with pain but, instead, with having to rely on forms of life support that simultaneously rob their lives of quality (as with, e.g., motor neurone disease). Yet others struggle with psychological distress and various psychiatric conditions and believe these conditions ought to be counted among the forms of suffering that qualify competent individuals to access medical assistance with dying. There has been greater recognition of, and support for, this position in those jurisdictions that make the role of unbearable suffering central to the determination of the eligibility of competent individuals for medical assistance with dying (see the discussion above of the first condition). Even so, inclusion of these forms of suffering highlights legitimate issues to do with the competence of at least some of those who suffer from them. (For a helpful recent study of the handling of requests for assistance with dying by psychiatric patients in the Netherlands see Kim, et al. 2016.)

A final preliminary point is that the fourth condition requires that the choice to die not only be uncoerced and competent but that it be enduring. The choice is one that will require time for reflection, and, almost certainly, discussion with others, so should not be settled in a moment. Nonetheless, as with other decisions affecting matters of importance, adults are presumed to choose voluntarily and to be competent unless the presence of defeating considerations can be established. (See the entry on decision-making capacity .) The burden of proof of establishing lack of voluntariness, or lack of competence, is on those who refuse to accept an adult person’s choice. There is no need to deny that this burden can sometimes be met (e.g., by pointing to the person’s being in a state of clinical depression). The claim is only that the onus falls on those who assert that an adult’s choice is not competent. (There are different issues to be faced when the competence of at least some older children and adolescents is at issue. In the Netherlands, for example, those aged twelve and older have sometimes been found to be competent to make end-of-life decisions for themselves. However, the topic will not be pursued further here because the focus of the entry is on competent adults.)

Clearly the five conditions set out above are likely to require some refinement if complete agreement is to be reached but there is sufficient agreement for us to proceed without further ado to consideration of the cases for and against legalization of voluntary euthanasia. (However, for a fuller discussion of issues concerning the definition of ‘euthanasia’ see, e.g., Beauchamp and Davidson 1979.)

One central ethical contention in support of voluntary euthanasia is that respect for persons demands respect for their autonomous choices as long as those choices do not result in harm to others. Respect for people’s autonomous choices is directly connected with the requirement for competence because autonomy presupposes competence (cf., Brock 1992). People have an interest in making important decisions about their lives in accordance with their own conception of how they want to live. In exercising autonomy, or self-determination, individuals take responsibility for their lives; since dying is a part of life, choices about the manner of their dying and the timing of their death are, for many people, part of what is involved in taking responsibility for their lives. Many are concerned about what the last phase of their lives will be like, not merely because of fears that their dying might involve them in great suffering, but also because of the desire to retain their dignity, and as much control over their lives as possible, during this phase. A second contention in support of voluntary euthanasia was mentioned at the beginning of this entry, namely the importance of promoting the well-being of persons. When someone is suffering intolerable pain or only has available a life that is unacceptably burdensome (see the third condition above), and he competently requests medical assistance with dying, his well-being may best be promoted by affording him that assistance. When harnessed together, the value to individuals of making autonomous choices, and the value to those individuals who make such choices of promoting their own well-being, provide the moral foundation for requests for voluntary euthanasia. Each consideration is necessary for moral justification of the practice, but taken in isolation neither suffices (see, e.g., Young 2007, 2017; Sumner 2011, 2017).

The technological interventions of modern medicine have had the effect of stretching out the time it takes for many people to die. Sometimes the added life this brings is an occasion for rejoicing; sometimes it drags out the period of significant physical and intellectual decline that a person undergoes with the result that life becomes no longer worth living. Many believe there is no single, objectively correct answer as to when, if at all, a person’s life becomes a burden and hence unwanted. If they are right, that simply points up the importance of individuals being able to decide autonomously for themselves whether their own lives retain sufficient quality and dignity to make life worth living. Others maintain that individuals can be in error about whether their lives continue to be worth living (cf., Foot 1977). The conditions outlined above in Section 2 are intended by those who propose them to serve, among other purposes, to safeguard against such error. But it is worth adding that in the event that a person who considers that she satisfies those conditions is judged by her medical attendants to be in error about whether it would be worth her continuing to live, the likely outcome is that those attendants will refuse to provide medical assistance with dying. (Evidence that will be mentioned below shows that this happens more frequently than might be predicted in jurisdictions in which medically assisted dying has been legalized. (There are discussions of the principles at stake in such matters in Young 2007; Wicclair 2011; Sumner 2020.) Unless a patient is able to be transferred to the care of other medical professionals who accept her assessment, she will have to rely on her own resources (e.g., by refusing nutrition and hydration). Even so, other things being equal, as long as a critically ill person is competent, her own judgement of whether continued life is a benefit to her ought to carry the greatest weight in any end-of-life decision making regardless of whether she is in a severely compromised and debilitated state. The idea that a competent individual’s autonomous judgment of the value to her of continued life should trump an assessment by others of her well-being should not be thought surprising because precisely the same happens when a competent patient refuses life-prolonging treatment.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is agreed that we should respect a person’s competent request for medical assistance with dying (e.g., so as to enable her to achieve her autonomously chosen goal of an easeful death). It might be thought that in such an eventuality different moral concerns will be introduced from those that arise in connection with competent refusals. After all, while competent patients are entitled to refuse any form of medical treatment, they are not entitled to insist on the administration of forms of medical treatment that have no prospect of conferring a medical benefit or are not being provided because of a scarcity of medical resources or their affordability. While each of these points is sound, it remains the case that medical personnel have a duty to relieve suffering when that is within their capacity. Accordingly, doctors who regard medical assistance with dying as an element of appropriate medical care will consider it morally permissible to agree to a request for assistance with dying by a competent dying patient who wishes to avoid unbearable suffering. The reason for claiming only that this is morally permissible rather than morally obligatory will be explained in a subsequent paragraph. (For further reflections on the issue of responses to requests for medical assistance see, for instance, Dworkin 1998; Sumner 2011, 2017, 2020; Young 2007, 2017.)

Notwithstanding this response, as was seen earlier, at least some proponents of voluntary medically assisted dying wish to question why medical assistance with dying should be restricted to those covered by, in particular, the first three conditions set out above in Section 2. If people’s competent requests for medically assisted death should be respected why impose any restrictions at all on who may have access to medically assisted death? Why, for example, should those suffering from depression, or forms of dementia, not be eligible for medically assisted dying? Most proponents of voluntary medically assisted dying hold that there are at least two reasons for restricting access to it to those who satisfy the conditions set out earlier (or, a modified set that takes account of the concerns canvassed in the discussion of those proposed conditions). First, they contend that there are political grounds for doing so, namely, that because legalizing medically assisted dying for competent individuals is politically contested, the best hope for its legalization lies in focusing on those forms of suffering most likely to effect law reform. That is why some proponents deny the eligibility even of sufferers from conditions like ‘locked-in’ syndrome, motor neurone disease, and multiple sclerosis for voluntary medically assisted dying since, strictly, they are not terminally ill, and reliance has to be placed in consequence on their claim to be suffering unbearably. Second, and relatedly, most proponents of the legalization of medical assistance with dying have been cautious about supporting medically assisted death for those suffering from, for example, depression and dementia, because not only are they not terminally ill, but their competence to request assistance with dying is apt to be called into question, particularly in instances where they have given no prior indication of their preference for such assistance. Restricting access to medical assistance with dying to those whose suffering is less likely to be disputed avoids becoming embroiled in controversy. As was noted earlier, some critics of the restrictive approach (e.g., Varelius 2014) take a harder line and claim that it should not even be necessary for a person to be suffering from a medical condition to be eligible for medical assistance with dying; it should be enough to be ‘tired of life’. Only in a few jurisdictions, viz., Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium, has this issue been seriously broached. Regardless of what may happen in those jurisdictions, those seeking the legal provision of medical assistance with dying in other jurisdictions seem likely to maintain that if such assistance is to be seen as a legitimate form of medical care it has to be provided in response to a medical condition (rather than because someone is ‘tired of life’), and, indeed, restricted to those who satisfy the conditions outlined earlier in Section 2 (or some similar set of conditions). In short, these latter hold that making an autonomous request for assistance with dying is necessary, but should not be sufficient, for triggering such assistance.

There is one final matter of relevance to the moral case for voluntary medically assisted death on which comment must be made. The comment concerns a point foreshadowed in a previous paragraph, but it is also linked with the remark just made about the insufficiency of an autonomous request for assistance with dying to trigger that assistance. It is important to make the point that respect has to be shown not only for the dying person’s autonomy but also for the professional autonomy of any medical personnel asked to lend assistance with dying. The value (or, as some would prefer, the right) of self-determination does not entitle a patient to try to compel medical professionals to act contrary to their own moral or professional values. Hence, if voluntary euthanasia is to be legally permitted, it must be against a backdrop of respect for professional autonomy. Similarly, if a doctor’s view of her moral or professional responsibilities is at odds with her patient’s competent request for euthanasia, she should make provision, where it is feasible to do so, for the transfer of the patient to the care of a doctor who faces no such conflict. Given that, to date, those who contend that no scope should be permitted for conscientious objection within medical practice have garnered very little support for that view, making use of referrals and transfers remains the most effective means of resolving such disagreements.

Opponents of voluntary euthanasia have endeavored in a variety of ways to counter the very straightforward moral case that has been laid out above for its legalization (see, for example, Keown 2002; Foley, et al. 2002; Biggar 2004; Gorsuch 2006). Some of the counter-arguments are concerned only with whether the moral case warrants making the practice of voluntary euthanasia legal, whereas others are concerned with trying to undermine the moral case itself. In what follows, consideration will be given to the five most important counter-arguments. (For more comprehensive discussions of the morality and legality of medically assisted death see Biggar 2004; Gorsuch 2006; Young 2007; Sumner 2011, 2017; Keown 2018).

4.1 Objection 1

It is sometimes said (e.g., Emanuel 1999; Keown in Jackson and Keown 2012) that it is not necessary nowadays for people to die while suffering from intolerable or overwhelming pain because the provision of effective palliative care has improved steadily, and hospice care is more widely available. Some have urged, in consequence, that voluntary euthanasia is unnecessary.

There are several flaws in this contention. First, while both good palliative care and hospice care make important contributions to the care of the dying, neither is a panacea. To get the best palliative care for an individual involves trial and error, with some consequent suffering in the process; moreover, even the best care fails to relieve all pain and suffering. Perhaps even more importantly, high quality palliative care commonly exacts a price in the form of side-effects such as nausea, incontinence, loss of awareness because of semi-permanent drowsiness, and so on. A rosy picture is often painted as to how palliative care can transform the plight of the dying. Such a picture is misleading according to those who have closely observed the effect of extended courses of treatment with drugs like morphine. For these reasons many skilled palliative care specialists acknowledge that palliative care does not enable an easeful death for every patient. Second, even though the sort of care provided through hospices is to be applauded, it is care that is available to only a small proportion of the terminally ill and then usually only in the very last stages of the illness (typically a matter of a few weeks). Notwithstanding that only relatively few of the dying have access to hospice care it is worth drawing attention to the fact that in, Oregon, to cite one example, a high proportion of those who have sought physician-assisted suicide were in hospice care. Third, and of greatest significance for present purposes, not everyone wishes to avail themselves of palliative or hospice care. For those who prefer to die on their own terms and in their own time, neither option may be attractive. As previously mentioned, a major source of distress for many dying patients is the frustration that comes with being unable to satisfy their autonomous wishes. Fourth, as also indicated earlier, the suffering that occasions a desire to end life is not always traceable to pain caused by illness. For some, what is intolerable is their forced dependence on others or on life-supporting machinery; for these patients, the availability of effective pain control is not the primary concern. (In relation to the preceding matters see Rietjens, et al. 2009 and Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al. 2012 for findings for the Netherlands; and, for Oregon, Ganzini, et al. 2009.)

4.2 Objection 2

A second, related objection to the moral and legal permissibility of voluntary euthanasia turns on the claim that we can never have sufficient evidence to be justified in believing that a dying person’s request to be helped to die is competent, enduring and genuinely voluntary.

It is certainly true that a request to die may not reflect an enduring desire to die (just as some attempts to commit suicide may reflect only temporary despair). That is why advocates of the legalization of voluntary euthanasia have argued that a cooling off period should normally be required before euthanasia is permitted to ensure that the request is enduring. That having been said, to claim that we can never be justified in believing that someone’s request to die reflects a settled preference for death is to go too far. If a competent person discusses the issue with others on different occasions over time, and remains steady in her resolve, or privately reflects on the issue for an extended period and does not waver in her conviction, her wish to die surely must be counted as enduring.

But, it might be asked, what if a person is racked with pain, or mentally confused because of the measures taken to relieve her pain, and is, in consequence, unable to think clearly and rationally about the alternatives? It has to be agreed that a person in those circumstances who wants to die should not be assumed to have a truly voluntary and enduring desire to die. However, there are at least two important points to make about those in such circumstances. First, they do not account for all of the terminally ill, so even if it is acknowledged that such people are incapable of agreeing to voluntary euthanasia that does not show that no one can ever voluntarily request help to die. Second, it is possible in at least some jurisdictions for a person to indicate, in advance of losing the capacity to give competent consent, how she would wish to be treated should she become terminally ill and suffer either intolerable pain or an unacceptable loss of control over her life (cf., for instance, Dworkin 1993). ‘Living wills’ or ‘advance directives’ are legal instruments for giving voice to people’s wishes while they are capable of giving competent, enduring and voluntary consent, including to their wanting help to die. As long as they are easily revocable in the event of a change of mind (just as civil wills are), they should be respected as evidence of a well thought-out conviction. (For more detailed consideration of these instruments see the entry on advance directives .)

Perhaps, though, what is really at issue in this objection is whether anyone can ever form a competent, enduring and voluntary judgement about being better off dead, rather than continuing to suffer from an illness, prior to suffering such an illness (cf., Keown in Jackson and Keown 2012). If this is what underlies the objection it is surely too paternalistic to be acceptable. Why is it not possible for a person to have sufficient inductive evidence (e.g., based on the experience of the deaths of friends or family) to know her own mind, and act accordingly, without having had direct experience of such suffering?

4.3 Objection 3

According to the traditional interpretation of the ‘doctrine of double effect’ it is permissible to act in a way which it is foreseen will have a bad effect, provided only that

the bad effect occurs as a side-effect (i.e., indirectly) to the achievement of the act that is directly aimed at;
the act directly aimed at is itself morally good or, at least, morally neutral;
the good effect is not achieved by way of the bad, that is, the bad must not be a means to the good; and
the bad effect must not be so serious as to outweigh the good effect.

Hence, it is permissible, according to the doctrine of double effect, to, for example, alleviate pain (a good effect) by administering a drug such as morphine, knowing that doing so will shorten life, but impermissible to administer the same drug with the direct intention of terminating a patient’s life (a bad effect). This latter claim is said to apply regardless of whether the drug is given at the person’s request.

This is not the appropriate forum for a full consideration of the doctrine, for which see the entry on the doctrine of double effect . However, there is one very important criticism to be made of the application of the doctrine that has direct relevance to the issue of voluntary euthanasia.

On the most plausible reading, the doctrine of double effect can be relevant to the permissibility of voluntary euthanasia only when a person’s death is bad for her or, to put it another way, a harm to her. Sometimes the notion of ‘harm’ is understood simply as damage to a person’s interests whether consented to or not. At other times, it is understood, more strictly, as damage that has been wrongfully inflicted. On either understanding of harm, there can be instances in which death for a person does not constitute a harm for her because it will either render her better off, or, as some would insist, no worse off, when compared with remaining alive. Accordingly, in those instances, the doctrine of double effect can have no relevance to the debate about the permissibility of voluntary euthanasia. (For extended discussions of the doctrine of double effect and its bearing on the moral permissibility of voluntary euthanasia see, e.g., McIntyre 2001; Woodward 2001; Cavanaugh 2006; Young 2007; Sumner 2011, 2017.)

4.4 Objection 4

As was noted earlier in Section 3, there is a widespread belief that so-called passive (voluntary) euthanasia, wherein life-sustaining or life-prolonging measures are withdrawn or withheld in response to a competent patient’s request, is morally permissible. The reason why passive (voluntary) euthanasia is said to be morally permissible is that the patient is simply allowed to die because steps are not taken to preserve or prolong life. This happens, for example, when a dying patient requests the withdrawal or the withholding of measures whose administration would be medically futile, or unacceptably burdensome. By contrast, active (voluntary) euthanasia is said to be morally impermissible because it is claimed to require an unjustifiable intentional act of killing to satisfy the patient’s request (cf., for example, Finnis, 1995; Keown in Jackson and Keown 2012; Keown 2018).

Despite its popularity and widespread use, the distinction between passive and active euthanasia is neither particularly clear nor morally helpful. (For a fuller discussion, see McMahan 2002.) Whether behavior is described in terms of acts or omissions (a distinction which underpins the alleged difference between active and passive voluntary euthanasia and that between killing a person and letting her die), is often a matter of pragmatics rather than anything of deeper moral importance. Consider, for instance, the practice (once common in hospitals) of deliberately proceeding slowly to a ward in response to a request to provide assistance for a patient who has been assigned a ‘not for resuscitation’ code. Or, consider ‘pulling the plug’ on a respirator keeping an otherwise dying patient alive, as against not replacing the oxygen supply when it runs out. Are these acts or omissions? If the answers turn on merely pragmatic considerations the supposed distinction between passive euthanasia and active euthanasia will be hard to sustain.

Even supposing that the distinction between acts and omissions, and the associated distinction between killing and letting die, can be satisfactorily clarified (on which see the entry doing v. allowing harm ), there remains the issue of whether these distinctions have moral significance in every circumstance. Consider a case of a patient suffering from motor neurone disease who is completely respirator dependent, finds her condition intolerable, and competently and persistently requests to be removed from the respirator so that she may die. Even the Catholic Church in recent times has been prepared to agree that it is permissible, in a case like this, to turn off the respirator. No doubt this has been because the Catholic Church considers such a patient is only being allowed to die. Even were it to be agreed, for the sake of argument, that such a death should be regarded as an instance of letting die, this concession would not show that it would have been morally worse had the patient been killed at her request (active voluntary euthanasia) rather than being allowed to die (passive voluntary euthanasia). Indeed, supporters of voluntary medically assisted death maintain that since death is beneficial in such an instance (or, at the very least, leaves the dying person no worse off), actively bringing about the death is morally to be preferred to just allowing it to happen because the desired benefit is achieved sooner and thus with less suffering.

Opponents of voluntary euthanasia claim, however, that the difference between active and passive euthanasia is to be found in the agent’s intention: if someone’s life is intentionally terminated she has been killed, whereas if she is just no longer being aggressively treated, her death should be attributed to the underlying disease. Many physicians would say that their intention in withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment in such circumstances is simply to respect the patient’s wishes. This is plausible in those instances where the patient competently requests that aggressive treatment no longer be given (or, the patient’s proxy makes such a request). But it will often be implausible. In many cases the most plausible interpretation of a physician’s intention in withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining measures is that it is to end the patient’s life. Consider the palliative care practice of ‘terminally sedating’ a patient after a decision has been made to cease aggressive treatment. Suppose (as sometimes happens) that this is then followed by withholding artificially supplied nutrition. In these latter instances the best explanation of the physician’s behavior is that the physician intends thereby to end the life of the patient. What could be the point of the action, the goal aimed at, the intended outcome, if not to end the patient’s life? (Cf. Winkler 1995.) No sense can be made of the action as being intended to palliate the patient’s diseased condition, or to keep the patient comfortable. Nor is it appropriate to claim that what kills the patient is the underlying disease. What kills the patient is the act of depriving her of nutrition (i.e., of starving her to death). The point can be generalized to cover many more instances involving either the withdrawal or the withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment. In short, there is no good reason to think that whereas so-called passive voluntary euthanasia is morally acceptable active voluntary euthanasia never can be.

But we can go further. Giving titrated doses of morphine that reach levels beyond those needed to control pain, or removing a respirator from a sufferer from motor neurone disease, seem to many of us to amount to intentionally bringing about the death of the person being cared for. To be sure, as was acknowledged above, there are circumstances in which doctors can truthfully say that the actions they perform, or omissions they make, will bring about the deaths of their patients even though it was not their intention that those patients would die. So, for instance, if a patient refuses life-prolonging medical treatment because she considers it futile, it can be reasonable to say that her doctor’s intention in complying with the request was simply to respect her wishes. Nevertheless, as we have seen, there are other circumstances in which it is highly stilted to claim, as some doctors continue to do, that they had no intention of bringing about death.

These considerations should settle matters but do not do so for those who maintain that killing, in medical contexts, is always morally unjustified – a premise that underwrites much of the debate surrounding this fourth objection. But this underlying assumption is open to challenge and has been challenged by, for instance, Rachels 1986 and McMahan 2002. One of the reasons the challengers have given is that there are cases in which killing a competent dying person when she requests assistance with dying, is morally preferable to allowing her to die, namely, when taking the latter option would serve only to prolong her suffering against her wishes. Further, despite the longstanding legal doctrine that no one can justifiably consent to be killed (on which more later), it surely is relevant to the justification of an act of killing that the person killed has autonomously decided that she would be better off dead and so asks to be helped to die.

4.5 Objection 5

It is sometimes said that if society allows voluntary euthanasia to be legalized, we will then have set foot on a slippery slope that will lead us eventually to support other forms of euthanasia, including, in particular, non-voluntary euthanasia. Whereas it was once the common refrain that that was precisely what happened in Hitler’s Germany, in recent decades the tendency has been to claim that experience with legalized euthanasia in the Netherlands and Belgium, in particular, has confirmed the reality of the slippery slope.

Slippery slope arguments come in various versions. One (but not the only) way of classifying them has been to refer to logical, psychological and arbitrary line versions. The common feature of the different forms is the contention that once the first step is taken on a slippery slope the subsequent steps follow inexorably, whether for logical reasons, psychological reasons, or to avoid arbitrariness in ‘drawing a line’ between a person’s actions. (For further discussion see, e.g., Rachels 1986; Brock 1992; Walton 1992.)

We need first to consider whether, at the theoretical level, any of these forms of argument is powerful enough to refute the case for the legalization of voluntary euthanasia. We will then be in a position to comment on the alleged empirical support from the experiences of Hitler’s Germany and, more recently, of legalized euthanasia in the Netherlands and elsewhere, for the existence of a slippery slope that supposedly comes into being with the legalization of voluntary euthanasia.

To begin with, there is nothing logically inconsistent in supporting voluntary euthanasia while maintaining the moral inappropriateness of non-voluntary euthanasia. (However, for an attempt to press the charge that there is such an inconsistency see, e.g., Keown 2022.) Undoubtedly, some advocates of voluntary euthanasia wish also to lend their support to some acts of non-voluntary euthanasia, for example, for those in persistent vegetative states who have never indicated their wishes about being helped to die, or for certain severely disabled infants for whom the outlook is hopeless. (See, e.g., Kuhse and Singer 1985; Singer 1994; Stingl 2010; Sumner 2017.) Others believe that the consent of the patient is strictly required if euthanasia is appropriately to be legalized. The difference is not a matter of logical acumen; it is to be explained by reference to the importance placed on key values by the respective supporters. Thus, for example, those who insist on the necessity for a competent request by a patient for medical assistance with dying typically believe that such a request is the paramount consideration in end-of-life decision making (even when it is harnessed to the value of individual well-being), whereas those who consider a person’s best interests to be the paramount consideration are more likely to believe in the justifiability of instances of non-voluntary euthanasia like those mentioned above.

Next, it is hard to see why moving from voluntary to non-voluntary euthanasia is supposed to be psychologically inevitable. Why should those who support the legalization of voluntary euthanasia, because they value the autonomy of the individual, find it psychologically easier, in consequence, to endorse the killing of those who are not able competently to request assistance with dying? What reason is there to believe that they will, as a result of their support for voluntary euthanasia, be psychologically driven to endorse a practice of non-voluntary euthanasia?

Finally, since there is nothing arbitrary about distinguishing voluntary euthanasia from non-voluntary euthanasia (because the line between them is based on clear principles), there can be no substance to the charge that only by arbitrarily drawing a line between them could non-voluntary euthanasia be avoided were voluntary euthanasia to be legalized.

What, though, of Hitler’s Germany and the recent experience of legalized voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands and elsewhere? The former is easily dismissed as an indication of an inevitable descent from voluntary euthanasia to non-voluntary. There never was a policy in favor of, or a legal practice of, voluntary euthanasia in Germany in the 1920s to the 1940s (see, for example, Burleigh 1994). There was, prior to Hitler coming to power, a clear practice of killing some disabled persons. But it was never suggested that their being killed was justified by reference to their best interests; rather, it was said that society would be benefited. Hitler’s later revival of the practice and its widening to take in other groups such as Jews and gypsies was part of a program of eugenics , not euthanasia.

Since the publication of the Remmelink Report in 1991 into the medical practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands, it has frequently been said that the Dutch experience shows that legally protecting voluntary euthanasia is impossible without also affording shelter to the non-voluntary euthanasia that will follow in its train (see, e.g., Keown 2018). In the period since that report there have been regular national studies of the practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands (see, e.g., Rietjens, et al. 2009; Onwuteaka-Philipsen, et al. 2012; van der Heide, et al. 2017). The findings from these national studies have consistently shown that there is no evidence for the existence of such a slippery slope. Among the specific findings the following are worth mentioning: of those terminally ill persons who have been assisted to die about sixty per cent have clearly been cases of voluntary euthanasia as it has been characterised in this entry; of the remainder, the vast majority of cases were of patients who at the time of their medically assisted deaths were no longer competent. It might be thought that these deaths ought to be regarded as instances of non-voluntary euthanasia. But, in fact, it would be inappropriate to regard them as such. Here is why. For the overwhelming majority of these cases, the decisions to end life were taken only after consultation between the attending doctor(s) and close family members, and so can legitimately be thought of as involving substituted judgements. Moreover, according to the researchers, the overwhelming majority of these cases fit within either of two common practices that occur in countries where voluntary euthanasia has not been legalized, namely, that of terminal sedation of dying patients, and that of giving large doses of opioids to relieve pain while foreseeing that this will also end life. In a very few cases, there was no consultation with relatives, though in those cases there were consultations with other medical personnel. The researchers contend that these instances are best explained by the fact that families in the Netherlands strictly have no final legal authority to act as surrogate decision-makers for incompetent persons. For these reasons the researchers maintain that non-voluntary euthanasia is not widely practised in the Netherlands.

That there have only been a handful of prosecutions of Dutch doctors for failing to follow agreed procedures (Griffiths, et al. 1998; Asscher and van de Vathorst 2020), that none of the doctors prosecuted has had a significant penalty imposed, that a significant proportion of requests for medical assistance with dying are rejected as unjustifiable, and that the Dutch public have regularly reaffirmed their support for the agreed procedures suggests that, contrary to the claims of some critics, the legalization of voluntary euthanasia has not increased the incidence of non-voluntary euthanasia. A similar picture to the one in the Netherlands has emerged from studies of the operation of the law concerning physician-assisted suicide in Oregon. Indeed, in a recent wide-ranging study of attitudes and practices of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide covering two continents, a prominent critic of these practices has concluded (in agreement with his co-authors) that little evidence exists of abuse, particularly of the vulnerable (see Emanuel, et al., 2016). Unfortunately, insufficient time has elapsed for appropriate studies to be conducted in the other jurisdictions that have legalized either voluntary euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide (but for some relevant evidence see e.g., White, et al. 2022). Finally, some commentators have pointed out that there may, in reality, be more danger of the line between voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia being blurred if euthanasia is practised in the absence of legal recognition, since there will, in those circumstances, be neither transparency nor monitoring (which cannot be said of the Netherlands, Belgium, Oregon and so on).

None of this is to suggest that it is not necessary to ensure the presence of safeguards against potential abuse of legally protected voluntary euthanasia. This is particularly important for the protection of those who have become incompetent by the time decisions need to be taken about whether to assist them to die. Furthermore, it is, of course, possible that the reform of any law may have unintended effects. However, if the arguments outlined above are sound (and the experience in the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, along with the more limited experience in several states in the United States and in Canada, is, for the present, not only the best evidence we have that they are sound, but the only relevant evidence), that does not seem very likely.

It is now well-established in many jurisdictions that competent patients are entitled to make their own decisions about life-sustaining medical treatment. That is why they can refuse such treatment even when doing so is tantamount to deciding to end their life. It is plausible to think that the fundamental basis of the right to decide about life-sustaining treatment – respect for a person’s autonomy and her assessment of what will best serve her well-being – has direct relevance to the legalization of voluntary euthanasia (see, e.g., Dworkin 1998; Young 2007, 2017; Sumner 2011, 2017). In consequence, extending the right of self-determination to cover cases of voluntary euthanasia does not require a dramatic shift in legal policy. Nor do any novel legal values or principles need to be invoked. Indeed, the fact that suicide and attempted suicide are no longer criminal offences in many jurisdictions indicates that the central importance of individual self-determination in a closely analogous context has been accepted. The fact that voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide have not been more widely decriminalized is perhaps best explained along a similar line to the one that has frequently been offered for excluding the consent of the victim as a justification for an act of killing, namely the difficulties thought to exist in establishing the genuineness of the consent. But, the establishment of suitable procedures for giving consent to voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide is surely no harder than establishing procedures for competently refusing burdensome or otherwise unwanted medical treatment. The latter has already been accomplished in many jurisdictions, so the former should be achievable as well.

Suppose that the moral case for legalizing voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide does come to be judged more widely as stronger than the case against legalization, and they are made legally permissible in more jurisdictions than at present. Should doctors take part in the practice? Should only doctors perform voluntary euthanasia? These questions ought to be answered in light of the best understanding of what it is to provide medical care. The proper administration of medical care should promote the welfare of patients while respecting their individual self-determination. It is these twin values that should guide medical care, not the preservation of life at all costs, or the preservation of life without regard to whether patients want their lives prolonged should they judge that life is no longer of benefit or value to them. Many doctors in those jurisdictions where medically assisted death has been legalized and, to judge from available survey evidence, in other liberal democracies as well, see the practice of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide as not only compatible with their professional commitments but also with their conception of the best medical care for the dying. That being so, doctors of the same conviction in jurisdictions in which voluntary medically assisted death is currently illegal should no longer be prohibited by law from lending their professional assistance to competent terminally ill persons who request assistance with dying because of irremediable suffering or because their lives no longer have value for them.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Medically Assisted Dying , an annotated bibliography authored by Robert Young (La Trobe University)
Eight Reasons Not to Legalize Physician Assisted Suicide , by David Albert Jones, online resource at the Anscombe Bioethics Centre website.

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Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Euthanasia – For Legalizing

There are many arguments for and against legalizing euthanasia. It has ethical benefits as well as downsides. Should euthanasia be legalized? Essay samples like this one will help you understand the issue.

Introduction

There is no respect for autonomy, justice is denied, sympathy for the suffering of others, individual liberty vs. state interest, the voice of the u.s. public.

The legality issue of Euthanasia has been a subject of heated debate since long. On the global scene, the Netherlands was the first country to legalize Euthanasia in April 2002, followed a month later by Belgium.

Switzerland legalized the practice in December 2005 (Reuters U.K). In the U.K where public support for legalization of Euthanasia rose from 69% in 1976 to 82% in 2004, it is widely expected that Parliament will soon legalize the practice (News-medical.net).

In the U.S, many states have been debating the legality issue of Euthanasia but only Oregon has legalized it since 1997 (Reuters U.K). It is my contention that Euthanasia should be legalized all over the country.

The word ‘Euthanasia’ comes from the Greek word ‘Euthanatos’ meaning ‘good health.’ Euthanasia is defined as the deliberate ending of a person’s life by anther person at the specific request of the former. Euthanasia is not the same as other practices such as Physician-Assisted Suicide, Terminal Sedation or Withholding/Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatments.

Physician-Assisted Suicide takes place when a physician, responding to specific request from patients, gives information {for example, a prescription for a fatal dose of sleeping pills}, and/or the means {such as a supply of carbon monoxide gas} of committing suicide to patients so that they can easily hasten their death (Religious tolerance.org).

Terminal Sedation occurs in cases where the physician administers sufficient sedatives to cause a terminally ill, competent patient to become unconscious, then permitting the patient to die of starvation, dehydration and the disease which has been contracted (Braddock et al.).

Withholding/Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatments takes place where a competent patient refuses to continue taking on-going life-sustaining treatment (Braddock et al.) such as the use of ventilators, dialysis, intravenous fluids and feeding tubes.

There are 3 kinds of Euthanasia. Active Euthanasia takes place when a person is put to death as a direct consequence of a request from him or her.

A famous example is the 1998 case involving Jack Kevorkian who caused the death {by lethal injection} of a patient suffering from ALS {Lou Gehrig’s Disease} who begged for a swift and painless death. Passive Euthanasia occurs when the death of a person is speeded up by changing some type of life-support being administered to him or her, thereby paving the way for nature to take its own course.

Examples of Passive Euthanasia include unplugging a respirator, ceasing administration of medications or not performing CPR {cardio-pulmonary resuscitation} on a person whose heart has ceased functioning. Involuntary Euthanasia involves putting to death persons who have not specifically asked for assistance in dying.

This usually occurs in case of those who have slipped into a Persistent Vegetative State and will in all likelihood never regain consciousness (Religioustolerance.org).

Taking decisions about the time and method of one’s death is considered very personal and confidential. Persons who are terminally ill patients with deadly diseases like ALS, AIDS, Alzheimer’s or Multiple Sclerosis know they will soon die and simply want to exercise control over the process. They cannot tolerate the loss of personal dignity as they are no longer self-sufficient, but have to constantly depend on others for care (Religioustolerance.org).

Secondly, such terminally ill persons do not wish to reduce their financial assets by having to constantly pay massive hospital bills as their death draws nearer; they would prefer to die quickly so that their inheritors of their assets will benefit to a greater degree by way of savings of such heavy hospital expenses.

Heavily underlying these reasons is the inescapable fact that they are living in excessive, chronic pain fully knowing that there is no cure for their ailment and that death is inevitable (Religioustolerance.org).

The Constitution of the country dictates that all persons have the freedom of choice. The freedom of choice in this case refers to the right of all persons – whether in good health, slightly ill or terminally ill – to choose if they want to go on living or if they are restrained so heavily by circumstances such as terminal illness to take the decision that they do not want to continue living and that they would be better off dead.

By not legalizing Euthanasia, terminally ill patients are denied the right to court speedier death by taking matters into their own hands. For some of them, death does not come as speedily as they wish, with the result that they have only one option left – death (Braddock et al.). By denying them the right to escape a life of pain that will anyway end in nothing by death, the State is denying terminally ill persons their Constitutional right

Some illnesses, besides causing intense physical suffering, also cause unbearable psychological burdens to patients (Braddock et al.). A classic example is AIDS. Sufferers of this disease endure horrific suffering as the disease progresses. Their bodily resistance steadily deteriorates, weakness sets in and they literally wither away to death.

Their physical anguish is accompanied by extreme mental suffering as they know that even with the best treatment, their burden of physical and metal suffering will at the most be slight, and that too temporarily, relieved but the onset of death is inevitable.

If these patients may request Euthanasia hasten death, do their loved ones not have the moral duty to end their physical and metal suffering? The key word in this scenario is ‘inevitability.’

The persons who have been entrusted by the patient to administer Euthanasia knows that death is inevitable, therefore, if such death is allowed to come in earlier than scheduled, it is a matter of showing sympathy for the suffering of the patient. In this context, Euthanasia is seen as a compassionate reaction to intense suffering.

There is no doubt that the State has a strong interest in preserving the life of its citizens. It is understandable and widely expected as a sign of a well-run State because such interest stems from the responsibility entrusted to the State.

Therefore when the State takes precautionary measures to safeguard its citizens such as apprehending thieves and muggers, or interning drug dealers and human smugglers, or punishing rapists and wife batterers, or sentencing serial killers to life imprisonment or capital punishment, these actions are viewed as signs of a government correctly doing the job that it was elected to do.

However, when it turns into a matter of private {as opposed to the above various forms of public safeguards}, the intensity of such State interest does not match the interest of terminally ill individuals who opt for death to end life. This lopsided {against the State} level of interest, if strengthened by prohibition by the State, is seen as an infringement on the personal liberty of the individual (Braddock et al.).

Perhaps the greatest U.S President of all time, Abraham Lincoln, described democracy as a rule “by the people, of the people and for the people.” It therefore follows that in this great democracy called the United States of America, it is the voice of the people that is paramount.

It also therefore follows that the voice of the people in case of legalizing Euthanasia should be treated with the greatest of importance. The voice of the people states that Euthanasia should be legalized.

While almost all the U.S states may have been intimated by the 1997 U.S Supreme Court landmark ruling against Euthanasia, the U.S public certainly has not been similarly affected. A 2005 Harris Poll involving 1,010 adults in the U.S discovered that as many as 64% of them disagreed with the 1997 Supreme Court ruling.

It was therefore not surprising that the same poll also found that 70% of them were in favor of legalizing Euthanasia. The greatest support was reserved for Involuntary Euthanasia with an overwhelming 72% of respondents declaring that they would go to the extent of expressly authorizing the administration of Euthanasia against themselves in their last wills and testaments (Taylor).

In addition to the above cited arguments, hard facts show that the most potent argument against legalizing Euthanasia {that it will increase the number of deaths of terminally ill persons} has been soundly refuted. Data from areas that have legalized Euthanasia do not show any marked changes as a result of this action. A good example is the U.S state of Oregon.

Ever since the passing of the Death with Dignity Act, the number of Euthanasia cases has hardly registered any noticeable change as compared to data of previous years. But what did change however, in Oregon as well as all those nations that have legalized Euthanasia, is the great relief that was made available to terminally ill patients – much needed relief that was cruelly denied to them before such legalization.

Their relief has been well articulated by Professor Torbjorn Tannsjo: “They [terminally ill patients] would know that, if, when their turn comes, and things turn out to be terrible, they have a way out” (News-medical.net).

Braddock C.H. & Tonelli M.R. “Physician-Assisted Suicide.” University of Washington. 2008.

“ British Medical Journal Publishes Euthanasia Opinions .” News-medical.net. 2005.

“ Euthanasia & Physician-Assisted Suicide .” Religioustolerance.org. 2002.

“ FACTBOX – Legal Status of Euthanasia around the World .” Reuters U.K. 2007.

Taylor, H. “Poll: U.S Adults Favor Euthanasia & Physician Assisted Suicide.” Death with Dignity National Center. 2005.

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Published: 15 January 2014

Should assisted dying be legalised?

Thomas D G Frost 1 ,
Devan Sinha 2 &
Barnabas J Gilbert 3

Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine volume 9 , Article number: 3 ( 2014 ) Cite this article

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When an individual facing intractable pain is given an estimate of a few months to live, does hastening death become a viable and legitimate alternative for willing patients? Has the time come for physicians to do away with the traditional notion of healthcare as maintaining or improving physical and mental health, and instead accept their own limitations by facilitating death when requested? The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge held the 2013 Varsity Medical Debate on the motion “This House Would Legalise Assisted Dying”. This article summarises the key arguments developed over the course of the debate. We will explore how assisted dying can affect both the patient and doctor; the nature of consent and limits of autonomy; the effects on society; the viability of a proposed model; and, perhaps most importantly, the potential need for the practice within our current medico-legal framework.

Introduction

Over the past two centuries, the United Kingdom has experienced rapid population growth associated with a substantial decline in mortality from acute infectious diseases and poor nutrition [ 1 ]. As the average life expectancy has increased, so too have the rates of debilitating chronic illness – particularly coronary artery disease and cancers [ 2 ]. These diseases require years of treatment instead of the mere days to weeks that medicine once operated within [ 2 ]. Although healthcare systems have sought to adapt to such changes, aiming to prevent and treat such disease wherever possible, debate has arisen regarding those patients in the latter stages of chronic, incurable, terminal conditions [ 3 , 4 ]. Moreover, there is increasing recognition that the patient must be at the centre of health care decision-making, such that outcomes must be tailored to their individual needs and views. By extension, assisted dying might seem a logical step to help achieve these goals within the realm of end-of-life decision making [ 5 ]. Several jurisdictions, notably Oregon (1997) and the Netherlands (2001) have already legalised assisted dying in some form. These factors have contributed to ongoing legislative discussions within Parliaments for almost a decade, with current opinion polling suggesting a majority of medical practitioners and the public in favour of physician-assisted suicide [ 6 ].

Viability of assisted dying in practice

In the UK, a model for assisted dying has been developed from the legal structure found within the Assisted Dying Bill introduced by Lord Falconer in the House of Lords in 2013 [ 7 ]. Assisted dying could only be considered under circumstances in which a patient of legal age is diagnosed with a progressive disease that is irreversible by treatment and is “reasonably expected to die within six months” [ 7 ]. Registered medical practitioners would make such decisions for patients with terminal illnesses. Addressing the technicalities of ‘assisted dying’ requires distinction between ‘physician-assisted suicide’ (offering patients medical actions or cessation of actions by which they can end their own life) and ‘euthanasia’ (whereby the medical practitioner actively induces death). In light of the strong hostility of the medical profession towards active euthanasia, this proposed model, as with previous attempts to legalise assisted dying, permitted only the former [ 8 – 10 ].

However, there is concern that such distinction may be unrealistic in practice because medical practitioners could find themselves with a patient who had failed to successfully end their own life and was subsequently left in a state of greater suffering. Were such a patient no longer able to give consent, a heavy burden would then be placed on the physician regarding how to proceed. Moreover, the practice of physician-assisted suicide might be deemed discriminatory, for example by giving only patients with good mobility control over their own method of death.

The Assisted Dying Bill 2013 included the provision that any terminal prognosis must be confirmed and attested by a second registered practitioner. The strictness of such criteria has parallels to a similar double-physician requirement when procuring a legal abortion under the 1967 Abortion Act. The stated aims of the provision in both cases are as follows: first, to check the accuracy of the prognosis upon which the decision was being made; second, to ensure that the situation meets the required criteria; and third, to check that such a decision was taken by the patient after full consideration of all available options [ 11 , 12 ]. By having a second independent doctor, the legislation ensures that all three checks are met without prejudice or mistake.

Problematic for any protocol for assisted dying is the fact that estimates of life expectancy in terminal prognoses are erroneous in 80.3% of cases [ 13 ]. Furthermore, the accuracy of such prognoses deteriorates with increased length of clinical predicted survival. Forecasts of survival times are based largely on past clinical experience, and the inherent variability between patients makes this more of an art than a science. This brings to concern both the accuracy of any prognosis meeting the six-month threshold and the validity of requests for assisted dying based partly or wholly on predicted survival times. Whilst the majority of errors in life expectancy forecasts are a matter of over-optimism and hence would not affect either of those two concerns, many cases remain unaccounted for. Overly pessimistic forecasts occur in 17.3% of prognoses; hence we must decide whether the one in six patients making a decision based on an inaccurate prognosis is too high a cost to justify the use of this system. Patients requesting an assisted death often cite future expectations of dependency, loss of dignity, or pain [ 14 ]. If the hypothetical point at which the progression of their illness means they would consider life to be not worth living is not, as informed, mere weeks away but in fact many more months, then this information would have resulted in a different decision outcome and potentiated unnecessary loss of life.

Whilst the presence of a second doctor would be expected to mitigate such forecasting errors, the anchoring bias of the initial prediction may be enough to similarly reduce the accuracy of the second estimate. It is prudent to question the true independence of a second medical practitioner, and whether this second consultation could become more of a formality, as has now become the case with abortion [ 15 ].

Another challenge for an assisted dying system would be to recognise whether patients requesting death were legally competent to make that decision. Consider that any request for suicide from a patient with clinical depression is generally categorised as a manifestation of that mental disorder, thereby lacking capacity. It is arguably impossible to separate out the natural reactions to terminal illness and clinical depression. Indeed, there is evidence that major depressive disorders afflict between 25% and 77% of patients with terminal illness [ 16 , 17 ]. Any protocol for assisted dying must first determine what qualifies as a ‘fit mental state’ for a terminal patient.

The need for assisted dying

It could be argued that a doctor’s fundamental duty is to alleviate forms of suffering in the best interests of the patient. The avoidance of physical pain, as an obvious manifestation of suffering, might explain why assisted dying would be both necessary and within the duties of a doctor to provide. The evolving principle in common law known as the ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’ offers a solution to this problem [ 18 ]. This legal judgement stated that “[a doctor] is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain even if the measures he takes may incidentally shorten life”. This entails that a protocol already exists for patients searching for an escape from chronic pain. Furthermore, numerous retrospective studies have revealed very little correlation between opioid dose and mean survival times: one study of over 700 opioid-treated patients found that the variation in survival time from high-dose opioid treatment is less than 10% [ 19 – 21 ]. It can therefore be said that pain alone, if appropriately managed, should never be cause for considering assisted dying as an alternative.

By contrast, the ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’ might be seen as a subjective interpretation that has been applied unequally due to a lack of specialist training or knowledge [ 22 ]. Despite this, the principle can be easily understood and poor awareness can be remedied by improvements in medical education and standardisation of protocols. Moreover, should we choose to accept arguments for assisted dying that are based upon inadequate administration of pain medication, we set a precedent for conceding shortcomings in palliative care and other end-of-life treatments. Offering hastened death could become an alternative to actively seeking to improve such failings.

Whilst much has been made of the ‘pain argument’ here, the call for assisted dying is rarely this simple. Many patients also suffer a loss of dignity, often due to their lack of mobility – the inability to relieve oneself without help is a potent example. Beyond this are additional fears of further debilitation and the emotional costs of dealing with chronic illness, both for the patient and for their relatives and friends. A study of terminal patients in Oregon showed that these were the most significant reasons behind requests for assisted suicide, the next commonest reason being the perception of themselves as a ‘burden’ [ 14 ]. Clearly, we could seek to provide balanced, compassionate medical care for these patients, and still fail to address these points.

Developments in healthcare and technology may reduce this emotional burden, but remain an imperfect solution.

Rights of patients and limitations of their autonomy

J.S. Mill’s pithy dictum describes autonomy as follows: “over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” [ 23 ]. Not only has the sanctity of bodily autonomy profoundly influenced the development of liberal democracies, it has also provoked a holistic shift in making our healthcare systems more patient-centred – “care that meets and responds to patients’ wants, needs and preferences and where patients are autonomous and able to decide for themselves” [ 5 ]. The ethical principle of controlling the fate of one’s own body is inherently relevant to the debate on assisted dying. It is difficult to reconcile that citizens may have the right to do almost anything to and with their own bodies– from participating in extreme sports to having elective plastic surgery – yet a terminal patient cannot choose to avoid experiencing additional months of discomfort or loss of dignity in their final months of life.

Expectation of individual liberty has been codified in law. The right to bodily autonomy has been interpreted to be included under Article 8 - the right to privacy - of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and subsequently the Human Rights Act (HRA) [ 24 , 25 ]. Moreover, the ECHR underpins the right of individuals to ‘inherent dignity’ [ 26 ]. Hence, if an individual feels that dignity is unattainable due to the progression of a terminal illness, then taking recourse though assisted dying ought to be a legitimate option.

Conversely, there are two notable oversights in this interpretation of a right to assisted dying as an extension of the principles of bodily autonomy:

First, it would be wrong to view individual liberty as absolute. The HRA allows for exceptions to Article 8 on grounds of ‘health or morals’ [ 25 ]. The principle of autonomy is not inviolable. Governments have limited such privileges for the protection of individuals and society, for example by criminalizing the use of recreational drugs or the selling of one’s own organs. The preservation of life by denying assisted dying could fall within this category.

Second, the right of autonomy is not necessarily intrinsic to human beings but, as Kant argued, is dependent on our ‘rational nature’ [ 27 ]. This concept sees autonomy as an exercise of ‘evaluative choice’ [ 27 ], requiring rationality on the part of individuals to appreciate the nature of options and their consequences. To achieve true autonomy, there must be sufficient information to make those rational decisions; this is the basis of informed consent and why it is a fundamental duty of a doctor to offer a patient an informed series of treatment options [ 28 ]. The logistical issue is that doctors are unable to advise patients regarding the point at which their situation becomes less preferable to being dead. No doctor (or individual) has any knowledge or experience of what ‘death’ may be like. Hence, in this case, the idea of exercising true autonomy through informed consent might be considered meaningless.

Legalising assisted dying by attempting to establish an absolute right to bodily autonomy may undermine other individual and group rights. Vulnerable patients may feel pressured into assisted dying because of social, emotional, or financial strains placed on family and/or friends. This is exemplified by the trend showing that the proportion of patients stating ‘relief of burden’ on others as the reason for requesting assisted dying has risen from 17% to 25% in Oregon since legalisation [ 29 ]. One could even consider the risk of assisted dying becoming an expected choice rather than a free one. Thus, assisted dying may erode the elemental right to life of terminal patients as the value of their life becomes tied to relative costs to society and to those around them.

Moreover, by creating one class of individuals for whom life is expendable, that particular view may be extended by society to all groups possessing such attributes (e.g. the permanently disabled). There would be a definite risk to the rights of these vulnerable groups in the form of society being less willing to provide for their health and social care.

It is often raised that the limited legalisation of assisted dying would inevitably become extended in scope, but this is not necessarily a flaw. Even if the right to determine the manner of death were later extended to a wider group of people, posterity may reflect positively on such a change, just as extending the franchise to women ultimately led to legislation demanding equal pay.

Effect on health professionals and their role

‘To act in the best interest of the patient’ is often cited as a central duty of the doctor [ 28 ]. This concept of ‘best interest’ guiding the doctor’s action has seen the development of two important ethical principles: beneficence and non-maleficence. Beneficence mandates that the actions of the doctor must be aimed to bring about benefit (clinical improvement) for the patient, usually measured in terms of reduced morbidity or mortality; non-maleficence requires that the doctor not carry out treatment that is likely to cause overall harm the patient [ 30 ]. These traditional ethical imperatives on a doctor both conflict with intentionally hastening the death of a patient, and a resolution of this tension would require redefining what constitutes ‘acting in the best interest’.

A further dimension is the potential reluctance of health professionals to engage in a practice that contravenes their own ethical beliefs, particularly as this would affect doctors who never entered training in the knowledge that assisting patients to die would be an expected duty. This is certainly no argument against the introduction of assisted dying; indeed, a recent survey of a cohort of NHS doctors found that 46% would seriously consider requests from patients to undertake steps to hasten death [ 31 ]. It merely expresses the point that any early model would have to account for the fact that an initial 54% of the doctors in the NHS would be required to advise qualifying patients of assisted dying as a legitimate option, despite disagreeing with it in principle.

Furthermore, doctors who agree ethically with this practice may find themselves facing conflicts of interest. It is expensive to treat chronically ill patients, particularly in the final months of life [ 32 ]. Moreover, it would be difficult for commissioners to ignore the fact that the sustained treatment of one individual could deprive many others from access to surgery or access to novel drugs. Such an argument does not suggest that doctors or any other hospital staff would treat this practice without appropriate respect or care; rather it acknowledges the need for appropriate rationing of care and questions the intentions of service providers. The perception of an ulterior motive could negatively impact patient trust. One survey showed that a reasonable minority of patients (27%) – and particularly particularly the elderly – believe that legalising assisted dying would lessen their trust in their personal physician [ 33 ]. The costs of weakened trust in the doctor-patient relationship could far outweigh the benefits of assisted dying, particularly given the importance of trust when treating a chronic patient for an extended period of time.

There is no doubt that assisted dying would empower some patients to maximise control over the timing and manner of their own death. Such expression of autonomy would surely solidify moves towards a patient-centred approach to healthcare. However, the capacity for such consensual requests remains in doubt. Clinically, the patient’s state of mind and the reliability of diagnostic predictions are of issue; philosophically, the idea of informed consent for death is contradictory. The implications for patients, physicians and society have been weighed extensively within this article. The central tenet throughout has been the balancing of an individual’s right to escape a circumstance that they find intolerable, alongside the consequential changes to their other rights, and the rights and responsibilities of third parties. Ultimately, the challenge is for us as a society to decide where this balance lies.

About the debate

The Varsity Medical Debate was started in 2008 with the aim of allowing students, professors and members of the polis, to engage in discussion about ethics and policy within healthcare. Utilising the age-old rivalry between the two Universities, the debate encourages medical students from both Oxford and Cambridge to consider and articulate the arguments behind topics that will feature heavily in their future careers.

The debate was judged on the logic, coherence, and evidence in arguments, as well as flair in presentation. Although the debaters may not have necessarily agreed with their allocated side, the debate format required them to acknowledge a particular school of thought and present the key arguments behind it. Oxford, who opposed the motion, was awarded the victory in the debate; however, this does not mean that the judges believe that position ought to become public policy.

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Acknowledgements

For Cambridge University: Hilmi Bayri (Trinity), Alistair Bolger (Jesus), Casey Swerner (St Johns).

For Oxford University: Devan Sinha (Brasenose), Thomas Frost (Lincoln), Collis Tahzib (Lincoln).

Martin Farrell (Cambridge).

Baroness Finlay: Professor of Palliative Care Medicine and former President of the Royal Society of Medicine.

Dr. Roger Armour: Vascular Surgeon and Inventor of the Lens Free Ophthalmoscope.

Mr. Robert Preston: Director of Living and Dying Well.

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All authors planned and elucidated the layout. TDGF and DS drafted the manuscript which was critically edited and added to by BJG. All authors have read and approved the final draft.

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Frost, T.D.G., Sinha, D. & Gilbert, B.J. Should assisted dying be legalised?. Philos Ethics Humanit Med 9 , 3 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1186/1747-5341-9-3

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Mercy killing debate: should euthanasia be legalized?

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Many new cases of physician-assisted suicide or mercy killing are emerging in Western countries. Some of them have regulated it. Do you think euthanasia should be legalized? Under what circumstances? Do we have the right to die as we choose?

Mercy Killing Debate

Euthanasia or physician- assisted suicide , also know as mercy killing , is becoming a prominent public debate . The implications of legalizing assisted suicide are wide-ranging from a medical , legal, political and ethical point of view.

The term euthanasia means "good death" in Greek. With the progress of medicine in multiple domains (e.g. anesthesiology, pain medicine) came the problem of the decision of death. Some countries, like for instance Belgium, The Netherlands, and some states in the USA, including New Mexico, Montana, Oregon and Vermont, have passed laws allowing voluntary euthanasia. But the legality of choosing the moment of death is an extremely controversial subject because it appeals to personal views on ethics and morality and is highly emotional and linked to religious beliefs. Most countries still consider euthanasia a crime . Some people consider allowing euthanasia to risk opening a slippery slope where killing may become more common, and risk the killing of people misinformed or against their will. These people also worry about the risk of killing any person with some sort of suffering (e.g. mental disability, physical handicap). Supporters of euthanasia claim it is an individual right to decide when to die, to keep control of their fate when it is still possible.

Types of euthanasia

There are different types of euthanasia according to whether the will of the patient has been expressed.

Voluntary euthanasia : to intentionally end the life of someone who asked for it to relieve physical pain and psychological suffering. It can be considered as assisted suicide. Patient gives informed consent. An official signed document in which one declares one wants to be euthanized.
Non-voluntary euthanasia : consent of the patient is unavailable. Usually family members are asked about the possible will of the patient as well as their own wish.
Involuntary euthanasia is against the patient’s will and is illegal, considered as murder, in most countries.

Euthanasia can also be divided into:

Passive euthanasia: when the family or medical staff withhold life support (e.g. medication, respiratory machine, feeding or liquids) from the patient.
Active euthanasia: when the patient is administered (e.g. injected) a lethal dose of any chemical substance to end her/life.

And you? Do you support mercy killing ? Should euthanasia be legalized? Before voting and commenting you may want to consider the pros and cons of legalizing physician-assisted suicide (see below).

Watch this video on the mercy killing debate

Euthanasia pros and cons

Dying with dignity: some people are deeply sick, postrated and unable to do even the most basic human actions, such as eating, changing clothes, washing themselves or using the toilets. They often find their state degrading and humilliating and may prefer to die with dignity and stop being a burden to those around them.
End to human suffering: people with terminal illness and no chance of recovery often suffer great physical pain and emotional distress. Ending their lives, if they wish so, can spare them from an unnecessary suffering.
Legal certainty: according to research conducted in the Netherlands, regulating euthanasia has improved legal certainty and has contributed to the carefulness of assisted suicide.
Healthcare spending: keeping alive terminal patients who are suffering and not able to recover is also very expensive and detracts medical resources from other patients who could heal or need treatments. Families of the patients who want to end their lives may also face bills which can very negatively affect their finances.
Autonomy and self-determination: opposing to someone's will of ending her/his life goes against that person freedom and right of deciding on their future.
Moral and ethical problems: physician assisted death clashes with religious beliefs. Many religions state that human life end should not be decided by people but by God.
Misunderstandings and errors: there are cases in which doctors have wrongfully diagnosed a terminal disease or have thought that a patient is without hope of recovery. However, medicine evolves and cures may be found. Some new treatments may become effective were others failed. So terminating someone's life even with her/his consent may be a mistake.
Legalizing murder: regulating euthanasia for some extreme cases may mean crossing a line. It has been argued that this could be a slippery slope which could end up with the legalization of an increasing number of cases for ending a life for utilitarian reasons.
Abuse: if euthanasia is legal, there may be an incentive to exaggerate the negative condition of patients so that the family decides to "disconnect" them so that the hospital or insurance company saves money.
Complexity: even if countries decide to legalize euthanasia, there may be great difficulties in agreeing with the cases and situations in which these mercy killings are acceptable and with the legal procedures that should be respected.

Taking all these pros and cons into consideration and the experience in the territories where it has been legalized, what would you recommend doing?

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Essay on Medicine

Legalized Euthanasia Argumentative Essay Examples

Type of paper: Argumentative Essay

Topic: Medicine , Nursing , Pain , Euthanasia , Life , Patient , Exercise , Training

Published: 02/12/2020

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Introduction

The process legalizing euthanasia in order to end suffering painlessly has been termed as one of the heated debates globally. It is clear shows that majority terminally-ill people have less chance for survival or to recover, though this does not give the doctors any power or responsibility to terminate a person live. The government should consider legalizing the practices because of the following reason. Legalization of euthanasia is very fundamental to the medical fraternity because it assist the ill person alleviate their depression, pain and suffering. All people are entitled to the liberty right to life. This means that individual suffering from terrible diseases has the right to be trapped in a hospital and has to experience extreme pain every day. It thus indicates the need for legalization of euthanasia so as to relieve the patient from the miserable pain. The patient’s will for a cessation in their treatment support the argument for legalizing euthanasia. It implies that euthanasia is the better option compared to continuation of the patient discomfort. This would assist in minimization of resource that is required to support the person’s life in the hospital bed. It therefore, ethical to respect a patient decision since they are entitled and accountable to the right of his or her own person decision. It is ethical to legalize this practice because it reduces the burden associated emotions and physical challenges that has been affecting the family members. This cause trauma and emotional havoc to the relatives while enduring to the hardship. The fact that the patient’s relatives gets sensitive over the total expense at the terminal care and this makes the patient feel guilty. The overall impact due to the cost accumulated makes the situation more severe. It thus advocate for legalization of the legalization practice in order to eradicate such instances where the patient has to worry of the family economic or emotional state anymore. On the other hand, this subject has encounter varying opposing viewpoints. Some argument refers euthanasia to among the factors that are violating the right for life. In that perspective, the practice may seem to go against human right for life but the for the sake of securing the resource necessary to support the rest of the family it would serve right if euthanasia is legalized. In other terms allowing of the ill person to die would result to happiness at a long run terms. This is based on the fact argument expounding on the right to life. It considers right to life to be not the right to exist therefore promoting legalization for euthanasia. The process of terminating a person for the benefit of the majority is ethical based on the fact that death is part of life. The entire should be treated focuses on the argument that people (the medical fraternity) are entitled the responsibility of making dying a good experience. It would therefore means that doctors would perform the practice professionally avoiding any inconveniences that would have a negative impact to the concern parties. The government should formulated effective and efficient policies that would improve the procedure of handing the patience with such case that demands for termination of their lives In conclusion, euthanasia should be legalized for the people liberty and general benefits of society. Although objections to euthanasia still remain legalization of this mercy killing is morally acceptable.

Works Cited

Medina, Loreta M.. Euthanasia. Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2005. Print.

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Why active euthanasia...

Why euthanasia should not be legalised

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Why active euthanasia and physician assisted suicide should be legalised

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Rapid Response:

In response to the editorial regarding the legalisation of active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide,1 I present the following arguments against the legalisation of active euthanasia.

Active euthanasia is unnecessary because alternative treatments exist

It is widely believed that there are only two options for patients with terminal illness: either they die suffering or receive euthanasia. Recent research in palliative medicine has shown that virtually all unpleasant symptoms experienced in terminal illness can be relieved or alleviated by existing techniques.

Requests for active euthanasia are rarely free and active.

A person with terminal illness is vulnerable, lacking the skills and knowledge to alleviate their symptoms. It is very difficult for him to be entirely objective about his own situation. Their capacity for decision-making may equally be affected by confusion, dementia or symptoms, which could be relieved with appropriate treatment. Patients who on admission say "let me die" usually after effective treatment are grateful that their request was not acceded to.

Active euthanasia gives too much power to doctors

Ironically, active euthanasia legislation makes doctors less accountable and gives them more power. Patients generally decide in favour of euthanasia on the basis of information given to them by doctors. If a doctor confidently suggests a certain course of action, it can be difficult for a patient to resist. However, diagnoses may be mistaken and prognoses may be widely misjudged. Active euthanasia gives the medical practitioner power, which in turn can be abused.

Active euthanasia leads inevitably to involuntary euthanasia

When active euthanasia has been previously accepted and legalised, it has led inevitably to inactive euthanasia.

Holland is moving rapidly down the slippery slope with the public conscience changing quickly to accept such action as acceptable. The Royal Dutch Medical Association has recommended that the termination of the lives of patients suffering from dementia is acceptable under certain conditions. Case reports include a woman killed at her own request for reasons of "mental suffering".[2]

Such a progression requires only four accelerating factors: favourable public opinion, willing doctors, economic pressure and a law allowing it. In most Western countries the first three ingredients are present already. When legislation comes into effect and political and economic interests are brought to bear, the generated momentum inevitably follows.

Dr Liz Croton SHO A&E City Hospital NHS Trust, Dudley Rd,Birmingham B18 7QH [email protected]

1. Doyle L, Doyle L. Why active euthanasia and physician assisted suicide should be legalised. BMJ 2001:323;1079-80.

Competing interests: No competing interests

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Euthanasia – Arguments in Favour and Against

Last updated on October 17, 2023 by ClearIAS Team

Euthanasia is the deliberate act of ending a person’s life to relieve them of suffering. It is a complex and ethically sensitive topic that has sparked debates and discussions worldwide. There are different forms of euthanasia, and it is regulated differently in various countries.

Euthanasia (“good death”) is the practice of intentionally ending a life to relieve pain and suffering. It is also known as ‘mercy killing’.

In many countries, there is a divisive public controversy over the moral, ethical, and legal issues of euthanasia. Euthanasia is categorized in different ways, which include voluntary, non-voluntary, or involuntary. Euthanasia is also classified into active and passive Euthanasia.

Table of Contents

Voluntary, Non-Voluntary, and Involuntary Euthanasia

Voluntary euthanasia: It is conducted with the consent of the patient and is termed voluntary euthanasia. Voluntary euthanasia is legal in some countries. Jurisdictions, where euthanasia is legal, include the Netherlands, Colombia, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
Non-Voluntary euthanasia: It is conducted where the consent of the patient is unavailable and is termed non-voluntary euthanasia. Non-voluntary euthanasia is illegal in all countries. Examples include child euthanasia, which is illegal worldwide but decriminalized under certain specific circumstances in the Netherlands under the Groningen Protocol.
Involuntary euthanasia: It is conducted against the will of the patient and is termed involuntary euthanasia. Involuntary euthanasia is usually considered murder.

Passive vs Active euthanasia

Voluntary, non-voluntary, and involuntary euthanasia can all be further divided into passive or active variants.

Passive euthanasia entails the withholding of common treatments, such as antibiotics, necessary for the continuance of life.
Active euthanasia entails the use of lethal substances or forces, such as administering a lethal injection, to kill and is the most controversial means.

Euthanasia debate

Euthanasia raises profound ethical and moral questions. Supporters argue that it can be a compassionate and dignified way to end suffering, particularly in cases of terminal illness.

Opponents argue that it raises significant ethical concerns, including the potential for abuse, coercion, and mistakes in diagnosing terminal conditions.

Arguments in Favor

Historically, the euthanasia debate has tended to focus on several key concerns. According to euthanasia opponent Ezekiel Emanuel, proponents of euthanasia have presented four main arguments:

that people have a right to self-determination, and thus should be allowed to choose their fate
assisting a subject to die might be a better choice than requiring that they continue to suffer
the distinction between passive euthanasia, which is often permitted, and active euthanasia, which is not substantive (or that the underlying principle–the doctrine of double effect–is unreasonable or unsound);
permitting euthanasia will not necessarily lead to unacceptable consequences. Pro-euthanasia activists often point to countries like the Netherlands and Belgium, and states like Oregon, where euthanasia has been legalized, to argue that it is mostly unproblematic.
Constitution of India: ‘Right to life’ is a natural right embodied in Article 21 but euthanasia/suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction of life and, therefore, incompatible and inconsistent with the concept of ‘right to life’. The State must protect life and the physician’s duty to provide care and not to harm patients. Supreme Court in Gian Kaur Case 1996 has held that the right to life under Article 21 does not include the right to die.
Caregiver’s burden: Right-to-die supporters argue that people who have an incurable, degenerative, disabling, or debilitating condition should be allowed to die in dignity. This argument is further defended by those, who have chronic debilitating illness even though it is not terminal such as severe mental illness. The majority of such petitions are filed by the sufferers or family members or their caretakers. The caregiver’s burden is huge and cuts across various financial, emotional, time, physical, mental, and social domains.
Refusing care: The right to refuse medical treatment is well recognized in law, including medical treatment that sustains or prolongs life. For example, a patient suffering from blood cancer can refuse treatment or deny feeds through a nasogastric tube. Recognition of the right to refuse treatment gives way to passive euthanasia.
Encouraging organ transplantation: Mercy killing in terminally ill patients provides an opportunity to advocate for organ donation. This, in turn, will help many patients with organ failure waiting for transplantation. Not only does euthanasia give the ‘Right to die‘ for the terminally ill, but also the ‘Right to life‘ for the organ needy patients.

Arguments against

Emanuel argues that there are four major arguments presented by opponents of euthanasia:

not all deaths are painful;
alternatives, such as cessation of active treatment, combined with the use of effective pain relief, are available;
the distinction between active and passive euthanasia is morally significant; and
legalizing euthanasia will place society on a slippery slope, which will lead to unacceptable consequences
Euthanasia weakens society’s respect for the sanctity of life.
Euthanasia might not be in a person’s best interests, for example, getting old-aged parents killed for property will.
Belief in God’s miracle of curing the terminally ill.
The prospect of a discovery of a possible cure for the disease shortly.
Proper palliative care makes euthanasia unnecessary.
There is no way of properly regulating euthanasia.
Allowing euthanasia will lead to less good care for the terminally ill.
Allowing euthanasia undermines the commitment of doctors and nurses to save lives.
Euthanasia may become a cost-effective way to treat the terminally ill.
Allowing euthanasia will discourage the search for new cures and treatments for the terminally ill.
Euthanasia gives too much power to doctors.

Euthanasia in India

Passive euthanasia is legal in India. On 7 March 2011, the Supreme Court of India legalized passive euthanasia using the withdrawal of life support to patients in a permanent vegetative state. The decision was made as part of the verdict in a case involving Aruna Shanbaug, who had been in a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) for 42 years until she died in 2015.

The Aruna Shanbaug Case

In March 2011, the Supreme Court of India passed a historic judgment permitting Passive Euthanasia in the country. This judgment was passed after Pinki Virani’s plea to the highest court in December 2009 under the Constitutional provision of “Next Friend”. It’s a landmark law which places the power of choice in the hands of the individual, over government, medical or religious control which sees all suffering as “destiny”. The Supreme Court specified two irreversible conditions to permit Passive Euthanasia Law in its 2011 Law:

The brain-dead for whom the ventilator can be switched off.
Those in a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) for whom the feed can be tapered out and pain-managing palliatives be added, according to laid-down international specifications.

The same judgment law also asked for the scrapping of 309 , the code that penalizes those who survive suicide attempts. In December 2014, the Government of India declared its intention.

PIL filed by Common Cause

However, on 25 February 2014, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India termed the judgment in the Aruna Shanbaug case to be ‘inconsistent in itself’ and referred the issue of euthanasia to its five-judge Constitution bench on a PIL filed by Common Cause , which case is the basis of the current debate.

Then, the CJI referred to an earlier Constitution Bench judgment which, in the Gian Kaur case , “did not express any binding view on the subject of euthanasia; rather it reiterated that the legislature would be the appropriate authority to bring change.” Though that judgment said the right to live with dignity under Article 21 was inclusive of the right to die with dignity, it did not conclude the validity of euthanasia, be it active or passive.

“So, the only judgment that holds the field about euthanasia in India is the ruling in the Aruna Shanbaug case, which upholds the validity of passive euthanasia and lays down an elaborate procedure for executing the same on the wrong premise that the Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur had upheld the same,” the CJI said.

Common Cause Case: In 2018, the Supreme Court issued a significant judgment in the Common Cause case. The court recognized the right to die with dignity as a fundamental right and permitted passive euthanasia. It provided guidelines for the process and conditions under which passive euthanasia could be allowed.

Government’s endorsement of Passive Euthanasia

On December 23, 2014, the Government of India endorsed and re-validated the Passive Euthanasia judgment law in a Press Release, after stating in the Rajya Sabha as follows: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, while dismissing the plea for mercy killing in a particular case, laid down comprehensive guidelines to process cases relating to passive euthanasia.

Thereafter, the matter of mercy killing was examined in consultation with the Ministry of Law and Justice and it has been decided that since the Hon’ble Supreme Court has already laid down the guidelines, these should be followed and treated as law in such cases. At present, there is no legislation on this subject and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding on all.

The court rejected active euthanasia using lethal injection. In the absence of a law regulating euthanasia in India, the court stated that its decision becomes the law of the land until the Indian parliament enacts a suitable law. Active euthanasia, including the administration of lethal compounds to end life, is still illegal in India, and in most countries.

As India had no law about euthanasia, the Supreme Court’s guidelines are law until and unless Parliament passes legislation. The following guidelines were laid down:

A decision has to be taken to discontinue life support either by the parents the spouse or other close relatives, or in the absence of any of them, such a decision can be taken even by a person or a body of persons acting as a next friend. It can also be taken by the doctors attending the patient. However, the decision should be taken bona fide in the best interest of the patient.
Even if a decision is taken by the near relatives or doctors or next friend to withdraw life support, such a decision requires approval from the High Court concerned.
When such an application is filled, the Chief Justice of the High Court should forthwith constitute a Bench of at least two Judges who should decide whether to approve or not. A committee of three reputed doctors to be nominated by the Bench, will report the condition of the patient. Before giving the verdict, a notice regarding the report should be given to the close relatives and the State. After hearing the parties, the High Court can give its verdict.

A law commission had proposed legislation on “passive euthanasia”, it said. According to the Centre, the decision to come out with a bill was taken after considering the directives of the apex court, the law commission’s 241st report, and a private member bill introduced in Parliament in 2014.

The Centre said that initially, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of B.P. Sharma, secretary in the Health and Family Welfare Ministry, on May 22, 2015, to examine the draft of The Medical Treatment of Terminally Ill Patients (Protection of Patients and Medical Practitioners) Bill and the draft of The Euthanasia (Regulation) Bill.

This move to introduce a bill is a welcome step to clear the grey areas in the Euthanasia debate. Students can also link to this issue while answering questions on:

Judicial activism: SC framing laws when the parliament hasn’t. Just like the Visaka case.
Ethical dilemma in Paper 4 .

In India, euthanasia has no legal aspect , and there is no penal law yet introduced in the IPC that specifically deals with euthanasia.

However, the Supreme Court of India legalized passive euthanasia in 2018 with some conditions, allowing patients to withdraw medical support if they go into an irreversible coma.
Passive euthanasia is a matter of ‘living will’, and an adult in their conscious mind is permitted to refuse medical treatment or voluntarily decide not to take medical treatment to embrace death naturally, under certain conditions.
Individuals are only allowed to draft a living will while in a normal state of health and mind.
Active euthanasia remains illegal in India.

Article by: Jishnu J Raju

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Reader Interactions

February 11, 2016 at 3:48 pm

excellent one..

February 24, 2016 at 8:34 pm

Giving passive euthanasia to a patient who is already dead (not literally) is a right choice.Its better than making them as well as others to suffer.

July 20, 2017 at 4:28 pm

so very true.

July 1, 2016 at 10:58 pm

If the patient does not wants to suffer and himself asking for euthanasia then voluntary euthanasia should be made legal because it will be difficult for him to live than to die. But in case of involuntary euthanasia, there should be some specific time limit upto which the patient’s relatives must wait for him to recover but if there is no improvement like in case of coma , after 7-10 years , there is less chances of the patient to recover. In such cases , involuntary euthanasia should be made legal.

March 16, 2017 at 12:37 pm

no it is not possible If the patient tends to recover over a period of time or suddenly he becomes normal then the involuntary euthanasia will become very dangerous

March 16, 2017 at 12:35 pm

Very Very Useful

June 26, 2018 at 8:12 am

Helpful source I can use to rely on research. Thank you so much, clear IAS.

May 17, 2019 at 9:58 pm

Thanku for quality content

May 23, 2020 at 10:27 pm

“Mercy Killing ” is a responsible debate . It mainly depends on persons will on his /her life.

July 2, 2020 at 2:26 pm

Euthanasia should not be accepted as there is always some hope for better.

May 24, 2021 at 11:57 am

If under Article 21 of the constitution, right to live with dignity is inclusive of right to die with dignity, then why should the provisions under the Euthanasia act be restricted to the old and dying patients. There are a lot of people in their 60s and 70s with limited financial resources, who feel neglected / unwanted by the family who would like to die with dignity rather than be dependent on their children or the other members of family. They may be in good health but would still like to self determine to end their life with dignity. In such cases the law should allow for such people to adopt active Euthanasia. Such people could be persuaded to donate their organs which will help save other lives.

August 25, 2021 at 9:40 am

euthanasia cannot be legalised because of its higher probability of misuse. whether it is for property, money or because of any family problem

August 4, 2022 at 12:11 pm

A thought for all: If you do not have a choice to life, i.e. choose to be born then how can choosing your own means of death, be fair or valid? Something you cannot create or re-created is not yours to manage. My say: God is the giver of life and He alone should take it. Our sufferings are a means of learning, loving, understanding and above all our closeness to Almighty God.

June 28, 2023 at 6:36 pm

ur death is already written whether you take it or god does so doesnt matter

September 19, 2022 at 12:47 pm

I can’t put my dog to sleep for I am as old as he; and despite our handicaps he also wants to live like me.

Boghos L. Artinian

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Legalizing euthanasia or assisted suicide: the illusion of safeguards and controls

Euthanasia or assisted suicide—and sometimes both—have been legalized in a small number of countries and states. In all jurisdictions, laws and safeguards were put in place to prevent abuse and misuse of these practices. Prevention measures have included, among others, explicit consent by the person requesting euthanasia, mandatory reporting of all cases, administration only by physicians (with the exception of Switzerland), and consultation by a second physician.

The present paper provides evidence that these laws and safeguards are regularly ignored and transgressed in all the jurisdictions and that transgressions are not prosecuted. For example, about 900 people annually are administered lethal substances without having given explicit consent, and in one jurisdiction, almost 50% of cases of euthanasia are not reported. Increased tolerance of transgressions in societies with such laws represents a social “slippery slope,” as do changes to the laws and criteria that followed legalization. Although the initial intent was to limit euthanasia and assisted suicide to a last-resort option for a very small number of terminally ill people, some jurisdictions now extend the practice to newborns, children, and people with dementia. A terminal illness is no longer a prerequisite. In the Netherlands, euthanasia for anyone over the age of 70 who is “tired of living” is now being considered. Legalizing euthanasia and assisted suicide therefore places many people at risk, affects the values of society over time, and does not provide controls and safeguards.

1. INTRODUCTION

Euthanasia is generally defined as the act, undertaken only by a physician, that intentionally ends the life of a person at his or her request 1 , 2 . The physician therefore administers the lethal substance. In physician-assisted suicide ( pas ) on the other hand, a person self-administers a lethal substance prescribed by a physician.

To date, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg have legalized euthanasia 1 , 2 . The laws in the Netherlands and Luxembourg also allow pas . In the United States, the states of Oregon and Washington legalized pas in 1997 and 1999 respectively, but euthanasia remains illegal 3 . The situation in the state of Montana is currently unclear; a bill legalizing pas was passed by the state legislature in 2010, but was recently defeated by the state’s Senate Judiciary Committee.

In the Netherlands, euthanasia and pas were formally legalized in 2001 after about 30 years of public debate 1 . Since the 1980s, guidelines and procedures for performing and controlling euthanasia have been developed and adapted several times by the Royal Dutch Medical Association in collaboration with that country’s judicial system. Despite opposition, including that from the Belgian Medical Association, Belgium legalized euthanasia in 2002 after about 3 years of public discourse that included government commissions. The law was guided by the Netherlands and Oregon experiences, and the public was assured that any defects in the Dutch law would be addressed in the Belgian law. Luxembourg legalized euthanasia and pas in 2009. Switzerland is an exception, in that assisted suicide, although not formally legalized, is tolerated as a result of a loophole in a law dating back to the early 1900s that decriminalizes suicide. Euthanasia, however, is illegal 4 . A person committing suicide may do so with assistance as long as the assistant has no selfish motives and does not stand to gain personally from the death. Unlike other jurisdictions that require euthanasia or assisted suicide to be performed only by physicians, Switzerland allows non-physicians to assist suicide.

In all these jurisdictions, safeguards, criteria, and procedures were put in place to control the practices, to ensure societal oversight, and to prevent euthanasia and pas from being abused or misused 5 . Some criteria and procedures are common across the jurisdictions; others vary from country to country 5 , 6 . The extent to which these controls and safeguards have been able to control the practices and to avoid abuse merits closer inspection, particularly by jurisdictions contemplating the legalization of euthanasia and pas . The present paper explores the effectiveness of the safeguards and the “slippery slope” phenomenon.

2. SAFEGUARDS AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS

2.1. voluntary, written consent.

In all jurisdictions, the request for euthanasia or pas has to be voluntary, well-considered, informed, and persistent over time. The requesting person must provide explicit written consent and must be competent at the time the request is made. Despite those safeguards, more than 500 people in the Netherlands are euthanized involuntarily every year. In 2005, a total of 2410 deaths by euthanasia or pas were reported, representing 1.7% of all deaths in the Netherlands. More than 560 people (0.4% of all deaths) were administered lethal substances without having given explicit consent 7 . For every 5 people euthanized, 1 is euthanized without having given explicit consent. Attempts at bringing those cases to trial have failed, providing evidence that the judicial system has become more tolerant over time of such transgressions 5 .

In Belgium, the rate of involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia deaths (that is, without explicit consent) is 3 times higher than it is in the Netherlands 8 , 9 . (“Involuntary euthanasia” refers to a situation in which a person possesses the capacity but has not provided consent, and “non-voluntary euthanasia,” to a situation in which a person is unable to provide consent for reasons such as severe dementia or coma). A recent study found that in the Flemish part of Belgium, 66 of 208 cases of “euthanasia” (32%) occurred in the absence of request or consent 10 . The reasons for not discussing the decision to end the person’s life and not obtaining consent were that patients were comatose (70% of cases) or had dementia (21% of cases). In 17% of cases, the physicians proceeded without consent because they felt that euthanasia was “clearly in the patient’s best interest” and, in 8% of cases, that discussing it with the patient would have been harmful to that patient. Those findings accord with the results of a previous study in which 25 of 1644 non-sudden deaths had been the result of euthanasia without explicit consent 8 .

Some proponents of euthanasia contend that the foregoing figures are misrepresentative, because many people may have at some time in their lives expressed a wish for or support of euthanasia, albeit not formally. The counterargument is that the legal requirement of explicit written consent is important if abuse and misuse are to be avoided. After all, written consent has become essential in medical research when participants are to be subjected to an intervention, many of which pose far lesser mortality risks. Recent history is replete with examples of abuse of medical research in the absence of explicit informed consent.

2.2. Mandatory Reporting

Reporting is mandatory in all the jurisdictions, but this requirement is often ignored 11 , 12 . In Belgium, nearly half of all cases of euthanasia are not reported to the Federal Control and Evaluation Committee 13 . Legal requirements were more frequently not met in unreported cases than in reported cases: a written request for euthanasia was more often absent (88% vs. 18%), physicians specialized in palliative care were consulted less often (55% vs. 98%), and the drugs were more often administered by a nurse (41% vs. 0%). Most of the unreported cases (92%) involved acts of euthanasia, but were not perceived to be “euthanasia” by the physician. In the Netherlands, at least 20% of cases of euthanasia go unreported 7 . That number is probably conservative because it represents only cases that can be traced; the actual number may be as high as 40% 14 . Although reporting rates have increased from pre-legalization in 2001, 20% represents several hundred people annually.

2.3. Only by Physicians

The involvement of nurses gives cause for concern because all the jurisdictions, with the exception of Switzerland, require that the acts be performed only by physicians. In a recent study in Flanders, 120 nurses reported having cared for a patient who received life-ending drugs without explicit request 15 . Nurses performed the euthanasia in 12% of the cases and in 45% of the cases without explicit consent. In many instances, the physicians were absent. Factors significantly associated with a nurse administering the life-ending drugs included the nurse being a male working in a hospital and the patient being over 80 years of age.

2.4. Second Opinion and Consultation

All jurisdictions except for Switzerland require a consultation by a second physician to ensure that all criteria have been met before proceeding with euthanasia or pas . In Belgium, a third physician has to review the case if the person’s condition is deemed to be non-terminal. The consultant must be independent (not connected with the care of the patient or with the care provider) and must provide an objective assessment. However, there is evidence from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Oregon that this process is not universally applied 10 , 13 . In the Netherlands, for example, a consultation was not sought in 35% of cases of involuntary euthanasia 7 . In 1998 in the Netherlands, 25% of patients requesting euthanasia received psychiatric consultation; in 2010 none did 16 . Moreover, non-reporting seems to be associated with a lack of consultation by a second doctor 14 .

In Oregon, a physician member of a pro-assisted-suicide lobby group provided the consultation in 58 of 61 consecutive cases of patients receiving pas in Oregon 17 . This raises concerns about the objectivity of the process and the safety of the patients, and raises questions about the influence of bias on the part of these physicians on the process.

Networks of physicians trained to provide the consultation role when euthanasia is sought have been established in the Netherlands (Support and Consultation on Euthanasia in the Netherlands) and Belgium [Life End Information Forum ( leif )] 18 . Their role includes ensuring that the person is informed of all options, including palliative care. However, most leif physicians have simply followed a 24-hour theoretical course, of which only 3 hours are related to palliative care, hardly sufficient to enable a leif member to provide adequate advice on complex palliative care needs 19 . The development of expertise in palliative care, as in any other specialty, requires a considerable amount of time. In the United Kingdom, it involves a 4-year residency program, and in Australia and the United States, 3 years.

Oregon requires that a patient be referred to a psychiatrist or psychologist for treatment if the prescribing or consulting physician is concerned that the patient’s judgment is impaired by a mental disorder such as depression. In 2007, none of the people who died by lethal ingestion in Oregon had been evaluated by a psychiatrist or a psychologist 20 , despite considerable evidence that, compared with non-depressed patients, patients who are depressed are more likely to request euthanasia and that treatment for depression will often result in the patient rescinding the request 21 – 23 . In a study of 200 terminally ill cancer patients, for example, the prevalence of depressive syndromes was 59% among patients with a pervasive desire to die, but only 8% among patients without such a desire 21 . Despite that finding, many health professionals and family members of patients in Oregon who pursue pas generally do not believe that depression influences the choice for hastened death 24 .

A recent Oregon-based study demonstrated that some depressed patients are slipping through the cracks 25 . Among terminally ill patients who received a prescription for a lethal drug, 1 in 6 had clinical depression. Of the 18 patients in the study who received a prescription for the lethal drug, 3 had major depression, and all of them went on to die by lethal ingestion, but had been assessed by a mental health specialist.

There is evidence, therefore, that safeguards are ineffective and that many people who should not be euthanized or receive pas are dying by those means. Of concern, too, is the fact that transgressions of the laws are not prosecuted and that the tolerance level for transgressions of the laws has increased. Moreover, as the next section will explore, the boundaries of what constitutes “good” practices with respect to euthanasia and pas continue to change, and some of the current practices would just a few decades ago have been considered unacceptable in those jurisdictions that have legalized the practices.

3. THE “SLIPPERY SLOPE” ARGUMENT

The “slippery slope” argument, a complex legal and philosophical concept, generally asserts that one exception to a law is followed by more exceptions until a point is reached that would initially have been unacceptable. The “slippery slope” argument has, however, several interpretations 26 , some of which are not germane to the euthanasia discussion. The interpretations proposed by Keown in 2002 27 appear very relevant, however. He refers to these collectively as a “practical slippery slope,” although the term “social slippery slope” may be more applicable. The first interpretation postulates that acceptance of one sort of euthanasia will lead to other, even less acceptable, forms of euthanasia. The second contends that euthanasia and pas , which originally would be regulated as a last-resort option in only very select situations, could, over time, become less of a last resort and be sought more quickly, even becoming a first choice in some cases.

The circumvention of safeguards and laws, with little if any prosecution, provides some evidence of the social slippery slope phenomenon described by Keown 5 , 28 . Till now, no cases of euthanasia have been sent to the judicial authorities for further investigation in Belgium. In the Netherlands, 16 cases (0.21% of all notified cases) were sent to the judicial authorities in the first 4 years after the euthanasia law came into effect; few were investigated, and none were prosecuted 5 . In one case, a counsellor who provided advice to a non-terminally ill person on how to commit suicide was acquitted 29 . There has therefore been an increasing tolerance toward transgressions of the law, indicating a change in societal values after legalization of euthanasia and assisted suicide.

In the 1987 preamble to its guidelines for euthanasia, the Royal Dutch Medical Association had written “If there is no request from the patient, then proceeding with the termination of his life is [juristically] a matter of murder or killing, and not of euthanasia.” By 2001, the association was supportive of the new law in which a written wish in an advance directive for euthanasia would be acceptable, and it is tolerant of non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia 7 , 30 , 31 . However, basing a request on an advance directive or living will may be ethically problematic because the request is not contemporaneous with the act and may not be evidence of the will of the patient at the time euthanasia is carried out.

Initially, in the 1970s and 1980s, euthanasia and pas advocates in the Netherlands made the case that these acts would be limited to a small number of terminally ill patients experiencing intolerable suffering and that the practices would be considered last-resort options only. By 2002, euthanasia laws in neither Belgium nor the Netherlands limited euthanasia to persons with a terminal disease (recognizing that the concept of “terminal” is in itself open to interpretation and errors). The Dutch law requires only that a person be “suffering hopelessly and unbearably.” “Suffering” is defined as both physical and psychological, which includes people with depression. In Belgium, the law ambiguously states that the person “must be in a hopeless medical situation and be constantly suffering physically or psychologically.” By 2006, the Royal Dutch Medical Association had declared that “being over the age of 70 and tired of living” should be an acceptable reason for requesting euthanasia 32 . That change is most concerning in light of evidence of elder abuse in many societies, including Canada 33 , and evidence that a large number of frail elderly people and terminally ill patients already feel a sense of being burden on their families and society, and a sense of isolation. The concern that these people may feel obliged to access euthanasia or pas if it were to become available is therefore not unreasonable, although evidence to verify that concern is not currently available.

In Oregon, although a terminal illness with a prognosis of less than 6 months to live has to be present, intolerable suffering that cannot be relieved is not a basic requirement (again recognizing that the concept of “intolerable suffering” is in itself ambiguous). This definition enables physicians to assist in suicide without inquiring into the source of the medical, psychological, social, and existential concerns that usually underlie requests for assisted suicide. Physicians are required to indicate that palliative care is a feasible alternative, but are not required to be knowledgeable about how to relieve physical or emotional suffering.

Until 2001, the Netherlands allowed only adults access to euthanasia or pas . However, the 2001 law allowed for children aged 12–16 years to be euthanized if consent is provided by their parents, even though this age group is generally not considered capable of making such decisions 5 . The law even allows physicians to proceed with euthanasia if there is disagreement between the parents. By 2005, the Groningen Protocol, which allows euthanasia of newborns and younger children who are expected to have “no hope of a good quality of life,” was implemented 34 , 35 . In 2006, legislators in Belgium announced their intention to change the euthanasia law to include infants, teenagers, and people with dementia or Alzheimer disease 36 .

In Belgium, some critical care specialists have opted to ignore the requirement that, in the case of non-terminally-ill patients, an interval of 1 month is required from the time of a first request until the time that euthanasia is performed. One specialist reported that, in his unit, the average time from admission until euthanasia was performed for patients that seemed to be in a “hopeless” situation was about 3.5 days 37 . Beneficence, this specialist argued, was the overriding principle.

Initially, euthanasia in the Netherlands was to be a last-resort option in the absence of other treatment options. Surprisingly, however, palliative care consultations are not mandatory in the jurisdictions that allow euthanasia or assisted suicide, even though uncontrolled pain and symptoms remain among the reasons for requesting euthanasia or pas 38 . Requests by the Belgian palliative care community to include an obligatory palliative care consultation (“palliative filter”) were denied 19 . From 2002 to 2007 in Belgium, a palliative care physician was consulted (second opinion) in only 12% of all cases of euthanasia 31 . Palliative care physicians and teams were not involved in the care of more than 65% of cases receiving euthanasia. Moreover, the rates of palliative care involvement have been decreasing. In 2002, palliative care teams were consulted in 19% of euthanasia cases, but by 2007 such involvement had declined to 9% of cases. That finding contradicts claims that in Belgium, legalization has been accompanied by significant improvements in palliative care in the country 39 . Other studies have reported even lower palliative care involvement 8 , 13 . It must be noted that legalization of euthanasia or pas has not been required in other countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Ireland, France, and Spain, in which palliative care has developed more than it has in Belgium and the Netherlands.

The usefulness of a single palliative care assessment has been challenged—even when it is an obligatory requirement, as is the case at the University Hospital of the Canton of Vaud, Lausanne, Switzerland (the first hospital to allow, in 2005, assisted suicide in Switzerland 40 ) 41 . Among U.K. palliative care physicians, 63% feel that a single assessment is insufficient to fully evaluate and address the needs of a person requesting euthanasia or pas 42 . A similar number of U.K. psychiatrists have expressed similar concerns 43 , 44 , and only 6% of Oregon psychiatrists are comfortable providing consultations for patients requesting pas 45 .

Originally, it was the view of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, the Royal Dutch Medical Association, and the ministers of Justice and Health that euthanasia would not be an option in situations in which alternative treatments were available but the patient had refused them. When this view conflicted with the accepted ethical principle that patients are allowed to refuse a treatment option, the law was altered to allow access to euthanasia even if the person refused another available option such as palliative or psychiatric care. One consequence of the change is that, the appropriateness of suicide prevention programs may begin to be questioned, because people wanting to commit suicide should, on the basis of autonomy and choice, have the same rights as those requesting euthanasia.

There are other examples that a “social slippery slope” phenomenon does indeed exist. In Switzerland in 2006, the university hospital in Geneva reduced its already limited palliative care staff (to 1.5 from 2 full-time physicians) after a hospital decision to allow assisted suicide; the community-based palliative care service was also closed (JP. Unpublished data). Of physicians in the Netherlands, 15% have expressed concern that economic pressures may prompt them to consider euthanasia for some of their patients; a case has already been cited of a dying patient who was euthanized to free a hospital bed 46 . There is evidence that attracting doctors to train in and provide palliative care was made more difficult because of access to euthanasia and pas , perceived by some to present easier solutions, because providing palliative care requires competencies and emotional and time commitments on the part of the clinician 47 , 48 . At the United Kingdom’s parliamentary hearings on euthanasia a few years ago, one Dutch physician asserted that “We don’t need palliative medicine, we practice euthanasia” 49 . Compared with euthanasia cases, cases without an explicit request were more likely to have a shorter length of treatment of the terminal illness 10 .

Advocates of euthanasia have largely ignored these concerns about the “social slippery slope” and have opted to refute the “slippery slope” argument on the basis that legalizing euthanasia and pas has not led to exponential increases in cases of euthanasia or pas or in a disproportionate number of vulnerable persons being euthanized 7 , 26 , 30 . However, there is evidence that challenges those assertion.

The number of deaths by euthanasia in Flanders has doubled since 1998 30 . Of the total deaths in this Flemish-speaking part of Belgium (population 6 million), 1.1%, 0.3%, and 1.9% occurred by euthanasia in 1998, 2001, and 2007 respectively 30 (about 620, 500, and 1040 people respectively in those years). The requirement of the law to report euthanasia cases (aided by laxity in prosecuting cases that fall outside the requirement) may explain some, but not all, of the increase 31 . Chambaere et al. 10 reported in the Canadian Medical Association Journal that in Belgium, euthanasia without consent had decreased from 3.2% in 1998 to 1.8% in 2007. But a closer review of the original study shows that the rate had declined to 1.5% in 2001 and then increased again to 1.8% in 2007 30 .

In Holland, the overall rate of euthanasia was 1.7% of all deaths in 2005, down from 2.4% and 2.6% in 2001 and 1995 respectively, but no different from 1990 when the rate was 1.7% 7 . However, the Dutch government’s official statistics indicate a rise of 13% in 2009 compared with 2008; euthanasia now accounts for 2% of all deaths. Given the increasing numbers, interest in developing facilities that provide euthanasia (similar to those of the Swiss pro–assisted suicide group Dignitas) has recently been increasing. In Oregon, although the number of cases of pas remain very small relative to the population, the rate has been increasing: 24 prescriptions were written in 1998 (16 of which led to deaths by pas ), 67 prescriptions in 2003 (43 of which led to deaths by pas ), and 89 in 2007 50 .

In Belgium, the rates of involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia have decreased; together they accounted for 3.2%, 1.5%, and 1.8% of all deaths in 1998, 2001, and 2007 respectively (1800, 840, and, 990 people respectively in those years) 30 . In the Netherlands, the rate decreased from 0.7% in 2001 to 0.4% in 2005 7 . The actual rate is probably higher, given the large number of unreported cases. Notwithstanding the decrease, the rates are perturbing.

Battin et al. 51 examined data from Oregon and the Netherlands and concluded, as have others 30 , that there was no evidence that vulnerable people, except for people with aids , are euthanized disproportionately more. “Vulnerable” was defined in that study as individuals who are elderly, female, uninsured, of low educational status, poor, physically disabled or chronically ill, younger than the age of majority, affected with psychiatric illnesses including depression, or of a racial or ethnic minority. Finlay and George challenged the study on the basis that vulnerability to pas or euthanasia cannot be categorized simply by reference to race, sex, or other socioeconomic status. Other characteristics, such as emotional state, reaction to loss, personality type, and the sense of being a burden are also important 52 . Patients are also vulnerable to the level of training and experience that their physicians have in palliative care and to the personal views of their physicians about the topic. For example, one study showed that the more physicians know about palliative care, the less they favour euthanasia and pas 53 .

Two recent studies further contradict the findings by Battin and colleagues. Chambaere et al. found that voluntary and involuntary euthanasia occurred predominantly among patients 80 years of age or older who were in a coma or who had dementia 10 . According to them, these patients “fit the description of vulnerable patient groups at risk of life-ending without request.” They concluded that “attention should therefore be paid to protecting these patient groups from such practices.” In another study, two of the factors significantly associated with a nurse administering life-ending drugs were the absence of an explicit request from the patient and the patient being 80 years of age or older 15 .

4. THE RESPONSE

What can be done, then, when the best of palliative care is unable to address suffering?

Zylicz, a palliative care specialist who has worked extensively in the Netherlands with people requesting euthanasia and pas , provides a taxonomy to understand the reasons underlying the requests and provides stepping stones for addressing the requests. The requests can be classified into five categories (summarized by the abbreviation abcde ) 54 :

Being afraid of what the future may hold
Experiencing burnout from unrelenting disease
Having the wish and need for control
Experiencing depression
Experiencing extremes of suffering, including refractory pain and other symptoms

Strategies are available to begin to address severe refractory symptoms, to treat depression, and to deal with the fear that some people have of what the future with a terminal disease may hold. Approximately 10%–15% of pain and other physical symptoms (such as dyspnea and agitated delirium) cannot be controlled with first- and second-line approaches and become refractory. For these symptoms, there is the option of palliative sedation. Palliative sedation is defined as “the monitored use of medications intended to induce a state of decreased or absent awareness (unconsciousness) in order to relieve the burden of otherwise intractable suffering in a manner that is ethically acceptable to the patient, family and health-care providers in patients that are imminently dying” 55 . Its intent is not to hasten death, which differentiates it from euthanasia. The goal is to achieve comfort at the lowest dose of sedative possible (usually with midazolam infusion, not with opioids) and at the lightest level of sedation. Some patients therefore achieve comfort at light levels of sedation, allowing them to continue interacting with family; in others, comfort is achieved only at deep levels of sedation.

Studies have shown that losing a sense of dignity and hope and taking on a sense of burden prompt some people to seek euthanasia and pas 21 – 23 , 56 . Strategies to improve the sense of dignity, based on empirical studies that have explored the concept of dignity within palliative care, have been shown to work 57 . Similar strategies need to be developed in the areas of hope and burden.

Given effective palliation, including palliative sedation for patients with refractory symptoms, the only remaining issue is that of legalizing “on-demand” euthanasia and pas when there is no terminal disease or when the person is tired of living or has a mental illness. Legalizing euthanasia and assisted suicide in these circumstances is most concerning and would have major implications over time, including changing a society’s values and making suicide prevention programs redundant because people wishing to commit suicide would then be entitled to do so.

In 30 years, the Netherlands has moved from euthanasia of people who are terminally ill, to euthanasia of those who are chronically ill; from euthanasia for physical illness, to euthanasia for mental illness; from euthanasia for mental illness, to euthanasia for psychological distress or mental suffering—and now to euthanasia simply if a person is over the age of 70 and “tired of living.” Dutch euthanasia protocols have also moved from conscious patients providing explicit consent, to unconscious patients unable to provide consent. Denying euthanasia or pas in the Netherlands is now considered a form of discrimination against people with chronic illness, whether the illness be physical or psychological, because those people will be forced to “suffer” longer than those who are terminally ill. Non-voluntary euthanasia is now being justified by appealing to the social duty of citizens and the ethical pillar of beneficence. In the Netherlands, euthanasia has moved from being a measure of last resort to being one of early intervention. Belgium has followed suit 37 , and troubling evidence is emerging from Oregon specifically with respect to the protection of people with depression and the objectivity of the process.

The United Nations has found that the euthanasia law in the Netherlands is in violation of its Universal Declaration of Human Rights because of the risk it poses to the rights of safety and integrity for every person’s life. The UN has also expressed concern that the system may fail to detect and to prevent situations in which people could be subjected to undue pressure to access or to provide euthanasia and could circumvent the safeguards that are in place.

Autonomy and choice are important values in any society, but they are not without limits. Our democratic societies have many laws that limit individual autonomy and choice so as to protect the larger community. These include, among many others, limits on excessive driving speeds and the obligation to contribute by way of personal and corporate income taxes. Why then should different standards on autonomy and choice apply in the case of euthanasia and pas ?

Legislators in several countries and jurisdictions have, in just the last year, voted against legalizing euthanasia and pas in part because of the concerns and evidence described in this paper. Those jurisdictions include France, Scotland, England, South Australia, and New Hampshire. They have opted to improve palliative care services and to educate health professionals and the public.

6. CONFLICT OF INTEREST DISCLOSURES

The author has no financial conflict of interest to declare.

7. REFERENCES

IMAGES

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Euthanasia should be legalized because you are allowing someone that is living with pain to finally achieve some tranquility, it is saving the family from prolonged emotional hardship, and giving a struggling patient some type of quality of life. Don't use plagiarized sources. Get your custom essay on. Euthanasia is the painless killing of a ...
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Therefore, euthanasia should be legalized. Mercy killing of such people will be like doing them kindness, after their content lives and saving them from going through living torture. As it is better to have a short,happy and content life as opposed to a long one full of sufferings. Today is the era of cut throat competition.

Why we should make euthanasia legal

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